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ABSTRACT
This thesis seeks to investigate the impact of the 
decisions of the International Court of Justice on third 
parties from the perspective of the general and specific 
guarantees available for the protection of their interests 
under the Court's Statute. In the first chapter, the 
general protection extended to third parties is considered 
from the viewpoint of the general principle of the relative 
effect of judicial decisions, their value as building 
blocks of the Court's jurisprudence and their role as a 
subsidiary legal source.
The second and third chapters are devoted to a 
critical analysis of the nature, scope, effect and 
conditions for the operation of the specific third party 
guarantees, namely, intervention for the purpose of the 
protection of the interest of a third party and 
intervention when the construction of a convention is in 
issue in a pending case.
The fourth chapter examines the position of third 
parties in relation to the Court's advisory jurisdiction by 
considering the nature and effect of advisory opinions, by 
defining and identifying "third parties" in the context of 
the advisory procedure, by assessing the nature and extent 
of their participation in advisory proceedings and by 
undertaking a brief empirical survey of the impact of 
advisory opinions on them.
Finally, some of the principal observations are
2
rrecapitulated and suggestions for improving and 
strengthening the third party safeguards, which have been 
explored, are offered.
The main conclusion of this study is that in the final 
analysis the utility of the various third party safeguards 
considered, lies both in a liberal interpretation of the 
conditions governing their operation and in full 
participation by interested parties in contentious and 
advisory proceedings.
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INTRODUCTION
The position of third parties before the International 
Court of Justice is a subject which has attracted 
relatively little attention. Indeed, the neglect of this 
subject1 is in part probably a result of the sense of 
complacency generated by the protection which the operation 
in international adjudication of the principle of the 
relative effect of judicial decisions is believed to afford 
to third parties. The adequacy of such an important 
technical and formal protection appears to be doubtful when 
viewed against the operation of the doctrine of judicial 
precedents, whether masked under the notion of the 
consistency of jurisprudence, or under any other guise and 
the role of judicial decisions as a subsidiary means for 
determining rules of law to be applied by the Court.
The foregoing considerations represent only one of the 
main strands of the subject of this study, another aspect 
of which relates to intervention, that incidental 
procedural device which involves the interposition of a 
third party, a stranger to the principal proceedings, to 
protect its interests. The Statute of the Court provides 
for two different forms of intervention by states which are
This subject forms part of international procedure 
which has for long been regarded as "the Antarctica of 
international law”.
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not from the outset concerned in a suit brought before the 
Court. As regards the first type of intervention, a state 
which considers that its legal interest may be affected by 
the decision in a pending case may apply to be permitted to 
intervene. The fate of such an application rests entirely 
with the Court. As regards the second kind of 
intervention, whenever the construction of a convention 
arises in a case before the Court, states other than the 
parties to the proceedings which are parties to the
convention have a right to intervene in the case. A state 
which exercises this right is bound by the construction of 
the convention contained in the judgment.
For a very long time, state practice regarding 
intervention has been relatively sparse. Consequently, 
there was scant judicial authority and comparatively little 
academic discussion on the nature and scope of the
institution of intervention. However, the last two decades 
witnessed a dramatic change in this situation, with a
resurgence of practical and theoretical interest in the 
institution of intervention. Attempts by states to 
intervene in pending proceedings gave the Court ample 
opportunity to clarify the law on the procedure of
intervention in the context of actual litigation in 
accordance with the decision taken nearly 70 years ago to 
resolve matters as they arose. The Court*s response to 
attempts at intervention is bound to create expectations 
for the future and thus have significant implications for 
states contemplating recourse to intervention. Whether and 
to what effect the opportunity represented by the recent
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renewal of practical interest in the institution of 
intervention has been utilised by the Court, remains to be 
discovered.
It may seem strange to speak of "third parties” in 
relation to the advisory function which the Court performs 
as the judicial arm of the United Nations, since, in 
advisory proceedings, there are, technically speaking, no 
parties and no binding decisions. However, in terms of 
access to the Court, the conduct of the proceedings and the 
effect of advisory opinions, the participants in advisory 
proceedings may be regarded as "third parties". Moreover, 
the fact that the Court does not treat the legal advice it 
proffers as confidential, but insists on following a 
judicial procedure even in rendering advisory opinions, 
amounts to a recognition that such opinions are of interest 
to actors other than the requesting organs or bodies who 
may be considered as "third parties". Given that the 
advisory jurisdiction is not based on the consent of 
states, an advisory opinion may be rendered despite the 
opposition of interested "third parties". The Statute of 
the Court provides certain procedural safeguards for "third 
parties" which enable them to play an amicus curiae role in 
advisory proceedings. In appropriate circumstances, the 
Court may assimilate its advisory procedure to that 
followed in contentious proceedings. In addition to 
ascertaining the influence of advisory opinions on the work 
of the requesting organs or bodies, we shall enquire into 
whether these procedural guarantees and the non-binding 
character of the opinions are sufficient to protect the
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rights and interests of other "third parties".
In the first chapter, we shall examine the nature of 
judicial decisions and the scope and limits of the 
principle of the relative effect of judicial decisions in 
relation to third parties. It will be shown that the 
limitations sought to be placed on the Court's ability to 
follow the doctrine of judicial precedents have neither 
affected the place of judicial decisions in the Court's 
jurisprudence, nor prevented them from contributing 
significantly to the development of international law. The 
purpose of the chapter is to show that by contributing to 
the development of the law, judicial decisions undoubtedly 
affect the rights and interests of third parties, whatever 
else may be claimed for the principle of the relative 
effect of such decisions in international practice.
While the principle of the relative effect of judicial 
decisions may possibly protect third parties from the 
binding effect of the Court's decisions, they do not and 
cannot prevent such rights or interests from being 
affected. This is the proper role of the institution of 
intervention, with which we will be concerned in the next 
two chapters. We shall review the genesis of discretionary 
intervention, the conflicting policies associated with its 
exercise, the conditions governing its operation and its 
consequences. The role of the Court and the parties 
concerned will also be considered and the Court's approach 
to the resolution of related controversial issues will be 
critically analysed.
Enquiry in the third chapter will be directed towards
29
exploring the evolution and conditions necessary for the 
operation of intervention as of right, the extent, if any, 
of the discretion exercised by the Court in the matter of 
determining the admissibility of a declaration of 
intervention, and the effect of the Court*s judgment on a 
third state whose declaration of intervention has either 
been allowed or dismissed.
In the fourth chapter, we will describe the legal 
basis, nature and purposes of the advisory jurisdiction. 
"Third parties” will be defined and identified in relation 
to advisory proceedings. A consideration of the procedural 
safeguards available to "third parties” will be followed by 
a brief empirical assessment of the impact of advisory 
opinions on them.
The final chapter recalls, though not exhaustively, 
many of the principal deductions and projections that 
emerge from the discussion in the preceding chapters and 
the suggestions proffered.
In contrast to other studies, which have focused on 
one or other of the aspects of the subject, the present 
study seeks comprehensively to explore and analyse the 
objects, scope and limits of the third party procedural 
guarantees from various perspectives so as to attempt to 
assess their effectiveness and utility in safeguarding the 
rights and interests of third parties, as well as their 
future applicability. Suggestions for improvement will be 
offered in appropriate cases. It is hoped that the present 
study may help to increase awareness of the procedural 
protective devices available to third parties in
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proceedings before the International Court and related 
unresolved issues. By stimulating and provoking academic 
discussion of such outstanding matters, it is hoped that 
this study may make a modest contribution to knowledge on 
the subject of the position of third parties before the 
International Court.
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CHAPTER ONE 
GENERAL PROTECTION FOR THIRD PARTIES;
ARTICLES 59 AND 38(1)(dl OF THE STATUTE
1. Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is primarily to examine the 
nature of judicial decisions, especially those of the 
International Court of Justice,1 and ascertain the effect of 
such decisions on the litigants, that is the narrow circle of 
parties in particular, and third parties or states, and the 
development of international law in general. This will 
involve an analysis of the relevant provisions of the Statute 
and Rules of the Court,2 and their application in the 
jurisprudence of the Court. An attempt will be made to show 
that notwithstanding the apparent constraints placed on the 
Court*s authority to apply the doctrine of judicial precedent 
by Article 59 of the Statute, the Court has adopted the 
essence of that doctrine in nearly all its aspects. It will 
be shown in consequence that in spite of the qualification 
placed by Article 38(1)(d) of the Statute on judicial 
decisions in relation to the other elements of law to be
1 Hereinafter "the Court". For the purposes of this 
study, we shall treat the Permanent Court of International 
Justice (sometimes "the Permanent Court") and the-.* 
International Court of Justice (sometimes "the International 
Court") as one (the latter being the successor of the former) 
except where it is considered necessary to distinguish them.
2 Hereinafter "the Rules".
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applied by the Court, in practice it has elevated such 
decisions to the same status as treaties, custom and general 
principles of law. It is hoped to establish eventually that 
judicial decisions, regardless of the provisions of the 
Statute, have an effect and scope which extend far beyond the 
narrow circle of the parties, to the international community 
with significant implications for the shaping and moulding of 
international law.
2. Structure of a Judgment3
(a) Elements of the Judgment
The elements of the judgment4 with which we are here 
concerned include the operative provisions, the reasoning, 
separate or individual and dissenting opinions, as well as 
declarations. The two last-mentioned elements, in addition to 
their general contribution to the development of international 
law, by explaining more fully the vexed issues relating to the 
various forms of intervention permissible under the Statute of 
the Court other than the judgments of the Court as a whole, 
have greatly aided our understanding of such issues, the
3 This also includes advisory opinions, but the subject 
of advisory opinions is dealt with in another part of this 
work; see Chapter 4, below.
4 See Articles 59 and 38(1) (d) of the Statute of the 
Court. The Statute is reprinted in, e.g., I. Brownlie, Basic 
Documents in International Law. 3rd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1983), 387-404 (hereinafter “Basic Documents”): T.B.
Millar (ed.) with R. Ward, Current International Treaties (New 
York: New York University Press, 1984), 129-45 (hereinafter
“Treaties”); S . Rosenne, (comp. and ed.), Documents on the
International Court of Justice (Leiden: A.W. Sijthoff, 1974),
59-89 (hereinafter “Documents”).
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clarification of which the Court itself has until recently 
consistently and consciously evaded.
In accordance with a decision taken in 1948 the Court 
reads and approves the summary which precedes each judgment, 
advisory opinion and sometimes order.5 The status of headnote 
does not appear in either the resolution on the internal 
judicial practice adopted on 12 April 1976 or Article 95 of 
the Rules of Court adopted on 14 April 1978.6 Paragraph 1 of 
Article 95 of the Rules lays down that the judgment shall 
indicate:
(i) whether it is rendered by the Court as a whole or a 
Chamber thereof;
(ii) the date on which it is read;
(iii) the names of the participating judges;
(iv) the names of the parties and their representatives, that 
is agents, counsel and advocates;
(v) a summary of the proceedings;
(vi) submissions of the parties;
(vii) a statement of the facts;
(viii) the reasons in point of law;
(ix) the operative provisions of the judgment;
(x) the decision, if any, in regard to costs;
(xi) the number and names of the judges constituting the
5 See S. Rosenne, Procedure in the International Court: 
A Commentary on the 1978 Rules of the International Court of 
Justice (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1983), 198 
(hereinafter "Procedure".)
6 See ibid.
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majority; and
(xii) a statement as to the text of the judgment which is 
authoritative.7
(b) The Operative Provisions of the Judgment 
The term "decision" in legal terminology is used in a 
broad sense to refer to the whole of the judgment. When used 
in a narrow sense, however, the term is normally assumed to 
imply the operative provisions of the judgment. Article 59 of 
the Statute of the Court which is not infrequently interpreted 
as affording protection and respect for the rights and 
interests of states other than those which are parties to the 
case before the Court, uses the term "decision" instead of 
"judgment".8 The only other instances of the use of the terms
7 Parties to a case before the Court may choose to 
conduct the case in either French or English, the two official 
languages. Judgment is rendered in the language in which the 
parties have agreed to conduct the case. Should the parties 
fail to agree on the choice of language each of them may 
employ the language of its preference in its pleadings in 
which case the Court will deliver its judgment in both 
languages, and determine which of the two texts will be 
considered authoritative. Though the Court approves both 
texts of its judgment, owing to the speed with which they are 
prepared and the problems encountered in rendering technical 
legal texts from one language to another, the version of the 
judgment or individual dissenting opinion which is not the 
authoritative text should be used with care. See on this 
point, S. Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the International 
Court. 2nd rev. ed. (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
1985), 600 (hereinafter "Law and Practice".) See Statute, 
Article 39.
8 Cf. Articles 56-8 and 60-1 of the Statute which also 
employ the term "judgment". Article 94(1) of the Charter of 
the United Nations (which is reprinted in e.g. Brownlie, Basic 
Documents, 1-34? Millar, Treaties. 94-128; Rosenne, 
Documents, 1-57) uses the term "decision", while paragraph 2 
of the same Article employs the term "judgment". It does not
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"decision" or "decisions" may be found in Articles 62 and
38(1) (d) respectively. The operative provisions are that part 
of the judgment which carries out the main object thereof. 
They are also known as the dispositif.9 No matter the term 
or word used, the operative provisions are couched in terms of 
a decision.10 As a matter of strict law, it is only the
dispositif of the decision or judgment which has binding
force.11 The expression "to implement the decision" was
defined by the Court in the Interhandel Case (Preliminary 
Objections) as "to apply its operative part".12 In the ILQ 
Administrative Tribunal Case, the Court defined the Tribunal*s 
decision as "the operative part of its judgment on a given 
point and not the grounds of decision invoked by that 
Tribunal".13 Where necessary the Court may vote on each 
operative provision of a judgment separately.14
seem unreasonable to infer from this that the obligations 
imposed on the parties to a case are contained in the 
decision, that is, the operative part of the judgment.
9 See E. William, A. Jowitt and C. Walsh, Jowitt * s 
Dictionary of English Law. 2nd ed., J. Burke (ed.), 2 vols. 
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1977), s.v. "Dispositif", 
"Judgment", "Operative part" (hereinafter "Jowitt").
10 See Rosenne, Law and Practice. 601.
11 See E.M. Hambro, "Intervention under Article 63 of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice", 14 CS (1975)
(hereinafter "Intervention"), 387. Also see id., "The Reasons 
Behind the Decisions of the International Court of Justice", 
7 CLP (1954), 212 at 214 (hereinafter "Reasons").
12 See ICJ Reports 1959, 28.
13 See ibid. 1956, 4 at 8.
14 See Rosenne, Law and Practice. 601.
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(c) The Reasons in Point of Lav
The stipulation that the judgment shall state, among 
other things, the reasons in point of law contained in Article 
95(1) of the Rules is meant to give effect to Article 56 of 
the Statute which enjoins the Court to state the reasons on 
which the judgment is based. In other words, the Statute 
requires that the judgment be motivated. In the UN 
Administrative Tribunal Case, the Court considered this 
statutory requirement as one of the provisions necessary to 
establish the judicial character of an organ endowed with 
authority to make decisions with binding force.15
The Arbitral Award Case16 provided the Court with 
another occasion to express itself on this statutory 
requirement. Answering the contention that the Award was a 
nullity on grounds of alleged inadequacy of reasons in support 
of the conclusions reached by the Arbitrator, the Court, 
having examined the Award in question, found that it dealt in 
logical order and in some detail with all relevant 
considerations and that it contained ample reasoning and 
explanation in support of the conclusions reached by the 
Arbitrator.
While the operative part has binding force,17 it is the 
reasoning behind the judgment which creates law in a broader
15 See ICJ Reports 1954, 47 at 52.
16 See ibid. 1960, 192 at 216.
17 See Hambro, "Intervention", 392-3; id., "Reasons",
214.
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sense and contributes to the clarification and development of 
international law which is notoriously imprecise, fragmentary, 
uncertain and controversial.18
The reasons in point of law (or the reasoning) usually 
contain the legal rules and principles by means of which the 
conclusion is reached. The accumulation of reasons in point 
of law over a period of time constitutes the jurisprudence of 
the Court. This probably explains the tendency of the Court 
to refer frequently to "the jurisprudence".19
The value of the reasoning contained in judicial 
decisions as a source of law has received recognition in 
Article 38(1)(d) of the Statute, which directs the Court to 
apply, subject to Article 59, judicial decisions amongst 
others as subsidiary means for determination of rules of law. 
Rosenne, in explaining the apparent contradiction between the 
use of judicial decisions as precedents and Article 59, wrote 
that the decision which was only binding on the parties to a 
particular case was found in the operative clauses of the
18 See Hambro, "Intervention" 392-3; id., "Reasons" 214;
M. Virally, "Sources of International Law" (hereinafter 
"Virally"), Manual of Public International Law, ed. M. 
Sorensen (London: Macmillan & Co., 1968), 150.
19 See ICJ Reports 1982, 23; ibid. 1969, 4 at 53,
para.101(c)(i); ibid. 1985, 13 at 40-1, para.49. For similar 
references to jurisprudence, see ibid., 35, para.40, 45,
para.58; ibid. 1982, 78, para.132. The Court has also
referred to "international case-law", see e.g., ICJ Reports 
1984, 294, para.95, 295, para.100, 298, para.108; "decided - 
cases", see e.g., ibid., 297-8, para.107; and "case-law", see 
e.g., ibid., 208-9, para.143. See further L. Gross, "Some 
Observations on the International Court of Justice", 56 AJIL 
(1962), 33 at 43; J.N. Saxena, "The Court Without a Case", 12 
JILI (1970), 676 at 688 (hereinafter "Saxena").
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judgment, while "The Court's reasoning - its statement of what 
it regards as the correct legal position and why - enters into 
the general storehouse of public international law." This, in 
his view, accounts for the fact that decisions of the 
International Court have become one of the most important 
repertoires for the rules of international law and one of the 
law's most powerful instruments for adaptation to the 
constantly changing conditions.20
(d) Individual and Dissenting Opinions21
We may deduce from the foregoing analysis of the first 
two elements of a judgment that its operative provisions, 
which are in the nature of things usually addressed 
specifically to the actual case before the Court,22 are 
binding on the parties to the instant case and in that case 
alone. The truth of this proposition must necessarily be 
qualified by the fact that the conclusions from which the 
operative provisions stem are themselves firmly rooted in the 
legal principles and rules embodied in the reasoning which 
forms part of the jurisprudence of the Court in particular,
20 See S. Rosenne, The World Court. 3rd rev.ed. (Leiden: 
A.W.Sijthoff, 1973; Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana
Publications, 1973) , 98. This is the edition cited in the rest 
of this chapter. Cf. A.S. de Bustamante, The World Court. 
(New York: Macmillan Co., 1925), 241, para.225 (hereinafter
"de Bustamante").
21 See generally, I. Hussain, Dissenting and Separate 
Opinions at the World Court (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1984) (hereinafter "Hussain").
22 See ICJ Reports 1985, 43, para.55.
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and of international case law or judicial practice in general, 
which in turn binds third parties.
It might appear that disproportionate attention has been 
devoted in this study to an examination of the role of 
separate and dissenting opinions, considering their marginal 
status in relation to the judgments and the apparent lack of 
any obvious connection between the subject of this study and 
the part they play in the jurisprudence of the Court. There 
are very good reasons why we do not share these views. Not 
only do the separate and dissenting opinions form a 
peripheral, albeit important part of the individual majority 
decisions to which they relate, but they also form a part of 
the whole of the Court's jurisprudence. They have been said 
to be more revelatory of the sources of law than the majority, 
decisions themselves.23 If there is one subject which the 
Court has until recently persistently refused to face 
squarely, but which has been thoroughly explored by individual 
judges in their separate and dissenting opinions,24 that 
subject is discretionary intervention which will be considered 
in the next chapter. Indeed, the contribution of such
23 See R.D. Kearney, "Sources of Law and the International 
Court of Justice", in L. Gross (ed.), The Future of the 
International Court of Justice. Vol.2 (Dobbs Ferry, New York: 
Oceana Publications, 1976) (hereinafter "Future of the 
Court"), 615 (hereinafter "Kearney"). See also Rosenne, Law 
and Practice. 597.
24 See C.M. Chinkin, "Third Party Intervention Before the 
International Court of Justice", 80 AJIL (1986), 495 at 522 
(hereinafter "Chinkin"); P.C. Jessup, "Intervention in the 
International Court", 75 AJIL (1981), 903 (hereinafter 
"Jessup").
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opinions to the illumination of the controversial issues 
regarding intervention mainly, though by no means solely, 
accounts for the considerable emphasis which we have placed on 
the treatment of the role of individual opinions in the 
Court's jurisprudence.
Pursuant to Article 57 of the Statute, which permits any 
judge who does not share the opinion of the majority to 
deliver a separate opinion, Article 95(2) of the Rules allows 
a judge who so desires to append his individual opinion to 
the judgment, whether he dissents from the majority or not.25
In 1948 the Court decided that the opinion of a judge who 
disagreed with a judgment or advisory opinion should be called 
a dissenting opinion, while a separate opinion delivered by a 
judge who supported the operative part, the view of the 
majority but not its reasons, should be called an individual 
opinion.26 In practice these proposed labels appear to have 
been ignored by many judges with the result that the English 
version of concurring opinions have been called separate 
opinions while the French texts have been styled "opinions 
individuels".27 Article 95(2) of the 1978 Rules provides
25 The provisions of this paragraph also apply to orders 
made by the Court.
26 See ICJYB 1947-8, 68.
27 See Rosenne, Procedure. 197-8; F. Jhabvala, "The Scope 
of Individual Opinions in the World Court", 13 NYIL (1982), 
46-8 (hereinafter "Scope of Individual Opinions"). On 
separate and dissenting opinions see further, R.P. Anand, "The 
Role of Individual and Dissenting Opinions in International 
Adjudication", 14 ICLO (1965), 788-807 (hereinafter 
"Individual and Dissenting Opinions") ? M.O. Hudson, "The 28th 
Year of the World Court", 44 AJIL (1950), 20; E.M. Hambro,
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that a judge who wishes to record his concurrence or dissent 
without stating his reasons may do so in the form of a 
declaration.28
3. The Impact of the Judgment
The preceding analysis of the component parts of a 
judgment of the Court has served to bring out clearly the 
different functions which they perform as regards the effect 
of the judgment as a whole. We shall now turn to an
"Dissenting and Individual Opinions in the International Court 
of Justice", 17 ZAORV (1956-7), 240-1, 243-4? L. Hand, The 
Bill of Rights. The Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures 1958 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958), 71-2; W.A.
Bowen, "Dissenting Opinions", 17 Green Bag (1905), 693; J.W. 
Sanders, "The Role of Dissenting Opinions in Louisiana", 23 
LLR (1963), 677? E.T. Lee, "Editorial Notes: Dissenting
Opinions", 2 JMLO (1936-7), 405? W.E. Hirt, "In the Matter of 
Dissent Inter Judices de Jure". 31 PBAO (1959-60), 258-9? G. 
Fitzmaurice, "The Law and Procedure of the International Court 
of Justice: General Principles of Substantive Law", 27 BYIL
(1950), 1-2 (hereinafter "27 BYIL (1950)")? id., "Hersch
Lauterpacht - The Scholar as Judge: Part 1", 37 BYIL (1961), 
1-72 (hereinafter "Hersch Lauterpacht"); C.E. Hughes, The 
Supreme Court of the United States (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1928), 68? R.G. Simmons, "The Use and Abuse 
of Dissenting Opinions", 16 LLR (1956), 498? S. Rosenne, "Sir 
Hersch Lauterpacht1s Concept of the Task of the International 
Judge", 55 AJIL (1961), 852-3, 861? M. Politis, "How the
World Court Has Functioned", 4 FA (1926), 451? W.O. Douglas, 
"The Dissent: A Safeguard of Democracy", 32 JAJS (1948), 197? 
E.J. Cohn, "Citadelle der Freien Richterpersonlichkeit", 64 
Per Encrlische Gerichstaa (1958), cited in K.H. Nadelmann, "The 
Judicial Dissent: Publication v. Secrecy", 8 AJCL (1959),
430, n.128? H.F. Stone, "Dissenting Opinions Are Not Without 
Value", 26 JAJS (1942), 78? E. McWhinney, "The Legislative 
Role of the World Court in an Era of Transition" (hereinafter 
"McWhinney"), in Volkerrecht als Rechtsordnuna Internationale 
Gerichtsbarkeit Menschenrechte: Festschrift fur Hermann Mosler 
(Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1983) (hereinafter "Mosler
Collection"), 576.
28 On declarations see F. Jhabvala, "Declarations by 
Judges of the International Court of Justice", 72 AJIL (1978), 
830 (hereinafter "Declarations").
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investigation of the impact of the judgments of the Court in 
the light of the relevant provisions of the Statute and Rules, 
and their application in practice as well as the practice of 
states and the views of theorists of international law, so as 
to discover both the myth and the reality which lie behind the 
facade of the general safeguards provided by the Statute for 
the protection of the interests of third parties. Such an 
extensive and detailed investigation will not only help to 
place the issues with which we are here concerned in their 
true perspective, but it will also enable us to determine the 
adequacy or otherwise of the said general safeguards.
(a) Article 59 of the Statute
Article 59 of the Statute, which provides that "the 
decision of the Court has no binding force except between the 
parties and in respect of that particular case" has been 
interpreted in a number of ways in the jurisprudence of the 
Court, arbitral tribunals, state practice and the writings of 
publicists.
The text of Article 59 is exactly the same as that of its 
counterpart in the Statute of the Permanent Court. The 
wording of Article 59 resembles that of Article 84 of the 
First Hague Convention of 1907, which also had a negative 
formulation. In contrast to Article 59 of the Statute, 
Article 30 of the Model Rules of Arbitral Procedure, which 
incorporates both Article 59 and Article 94(2) of the 1978 
Rules, adopted a positive formula as follows: "Once rendered,
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the award shall be binding on the parties". It has been 
suggested that this formulation more accurately expresses the 
law.29
Article 59 is supplemented by Article 94(2) of the 1978
Rules, which provides that "the judgment shall be read at a
public sitting of the Court and shall become binding on the
parties on the day of the reading". Both these provisions
must be read in conjunction with Article 94 of the Charter of
the United Nations, according to whose terms each member
undertakes to comply with the decision of the Court in a case
to which it is a party. The Article further provides that:
If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations 
incumbent upon it under a judgment rendered by the Court, 
the other party may have recourse to the Security Council 
which may, if it deems necessary, make recommendations or 
decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the 
judgment.
It has however been suggested that the negative formula 
adopted in Article 59 is to be explained by the fact that the 
rule that the Court*s decision is binding upon the parties is 
laid down by Article 94 of the Charter.30 It is also
29 See Rosenne, Law and Practice. 619, n.2
30 See Virally, 149. It would appear that the framers 
of the Statute adopted this negative formula for Article 59 in 
order to avoid a repetition of that which is contained in the 
provisions of Article 94 of the UN Charter. As regards 
enforcement of judgments under Article 94 of the Charter, it 
may be noted that the US vetoed a Security Council resolution 
which would have required it to comply with the judgment 
handed down by the International Court concerning its dispute 
with Nicaragua. See Vol.32, KCA (Bristol: Keesing's
Publications, 1986), 34549. The position regarding the
enforcement of interim orders of protection is even less
clear, as they are, technically speaking, not judgments. See 
generally, V.S. Mani, "Interim Measures of Protection: 
Article 41 of the ICJ Statute and Article 94 of the Charter",
44
believed that Article 59 operates to confer on decisions of
the Court the authority of res judicata.31
The view that the drafting of the text of Article 59 of
the Statute leaves room for improvement and consequently that
it must be interpreted more liberally than its terms seem to
allow, finds some support in the jurisprudence and literature.
In considering the meaning of the phrase "in respect of that
particular case" embodied in that Article, an arbitral
tribunal, presided over by Verzijl, in the last phase of the
Lighthouses dispute between France and Greece, which had
previously been before the Permanent Court on two
occasions,32 after deciding that the dispute of which it was
seised was not distinct from that which was decided in 1937,
interpreted Article 59 thus:
One could moreover maintain also, arguing juridically, 
that the text of Article 59 is badly drafted, and that
10 IJIL (1970) , 359-72 (hereinafter "Interim Measures") ; J.B. 
Elkind, Interim Protection. A Functional Approach (The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1981). See also, Rosenne, The
World Court. 114. Also for an insight into the difficulties 
the Security Council might face with regard to carrying out 
Article 94(2) of the UN Charter, see L. Gross, "Treaty
Interpretation: The Proper Role of an International Tribunal", 
62-3 ASILP (1968-9), 109 (hereinafter "Treaty
Interpretation")., See further, ICJYB 1986-7, 165-6; 1987-8, 
153-4; 1988-9, 167-8; and 1989-90, 164-5.
31 See Virally, 149. Cf. the attitude of the Court in the 
South West Africa Cases (Second Phase), ICJ Reports 1966, 6, 
where preliminary issues which had been disposed of in an 
earlier judgment were reconsidered by the Court. See also R. 
Higgins, "The International Court and South West Africa: The 
Implications of the Judgment", 42 IA (1966), 580 (hereinafter 
"The Court and South West Africa").
32 See Lighthouses Case between France and Greece. PCIJ 
Series A/B. No.62, 4-60; Lighthouses in Crete and Samos. PCIJ 
Series A/B. No.71, 54-153.
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one must necessarily interpret it in a more liberal sense 
than its terms appear to justify. There is much to be
said in favour of this thesis. If it were true that the
judgment of the International Court is clothed with the 
authority of res judicata only in the case which has been 
decided, that would mean that if the lis concerns the 
interpretation of a clause of a treaty, the 
interpretation given could be used again in arguments in 
any future lis concerning the same clause of the treaty.
Such a result would not only be absurd, it would put
Article 59 in irreconcilable contradiction with the last 
sentence of Article 63 of the Statute. The res judicata 
extends in content beyond the limits of the case 
decided.33
Professor Guggenheim, as judge ad hoc for Liechtenstein 
in the Nottebohm Case (Second Phase) , observed that "the scope 
of the judicial decision extends beyond the effects provided 
for in Article 59 of the Statute".34 It has been observed 
that the Court itself has not apparently attempted to 
contradict this proposition but rather "to limit its 
application or potential application in a concrete case".35
In theory it would appear that both the Permanent Court 
and the International Court have adopted the doctrine of plain 
meaning in the interpretation of Article 59. This doctrine 
stresses the necessity of giving effect to the plain terms of 
a treaty or construing words according to their general and 
ordinary meaning or their natural significance and of not
33 See H. Lauterpacht (ed.), ILR 1956, No.23 (London:
Butterworth & Co., 1960), 82 at 86-7. See also Rosenne, Law
and Practice. 622, n.l.
34 See ICJ Reports 1955, 61.
35 See Rosenne, Law and Practice. 622, n.2. See
generally, ibid., 621-2.
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seeking aliunde for a meaning when the terms are clear.36
In the German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia Case, the 
Permanent Court stated the object of Article 59 as being ”to 
prevent legal principles accepted by the Court in a particular 
case from being binding upon other states or in other 
disputes".37 This statement does not appear to have been 
followed in the second phase of the Free Zones Case (Second 
Order), where the Court explained that it would be 
incompatible with the character of the judgments rendered by 
the Court to which binding force is attached by virtue of 
Article 59 and Article 63(2) of the Statute, to give a 
judgment which either of the parties might render inoperative. 
On the other hand, there seems to be nothing to prevent the 
Court from rendering a judgment by consent.38
The Court has explained that Article 59 rests on the 
assumption that the Court is at least able to render a binding 
decision in a matter connected with a title of jurisdiction 
and the subsistence of properly constituted proceedings. If 
the proceedings are not properly constituted the Court cannot 
give a decision binding on any state, either a third state 
whose interests constitute the real subject matter of the
36 See A. McNair, The Law of Treaties (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1961), 365.
37 The Court also added that Article 59 did not exclude 
purely declaratory iudcrments. ^  PCIJ Series A . No.7, 19, 
confirmed in Chorzow Factory Case (Interpretation^. PCIJ 
Series A . No.13, 20.
38 See PCIJ Series A . No.24, 14 confirmed in PCIJ Series 
A/B. No.46, 161.
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dispute or any of the parties.39
In the Temple Case (Preliminary Objections) the Court, 
alluding to the decision in the Aerial Incident Case, 
explained that the decision by reason of Article 59 was only 
binding qua decision as between the parties to that case and 
could not have any effect on Thailand. On the other hand, the 
Court distinguished carefully between the binding effect 
attributed to the decision, by Article 59, and the statement 
of what the Court considered had to be the correct legal 
position, and it examined the issue whether the legal position 
was relevant to the circumstances in the case before it.40
In the Northern Cameroons Case. the Court formally 
clarified the breadth of the scope of Article 59 by indicating 
that the judgment would not be binding on any other state not 
a party to the proceedings or on any organ of the United 
Nations.41
The Court clarified the position regarding declaratory 
judgments in the Northern Cameroons Case, where it considered 
it as indisputable that in an appropriate case it may make a 
declaratory judgment and implied the basic condition as being 
that if the declaratory judgment expounds a rule of customary
39 See Case of the Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 
(Italy v. France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland and the United States of America), ICJ Reports 1954, 
33-4 (hereinafter "Monetary Gold Case”). See also Rosenne, 
Law and Practice. 620.
40 See ICJ Reports 1961, 27.
41 See ICJ Reports 1963, 33. Cf. Rosenne, Law and
Practice. 621, n.l.
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law or interprets a treaty which remains in force, the 
judgment should have a continuing applicability. The Court 
stressed what it called the forward reach of the judgment as 
establishing once and for all, and with binding force as 
between the parties, a legal position which cannot again be 
called into question in so far as the legal effects ensuing 
therefrom are concerned.42 In 198443 the Court explained 
that a third state could either choose to rely on the 
protection which Article 59 provides, or to intervene under 
Article 62 of the Statute.44
In adhering to the doctrine of plain meaning, the Court 
has consistently declared that the effect of its decision is 
restricted to a narrow circle of parties and therefore is res 
inter alios acta vis-a-vis third states. Similarly, the 
effect of the decision is confined to the case decided and at 
least formally cannot be invoked in future cases. The res 
judicata effect of the decision is reinforced by Article 60 of 
the Statute which provides that the judgment shall be final 
and subject to no appeal. An application may, however, be 
made for the interpretation or, providing certain conditions
42 See ICJ Reports 1963, 37.
43 See Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriva/Malta: Application by Italy for Permission to 
Intervene. ICJ Reports 1984, 26, para.42 (hereinafter "Italian 
Intervention Case'M .
44 The Court subsequently drew attention to the protection 
which Article 59 of the Statute affords to third parties. See 
ibid. 1986, 25-6, para.21; 554 at 577-588, para.46, 579,
paras.49, 50.
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are fulfilled, revision of the judgment.45 In reality, it is 
difficult to square the Court's utterances with its practice 
regarding Article 59.
(b) Article 59 and the Doctrine of Stare Decisis
Our examination of judicial pronouncements concerning 
Article 59 of the Statute would seem to point to the 
conclusion that the World Court strives to observe both the 
letter and the spirit of that provision. Indeed, one would be 
forgiven for believing on the strength of such dicta that the 
impact of the Court's decisions is confined to the actual 
cases decided and the parties to them. The following survey 
of the Court's practice with respect to Article 59 will, 
however, reveal that the judicial remarks already examined do 
not tell the whole story, and that as a rule the Court pays 
lip service to the express prohibition contained in that 
provision with the result that the impact of judicial 
decisions extends to third parties.
Common lawyers regard judicial decisions as an 
authoritative source of law. This probably explains why 
common law is also known as judge-made law. Conversely, civil 
lawyers tend to look upon such decisions as binding judgments 
between parties to a particular dispute. In theory they 
therefore do not regard judicial decisions as a source of law 
applicable to the body politic as a whole, nor do they
45 See Articles 60 and 61 of the Statute.
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recognise the common law doctrine of stare decisis.46 While 
the common law adopts the pragmatic and practical approach 
based on former judicial experience, the civil law relies on 
abstract reasoning from general principles.47
Article 59 is identical to Article 5 of the French Civil 
Code which forbids judges to lay down rules of general 
application to govern future cases.48
The positivist doctrine in international law has 
interpreted Article 59 as constituting a limitation on the 
power of judicial precedents in the international sphere, for 
the reason that international tribunals owe their very 
existence and such jurisdictional powers as they possess to 
the will of states whose sovereignty will be impaired by 
raising judicial decisions to the authority of a source of
46 See to the same effect, M.K. Nawaz, "Other Sources of 
International Law: Are Judicial Decisions of the
International Court of Justice a Source of International 
Law?", 19 IJIL (1979), 526 (hereinafter "Nawaz"). Also see 
generally, A. Chayes, "A Common Lawyer Looks at International 
Law", 78 HLR (1965) 1396-1413; A.O. Adede, "International Law 
from a Common Law Perspective: A Second Look", 60 BULR (1980)
46-76 (hereinafter "Adede"); M. Zander, The Law-Making 
Process, 3rd ed. (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1989), 179-
224, 271-80, 293-369 (hereinafter "Zander").
47 See H. Lauterpacht, "The So-Called Anglo-American and 
Continental Schools of Thought in International Law", 12 
BYIL (1931), 31 at 52, 56 (hereinafter "Schools of Thought"); 
see also, id., The Development of International Law bv the 
International Court (London: Stevens & Sons, 1958), 69
(hereinafter ”Deve1ooment").
48 Cf. Sir Maurice Sheldon Amos and F.P. Walton, 
Introduction to French Law. 3rd ed. by F.H. Lawson A.E. Anton, 
L. Neville Brown (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967), 9- 
12; Zander, 218-21.
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law.49
Though it has been argued that Article 59 does not amount 
to an adoption of the civil law position concerning judicial 
precedents,50 there is some support for the view that the 
idea of incorporating some elements of civil law into the 
Statute of the Permanent Court and the International Court was 
not entirely absent from the minds of those framers of the 
Statute who had been brought up in the civil law tradition.51
It should, however, be pointed out that the difference 
between the civil and common law approaches concerning 
judicial precedent appears to have been grotesquely 
exaggerated, for its practical significance, if any, is very 
limited. The French, for instance, recognise what they call 
"une jurisprudence constante". In all civil law
- jurisdictions, the inherent worth of judicial decisions is 
recognised and acknowledged.52
49 See H. Lauterpacht, "Schools of Thought", 56.
50 See ibid.
51 See PCIJ Series D . No.2, 195-8, 283. See also the
observations of Politis in League of Nations, Minutes of the 
Committee of Jurists on the Statute of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice. Document No. C166, M66, 1929, 5 at 51. 
See further A.W.H. Hammarskjold, "Sidelights on the Permanent 
Court of International Justice", 25 Mich.LR (1926-7), 334*
52 See H. Lauterpacht, "Schools of Thought", 52, 53, n.l; 
Sir Maurice Sheldon Amos, "The Code Napoleon and the Modern 
World", 10 JCLIL. (1928), 222; O.J. Lissitzyn, The
International Court of Justice: Its Role in the Maintenance
of International Peace and Security. United Nations Studies 
No.6 (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
1951) 20 n.25 (hereinafter "Lissitzyn"); Rosenne, The World 
Court, 97.
52
The Reichsaericht of Germany in the inter-war years is 
reported to have made elaborate references to its own previous 
judgments in its decisions, such references usually concluded 
with the words "this must be adhered to". As a result of 
judicial activity much of the Civil Code is said to have been 
interpreted out of existence and the Civil Code law of 
mortgages was adapted to the extraordinary requirements of 
inflation at the time. This shows that there exists in both 
France and Germany, and indeed in all civil law jurisdictions, 
judge-made case law.53
In common law jurisdictions the authority of precedent as 
a formal source of law is limited by the requirements of 
justice, convenience and reasonableness. Consequently, the 
absolutely authoritative precedent is not exempt from the 
process of distinguishing in which free judicial activity 
necessarily asserts itself as it does in civil law 
jurisdictions in respect of the written law.54
In practice, the Court has not treated its earlier 
decisions in as narrow a spirit as the pronouncements 
mentioned above appear to indicate. While it has held back 
from expressly declaring itself as being under a duty to 
follow the doctrine of judicial precedent, the constant 
operation of that doctrine may be said to be the general rule
53 See H. Lauterpacht, "Schools of Thought", 53, 54.
54 See ibid. For the view that Article 38, para.1(d) of 
the Statute represents an interesting compromise between the 
common law adherence to judicial precedent and the civil law 
adherence to doctrine, see Rosenne, The World Court. 113-4.
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in its jurisprudence in keeping with which it constantly
refers to its own previous pronouncements and habitually cites
its own earlier judgments and advisory opinions as well as
those of other courts and tribunals.55 However, it does not
appear to have evolved any definite pattern, method or set of
rules for this practice.56 While some of the references and
citations may be regarded as:
little more than a form of incorporation by 
reference to previous statements, a technical 
feature of composition which lends itself to the 
elliptical phrasing so characteristic of 
contemporary international judgments,57
some have undoubtedly been intended for the purpose of
illustration.58 One also comes across typically bold and
more forthright references to previous pronouncements.59
Such dicta and holdings are not just employed for mere
55 See H. Lauterpacht, Development. 20; Virally, 150.
56 See Rosenne, Law and Practice. 612.
57 See ibid.
58 See for example, Chorzow Factory Case (Merits) , PCIJ 
Series A . No.17, 37; European Commission on the Danube. PCIJ 
Series B . No.14, 36.
59 See German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia Case 
(Merits), PCIJ Series A . No.7, 31; Greco-Turkish Agreement of 
December 1926, PCIJ Series B . No.16, 15. For other references 
to its previous decisions, see PCIJ Series A/B. No.46, 172; 
ICJ Reports 1952, 176 at 196, 200, 206; ibid. 1950, 74, 229, 
326; ibid. 1954, 47 at 56, 59; ibid. 1949, 182; ibid. 1961, 
17. See further, PCIJ Series B . No.5, 29; ICJ Reports 1962, 
155; ibid. 1956, 86; ibid. 1947/8, 61; ibid. 1973 at 302; 
ibid. 1984, 3 at 8, para.12, 20, para.31, 9, para.13, 18,
para.28; ibid. 1981, 12, para.17, 17, para.29; ibid. 1982, 
61, para.73, 37, para.23, 66-7, para.87; ibid. 1969, 18,
para.96; ibid. 1978, 36, para.86; ibid. 1974, 23, para.53, 
192, para.45; ibid. 1985, 24-5, para.20, 37-8, para.43, 38-9, 
para.45; ibid., 1986, 23-5, paras.27-9, 25, paras.30, 31, 83- 
4, para.155.
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illustration, explanation and emphasis, but they are also 
relied upon for instruction and authority. One aspect of the 
Court's treatment of judicial precedent is the continuity of 
jurisprudence in both the work of the Permanent Court and that 
of the International Court. Indeed, it has been suggested 
that the International Court has, since its inception, been 
aware of the need to maintain a continuity of tradition, case 
law and methods of work and that consequently, without being 
bound by judicial precedent as a principle or rule, the Court 
frequently seeks guidance in the decisions of the former Court 
with the result that there has evolved a remarkable unity of 
precedent, an important factor in the development of 
international law.60 It has also been observed that this 
continuity of jurisprudence has been prominent in the way in 
which the International Court has relied upon or indirectly 
acknowledged the persuasive authority of its own previous 
judgments and opinions as well as those of the Permanent 
Court.61
A perusal of the Court's judgments and opinions reveals 
that it strives to achieve and maintain a very high degree of 
consistency in its jurisprudence. To this end the Court does 
not only refer to its former judgments and opinions because
60 See the address delivered by President Winiarski on the 
40th Anniversary of the Inauguration of the Permanent Court, 
in ICJYB 1961-2, 2.
61 See H. Lauterpacht, Development. 11? see for example, 
PCIJ Series B. No.13, 38? PCIJ Series A . No.9, 21? ICJ
Reports 1947/8, 63? ibid. 1950, 8? ibid. 72? ibid. 1961, 
32-3? ibid. 1953, 19, 121? ibid. 1949, 24? ibid. 1984, 26-7, 
para.43? ibid. 1986, 10-11, para.29.
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the facts, circumstances or legal rules and principles 
established in such cases are identical to those in the case 
under consideration, but also for purposes of contrasting one 
case with the other. While on occasion the Court does this on 
its own initiative, in the majority of cases it has undertaken 
such differentiation for the reason that parties in the case 
under consideration have sought to rest their cases on such 
previous judgments or opinions or portions thereof.62
The relative character of the requirement of consistency 
of jurisprudence is undoubtedly an important guiding element 
in the course of judicial activity.
(c) The Decisions of Other Tribunals
Our earlier discussion of the Court's practice regarding 
Article 59 dealt entirely with its own jurisprudence and that 
of its predecessor, the Permanent Court. The other, if minor,
62 For example, in the Peace Treaties Cases, the Eastern 
Carelia Case was distinguished. See ICJ Reports 1950, 65 at 
71-2. In the Barcelona Traction Case (Preliminary
Objections), the Aerial Incident Case was distinguished. See 
ICJ Reports 1964, 28, 29, 31, 47. The Tunis and Morocco
Nationality Decrees Case was distinguished in the Mavrommatis 
Palestine Concessions Case. PCIJ Series A . No.2, 16; PCIJ 
Series E . No.3, 217-8; ibid., No.4, 92, 293; ibid., No.6, 
300. See Rosenne, Law and Practice. 613-4 and the literature 
cited therein. For other instances in which the Court 
distinguished previous cases, see PCIJ Series A . No.20, 16; 
ICJ Reports 1961, 17; ibid. 1959, 127; ibid. 1984, 266-7, 
paras.24-6, 309, para.144, 309-10, paras.147, 150; ibid.
1986, 573-5, para.39-41, 578, para.47, 579, para.49. For the 
view that the Court engages in distinguishing and adheres to 
judicial precedent because it aims at a fairly substantial 
degree of consistency, see I. Brownlie, Principles of Public 
International Law. 3rd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 
22-3 (hereinafter "Principles11) . This is the edition cited in 
the rest of this chapter.
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feature of such practice relates to the use which the Court 
makes of the jurisprudence of other international tribunals 
and municipal courts. For instance, in the Corfu Channel 
Case, the International Court noted that indirect evidence was 
admitted in all systems of law, and that its use was 
recognised by international decisions.63 Similarly, in the 
Nottebohm Case (Second Phase), the Court decided to resolve 
the issue before it in accordance with the principles evolved 
by arbitrators and applied by international arbitrators and 
the courts of third states.64 The practice of applying
jurisprudence other than its own finds some basis in the 
Statute. We shall now take a look at this second feature of 
the practice of the Court which serves to enhance the scope of 
the impact of the decisions of the Court and other 
international tribunals and municipal courts to third parties.
The practice of habitually invoking its previous 
judgments and opinions finds qualified support in Article 
38(1)(d) of its Statute, which directs the Court to apply 
among others, and subject to Article 59, judicial decisions as 
subsidiary means for the determination of the rules of law. 
It has been observed that this subparagraph mitigates the
63 See ICJ Reports 1949, 23.
64 See ibid. 1955, 21-2. In that case the Court adopted 
the definition of nationality accepted by the practice of 
states, arbitral and judicial decisions and the opinions of 
writers. See ibid., 23.
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apparent rigour of Article 59.65 It is generally agreed that 
the "judicial decisions" of which Article 38(1)(d) speaks 
include decisions of the Court itself.66 It is understood 
that the term "judicial decisions" also includes decisions of 
other international tribunals and national or municipal 
courts.67
The Court sometimes compendiously refers to "judicial 
decisions".68 The Court takes the view that such "judicial 
decisions" also include decisions of arbitration tribunals.69
The Court*s finding in the German Interests in Polish 
Upper Silesia Case that mixed arbitral tribunals and the 
Permanent Court of International Justice are not courts of the 
same character,70 coupled with the relative reserve with 
which it has treated the decisions of other tribunals, has led . 
some observers to conclude that the Court clearly considers 
its own opinions as having a different status from those of
65 See H. Lauterpacht, Development. 8. Cf. Rosenne's view 
that the effect of the creation of a substantial body of 
international case law through the constant accumulation of 
judicial precedents has been the incorporation of a sensible 
modification in the apparent rigidity of Article 38(1)(d). 
See Rosenne, Law and Practice. 611-2.
66 See Virally, 149.
67 See M.O. Hudson, The Permanent Court of International 
Justice 1920-42: A Treatise (New York: Macmillan Co., 1943),
613 (hereinafter "The Permanent Court").
68 See, for example, ICJ Reports 1985, 38-9, para.45.
69 See ICJ Reports 1984, 290-1, para.83, 302-3, para.123, 
324, para.187.
70 See PCIJ Series A . No.6, 26.
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any other tribunal, however exalted.71 Kearney wondered 
whether in view of the limits placed on the Court by Article 
59 such an assumption of a special status could be justified, 
more so since being the creature of a special compact it 
cannot confer on itself a position superior to the compact. 
Kearney found ratiocination in the statement that "this answer 
would overlook the capacity for growth in all human 
institutions which modify and expand the formal limitations of 
their conception".72 Perhaps we may add that the Court is 
indeed entitled to postulate for itself a superior position or 
status, for after all on Kearney's own admission it is the 
creature of a special compact, namely the Statute, which is an 
integral part of the Charter of the United Nations, a special 
multilateral treaty. Furthermore, the Court is one of the 
principal organs - indeed the principal judicial organ - of 
the United Nations.73 Moreover the quality of arbitral 
tribunals, usually composed of a sole arbitrator or a small 
group of jurists with a standing inferior to that of the 
International Court and attracting less emphasis than that of 
the Court, has been observed to be considerably varied.74 
This differentiation between the International Court and other 
international tribunals is by no means designed to detract
71 See Kearney, 699.
72 See ibid.
73 See Charter Article 92.
74 See D.W. Greig, International Law (London: 
Butterworths, 1970), 36; Brownlie, Principles. 20;
Lissitzyn, 10.
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from the contribution of such tribunals to the development of 
international law. For there is no denying that a number of 
awards have contained notable contributions from renowned 
jurists sitting as arbitrators, umpires or commissioners, to 
the development of international law and jurisprudence.75
The Court has on occasion referred to decisions of other 
tribunals.76 Such reference has been to arbitral practice 
generally or on a specific issue. The Meerauae Arbitration 
Case, decided by an arbitral tribunal in 1902,77 was cited to 
sustain a view taken by the Court in the Jaworzina Boundary 
Case.78 The Costa Rica Packet Case decided by an arbitral 
tribunal in 1897, to which a party had referred, was cited by 
the Court but found to be distinguishable from the case before 
it.79
75 See Brownlie, Principles. 20 for examples of such
decisions? H. Lauterpacht, Development. 19; Lissitzyn, 9-10? 
A.D. McNair, The Development of International Justice (New 
York: New York University Press, distributed by Oceana
Publications, 1954) , 1-5 (hereinafter 1 International
Justice”).
76 See Brownlie, Principles. 20-1; Greig, International 
Law. 33? H. Lauterpacht, Development. 15-8 passim? Hudson, 
The Permanent Court. 613-4.
77 See G.Fr. de Martens, Nouveau Recueil General de 
Traites et Autres Actes Relatifs aux Rapports de Droit 
International. 3rd ser., continued by H. Triepel, Vol. 3 
(Leipzig: Librairie Dieterich, Theodor Weicher, 1910), 3:71; 
see also Hudson, The Permanent Court. 613.
78 See PCIJ Series B. No.8, 42-3.
79 See J.B. Moore, History and Digest of the International 
Arbitrations to Which the United States Has Been a Party. 
Vol.5 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1898), 5:4948 
(hereinafter 'international Arbitration”)? G.Fr. de Martens, 
Nouveau Recueil General. 2nd ser., continued by Felix Stoerk 
(Leipzig: Librairie Dieterich, Theodor Weicher, 1898), 23:808.
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In the Reparations Case the Court said that
"international tribunals are already familiar with the problem 
of the claim in which two or more national states are
interested and they know how to protect the defendant state in 
such a case”.80 A notable departure from the Court's
tradition of not referring specifically to arbitral decisions 
in the texts of its judgments occurred in the string of
continental shelf delimitation judgments rendered between 1982 
and 1985, in which the Franco-British Arbitration decision of 
1977 was referred to.81
Sometimes the Court finds it necessary to distinguish 
arbitral decisions, especially when parties to cases before it 
attempt to avail themselves of legal principles and rules 
embodied in such decisions; for example in the Gulf of Maine
See also PCIJ Series A , No. 10, 26; Hudson, The Permanent
Court. 613-4. For other instances of reference to the 
decisions of other tribunals by the Permanent Court, see PCIJ 
Series A . No.9, 31; ibid., No.17, 31, 47, 57; Permanent
Court of Arbitration, Hague Court Reports, ed. J.B. Scott (New 
York, 1916), 3; PCIJ Series B. No.11, 30; Permanent Court of 
Arbitration, Hague Court Reports. 2nd ser., ed. J.B. Scott 
(New York, 1932), 84; PCIJ Series A/B. No.53, 45, 46; ibid., 
No.61, 243. See also ICJ Reports 1951, 131.
80 See ICJ Reports 1949, 187.
81 See ICJ Reports 1982, 38, para.25, 57, para.66; ibid., 
1984, 267, para.25, 290, para.83, 293, para.92, 302-3,
para.123, 324, para.187; ibid., 1985, 42, para.52, 44,
para.54. In the UN Headguarters Agreement Case, reference was 
made to the Alabama Arbitration. See ibid. 1988, 34, para.57. 
See also Nagendra Singh, The Role and Record of the 
International Court of Justice (Dordrecht, Boston, London: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1989), 145 (hereinafter "Singh").
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Case,82 the case before the Court was distinguished from that 
decided by the Franco-British Arbitration of 1977.
It is evident from the foregoing examination of cases 
that references to arbitral practice by the Court are 
relatively sparse. In the majority of cases such references 
have been far too general to be of value. Some arbitral 
awards have distinctly contributed to international law "by 
reason of their scope, their elaboration and the consciousness 
with which they have examined the issues before them."83 It 
is in the interests of the continuity, development and sound 
administration of international justice that it should not 
leave out of account the body of precedent which is full of 
instruction and authority built up by arbitral law.84 While 
considerations of economy in the method of pronouncements of 
the Court have been advanced as an explanation for the 
tendency of the Court to avoid detailed or extensive 
examination of arbitral awards, we would like to point to the 
Court's inclination to regard itself as occupying a higher 
status than other tribunals, and its pronouncements as having
82 See ICJ Reports 1984, 301, para.117. The Grisbadarma 
Case concerning the delimitation of fishing grounds between 
Norway and Sweden was distinguished with regard to the 
doctrine of acquiescence, see ibid., 309, para.146. The 
Arbitral Award Case was also distinguished, see ibid., 309-10, 
para.147.
83 See H. Lauterpacht, Development. 18.
84 See ibid., 17-8. For the role of the Permanent Court 
of Arbitration as well as the Permanent Court of International 
Justice and the International Court of Justice in the 
development of international law, see J.E.S. Fawcett, "The 
Development of International Law", 46 IA (1970), 131-4 
(hereinafter "Fawcett").
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a special character vis-a-vis those of such tribunals, as 
another reason or explanation for its relative unwillingness 
to refer as frequently to arbitral decisions as it does to its 
own judgments and opinions. Whatever the reasons of the 
Court, the result is that the full potential of Article 
38(1)(d) is yet to be fully and beneficially exploited as far 
as arbitral decisions are concerned.
Besides arbitral tribunals, states may by agreement 
establish other tribunals to undertake specific or well- 
defined tasks. The International Military Tribunal for the 
Trial of German Major War Criminals85 provides a classic 
example of such a tribunal. Though such tribunals may produce 
valuable pronouncements on delicate issues and thus contribute 
in some way to the development of international law, their 
ability to do this must necessarily depend on their standing, 
the calibre of the jurists who serve on them, the conditions 
under which they carry out their tasks and the procedures they 
employ. It has been observed that the judgment of the 
military tribunal for the trial of German major war criminals
85 See International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), 
Judgment and Sentences, reprinted in "Judicial Decisions", 41 
AJIL (1947), 172. See also V.V. Pustagarov, "The Nuremberg 
Case and the Development of International Law", SYIL (1986), 
144; H.-H. Jescheck, "Nuremberg Trials", in instalment 4,
EPIL, ed. R. Bernhardt (1982), 50-7? Q. Wright, "Legal
Positivism and the Nuremberg Judgment", 42 AJIL (1948), 405- 
14? id., "The Law of the Nuremberg Trial", 41 AJIL (1947), 
38-72? E. Schwelb, "Crimes Against Humanity", 23 BYIL (1946), 
178-226? G.A. Finch, "The Nuremberg Trial and International 
Law", 41 AJIL (1947), 20-37; F.B. Schick, "The Nuremberg
Trial and the International Law of the Future", ibid., 770-94. 
In connection with the punishment of war criminals see 
generally, A.N. Sack, "Punishment of War Criminals and the 
Defence of Superior Order", 60 LOR (1944), 63-8.
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contains some important findings on issues of law.86
(d) Decisions of Municipal Tribunals87
Article 38(1)(d), which refers simply to "judicial 
decisions", does not appear to restrict the power of the Court 
to apply such judicial decisions "as subsidiary means for 
determination of rules of law" to decisions of the Court and 
other international tribunals alone. Consequently, the Court 
is at liberty to apply decisions of municipal courts and 
tribunals in this way also. It has in practice been most 
reluctant to refer to the decisions of municipal courts and 
tribunals, even when they have been cited by parties and in 
spite of general agreement in legal circles that such 
decisions do have evidential value.88 However, municipal 
courts and tribunals seldom have to decide questions involving 
international law issues.89 A municipal decision may provide 
a statement of evidence of what the court concerned considers 
to be a rule of international law. The weight to be accorded 
such a statement must surely depend on the availability of
86 See Brownlie, Principles. 24. For the contribution of 
international administrative tribunals to the development of 
international administrative law, see Greig, International 
Law. 36-7.
87 See generally, H. Lauterpacht, "Decisions of Municipal 
Courts as a Source of International Law", 10 BYIL (1929), 65- 
95.
88 See McNair, International Justice. 12-3. Cf. Hambro, 
"Reasons", 213.
89 With the exception of prize courts, dealing with the 
legality of the seizure of ships and cargoes in time of war.
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other evidence corroborating the existence of the rule of law 
in question.
In the Chorzow Factory Case (Jurisdiction) ,90 a bare 
reference was made to the jurisprudence of municipal courts. 
In the Lotus Case91 both the Court itself and the parties 
before it referred to a number of municipal decisions on the 
question of criminal jurisdiction in cases of collision on the 
high seas. As this jurisprudence was divided, the Court 
concluded that it was hardly possible to see in it any 
indication of the existence of a restrictive rule of 
international law.92 The judgment of an English court in the 
Franconia Case (Regina v. Kevn (1897) L.R. 2 Ex.Div. 63) was 
examined. It was said that the conception of international 
law upon which the majority of the judges may have proceeded 
was peculiar to English jurisprudence, not generally accepted 
even in common law countries, and abandoned in more recent 
English decisions.
In the Personal Work of Employers Case, reference was 
made to municipal jurisprudence on the constitutionality of 
legislation.93 In its application of the rule as to the 
exhaustion of local remedies in the Panevezvs-Saldutiskis 
Railways Case (Preliminary Objections) the Court examined the 
Jeglinas Case in some detail. This case, which had been
90 See PCIJ Series A . No.9, 31.
91 See ibid., No. 10, 1.
92 See ibid., No. 10, 26-30.
93 See PCIJ Series B . No. 11, 20.
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decided by a Lithuanian court, had been referred to as an 
element of the issues before the Court. The Court held that 
no call for the decisions of a Lithuanian court existed to 
relieve against the application of the rule.94 Similar 
reference was made in the Chorzow Factory Case (Jurisdiction) 
to the decision of a Polish court at Katowice.95
The Court may have to examine the decisions of the courts 
of a state if called upon to apply the judicial decisions of 
that state. In the Serbian and Brazilian Loans Cases, the 
Permanent Court referred to the doctrine and jurisprudence of 
French courts.96
Municipal decisions may also serve as evidence of the 
practice of the state of the forum, being evidence of 
international custom.97 They are used more frequently in 
individual and dissenting opinions.98 In the Lotus Case. 
Judge Moore sounded the note of caution that international 
tribunals
are not to treat the judgments of the court of one state 
on questions of international law as binding on other 
states but while giving to such judgments the weight due 
to judicial expressions of a view taken in a particular 
country ought to follow them as authority only so far as
94 See PCIJ Series A/B. No.76, 19-21.
95 See PCIJ Series A . No. 17, 33-4. In the Fisheries Case. 
Norwegian decisions were quoted by the Court in order to prove 
Norwegian conceptions. See Hambro, "Reasons", 213, n.10. Cf. 
id., "Address to the American Society of International Law", 
62 ASILP. (1968) 267 at 271.
96 See PCIJ Series A . No.20, 47, and No.21, 124-5.
97 See H. Lauterpacht, Development. 20.
98 See Hudson, The Permanent Court. 615.
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they are found to be in harmony with international
law.99
What the foregoing examination of the Court's attitude to 
municipal decisions suggests is that though the Court seldom 
refers to such decisions they have some value. For instance, 
if the municipal jurisprudence cited in the Lotus Case was 
found to be sufficiently uniform, the Court might have been 
willing to consider what value to attribute to it. By 
providing evidence of the practice of the state of the forum 
and of the rules of international law in the states in which 
they are rendered, municipal decisions do perhaps indirectly 
contribute to the course of international law and justice. 
They have also contributed perhaps directly, to the 
development of international law. It was Chief Justice 
Marshall of the United States Supreme Court who, in 1812, laid 
down what came to be accepted as the classic statement on the 
immunity of ships belonging to a foreign sovereign from the 
jurisdiction of the territorial state.100
In fact virtually the whole of the law of sovereign 
immunity which is regarded as a doctrine of international law 
has evolved through national jurisprudence; and it is in the 
nature of that claim that cases concerning immunity from local 
jurisdiction have by and large been dealt with by municipal 
courts. Our understanding of international law in this area 
has been developed through municipal court decisions which
99 See PCIJ Series A . No.10, 74.
100 See The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon. 11 US (7 
Cranch), 116.
have in turn been supplemented by municipal legislation.
Boundary disputes between various states of the union 
have made it possible for the Federal Supreme Court to apply 
and develop the relevant principles of international law.101 
In maritime law in general and prize law in particular the 
contribution of English courts has received recognition and 
acknowledgement. In addition, municipal decisions constitute 
a valuable source for materials on recognition of 
belligerency, of governments and of state succession, 
sovereign immunity, diplomatic immunity, extradition, war 
crimes, belligerent occupation and the concept of state of 
war.102 While widespread state practice indicative of a view 
of a rule of law contrary to that contained in a municipal 
decision will undoubtedly minimise the importance of such a 
decision, where evidence in favour of a rule is uncertain, or 
existing authority scanty, municipal decisions may be of 
immense value.103
(e) Reasons for Observance of Judicial Precedent
The above survey of the practice of the Court with regard 
to Article 59 has established, first, that the Court has not 
involved itself with the difference in approach of the common
101 See Greig, International Law. 38? Brownlie, 
Principles. 24-5. Also see K.H. Kaikobad, "The Shatt-al-Arab 
River Boundary: A Legal Reappraisal", 56 BYIL (1985), 49 at 
73-6; McNair, International Justice. 15.
102 See Brownlie, Principles. 24.
103 See Greig, International Law. 39.
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and civil law jurisdictions to the doctrine of stare decisis: 
second, that in theory it has in its pronouncements bearing 
directly on Article 59, scrupulously observed the injunction 
laid down therein; and third, that in practice, for reasons 
of continuity and consistency of jurisprudence, it cites its 
previous judgments and opinions in spite of the express 
prohibition thereof contained in Article 59.
Adherence to judicial precedents makes for certainty, 
stability and uniformity, all of which are essential 
requirements for the sound administration of justice.104 
Observance of judicial precedent is consonant with the need to 
avoid any semblance of abuse or excess of judicial discretion, 
a point which assumes added significance in the international 
sphere.105 Judicial decisions constitute a repository of 
legal experience which it is not only convenient to follow but 
also to which it is politic to have recourse for guidance and 
instruction.106 The tendency to recognise that judicial 
decisions have some value as precedents is a natural one for 
all tribunals which can develop independently of the need for 
artificial doctrines of the binding force of precedents or 
difficult theories of judicial legislation.107 Similarly,
104 See Hudson, The Permanent Court. 613, as well as
President Winiarski*s remarks referred to above, 55, n.60.
105 See to the same effect, H. Lauterpacht, Development.
14.
106 See ibid.; id., "Schools of Thought", 52-3.
107 See Rosenne, Law and Practice. 612; H. Lauterpacht, 
"Schools of Thought", 52-3; J.B. Moore, "The Organisation of 
the Permanent Court of International Justice", 22 CLR (1921),
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judges are naturally reluctant, in the absence of compelling 
reasons to the contrary, to admit that they have been wrong in 
the past. As an illustration, Lauterpacht cites the example 
of the way in which English Chancellors administering the 
original elastic rules of equity, regularly learned to 
recognise the authority of case law with a rigidity frequently 
surpassing that of the common law whose conservatism they set 
themselves to combat.108 Judicial precedents are followed 
everywhere because of their intrinsic merit. They influence 
judges in future cases with materially similar facts because 
they contain what the Court had previously held to be good 
law.109 Judicial decisions are therefore treated with 
respect in view of their persuasive authority.110 A further 
reason for the observance of judicial precedent is^  the absence 
of a code of a generally recognised system of law and the lack 
of opportunities for authoritative and impartial statements of 
the law.111
While the Court will not depart from "the established 
jurisprudence", "the long-established jurisprudence"112 or
510 (hereinafter "Organisation").
108 See H. Lauterpacht, Development. 14.
109 See ibid., 14-5.
110 See ibid., 18; McNair, International Justice. 12; 
Rosenne, Law and Practice. 614.
111 See H. Lauterpacht, Development. 14.
112 See ICJ Reports 1961, 32, 34.
"firmly established rule"113 without good reason, it is not 
always possible or even desirable to follow precedent 
mechanically. However, if the Court deems it proper to 
overturn the consistency, continuity and uniformity of 
precedent or jurisprudence it is bound to adduce reasons in 
explanation thereof, thus the process of distinguishing is 
sometimes employed to set aside a holding or dictum which the 
Court is unable to follow. Where the previous practice has 
not been sufficiently uniform and the precedents therefore 
vary, as for example on such questions as the admissibility of 
recourse to preparatory work in the interpretation of treaties 
or the restrictive interpretation of limitations of state 
sovereignty, the Court has tended to rely on one set of 
precedents to the exclusion of the rest114 without feeling 
bound to explain the choice thus made. The Court has largely 
adopted the substance of judicial precedent and yet managed, 
through the technique of distinguishing, to retain the 
flexibility necessary to enable it to modify previous 
positions it has perceived to be untenable. In consequence 
the Court has observed the letter if not the spirit of Article 
59 of its Statute. If viewed from this perspective it will be 
crystal clear that the mandatory language of that Article is 
not without import.115
113 See ibid. 1986, 632, para. 147.
114 See to the same effect, H. Lauterpacht, Development. 
18-19, 121ff and 300ff and the authorities therein cited.
115 See ibid., 19.
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(f) State Practice and Judicial Precedent
So far we have observed that the Court's application of 
international jurisprudence has served to expand the scope of 
its judgments to third parties, which, on account of Article 
34(1), invariably means third states. Article 38(1)(b) and 
(c) require the Court to apply international custom as 
evidence of a general practice accepted as law and the general 
principles of law recognised by civilised nations in deciding 
disputes submitted to it.
The fact that judicial decisions assume the character of 
precedents with persuasive authority finds some support in 
state practice. This may sometimes be apparent in the 
correspondence between states with regard to arbitral awards 
and judicial decisions. A case in point is the concluding 
passage of the letter addressed on 26 February 1923 by Mr. 
Charles Evans Hughes, the United States Secretary of State, to 
the Norwegian Minister at Washington, concerning the award 
given in the Norwegian Shipowners Case, in which the United 
States government, having regard to certain alleged 
shortcomings of the award, declared that "the award cannot be 
deemed by that government to possess an authoritative 
character as a precedent".116
In 1929 the British government, in accepting the 
jurisdiction of the Court under the "optional clause" of the 
Statute, said that in comparison with codification "the method
116 See ibid., 22, n.74. See also Hague Court Reports. 
2nd ser., 82.
of building up a body of law by a series of legal decisions, 
a method which produced the English common law, may be the 
more suitable for at any rate some important branches of the 
Law of Nations".117
In cases before the Court, states frequently refer to 
judicial and arbitral decisions.118 Indeed, such decisions 
are cited by states much more often than by the Court. In the 
Lotus Case.119 the Court had to distinguish the Costa Rica 
Packet Case120 to which one of the parties had referred. In 
the same case national decisions concerning the jurisdiction 
of flag states were cited by both parties (see above, ).
In the Peace Treaties Cases the Court distinguished the 
Eastern Carelia Case, on which the states concerned sought to 
rest their challenge to the Court's jurisdiction. Similarly, 
the Court had to distinguish the Aerial Incident Case from two 
later cases, namely the Barcelona Traction Case (Preliminary 
Objections),121 and the Temple Case (Preliminary
117 See Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Misc. No.12, 
Memorandum on the Signature bv His Majesty's Government in the 
United Kingdom of the Optional Clause of the Statute of the 
Permanent Court of International Justice. Cmnd. 3452 (1929), 
8. See Lissitzyn, 12-3.
118 See Virally, 151; Rosenne, Law and Practice. 611-4; 
Greig, International Law. 32-3.
119 See PCIJ Series A . No.10, 26.
120 See Moore, International Arbitrations. 5:4948, and 
Martens, Nouveau Receuil General. 2nd Ser., 23:808.
121 See ICJ Reports 1964, 6.
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Objections) .122 Perhaps more important for our purposes is 
the fact that in the Aerial Incident Case, the substantive 
rules upon which Israel relied were supported in its pleadings 
"by a wealth of authority drawn particularly from previous 
decisions of the Court".123
In the Nottebohm Case (Second Phase)124 the portion of 
the Liechtenstein pleadings relating to the obligations of the 
belligerent concerning the treatment of the person and 
property of nationals of a neutral state, abounded in 
illustrations from international jurisprudence.125 In the 
Barcelona Traction Case (Merits) the Court dismissed summarily 
an attempt by the parties to rely on general arbitral 
jurisprudence and explained that since in most cases the 
decisions cited rested upon the terms of instruments 
establishing the jurisdiction of the tribunal or Claims 
Commission and determining what rights might enjoy protection, 
they could not give rise to generalisation going beyond the 
special circumstances of each case. Nor would the Court 
accept other cases allowing or disallowing claims by way of 
accession, as directly relevant to the case before it. The 
Court also distinguished the case actually being heard from 
the Nottebohm Case (Second Phase) by saying that "given both
122 See ibid. 1961, 17, 25, 28. See also ibid. 1954, 29-
32.
123 See ICJ Reports 1959, 127. See also Greig, 
International Law. 33.
124 See ICJ Reports 1955, 4.
125 See Greig, International Law. 32-3.
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the legal and factual aspects of protection in the present 
case there can be no analogy with the issues raised or the 
decision given in that case".126
In Pakistani Prisoners of War Case (Interim Measures), 
India cited the Monetary Gold Case precedent in relation to 
the absence from the proceedings of Bangladesh.127 The Gulf 
of Maine Case also provides an excellent illustration of 
reliance by the parties on judicial and arbitral 
precedents.128
The preceding examination of state practice clearly shows 
that, like the Court, states have perhaps for diverse reasons 
relied on the reasoning and pronouncements of the Court in 
previous judgments and opinions. It does not appear that 
states do so for continuity or consistency of jurisprudence. 
It would seem that the primary though by no means exclusive 
reason for which states tend to rely on earlier cases is that 
of self-interest. A state will therefore not hesitate to
126 See ICJ Reports 1970, 42. See also ibid. 1982, 43-4, 
paras.36-7; 46-7, para.44; 57, para.66; 62-3, para.76; 75-6, 
para.100.
127 See J.B. Elkind, Non-Appearance Before the 
International Court of Justice; Functional and Comparative 
Analysis (Dordrecht, Boston, Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers, 1984), 64-5 (hereinafter "Non-Appearance") . In 
1990, a chamber of the Court had to distinguish the Monetary 
Gold Case on which the applicant state sought to rely. See 
Land. Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El 
Salvador/Honduras). Application to Intervene. Judgment, ICJ 
Reports 1990, 92, at 107, para.34; 114-6, paras.52-6; 122,
para.73 (hereinafter "Nicaracruan Intervention Case”).
128 See ICJ Reports 1984, 295, paras. 99-100; 298,
para.108; 302, para.123; 308-9, paras.143; 144; 146; 309-10, 
paras.147, 149. In this connection see also, ibid. 1985, 32, 
para.31; 38, para.44; 46, para.59.
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invoke a reasoning or observation in a former judgment or 
opinion, if this will help its case. Where a state which is 
a party to a case before the Court considers that insistence 
on the plain meaning of Article 59 of the Statute will be to 
its benefit, it will often take that course of action. 
Nowhere is the ambivalent attitude of states to the rule laid 
down in Article 59 more manifest than in their approach to the 
issue of discretionary intervention.129 Who can blame them? 
If the Court has largely adopted the substance of judicial 
precedent, thereby rendering its behaviour in given situations 
more predictable, states are fully entitled to take advantage 
thereof. Besides, through the Statute, states have directed 
the Court to apply judicial decisions as subsidiary means for 
determining rules of law subject to Article 59.130
The value of judicial decisions as precedents probably 
explains why jurists attach great importance in their writings 
to statements of law which emanate from the Court, and the 
crucial role of international jurisprudence in resolving legal 
issues. As O'Connell has observed, the practising
international lawyer "selects as his sharpest and most valued 
tool the judicial decisions which will support his case".131
State practice with regard to judicial precedent has
129 See ICJ Reports 1984, 14-5, paras. 20, 22; 17-8,
para.26. Cf. ibid. 1981, 8-9, para.13; 11, para.16.
130 See Statute, Article 38(1) (d).
131 See D.P. O'Connell, International Law (London: 
Stevens & Sons, 1965), 30 (hereinafter "O'Connell"). See 
also, Nawaz, 538-40; H. Lauterpacht, Development. 58; 
Lissitzyn, 11-3.
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largely been influenced, if not guided, by the practice of the 
Court itself. Such state practice has also been suggestive of 
what might be called double standards. The position of Malta 
in the 1981 and 1984 cases in which it was involved provides 
an example of this.132 Such ambivalence is also implicit in 
the Libyan argument opposing the Italian application for 
permission to intervene in the case between Libya and Malta. 
States have thus tended to observe precedent when it suits 
them to do so, otherwise they have insisted on the ordinary 
meaning of Article 59. However, on balance the former 
attitude seems to predominate over the latter.133 In sum it 
may be concluded that like the Court, states have also largely 
adopted the essence of judicial precedent.
4. Article 38(lWd) of the Statute
So far we have considered some of the elements which 
compose a judgment of the Court, and noted that irrespective 
of the rule contained in Article 59, the res judicata effect
132 We are of the opinion that Malta could justify its 
shift of position in 1984 on the grounds that the rejection by 
the Court of its position regarding the meaning of Article 59 
of the Statute in 1981 amounted to a correction of that 
position by the Court which, according to the principle iura 
novit curiae is supposed to know the law and also possess a 
superior understanding of the law by virtue of the proprio 
motu principle. (Concerning the latter principle, see 
Higgins, ”The Court and South West Africa”, 582. For a 
discussion of the former, see below, 96, n.191.) As happened 
in 1984, both Malta and Libya found themselves on the same 
side as the Court as far as the meaning of Article 59 of the 
Statute was concerned.
133 See the position of the United States with respect to 
Article 59 in the Aerial Incident Case. ICJ Reports 1959, 127.
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of the judgment refers only to the operative provisions of the 
judgment which are binding in that case only and on the 
parties alone. The reasoning embodied in the judgment and the 
relevant individual and dissenting opinions pass into the 
Court*s jurisprudence on which it relies for guidance and 
instruction, among other things, and the persuasive authority 
which it may invoke when deciding future cases. The Statute 
sanctions such use of jurisprudence subject to certain 
conditions, probably designed to restrict the effect of the 
judgment to the parties to the case and the case alone. In 
reality, the Court has not felt inhibited by such limitations 
from applying judicial decisions as a source of law. In 
consequence, it cannot be maintained that third parties are 
immune from the impact of the judgments of the Court.
(a) Background134
Article 38(1) in part authorises the Court to apply 
"subject to Article 59 judicial decisions ... as subsidiary 
means for determination of rules of law”. This provision is 
identical to the corresponding provision in Article 38(4) of 
the Statute of the Permanent Court.135 It seems that the
134 See generally, Kearney, 610-4.
135 Article 38 of the present Statute, like many others, 
was taken over almost in toto from Article 38 of the Statute 
of the Permanent Court, which stemmed from an article embodied 
in the Descamps proposal, which directed the judge to apply in 
the solution of international disputes among others 
"international jurisprudence as a means for the application 
and development of law". See PCIJ, Advisory Committee of 
Jurists, Proces-Verbaux of the Proceedings of the Advisory 
Committee of Jurists. The Hague, 1920, 307 (hereinafter
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main objection to the draft of this article as proposed by 
Baron Descamps was that it permitted too wide a latitude to 
the Court. The relevant paragraph of the revised text 
submitted by Elihu Root required the Court to apply within the 
limits of its jurisdiction, among others "the authority of 
judicial decisions ... as means for the application and 
development of law".136 This draft was accepted with minor 
alterations as a basis for consideration by the drafting 
committee137 whose text of the Court's statute was submitted 
to the Committee of Jurists. The pertinent paragraph in the 
Root proposal which had become Article 31 instructed the Court 
within the limits of its jurisdiction to apply, inter alia, 
"rules of law derived from judicial decisions ...,|138
In the discussion of the Article, a proposal by Descamps 
for the addition of the words "as subsidiary means for the 
determination of rules of law" to that paragraph was 
adopted.139 So was a proposal by Lord Phillimore for the 
deletion of the clause "rules of law derived from".140
The provision became Article 35 of the text adopted on
"Proces-Verbaux").
136 See ibid., 344.
137 See ibid., 336-8. During the discussion of the Root
draft an amended text was presented by M. Ricci Bussati, the 
main effect of which was to emphasise that judicial decisions 
and legal writings were not sources of law, ibid., 351.
138 See ibid., 567.
139 See ibid., 584, 620.
140 See ibid.
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first reading141 and adopted without further change in the 
final reading.142
The report to the Council of the League which accompanied 
the draft prepared by M. De Lapradelle said among other things 
that there was no question of giving such an unrestricted 
field to the decision of the Court as contained in Article 7 
on an International Prize Court. The relevant provision of 
the Article in the report enjoined the Court to apply 
"judicial decisions ... as subsidiary means of determining the 
rules of law".143
The Council of the League at its meeting in Brussels on 
27 October 1920 considered and accepted the draft Statute but 
proposed certain amendments. The only amendment in respect of 
Article 35 was to make its operation subject to Article 57 
bis. This article was one of the Council's amendments to the 
Statute and provided that "the decision of the Court has no 
binding force except between the parties and in respect of 
that particular case".144 This addition was based upon the 
report submitted by the French member Leon Bourgeois as a 
direct expression of a rule contained by implication in 
Article 61 of the draft regarding the binding effect of a
141 See ibid., 665-6.
142 See ibid., 680.
143 See ibid.
144 See Documents Concerning the Action taken bv the 
League of Nations under Article 14 of the Covenant and the 
Adoption bv the Assembly of the Statute of the Permanent 
Court. Geneva, 1921, 58-9 (hereinafter "League of Nations,
Documents").
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decision upon states which exercise the right of 
intervention.145
The most important statement in the report of the Sub­
committee said:
An Argentinian Amendment proposed a new text of this 
Article intended among other things to limit the power of 
the Court to attribute the character of precedent to 
judicial decisions. The Sub-Committee has not adopted 
this amendment. On the contrary, it considered that it 
would be one of the Court's most important tasks to 
contribute through its jurisprudence to the development 
of international law.146
Article 35 became Article 38 in the draft Statute annexed to
the Sub-Committee report and its wording is that of the
Statute as finally adopted by the League Assembly 13 December,
1920.
Chapter 7 of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals recommended the 
establishment of an international court of justice whose 
statute should be either the Statute of the Permanent Court 
with any desirable modifications, or a new statute based upon 
that of the Permanent Court.147 No changes in respect of 
Article 38 were proposed in the comments submitted by states 
regarding amendments to the Statute of the Permanent Court as 
part of the preparatory work for the San Francisco conference.
The informal Inter-Allied Committee commented that "the 
law to be applied by the Court is set out in Article 38 of the
145 See ibid., 50.
146 See ibid., 211.
147 See Documents of the United Nations Conference on 
International Organisation. San Francisco. 1945. Vol.14 
Committee of Jurists. London, 1945, 499 (hereinafter "UNCIO") .
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Statute and although the wording of this provision is open to 
criticism it has worked well in practice and its retention is 
recommended".148
The changes contained in a Cuban proposal included a very 
substantial modification of the fourth paragraph which read 
"the rules of international law for the establishment of which 
judicial decisions of an international order ... shall 
serve".149
The Washington Committee of Jurists, whose task was to 
propose a draft statute for submission to the San Francisco 
conference, merely revised the internal enumeration of Article 
38 and commented that the Article had given rise to more 
controversies in doctrine than in practice.150
The Chilean proposal that the first paragraph of Article 
38 be amended to read "the court whose mission is to decide in 
accordance with international law such disputes as are 
submitted to it shall apply"151 was adopted by Committee 1 of 
Commission IV on Judicial Organisation. This is the source of 
the addition of the introductory clause which opens the first 
paragraph of Article 38 of the present Statute.
There is nothing in the drafting history of Article 38 to 
support the view that with the exception of the fourth 
paragraph, the hierarchical principle was intended by the
148 See ibid., 45.
149 See ibid.
150 See ibid., 127.
151 See UNCIO, Vol. 13, 453.
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framers of the Statute to operate with respect to that 
Article. In fact it is probably truer to conclude from the 
deletion of such words or expressions as "in the under­
mentioned order"152 "in the order following"153 from earlier 
formulations of the Article, that this principle was rejected 
out of hand. Had such phrases been retained in the final 
version of Article 38, the freedom of the Court to declare and 
develop the law would have been severely curtailed.154 By 
directing the Court to decide disputes in accordance with 
international law and by providing some indication of the law 
to be applied by the Court, Article 38 has endowed the Court 
with the desired legal and judicial character which sets it 
apart from its forerunners.155
The use of the word "civilized" in Article 38(1)(c) is 
unfortunate156 and inappropriate as it appears to imply a 
value judgment. Since Article 9 speaks of "the main forms of 
civilization" and the "principal legal systems" it is doubtful 
whether well-defined criteria exist for determining "civilized 
nations". While it might have been quite in keeping with the 
mood and psychology of the times to use the term "civilized"
152 In both the Descamps and Root draft of the Article.
153 In the Drafting Committee's version of Article 31.
154 See to the same effect, Kearney, 614, 697, 707.
155 See ibid., 615. See also, A.P. Fachiri, The Permanent 
Court of International Justice. 2nd ed. (London: Oxford
University Press, Humphrey Milford, 1932), 101 (hereinafter
"Fachiri").
156 See Rosenne, Law and Practice. 608.
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when the Statutes of both Courts were being drafted, one 
wonders whether its continued retention in the present Statute 
reflects the real state of affairs. Furthermore, as the 
states which framed the Statute were all considered to be 
civilized, one finds the necessity for the use of the word 
puzzling. In any case, can it not be safely assumed that all 
states which accede to the Statute of the Court are adjudged 
to be civilized in the pertinent sense in which that word is 
used in the Statute? It is even debatable to suggest that 
today those states which have not acceded to the Statute are 
not civilized. For these reasons, among others, it is 
respectfully submitted that the retention of the word 
civilized in Article 38(1)(c) has outlived its usefulness. 
Rosenne has observed that the use of the word civilized in 
that paragraph is in the view of most persons "superogatory as 
well as meaningless”.157
Article 38(1)(c) was inserted into the Statute to prevent 
the situation from arising in which the Court would be 
compelled to throw out a case because it has no law available 
on which to decide it. This situation, commonly referred to 
in the legal literature as non liquet.158 was one of the
157 See Rosenne, The World Court. 113. Cf. Singh, 46,
144.
158 See generally H. Lauterpacht, The Function of Law in 
the International Community (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933), 
51-84 (hereinafter "Function”); id., "Some Observations on 
the Prohibition of 'Non Liquet1 and the Completeness of the 
Law", in Svmbolae Verz ii1 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers, 1958), 196-221; J. Stone, "Non Liquet and the
Function of Law in the International Community", 35 BYIL 
(1959), 124-61.
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serious problems which dominated the deliberations of the 
Committee of Jurists responsible for preparing a plan for the 
establishment of a Permanent Court.159
The fact that there has never been a case in which 
Article 38 has been a key issue before the Court serves to 
underscore the veracity of the assertion that it has proved 
satisfactory in practice notwithstanding the doctrinal 
problems which it might have caused.160 Its practical 
success is further underlined by the fact that it is 
frequently taken over into international arbitration 
agreements.161 It has also been regarded as a successful 
accomplishment of the codification of the sources of law.162 
Article 10 of the Model Rules of the ILC on arbitration 
procedure proposed making it a general feature of the law of 
arbitral procedure.163
159 See Kearney, 611-2; also, Rosenne, Law and Practice.
605.
160 See Rosenne, Law and Practice. 604, 605; also see
M.O. Hudson, International Tribunals. Studies in the 
Administration of International Law and Organisations, No.2 
(Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
1944), 19, 254.
161 See Rosenne, Law and Practice. 604.
162 See UN, Survey of International Law in Relation to the
Work of the International Law Commission. Memorandum of the
Secretary-General of the United Nations, New York, 1949,
Document A/CN.4/1/Rev.1, 22; Rosenne, Law and Practice. 604.
163 See ibid. Rosenne also points to the sparsity of 
direct jurisprudence on the article as an indication of its 
satisfactory operation in practice, ibid., 605. See PCIJ 
Series A . No.20-1, 20 and ICJ Reports 1960, 37. In addition 
to these the article has also been mentioned in passing in a 
few recent cases. See, for instance, ibid. 1982, 37, para.23; 
ibid. 1984, 290-1, paras.83-4.
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(b) Judicial Decisions as a Source of Law
The meaning of the term "source" is a matter which has 
aroused some controversy. In common law, the term is used in 
a number of senses. When we speak of a formal source we are 
referring to the law-creating process, or the acts or facts by 
which a material source is clothed with legal validity and 
obligatory force. A material source alludes to that source 
from which the substance of the law is derived, or the content 
of the law.164 As Kearney has rightly observed the 
distinction between formal and material is not an easy one to 
make.165 Historical sources are those sources which the law 
itself acknowledges. The Roman legal system affords a very 
good example of this type of source. Last but not least by a 
literal source we mean the place where the law is found. An 
Act of Parliament provides an example of literal source.166
Given that these diverse meanings render the concept of 
source in both municipal and international law confusing, it 
is no wonder that some theorists of international law, notably 
P.E. Corbett, have advocated its abandonment from the 
terminology of international law.167 The term may however be
164 See to the same effect, Nawaz, 526. Also, G. 
Fitzmaurice, "Some Problems Regarding the Formal Sources of 
International Law", in Svmbolae Verziil (The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers, 1958), 153, 154 (hereinafter "Some
Problems"); Kearney, 697.
165 See ibid., 617.
166 See Nawaz, 526.
167 See P.E. Corbett, "The Consent of States and the 
Sources of the Law of Nations", 6 BYIL (1925), 20.
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retained if we make sure how it is intended to be used. For 
example, we have been admonished not to use it in relation to 
the question why international law is in general binding.168 
It has been suggested that the term source be replaced by the 
term "evidence”, since the evidence of international law is 
the documents proving the consent of a state to its rules. As 
consent is the essential basis of international law, it is to 
those documents that prove consent that one must look in an 
enquiry about sources of international law. It has been 
argued that the term "evidence" is better suited to the 
international legal system which is an aggregate of rules 
governing interstate relations.169 Nawaz points to
Sorensen's definition of sources of international law as 
"those things which indicate the actual or concrete content of 
this system” which he calls "this functional meaning of the 
term source” as lending support to the proposition that it be 
discarded in favour of the term evidence.
It is significant that the word source is conspicuously 
absent from the provisions of Article 38 and also that they
are not explained in unqualified terms. It does not therefore
seem that the enumeration contained in Article 38 is meant to 
be or indeed is exhaustive.170 On the assumption that the 
consequence of the amendment to Article 38 of the Statute of
168 See C. Parry, The Sources and Evidences of 
International Law (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1965), 4 (hereinafter "Parry”). See also O'Connell, 9.
169 See Nawaz, 527.
170 See to the same effect, Nawaz, 527-8.
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the Permanent Court is to declare that the four enumerated
sources of law are intended as "an authentic emanation of the 
various components of existing law to be applied by the 
Court", Kelsen objects to the four categories as being 
exclusive or normative.171 Kearney comments that "presumably 
Kelsen is using the term 'authentic' in the same sense as 'the 
authentic interpretation* of German law, an interpretation 
that is as binding and of the same quality as the legal 
instrument which is being interpreted.172 
Fitzmaurice has observed that:
Article 38 ... is not technically an abstract statement 
of what the sources of international law are, but a 
standing directive to the Court (analogous to any 
corresponding provision of a compromis in a particular 
case) as to what it is to apply in deciding cases brought 
before it. Insofar as Article 38 does purport to contain 
or reflect an abstract statement of the sources of 
international law it is defective because (a) it does not 
distinguish between the formal and material sources; (b) 
it establishes no system of priorities, except on one 
point or inferentially and then not in all respects the 
right one, and (c) the formal sources of international 
law, while covered by it, are imperfectly or 
inappropriately stated.173
If we agree with Fitzmaurice that Article 38 is a 
standing directive to the Court, then its significance must 
necessarily lie in its value as a tool rather than its quality 
as a doctrinal exposition. While the absence of a rigid
171 See H. Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations: A 
Critical Analysis of Its Fundamental Problems. 4th impression, 
bound in supplement (London: Stevens & Sons, published under 
the auspices of the London Institute of World Affairs, 1964), 
531-4 (hereinafter "Kelsen"); see also Kearney, 654.
172 See ibid.
173 See Fitzmaurice, "Some Problems", 176.
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classification with respect to the first three paragraphs of 
the article as we have already seen affords the Court ample 
latitude to declare and develop the law, the lack of 
distinction between material and formal sources of law 
enhances the flexibility available to the Court in carrying 
out its functions. It must be pointed out that this so-called 
defect has not prevented the decisions of the Court, as well 
as those of other tribunals, from performing their legitimate 
role in the development of international law and 
jurisprudence. To this extent, these so-called defects may 
after all prove to be the strength of the article.174
In spite of the difficulties regarding the use of the 
word "sources” in legal terminology, Article 38 has not 
infrequently been regarded as listing the sources of 
international law.175 In fact, the Court itself has referred 
to "the legal sources specified in Article 38(1)...". 176 In 
the Gulf of Maine Case a chamber of the Court, in order to 
ascertain the principles and rules of international law which 
in general govern the subject of maritime delimitation, had to 
refer to
conventions, (Article 38, para.1(a)) and international 
custom (para.l(b)), to the definition of which judicial 
decisions (para.1(d)) either of the Court or of 
arbitration tribunals have already made a substantial
174 See Kearney, 697.
175 See Rosenne, Law and Practice. 604, n.2.
176 See ICJ Reports 1982, 37, para.23; ibid. 1986, 575, 
para.42.
contribution.177
It is clear that the Court considers judicial decisions 
as a source of law though it has never expressly indicated the 
nature or the kind of source it is. We have seen178 how the 
Court, in spite of the emphatic language of Article 59 which 
seeks to limit the formal authority of the decision to the 
case in which it is rendered and to the narrow circle of 
parties thereto, has, subject to the overriding principle of 
res iudicata. reconsidered the substance of the law as
contained in an earlier decision and also regularly cited 
previous decisions and opinions. It has also been pointed 
out179 that the ratio decidendi of the Court*s judgment and 
opinions as opposed to its dispositif greatly enrich the 
general corpus of international law. It is for this reason 
that one encounters references to "well established 
principles",180 "firmly established rule",181 "the
established jurisprudence"182 or "the long established 
jurisprudence" in the Court's judgments and advisory opinions. 
The practice of the Court leads one to conclude that it 
regards judicial decisions as the source of law. State
practice largely influenced or determined by that of the
177 See ibid. 1984, 290-1, para.83.
178 See above, 50-6.
179 See above, 37-9.
180 See ibid. 1985, 40, para.47.
181 See ibid. 1986, 632, para. 147.
182 See ibid. 1961, 32, 34.
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Court, though not usually entirely consistent, tends to 
confirm the view that states do consider judicial decisions as 
a source of law.
Juristic opinion on the answer to the question whether 
judicial decisions, especially those of the International 
Court, constitute a source of law as far as can be discerned 
from the legal literature, is by no means unanimous. There 
is, however, little doubt that many distinguished theorists of 
international law look upon judicial decisions as a source of 
law.183
The view that judicial decisions constitute a source of 
international law is also contained in Article 24 of the 
Statute of the ILC which imposes on that body the duty to 
consider ways and means for making the evidence of customary 
international law more readily available, by reference to 
"documents concerning state practice and of the decisions of 
national and international courts on questions of 
international law". The ILC went on record as saying that 
"such decisions, particularly those by international courts, 
may formulate and apply principles and rules of customary 
international law", as particulars of the evidence of which it 
mentioned:
183 See Kearney, 697-8; H. Lauterpacht, Development. 21. 
See also Nawaz, 528-9. For a very cautious and hesitant, if 
practically identical view, see S. Rosenne, The International 
Court of Justice (Leiden: A.W. Sijthoff, 1957), 425
(hereinafter "The ICJ"); id., The World Court. 113-4; id., 
Law and Practice. 611-2. See also Higgins, "The Court and 
South West Africa", 591; Jhabvala, "Scope of Individual 
Opinions", 52.
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(a) Texts of international instruments;
(b) Decisions of international courts;
(c) Decisions of national courts;
(d) National legislation;
(e) Diplomatic correspondence;
(f) Opinions of national legal advisers (with reserve); and
(g) Practice of international organisations.184
The ILC therefore recognises judicial decisions as evidence of 
international law.
To the reasons already adduced in explanation of the 
Court*s reluctance to rely on the decisions of other 
tribunals,185 we would like to add, and this may be 
especially valid in the early years of the Permanent Court, 
the fact that the Court would have had to rely on the 
jurisprudence of other tribunals as the cornerstone of its own 
jurisprudence, had it cultivated habits in its formative years 
of invoking the decisions of such tribunals which may not have 
shared its judicial character. While this may not be totally 
undesirable it is debatable whether given the relative 
sparsity of general arbitral jurisprudence, let alone its non­
judicial character, such jurisprudence would have been an 
appropriate launching pad for the take-off of the kind of 
system of international adjudication for which both the 
Permanent Court and the International Court were created. In
184 See UN, GAOR, Supp. No. 12, A/316. See also Nawaz,
529.
185 See above, 59.
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fairness to the International Court, however, it should be 
said that the attitude it adopted towards international 
arbitral jurisprudence exemplified by its summary dismissal of 
general arbitral jurisprudence in the Barcelona Traction Case 
(Merits), appears to have been somewhat modified in recent 
times. This change in the Courtfs attitude regarding arbitral 
jurisprudence is evidenced by frequent references to the 
Franco-British Arbitration of June 1977 in subsequent 
continental shelf delimitation cases which have come before 
it. Moreover, in theory at least, it does not seem that the 
Court has ascribed a secondary role to such jurisprudence. 
Some indication of this comes out very clearly in the Court's 
reference to Article 38 of the Statute in the Gulf of Maine 
Case.
It has also been pointed out that the Court never cites 
decisions of municipal courts. It regards such decisions as 
being in a category different from those of other 
tribunals.186 It has been suggested that the decisions of 
municipal courts which are organs of the state, when vested 
with authority and uniformity, may be regarded as expressing 
the opinio juris of that state. When a series of concordant 
and authoritative decisions of municipal courts cover a point 
of international law, such decisions may properly be regarded 
as evidence of international custom in which sense, in 
addition to serving as subsidiary means for determining rules 
of international law according to the terms of Article
186 See H. Lauterpacht, Development. 20.
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38(1)(d), they also act as evidence of a general practice 
accepted as law under Article 38(1)(b).
By virtue of the rule contained in Article 59 judicial 
decisions are certainly, at least in theory, not a formal 
source, though they may be a material or literary source. 
Fitzmaurice has described them as a "formally material" 
source.187
Besides the fact that the employment of judicial
decisions as a source of law is subject to Article 59, in
relation to other the legal sources enumerated in the first
three subparagraphs of that Article, they are also it is a
subsidiary source. The meaning of the term subsidiary is not
clear. According to Hudson
It may be thought to mean that these sources are to be 
subordinated to others mentioned in the Article. That 
is, to be regarded only when sufficient guidance cannot 
be found in international conventions, international 
customs and general principles of law.
He further adds that "the French term auxiliaire seems however
to indicate that confirmation of rules found to exist may be
sought by referring to jurisprudence".188
It has been argued that state practice which is
responsible for the creation of new rules and clarification of
existing rules of international law, is the primary means for
187 See Fitzmaurice, "Some Problems", 172-3. Fitzmaurice 
explains that "judicial decisions are a source which tribunals 
are bound to take into account, even if they are not bound to 
follow them... ". See also Fitzmaurice1s characterization of 
the decision in the Fisheries Case (ICJ Reports 1951, 116) as 
a "quasi-formal" source of law. See also Kearney, 699.
188 See Hudson, The Permanent Court. 612-3.
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the determination of those rules; and that only infrequently 
will tribunals be called upon to adjudicate on inter-state 
disputes, so that judicial decisions are subsidiary means for 
determining rules of law.189
The part played by state practice has been expressly 
acknowledged in subparagraph (b) , and implicitly recognised in 
subparagraphs (a) and (c) of Article 38(1). It is therefore 
difficult to sustain the argument that it is the primary means 
for the creation of rules of international law in relation to 
Article 38(1)(d), not least because it would seem to transfer 
the judicial task of ascertaining the law from the Court to 
states, a proposition which is both impracticable and patently 
unacceptable.
Besides the standing directive given to the Court by
states through the medium of the Statute, it may be said that
the law lies in the bosom of the Court, that is, the law lies
within the judicial knowledge of the Court. In the Nicaragua/
United States Case the Court explained that
The principle jure novit curia signifies that the law is 
not solely dependent on the argument of the parties 
before it with respect to the applicable law (Lotus Case. 
PCIJ Series.A. No. 10, 31) so that the absence of one
party has less impact.
It recalled its observation in the Fisheries Jurisdiction
Cases that:
The Court as an international juridical organ is deemed 
to take judicial notice of international law and is 
therefore required ... to consider on its own initiative 
all rules of international law which may be relevant to 
the settlement of the dispute, it being the duty of the
189 See Greig, International Law. 32.
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Court itself to ascertain, in applying the relevant law 
in the given circumstances of the case, the burden of 
establishing or proving rules of international law cannot 
be imposed on any of the parties for the law lies within 
the judicial knowledge of the Court.190
So while the views of the parties to a case as to the law
applicable to their dispute are material, particularly when
those views are concordant,191 in the final analysis the
Court must decide as to the law to be applied to the
dispute.192
Many Soviet writers espouse the view that decisions of 
the Court constitute a subsidiary source of international 
law.193 Tunkin points to the rejection of judicial precedent 
by Article 59 of the Statute,194 and seeks justification for
190 See ICJ Reports 1986, 24, para.29. Also, ibid. 1974, 
9, para.17, 181, para.18.
191 See ibid. 1986, 24, para.29. See also Rosenne, Law 
and Practice. 603-4 and the authorities therein cited. After 
having observed in connection with the Court's judgment in the 
South West Africa Cases (Second Phase) that "the proprio moto 
principle is not a licence to ignore established legal 
concepts nor to avoid issues upon which one has legal 
jurisdiction to pronounce", Higgins remarked that "it [the 
proprio moto principle] is a principle designed to affirm the 
Court's superior understanding of the law to that of the 
parties before it". See Higgins, "The Court and South West 
Africa", 582. See also, Jhabvala, "Scope of Individual 
Opinions", 50, where he points out that judges are presumed to 
have a recognised competence in international law. See 
Article 2 of the Statute. See also Singh, 143.
192 For the view that the practical significance of the 
label "subsidiary means" in Article 38(1)(d) is not to be 
exaggerated, see Brownlie, Principles. 20.
193 See G.I. Tunkin, Theory of International Law (London: 
Allen & Unwin, 1974? Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1974), 182 (hereinafter "Theory"), for his view and 
other Soviet citations. Cf. W.E. Butler, Soviet Law. 2nd ed. 
(London: Butterworths, 1988), 51-3.
194 See Tunkin, Theory, 183.
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his position that the decisions of the Court are not part of 
the process for creating and modifying norms of international 
law in the argument that decisions of the Court reflect the 
opinion of its members who are specialists in international 
law. He declares that "this brings decisions of the Court 
closer to doctrine and not without reason does the Statute of 
the Court speak of judicial decisions and the teachings of 
international law simultaneously”.195
Tunkin's stance has been criticised, and rightly so, for 
denying to judicial authority its due place in legal doctrine 
and practice. It has been pointed out that the Court's 
decisions are certainly on a different plane from juristic 
opinions and that the Court is neither a mere assemblage of 
highly qualified publicists nor its decisions mere expressions 
of juristic writings.196
Tunkin's view regarding judicial decisions closely 
resembles the classical position of which Virally is an 
exponent. To Virally the judicial decisions mentioned in 
Article 38(1)(d) refer first and foremost to the decisions of 
the Court itself. He makes the point that the Court refers 
constantly to its previous decisions, the illustrative value 
of which, in his view, depends upon the authority of the Court 
and the procedure by which they have been reached, rather than 
on their binding force which is restricted to the circle of
195 See ibid. See also Nawaz, 530.
196 See ibid.
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parties and to the actual judgment or order.197 For Virally,
judicial decisions create particular rules in a derivative
manner by imposing obligations on the parties by virtue of
superior rules. Having differentiated between the operative
part and the reasoning of the judgment, he points out that
general principles of law are, in practice, incorporated into
international law through judicial decisions. Unlike the
first three legal sources listed in Article 38(1), judicial
decisions are seen by Virally as not being autonomous, but
mere subsidiary means for the ascertainment of general rules
of law. In summing up his discussion of judicial decisions as
a source of law he enters the caveat that
It must be understood that Subsidiary* does not mean 
* secondary*. On the contrary, in many areas of 
international law such decisions constitute the best 
means of ascertainment of what the law is. Judicial... 
decisions [Virally concludes] represent an integral part 
of international practice in the creation of customary 
rules.
Another category of judicial decision, which also 
constitutes an autonomous source of law, is that pertaining to 
jurisdictional questions, for under Article 36(6) *'in the 
event of a dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, 
the matter shall be settled by a decision of the Court*'. Such
197 See Virally, 150-1. For the view that the decisions 
of the Court on procedure constitute an autonomous source of 
law, see Virally, 151-2? see also Muhammad Zafrullah Khan, 
"Address by the President of the International Court of 
Justice at a Special Sitting of the Court held on 27 April 
1972 to mark the 50th Anniversay of the Inauguration of the 
International Judicial System", reprinted in 19 NILR (1972), 
12? see also ICJYB 1971-2, 128-40 where the address is also 
reprinted. On the Court's power to regulate its procedure, 
see Articles 30 and 48 of the Statute. See also, Moore, 
"Organisation", 506.
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a determination will be final and binding on the parties under 
the terms of Articles 60 and 59 respectively.
De Bustamente adopts a position substantially similar to 
that of Virally when he observed, in relation to the amendment 
of Article 35(4) (now Article 38(1)(d)) by the Council of the 
Assembly of the League which made the operation of that 
article subject to the provisions of Article 37(a) (now 
Article 59), that "this indicates in a rather confused manner 
the difference not discussed by anyone between jurisprudence 
as a source of law and the effect of res judicata".198 
Concluding his treatment of the law applied by the Court he 
wrote:
The final revision of this Article slightly diminished, 
in No. 4, the obligatory force of international 
jurisprudence. Its creative legal power, in the absence 
of written or customary law, is limited to being an 
auxiliary method for determining its rules. [He hastens 
to add that] There is however no standard, outside of 
jurisprudence ... for determining what are the 
principles of law recognised by civilized nations ...199
(c) Limitations of Judicial Decisions as a Source of Law200 
The international judicial system suffers from a number 
of severe limitations which militate against the tendency to
198 See de Bustamante, 241-2.
199 See ibid.
200 On the contrasts between national and international 
judicial systems, see generally L.F. Damrosch, "Multilateral 
Disputes", in The International Court of Justice at the 
Crossroads. L.F. Damrosch (ed.) (Dobbs Ferry, NY: 
Transnational Publishers, 1987), 376 at 378-80 (hereinafter 
"Damrosch"); J.G. Merrills, International Dispute Settlement 
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1984), 103 (hereinafter
"Merrills").
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regard judicial decisions as a source of law. The particular 
reasoning and unintegrated character of the system render it 
difficult, if not impossible, to regard judicial decisions as 
a source of law.201 The view has been expressed that "it is 
incautious to extract general propositions from opinions and 
judgments devoted to a specific problem or settlement of . 
disputes entangled with the special relations of two 
states".202 Another limitation of the international 
judicial system is the lack of automatic enforcement of its 
orders indicating interim measures of protection and 
judgments. Under Article 94(1) of the United Nations Charter 
"each member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with 
the decision of the International Court of Justice to any case 
to which it is a party". Under paragraph 2 of the same 
article
even if a party to the same case fails to perform the 
obligations incumbent upon it under a judgment rendered 
by the Court the other party may have recourse to the 
Security Council which may, if it deems necessary, make 
recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to 
give effect to the judgment.
It is clear from the provisions of the Charter that the 
Security Council will not normally, on its own initiative, 
take action to give effect to a judgment of the Court. It 
must be approached by one of the parties to the case decided.
201 See ICJ Reports 1984, 290, para. 81, concerning
uniqueness of cases.
202 See Brownlie, Principles. 21. See also Rosenne, The 
World Court. 114? id., The ICJ. 495. On this uninterpreted 
character of the international judicial system, see Article 9 
of the Statute.
100
When such an approach is made, there is no guarantee that the 
Security Council resulting draft resolution would not be 
subjected to the veto by a permanent member.203
One further limitation which is somewhat connected to the 
last mentioned, pertains to the absence of compulsory 
jurisdiction. The essentially voluntary character of the 
system means that judicial traditions, strictly speaking, 
cannot create general rules binding on all states just as 
judicial precedent binds individuals in common law 
jurisdictions or just as in all states those rules which are 
the object of what is called "the settled jurisprudence" bind 
individuals who are subject to the compulsory jurisdiction of 
the courts.204
The international judicial system has yet another 
limitation which makes the proposition that judicial decisions 
represent a source of law seemingly untenable. This has to do 
with the relative sparsity of international litigation.205
203 See above, 44, n.30. On the enforcement of
international judicial decisions, see generally, E.K. Nantwi, 
The Enforcement of International Judicial Decisions and 
Arbitral Awards in Public International Law (Leiden: A.W.
Sijthoff, 1966); R.P. Anand, Studies in International 
Adjudication (Delhi: Vikas Publications, 1969), 250-86
(hereinafter "Studies"); W.M. Reisman, Nullity and Revision: 
The Review and Enforcement of International Judgments and 
Awards (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971) (hereinafter 
"Nullity") ? id., "The Enforcement of International Judgments", 
ASILP (1968), 13-35.
204 See Virally, 151.
205 See Rosenne, The World Court. 113-4; Higgins, "The 
Court and South West Africa", 593; Saxena, 676; Nawaz, 532; 
T.O. Elias, Africa and the Development of International Law 
(Leiden: A.W. Sijthoff, 1972), 76 (hereinafter "Africa"). See 
also ICJYB 1969-70, 24.
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The aforementioned limitations notwithstanding, judicial 
decisions, especially those of the International Court, have 
made an invaluable contribution to the development of 
international law. They constitute a "principle method by 
which the law can find some concrete measure of clarification 
and development".206
(d) Normative Impact of Judicial Decisions
So far we have examined the tendency of the International 
Court to refer to its own jurisprudence and that of its 
predecessor, the Permanent Court, whose lead it may be said to 
be following in this regard. The effect of this tendency on 
the attitude of states and the doctrinal writing of jurists 
has also been clearly shown. Some judgments have also exerted 
a profound and decisive influence on the codification and 
progressive development of international law, through their 
impact on international codifying agencies and conferences. 
It is this impact of the jurisprudence of the Court on the 
course of international law which we propose to explore by a 
brief study of some of these judgments.
206 See the dissenting opinion of Fitzmaurice J. in the 
Barcelona Traction Case (Merits), ICJ Reports 1970, 64. See 
also Elias, Africa. 76, 77; S. Oda, "The Role of the
International Court of Justice" 19 IJIL (1979), 162-3
(hereinafter "Role of the Court"); Rosenne, The World Court. 
128; Fawcett, 134; H. Lauterpacht, Development. 87, 190-9 
passim; Greig, International Law. 34; Fitzmaurice, "Some 
Problems", 170.
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(i) Corfu Channel Case207
This dispute, which gave rise to three Judgments by the
207 See ICJ Reports 1949, 4. For references to this case 
in the literature see, for example, Fawcett, 134; Rosenne, 
The World Court. 121-3; J. Verzijl, The Jurisprudence of the
World Court; A Case-bv-Case Commentary. Vol. 2, The
International Court of Justice (1947-65) (Leiden: Institute 
for International Law of the University of Utrecht, 1966) , 22- 
36 (hereinafter tvVerzijl") ; E.M. Hambro, The Case Law of 
the International Court (Leiden: A.W. Sijthoff, 1952), 55, 71, 
95-7, 123-5, 129-31, 161, 327, 329, 363-5, 367, 419, 421, 423 
(hereinafter "Case Law”); G. Elian, The International Court 
of Justice (Leiden: A.W. Sijthoff, 1971), 98-100 (hereinafter 
"Elian"); I. Brownlie, "The Use of Force in Self-Defence", 37 
BYIL (1961), 183 at 223, 233, 244, 250, 266 (hereinafter "Use 
of Force"); Parry, 60, 149, 182; C.G. Tornaritis, "The
Review of the Role of the International Court of Justice", 24 
RUCW 1 (1971), 34
(hereinafter "Tornaritis"); G. Fitzmaurice, "The Law and 
Procedure of the International Court of Justice: Treaty
Interpretation and Certain Other Treaty Points", 28 BYIL 
(1951), 18-9, 21, 27 (hereinafter "28 BYIL (1951)"); id., "The 
Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice, 1951- 
54: Questions of Jurisdiction, Competence and Procedure", 34 
BYIL (1958), 8, 31, 81, 82, 84-5, 91, 99 (hereinafter "34 BYIL 
(1958)"); id.,"The Law and Procedure of the International 
Court of Justice, 1954-9: General Principles and Sources of 
International Law", 35 BYIL (1959), 183, 212, 234 (hereinafter 
"35 BYIL (1959)"); id., The Law and Procedure of the 
International Court of Justice. Vol.2 (Cambridge: Grotius
Publications Ltd., 1986), 2:4-6, 13, 17, 19-22, 27-31, 33, 59- 
60, 62, 68, 100-1, 109-11, 124, 126-31, 183 n.3, 434, 457,
504, 508 n.2, 510-1, 517, 525, 577, 582, 585-6, 614, 709 n.9, 
770 n.4, 771 n.2 (hereinafter l'Fitzmaurice") ; Elkind, Non- 
Appearance . 38-41; Merrills, 96, 103; I.F.I. Shihata, The 
Power of the International Court to Determine Its Own 
Jurisdiction (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1965), 
56, 131, 135-6 (hereinafter "Shihata"); J.R. D'Angelo,
"Resort to Force by States to Protect Nationals: The US Rescue 
Mission to Iran and its Legality under International Law", 21 
VJIL (1981), 486, 502-3 (hereinafter "D'Angelo"); H.K.
Hubbard, "Separation of Powers Within the United Nations: A 
Revised Role for the International Court of Justice", 38 
Stan.LR (1985), 169, 174, 180; G.F. Jones, "Termination of 
Declarations under the Optional Clause: Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua", 20 TILJ 
(1985), 557, 559, n.ll (hereinafter "Jones"); G. Weissberg, 
"The Role of the International Court of Justice in the United 
Nations System: The First Quarter Century", in L. Gross
(ed.), The Future of the Court 131, 132, 165-8, 172, 173
(hereinafter "Weissberg").
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Court, arose out of the explosions of mines by which some 
British warships suffered damage while passing through the 
Corfu Channel in 1946, in a part of Albanian waters which had 
previously been swept. The ships were severely damaged and 
several crew members killed.
On the recommendation of the Security Council the United 
Kingdom instituted proceedings against Albania in the 
International Court on 22 May 1947. The Court rejected a 
preliminary objection filed by Albania and decided that the 
proceedings on the merits should continue.
The Court, in its judgment of 9 April, 1949, found 
sufficient evidence to hold Albania the territorial state 
responsible in law for the incident of 22 October 1946 and 
under a duty of making compensation for the resulting loss and 
damage. The Court also held that while the passage of British 
warships through the Corfu Channel on 22 October, was not a 
violation of Albanian sovereignty as it had the character of 
innocent passage, the minesweeping activities of 12 and 13 
November 1946 certainly had that effect, and that this 
declaration by the Court constituted in itself appropriate 
satisfaction.208
The significance of this case for our enquiry lies in the 
rules applied by the Court to the right of innocent passage 
through the territorial sea in general, and through straits 
serving international navigation in particular,209 as well as
208 See ICJ Reports 1949, 36.
209 See Oda, "Role of the Court", 162.
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the formulation of the law of state responsibility.210 On
the duty of the Albanian authorities to shipping in the
territorial sea in general, the Court said:
The obligations incumbent upon the Albanian authorities 
consisted in notifying, for the benefit of shipping in 
general, the existence of a minefield in Albanian 
territorial waters and in warning the approaching British 
warships of the imminent danger to which the minefield 
exposed them. Such obligations are based ... on 
elementary considerations of humanity, even more exacting 
in peace than in war; the principle of the freedom of 
maritime communication? and every State's obligation not 
to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts 
contrary to the rights of other States .. .211
In reply to Albania1s contention that the North Corfu
Strait did not belong to the class of international highways
through which a right of passage existed, on the grounds that
it was only of secondary importance, and not even a necessary
route between two parts of the High Seas, and that it was used
almost exclusively for local traffic to and from the ports of
Corfu and Swanda, the Court declared that the decisive
criterion was rather the geographical situation of the Strait
as connecting two parts of the High Seas, and the fact that it
was being used for international navigation. The Court
concluded that having regard to these various considerations:
"the North Corfu Channel should be considered as belonging to
the class of international highways through which passage
cannot be prohibited by a coastal State in time of peace."212
210 See H. Lauterpacht, Development. 87ff; also Elias, 
Africa. 77.
211 See ICJ Reports 1949, 22.
212 See ibid., 29.
105
While the Court conceded Albania*s right to regulate the 
passage of warships through the strait, in view of the 
exceptional circumstances then prevailing, it did not consider 
that Albania was justified in prohibiting such passage or 
subjecting it to the reguirement of special authorisation.213
The Corfu Channel Case was the first of a series of cases 
in which the Court was to discuss matters concerning the law 
of the sea. The rules applied by the Court to the regime of 
the straits used for international navigation and the innocent 
passage of warships, engaged the attention of the ILC to which 
the General Assembly of the United Nations had assigned the 
task of the codification of the Law of the Sea. On the basis 
of the work of the ILC it was possible for the 1958 Geneva 
Conference on the Law of the Sea to lay down general rules 
governing the right of innocent passage through the 
territorial sea and through straits serving international 
navigation.214
The rules governing the regime of the Straits used for 
international navigation and the innocent passage of warships, 
embodied in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea 
and the Contiguous Zone were incorporated into the 1982 United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.215 Article 24 of
213 See ibid., 29-32.
214 See Rosenne, The World Court. 127-8? id., The ICJ.
495.
215 See UN, The Law of the Sea: Official Text of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea with Annexes 
and Index (New York, 1983), Articles 17, 19, 24, 45? the
Convention is also reprinted in e.g. Brownlie, Basic
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the Convention reflects the Court*s ruling in the Corfu 
Channel Case concerning the obligations incumbent upon the 
Albanian authorities to notify, for the benefit of shipping in 
general, the existence of a minefield and to warn the 
approaching British warships of the danger to which the 
minefield exposed them. Article 24 is also consistent with 
the Court*s ruling that Albania was not justified in 
prohibiting the passage of ships through the North Corfu 
Strait, or subjecting such passage to special authorisation. 
It will be noticed that the references in the Convention to 
"straits used for international navigation" and "between a 
part of the high seas" are identical to the criteria relied on 
by the Court to describe the North Corfu Channel "as belonging 
to the class of international highways through which passage 
cannot be prohibited by a coastal state in time of peace".216
In formulating the law of state responsibility, the Court 
considered it as clear that the mere fact that the explosions 
which had caused damage, injury and death to British warships 
and naval personnel were caused by a minefield in Albanian 
territorial waters could not justify the imputation to that 
government of the knowledge of the fact that the mines were 
being laid. The Court conceded that a state in whose 
territorial waters a breach of international law occurred 
could not evade a request to render an explanation just by 
claiming ignorance of the act constituting the said breach and
Documents, 85-203; Millar, Treaties. 145-74.
216 See above, 105.
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its authors. In the view of the Court, the state concerned 
may be under a limited obligation to prove the use it has made 
of the means of information and enquiry at its disposal.217
The Court qualified the liability of the state concerned 
by observing that the mere fact of control exercised by a 
state over its territorial waters could not constitute an 
adequate basis for concluding that it necessarily knew, or 
should have known, of any unlawful act committed therein, nor 
yet that it necessarily knew, or ought to have known, the 
authors.218 The Court thought that this qualification of the 
liability was in turn also limited by the consideration that 
the injured state should be permitted a more liberal recourse 
to inferences of fact and circumstantial or indirect 
evidence.219 Thus, in the Corfu Channel Case judgment the 
Court had through a shrewd mixture of "judicial restraint and 
economy of expression” formulated a balanced law of state 
responsibility and thereby made a useful contribution to 
international law. The Court has been criticized for not 
indicating the source of the law it applied in this case in 
relation to state responsibility, especially its failure to 
cite any provisions of the UN Charter.220
217 See ICJ Reports 1949, 18.
218 See ibid. Cf. the Court's observations in the 
Nicaragua/United States Case (Merits), ICJ Reports 1986, 84, 
para.155 and 86, para.160.
219 See ICJ Reports 1949, 18.
220 See D'Angelo, 501-3? Lissitzyn, 26-7.
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(ii) Fisheries Case221
The judgment delivered by the Court in this case ended a 
long controversy between the United Kingdom and Norway which 
had aroused considerable interest in other maritime states. 
In 1935 Norway enacted a decree by which it reserved certain 
fishing grounds situated off its northern coast for the 
exclusive use of its own fishermen. The question at issue was 
whether this decree, which laid down a method for drawing the 
baselines from which the width of the Norwegian territorial 
waters had to be calculated, was valid international law. 
This question was rendered particularly delicate by the 
intricacies of the Norwegian coastal zone, with its many 
fjords, bays, islands, islets and reefs. In its judgment of 
18 December 1951, the Court found that, contrary to the 
submissions of the United Kingdom, neither the method nor the 
actual baselines stipulated by the 1935 decree were contrary 
to international law.
221 See ICJ Reports 1951, 116. For references to this 
case in the literature, see for example: Fawcett, 134? Oda, 
"Role of the Court", 160, 162-3; Rosenne, The World Court. 
126-8; id., "On the Non-Use of the Advisory Competence of the 
International Court of Justice", 39 BYIL. (1963), 1 at 30
(hereinafter "Non-Use"); Nawaz, 532-4; J.G. Starke, 
"International Legal Notes: The Locus Standi of a Third State 
to Intervene in Contentious Proceedings before the ICJ", 58 
ALJ. (1984) 356 (hereinafter "Locus Standi"); Verzijl, 100- 
16; Hambro, Case Law. 73-81, 345; Elian, 100-1; Tornaritis, 
34; Merrills, 94, 104-5; Fitzmaurice, 86, 138-84, 197,
199-259, 436, n.5, 505, n.5, 506, n.4, 579-80, 538 n.4; id., 
"The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice 
1951-54: Points of Substantive Law, Part I", 31 BYIL (1954),
1, 8-47, 70 (hereinafter "31 BYIL (1954)"); id., 35 BYIL. 
183, 235; F. Vallat, "The Function of the International Court 
of Justice in the World Community", 2 GJICL (1972), 55-6;
Weissberg, 173, 189.
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The Court's decision in this case in effect created a new 
rule of international law for the delimitation of maritime 
frontiers in parts of the world where unusual geographical and 
economic factors are present. In addition to the effect of 
the decision on the thinking of foreign offices throughout the 
world, the applicable principles for the delimitation of the 
territorial sea expounded by the courts also influenced the 
ILC222 to which the General Assembly of the United Nations 
had entrusted the first phase of the task of codifying the Law 
of the Sea in 1950. The problem of formulating general rules 
from the specific principles and rules applied in the 
Fisheries Case as well as those applied earlier in the Corfu 
Channel Case (Merits) 223 relating to the right of innocent 
passage through the territorial sea in general and through 
straits used for international navigation in particular, was 
addressed by the ILC with political guidance from the General 
Assembly of the United Nations and individual governments.224
The rules of general application thus formulated were 
approved on the political level225 by the first United 
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea in Geneva in 1958. 
The Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone 
adopted by that conference assimilated the straight baselines
222 See H. Lauterpacht, Development. 197.
223 See above, 106-7.
224 See Rosenne, The World Court. 128? id., The ICJ. 495.
225 See Rosenne, The World Court. 128.
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method.226 The same rule was eventually incorporated in 
paragraphs 1 and 5 of the United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea of 1982.227
The similarity of the language used by the Convention to 
describe economic interest with that used in the judgment is 
particularly striking. Article 15 of the Convention 
concerning delimitation of the territorial sea between 
opposite or adjacent states, which prohibits either of two 
states with opposite or adjacent coasts in the absence of 
agreement to the contrary, from extending their territorial 
sea beyond the median line every point of which is equidistant 
from the nearest points on the baseline on which the breadth 
of territorial seas of each state is measured, also contains 
a proviso that it does not apply where it is necessary by 
reason of historic title or other special circumstances to 
delimit the territorial sea of the two states in a way which 
is at variance therewith.228
The effect produced by the decision in the Fisheries Case 
on the subsequent course of the development of international 
law relating to the matters discussed in the judgment bears 
out the normative value of judicial decisions.
226 See Article 4 of the Law of the Sea Convention (1958) 
in Brownlie, Basic Documents. 87-8.
227 See Brownlie, Basic Documents. 145.
228 See ibid., 147-8.
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(iii) The North Sea Cases229
These cases concerned the delimitation of the continental 
shelf of the North Sea as between Denmark and the Federal 
Republic of Germany, and as between the Netherlands and the 
Federal Republic, and were submitted to the Court by special 
agreement. The parties asked the Court to state the 
principles and rules of international law applicable, and 
undertook thereafter to carry out the delimitations on that 
basis. By an Order of 26 April 1968 the Court, having found 
Denmark and the Netherlands to be in the same interest, joined 
the proceedings in the two cases. In its judgment, delivered 
on 20 February 1969, the Court found that the boundary lines 
in question were to be drawn by agreement between the parties 
and in accordance with equitable principles in such a way as 
to leave to each party those areas of the continental shelf 
which constituted the natural prolongation of its land
229 See ICJ Reports 1969, 3. For references to this case 
in the literature, see for example: D.N. Hutchinson, "The
Concept of Natural Prolongation in the Jurisprudence 
Concerning Delimitation of Continental Shelf Areas", 55 BYIL 
(1984) 133; id., "The Seaward Limit to Continental Shelf
Jurisdiction in Customary International Law", 56 BYIL (1985) 
115-62; Oda, "Role of the Court", 160, 162-4; Rosenne, The 
World Court. 158-9; id., Procedure, 36, 38, 39, 47, 201-6 
passim; Nawaz, 535-8; Elian, 128-30; Hussain, 62, 164-72; 
189-90; 203, 275 n.104, 295 nn.l and 2, 296 n.27; Angelo
Davi•, L'Intervento davanti alia Corte Internazionale di 
Guistizia (Naples: Casa Editrice Jovene, 1984), 17
(hereinafter "Davi"); Kearney, 655-61; Merrills, 108. See 
also, A.W. Rovine, "The National Interest and the World 
Court", in L. Gross (ed.), Future of the Court. 313, 318, 324; 
P.C. Szasz, "Enhancing the Advisory Competence of the World 
Court", in L. Gross (ed.), Future of the Court. 499 at 515 
n.100 (hereinafter "Szasz"); A.O. Adede, "Toward the 
Formulation of the Rule of Delimitation of Sea Boundaries 
between States with Adjacent or Opposite Coastlines", 19 VJIL 
(1978-9), 207 at 315, 216, 234-5, 253.
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territory under the sea, and it indicated certain factors to 
be taken into consideration for that purpose. The Court 
rejected the contention that the delimitations in question had 
to be carried out in accordance with the principle of 
equidistance as defined in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the 
Continental Shelf. The Court took account of the fact that 
the Federal Republic had not ratified that Convention, and 
held that the equidistance principle was not inherent in the 
basic concept of continental shelf rights, and that this 
principle was not a rule of customary international law.
It has been observed that
It is the elucidation of the limits of the continental
shelf and the role of equity in delimitation of lateral
boundaries in contemporary international law that make 
[this] decision one of the landmarks in international 
j urisprudence.230
Nawaz further points out that the 200 metre isobath 
criterion laid down by the 1958 Geneva Continental Shelf 
Convention alongside exploitability, received from the 
judgment a jolt probably never witnessed in the history of 
international law.231 The reverberations of the judgment 
were echoed at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law
of the Sea in the emphasis which many states placed on the
importance of geological and geomorphological factors 
underlining the theory of natural prolongation. The decision, 
not surprisingly, brought about a change in the definition of 
the continental shelf as embodied in the 1958 Geneva
230 See Nawaz, 536.
231 See ibid., 537.
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Convention on the Continental Shelf and the 1982 Convention on 
the Law of the Sea.232
Once again, we witness the impact of a decision of the 
Court on the codification and progressive development of the 
law of the sea. In subsequent continental shelf cases the 
Court has made remarks acknowledging the contribution of its 
jurisprudence in the North Sea Cases to the development of the 
principles and rules governing the delimitation of the 
continental shelf.233
The 1969 judgment demonstrates the unique value of the 
International Court in both evidencing lex lata and 
influencing lex ferenda.234 This case, in which the parties 
sought a declaratory judgment from the Court, also served as 
a mode for seising the Court which was adopted in subsequent 
cases of a similar nature.235
5. Conclusion
Whatever the weaknesses of judicial legislation, the fact
232 See Articles 76(1) and 83(1) of the 1982 UN Convention 
on the Law of the Sea in Brownlie, Basic Documents. 177, 181.
233 See for example, ICJ Reports 1982, 46, para. 32; 47,
para.45? 92, para.132; ibid. 1984, 293, para.91; 293-4,
para.93? 294, para.95? 299-300, para.112? 324, para.187; 339,
para.230.
234 See to the same effect, Nawaz, 538.
235 See H. Mosler, "The Area of Justiciability: Some
Cases of Agreed Delimitation in the Submissions of Disputes to 
the International Court of Justice", in Essays in 
International Law in Honour of Judge Manfred Lachs. J. 
Makarczyk (ed.), (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,
1984), 407-21 passim (hereinafter "The Lachs Collection") .
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that the Court employs it as a means of laying down the law 
for parties other than those to the immediate dispute and for 
future cases is indisputable. A unique characteristic of 
judicial decisions as a legal source, which has very often 
been overlooked, relates to the fact that, in the final 
analysis, it serves as a catalyst to development of 
international law and its influence permeates the other 
principal autonomous legal sources specified in Article 38(1). 
Judicial decisions, whether they are to do with the 
interpretation of treaties, the ascertainment or affirmation 
of rules of international customary law or the application of 
general principles of law, will usually be considered by the 
Court as representing the best and most authoritative evidence 
of international law. In view of the all-pervading influence 
of judicial decisions on the other legal sources, the idea 
that they constitute merely a subsidiary source of law seems 
very hard to sustain.
In the light of the foregoing considerations the 
conclusion seems inescapable that as far as the development of 
international law goes, neither Article 38(1)(d) nor Article 
59, each by itself or operating in conjunction with one 
another, can adequately safeguard third parties from the 
effect of judgments and opinions of the Court. The formal 
protection which the said provisions are intended to provide 
is without any practical value. In fact it has been argued, 
perhaps rightly, that the somewhat wide provision of Article 
59 may be explained by the possibility that the framers of the
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Statute of the Permanent Court in 1920 did not appreciate all 
the possibilities in the direction of the development of 
international law of the activity of the Court about to be 
established.236 It is instructive to note that in 
recognition of the inadequacy of the protection of the 
interests of third parties provided by Articles 38(1)(d) and 
59, the Statute makes specific provision for the safeguarding 
of such interests through the institution of intervention,237 
to the study of which we shall turn in the next chapter.
236 See H. Lauterpacht, Development. 8.
237 See Articles 62 and 63 of the Statute.
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CHAPTER TWO
SPECIFIC PROTECTION FOR THIRD PARTIES 
DISCRETIONARY INTERVENTION1
1. Introduction
The statutory provisions on intervention may be regarded 
as specific guarantees for safeguarding the rights and 
interests of third states. Unlike the provision contained in 
Article 59 of the Statute, their effect is neither general nor 
automatic. They must be specifically invoked. They are 
granted subject to certain conditions and under different 
circumstances. Under Article 62 of the Statute, a state which 
considers that it has a legal interest which may be affected 
by the decision in a pending litigation may submit a request 
to the Court to be permitted to intervene in the case. The 
Court decides whether to grant or refuse such a request. For 
this reason, this form of intervention has been called 
discretionary intervention, or intervention by leave of the 
Court.2
Under Article 63 of the Statute, any state which is party 
to a convention whose construction is in question in a pending 
litigation has the right to intervene in the case. If it
1 See generally, Davi, 17-50, 146-226, 227-262.
2 Cf. Schwarzenberger, who has described intervention 
under Article 62 as "legal interest intervention". See G. 
Schwarzenberger, International law as Applied bv International 
Courts and Tribunals. Vol.4, International Judicial Law 
(London: Stevens and Sond Ltd., 1986), 399 (hereinafter "4
Schwarzenberger").
117
exercises this right, it is bound by the interpretation of the 
Convention given in the judgment. This kind of intervention 
has been referred to as intervention as of right.3 The 
subject matter with which the former is concerned is general 
in character, while that of the latter is special or 
particular. The possibility, scope and legal effects of third 
party intervention in pending primary proceedings are 
circumscribed by the consensual nature of the judicial 
settlement of international disputes.4
In this chapter we are concerned mainly with the former 
type of intervention, that is intervention under Article 62 as 
a specific guarantee for the protection of the rights or legal 
interests of third states. We shall analyse the attitude of 
the Court towards this remedy as reflected in its application 
or interpretation of the conditions stipulated by the Statute 
to govern its operation in its rules and its jurisprudence and 
its approach to the resolution of related controversial 
issues. A possible method for resolving such matters will be 
suggested. It is hoped that this discussion will serve to 
shed some light on the role which states, whether they are 
invoking or opposing intervention, and theorists of 
international law consider that this procedural remedy should 
play in international adjudication. This will involve, among 
other things, a brief review of the genesis of discretionary
3 Cf. Schwarzenberger who has characterized this as 
"construction of treaty intervention". See ibid.
4 See ibid.
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intervention, the conflicting policies associated with its 
exercise, the conditions governing its operation, as well as 
a consideration of the role of the Court and the parties 
concerned.
2. Preliminary Remarks
(a) Definition
The institution of intervention is a procedural legal 
device known and accommodated by the principal legal systems 
of the world, ancient and modern. It has existed as a 
legitimate means, indeed an appropriate remedy, which has 
afforded third parties, extraneous to a pending legal dispute 
already commenced by the original parties, the opportunity to 
participate in the proceedings so as to defend their legal 
rights or interests which may otherwise be affected by the 
course of the proceedings.5
5 See the dissenting opinion of V-P. Sette-Camara in the 
Italian Intervention Case. ICJ Reports 1984, 3 at 72, para.2; 
88, para.85? 124, para.16 (Ago J dissenting). See also
separate opinion of Oda J. in the Case Concerning the 
Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libvan Arab Jamahiriya: Application 
bv Malta for Permission to Intervene). Judgment of 14 April 
1981 (hereinafter "Maltese Intervention Case”). 3 at 25,
para.5. See further, Chinkin, 523? Starke, "Locus Standi", 
356. It must be emphasised that in this study we are merely 
concerned with intervention in the World Court and that the 
term ‘intervention1 is used to refer to a device of legal 
procedure and has nothing whatsoever to do with the other 
senses in which that term is often employed. It should 
therefore be distinguished from, for example, intervention as 
used in Article 2(7) of the Charter of the United Nations and 
military intervention. For a discussion of the use of 
intervention in these and other senses, see for example, W.E. 
Hall, A Treatise on International Law. 9th ed. (Oxford: Peane 
Higgins, 1924), 337-50; L.F.L. Oppenheim, International Law.
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Similarly, the procedural faculty of intervention is 
known and recognised as an institution by means of which a 
third state may take part in litigation already set in motion 
at the instance of two or more states for the protection or 
safeguarding of its own rights or interests.6
(b) Objectives
The significance of intervention lies in the fact that, 
by avoiding circuity of actions or multiplicity of decisions 
in the same case, it is useful in promoting economy of 
litigation. It achieves this by providing a means whereby 
several courses of action concerning the same set of rights or 
litigation may be dealt with and disposed of through a single 
proceeding, thereby simplifying the work of the Court and 
helping to bring about judicial economy. Thus, intervention 
prevents the same or substantially the same questions or 
issues being tried more than once with different results and 
the consequent loss of prestige, credibility or weakening of 
moral authority which this might entail for the Court. In
8th ed., Vol.l "Peace”, ed. Hersch Lauterpacht (London: New
York/Toronto: Longmans, Green & Co., 1955), 304-320
(hereinafter "Oppenheim")? J.L. Brierly, The Law of Nations: 
An Introduction to the International Law of Peace. 5th ed. 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1955), 308-15; W.
Simons, The Evolution of International Public Law in Europe 
Since Grotius (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1931) , 72 at
84-95? Hambro, Case Law. 410-21? P.B. Potter, ”L 1Intervention 
en Droit International Modern”, 32 ADIRC (1930), II, 611.
6 See V.S. Mani, International Adjudication: Procedural
Aspects (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1980), 248 
(hereinafter "Mani").
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short,7 intervention ensures that the purpose of the general 
principle of litigation, namely that all necessary and proper 
parties but no others should be before the Court to enable the 
effectual and complete determination of the issues arising in 
the proceedings, is not defeated.8
Intervention may also enable a state to secure what has 
been called "procedural economy of means" by relieving it of 
the burden of subsequent direct litigation against the 
principal parties.9 This may not only prove convenient but 
it will also save time and costs.10
Furthermore, in an increasingly interdependent world, we 
cannot pretend that litigation between two or more states may
7 This is probably more important in the municipal than 
in the international sphere because of the lack of compulsory 
jurisdiction in the latter.
8 See Sir Jack Jacob (ed.), The Supreme Court Practice 
1985, Vol.2 (London: Sweet & Maxwell Ltd.) Order 15, Rule 6,
section 7, 180-1 (hereinafter "Supreme Court Practice"). See 
also, P. Langan & D.G. Lawrence, Civil Procedure (London: 
Sweet & Maxwell, 1976), 130ff (hereinafter "Langan &
Lawrence"); D.N. Barnard, The Civil Court in Action (London: 
Butterworths, 1977), 120ff (hereinafter "Barnard");
Halsburv's Laws of England. Vol.37, 4th ed., Editor-in-Chief 
Lord Hailsham of St. Marylebone (London: Butterworths, 1982), 
159ff, para.215 (hereinafter "Halsburv1s'M ; Paul Bastid, 
"L1intervention devant les Juridictions Internationales", 36 
RPP (1929), 100 (hereinafter "Bastid"); Mani, 249; Damrosch, 
387-8. See also the dissenting opinion of Oda J. in the 
Italian Intervention Case. ICJ Reports 1984, 92-3, paras.6, 7; 
98, para.18.
9 See the Italian Intervention Case, ibid., 26, para.42, 
and the dissenting opinion of Schwebel J., 134, para.10.
10 See Langan & Lawrence, 131-2; Barnard, 120; Supreme 
Court Practice. Order 16, Rule 6, 238. It is important not to 
overstress this point.
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not raise issues of international law affecting other 
states.11
Though the decision of an international tribunal may be 
final and binding on the parties to the litigation, it may 
also amount to "a considered and authoritative pronouncement" 
concerning all rights and duties of the type in the instant 
case.12 In the circumstances a third state concerned with a 
conflict situation of a similar nature will be better off 
participating in the pending proceedings than by commencing 
fresh proceedings after their termination, by which time the 
outcome of the principal proceedings will have created an 
authoritative, non-binding precedent which may prejudice its 
own claims juridically. In this sense intervention may enable 
a third state to avoid the creation of a judicial precedent 
which will be likely to put its claims in jeopardy.13
By providing another means of seising the Court,
11 See H.E. Richards, "The Jurisdiction of the Permanent 
Court of International Justice", in 2 BYIL (1921-2), 4? Mani, 
249. See also T.O. Elias, The International Court of Justice 
and Some Contemporary Problems; Essavs on International Law 
(The Hague/Boston/London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1983), 
91, (hereinafter "The ICJ'H ? id., "The Limits of the Right of 
Intervention in a Case before the International Court of 
Justice", in Mosler Collection. 159 at 165 (hereinafter "The 
Limits").
12 See Mani, 249; Chinkin, 502, 529? G.P. McGinley,
"Intervention in the International Court: The Libya/Malta
Continental Shelf Case". 34 ICLP (1985), 671 at 689ff
(hereinafter "McGinley"); the dissenting opinion of Jennings 
J. in the Italian Intervention Case. ICJ Reports 1984, 157, 
para.27.
13 See the separate opinion of Mbaye J. in Italian 
Intervention Case. ICJ Reports 1984, 47. See also Bastid, 
100-1; Mani, 249.
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intervention performs a procedural function. In this way it 
may open up a side door towards wider use of the Court for the 
settlement of disputes.14 It does not appear that the hope 
that intervention would encourage states to make greater use 
of the Court has been realised.15
Intervention also affords states the opportunity to 
contribute to the development of international law by the 
International Court which is "an authoritative source for the 
progressive development of international law".16 
Intervention may also make it possible for the Court to be 
supplied with full or additional information concerning the 
dispute submitted to it.17
(c) How does one account for the Slow Acceptance of 
Intervention bv the International Judicial System? 
Notwithstanding the foregoing merits of intervention, 
which had first evolved in diverse municipal legal systems,
14 See Moore, "Organisation" 507; Mani, 249. See also the 
separate opinion of Mbaye J., ICJ Reports 1984, 41.
15 See Mani, ibid.
16 See Jhabvala, "Scope of Individual Opinions", 52. See 
also for example, the observations of Mr. Balfour in League of 
Nations, Documents, 38; Moore J. in Acts and Documents 
concerning the Organisation of the Court, PCIJ Series D . No.2, 
91; the separate opinion of de Arechaga J.A. in the Italian 
Intervention Case. ICJ Reports 1984, 62, para.22. See further 
J.T. Miller Jr., "Intervention in Proceedings before the 
International Court of Justice", in Future of the Court. 550 
at 556 (hereinafter "Miller").
17 See Chinkin, 500-1; see also the Italian Intervention 
Case. ICJ Reports 1984, 25, and the separate opinion of Mbaye 
J., 43.
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the international judicial system has, for a variety of 
reasons, been very slow in adopting this procedural remedy, 
especially that form of it for which Article 62 of the Statute 
provides.18 First, in view of the interdependence of 
international relations, events which end up in international 
litigation will necessarily impinge upon the legal interests 
of states in various ways. Should an unrestrained right of 
intervention be allowed nearly every third state would be able 
to identify some interest, whether it concerns the 
construction of a convention or the interpretation of the 
principles and rules of international law. Any state which 
perceives its legal interest to be threatened by the course of 
a litigation between other states will be induced by the 
principles of economy and efficiency to seek to intervene in 
the case.19
Secondly, in a system of international adjudication based 
mainly on consent, sovereign states as parties to disputes may 
usually not take kindly to intervention by a third state in 
the absence of any prior agreement. Consistent with this view 
it has been argued that intervention runs counter to some
18 See W.M. Farag, L 1Intervention Devant la Court 
Permanente de Justice Internationale (Paris: Librairie
Generale de Droit International et de Jurisprudence, 1927), 9- 
38 (hereinafter "Farag”). See also Mani, 249-50. See 
generally, R.V. Rogers, "Intervention at Common Law", 57 LOR 
(1941), 400-8; D.L. Shapiro, "Some Thoughts on Intervention 
before Courts, Agencies and Arbitrators", 81 HLR (1968), 721- 
72? Moored Federal Practice: US Supreme Court Practice and
Rules. 2nd ed., Ch.24.
19 See Chinkin, 500. See also Mani, 250, and the comments 
of Mr. Balfour in League of Nations Documents. 38 and Moore J. 
in PCIJ Series D . No.2, 91.
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fundamental postulates on which the international judicial 
system is based, that is the principles of reciprocity of 
rights and obligations and of equality of parties before the 
Court. Moreover, intervention may also serve to modify and 
widen the scope of the Special Agreement concluded by the 
original parties by which the original dispute was referred to 
the Court and lead the Court to pronounce on matters 
unenvisaged by that Agreement and hitherto unknown to the 
parties. In this way intervention would expand the scope and 
disrupt the development of the dispute already submitted to 
the Court.20
Thirdly, it has been pointed out that an international 
tribunal which lacks the requisite authority to check any 
abuse of its process may be unable to handle a possible deluge 
of unwarranted interventions.21
Fourthly, by enabling third states to participate in 
proceedings already instituted by the original parties, 
intervention may cause additional expense and necessitate the 
taking of new evidence. In this connection Mani has observed 
that "international adjudicative process is an expensive 
exercise for the parties instituting it, and any procedure 
that tends to retard the proceedings thereby hampering 
expeditious disposal of the dispute is generally discouraged
20 See Italian Intervention Case. ICJ Reports 1984, 15, 
18, paras. 21, 27; 22, paras. 34, 35. See also separate
opinions of Judges Morozov, ibid., 39, para.3, Singh, ibid., 
33; Mbaye, ibid., 42-3; and de Arechaga J.A., ibid., 59-62, 
paras.13-21.
21 See Mani, 250.
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in international practice”.22
Fifthly, states are not ordinarily favourably disposed to 
intervention on the grounds that it enables the intervenor to 
enjoy an unfair advantage over the main parties to the case. 
Judge Schwebel concedes that there is a measure of advantage 
inherent in the capacity of intervenor. This unfair advantage 
arises because by the time a third state intervenes in the 
proceedings the original parties are already committed to 
certain positions or lines of argument by the contents of 
their pleadings which are usually well known to the intervenor 
whose position they know next to nothing about.23
Finally, it has been pointed out that "the efficacy of 
international law as a body of predictable and well-contoured 
norms of behaviour of states is not of the same order and 
character as that of a well developed municipal legal 
system".24
(d) Types of Intervention
The procedural remedy of intervention follows various 
models in different municipal legal systems. Intervention may 
assume the "principal model", the "accessory model", the
22 See ibid. See also Halsbury^s, 10-2, paras.2-3, and 
Supreme Court Practice. Order 1502.
23 See ICJ Reports 1984, 14, para. 19; and Maltese
Intervention Case. ICJ Reports 1981, 35 (separate opinion of 
Schwebel J .).
24 See Mani, 250.
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"assistance model" or the "aggressive model".25 In his
separate opinion in the Italian Intervention Case Judge Ad Hoc
de Arechaga identified two types of intervention in municipal
law, namely, principal or competing intervention (or an
intervention ad excludendum) and supporting intervention (or
intervention ad adiuvendum). In the former the intervenor
requests the Court to reject the claims of the original
parties. Consequently, the original parties find themselves
in the position of respondants or defendants vis-a-vis the
intervenor. In the case of the latter the third party
intervenes to support either the plaintiff or defendant.26
It would appear that three forms of intervention were
envisaged by the framers of the Statute of the Permanent
Court, on which the Statute of the present Court is largely
based. The relevant parts of the report of the drafting group
of the Advisory Committee of Jurists, presented by Mr. de
Lapradelle, its Chairman, at the 32nd meeting, whose reading
was completed at the 34th meeting, reads as follows:
Lastly, the question of the right of intervention ... is 
dealt with explicitly in this plan. There are three 
possibilities. A party may wish to take sides with the 
plaintiff or the defendant. A party may claim certain 
exclusive rights, or a party may request that one of the 
two contesting states should withdraw on the ground that 
it is not the real dominus of the right which it claims.
25 See for example, Chinkin, 523. See dissenting opinion 
of V-P. Sette-Camara in ICJ Reports 1984, 71, para.3. See 
also, G. Morelli, "Fonction et Objet de 1'Intervention dans le 
Proces International", in The Lachs Collection. 404-5 
(hereinafter "Morelli"). On the analysis of intervention in 
municipal legal systems, see Davi, 115-45.
26 See Italian Intervention Case. ICJ Reports 1984, 67,
68.
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In this latter case intervention tends to become 
exclusion but as a rule a state is content to take joint 
action with one of the parties: should this be allowed?
The Committee replies in the affirmative but on condition 
that an interest of a legal nature is involved ...27
The Statute of the Court provides for two different forms
of intervention, namely discretionary intervention or
intervention by leave of the Court and intervention as of
right.28 In this chapter we are mainly concerned with the
former type of intervention, the origin and evolution of which
we will now briefly trace.
(e) Evolution of Article 62 of the Statute29
Article 62 of the Statute of the International Court had
27 See S. Oda, "Intervention in the International Court 
of Justice: Articles 62 and 63 of the Statute", in Mosler
Collection. 629 at 635 (hereinafter "Intervention"). During 
an earlier discussion on intervention, Lord Phillimore, in 
explaining the right of intervention as it existed in English 
law, emphasised in particular the fact that in England an 
intervening body could only associate itself with the 
defendant. Mr. Loder explained that Dutch law admitted of 
intervention both on the side of the plaintiff and of the 
defendant. The President thought that the solution of the 
question of intervention should be drawn from common law and 
proposed a wedding based on the idea. See ibid., 633.
28 See, for example, the S.S. Wimbledon Case. PCIJ Series 
A, No.l, 9-13 at 12; Maltese Intervention Case. ICJ Reports 
1981, 13, para.21. See also, Miller, 550; Chinkin; 496,
Mani, 254, 255, 258; Rosenne, Procedure. 173;
Emmanuel Decaux, "L*arret de la CIJ sur la requete a fin 
d'Intervention de Malte dans I 1Affaire du Plateau Continental 
entre la Tunisie et la Libye", 27 AFDI (1981), 177 at 181 
(hereinafter "Decaux")", . _ Charles Rousseau, "Le
Reglement Arbitral et Judiciaire et les Etats Tiers", in 
Melanges offerts a Henri Rolin - Problemes de Droit des Gens 
(Paris: Pedone, 1964) ; .  300 at
308 (hereinafter "Rousseau"); and B. Smyrniadis, 
"L'Intervention devant la Cour Internationale de Justice", 9 
REPI (1953), 28 (hereinafter "Smyrniadis").
29 See generally, Davi, 105-14.
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no forerunner in state practice in 1920. It was introduced
into the draft Statute of the Permanent Court by the Advisory
Committee of Jurists during their consideration of Article 23
of the text of the draft scheme for the establishment of a
Permanent Court of International Justice prepared by its
drafting committee, concerning intervention where the
construction of a convention is in question (now Article 63 of
the Statute) .30 In the course of the discussion it was
suggested that the institution of intervention be made
complete by the addition of Article 48 of a plan previously
prepared by a conference of five neutral powers, the first
paragraph of which reads as follows: "Whenever a dispute
submitted to the Court affects the interests of a third state,
the latter may intervene in the case."31 It was also pointed
out that the interest affected must be a legitimate32 one.
The President of the Advisory Committee, Baron Descamps,
proposed the following wording:
Should a state consider that it has an interest of a 
legal nature which may be affected by the decision in the 
case, it may submit a request to the Court to be 
permitted to intervene. It will be for the Court to 
decide upon this request.33
This formula was adopted by the Committee subject to
30 See Maltese Intervention Case. ICJ Reports 1981, 22; 
Oda, "Intervention", 631; Proces-Verbaux (1920), 561-71, 587- 
94.
31 See Oda, "Intervention", 631; Maltese Intervention 
Case. ICJ Reports 1981, 22.
32 It would appear that this term was used erroneously in 
place of "legal".
33 See Oda, "Intervention", 633.
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revision and made a separate article which was inserted
immediately before the present Article 63. As Article 60 this
new provision read as follows:
Should a state consider that it has an interest of a 
legal nature which may be affected by the decision in a 
case it may submit a request to the Court to be permitted 
to intervene as a third party. It will be for the Court 
to decide upon this request.
Article 62 remained unaffected by the amendment of the Statute
by a Protocol concerning the Revision of the Statute of the
Permanent Court of International Justice, which formed the
subject of a resolution of the Assembly of the League of
Nations on 14 September 1929, and which came into effect on 1
February 19 3 6.35
The Committee of Jurists designated by the United Nations
met in Washington in April 1945 to prepare, and submit to the
San Francisco Conference, a Draft Statute of the International
Court of Justice.36 The only change in Article 62 in
revisions of the text of the Statute of the Permanent Court
prepared by the Drafting Committee on the basis of the
American draft, was the deletion of the expression "as a third
party" from its English version as misleading.37 The
Drafting Committee explained that the formal emendations of
34 See ibid., 638.
35 See ibid., 639.
36 See generally 14 UNCIO.
37 See ibid., 323-47, 485-500? Oda, "Intervention", 639. 
Jessup, 907. See also Smyrniadis, 29? Davi, 1? Damrosch, 
381, n.19. See further ICJ Reports 1981, 15, para.22.
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the English text "do not change the sense thereof."38 Thus 
Article 62 of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice, as finally adopted, provides:
(1) Should a state consider that it has an interest of a 
legal nature which may be affected by the decision in a 
case, it may submit a request to the Court to be
permitted to intervene.
(2) It shall be for the Court to decide upon this
request.
Intervention for the protection of a legal interest is
analogous to that which has been known and recognised in all
legal systems of the world without exception.
Intervention, like the acceptance of the jurisdiction of
the Court, is voluntary in character as it depends solely on
the decision of the state concerned. The International Court
itself expressed this view when it distinguished the Italian
Intervention Case from the earlier Monetary Gold Case by
observing that:
In the absence from the Court's procedures of any system 
of compulsory intervention whereby a third state could be 
cited by the Court to come in as a party it must be open 
to the Court and indeed its duty to give the fullest 
decision it may in the circumstances of each case, unless 
of course, as in the Case of Monetary Gold Removed from 
Rome in 1943 the legal interest of a third state would 
not only be affected by the decision but would form the 
very subject matter of the decision which is not the case 
here.39
The Court declined to exercise jurisdiction in the latter case 
in the absence of Albania, "a necessary and indispensable
38 See 14 UNCIO. 626; Oda, "Intervention", 639.
39 See Italian Intervention Case. ICJ Reports 1984, 25, 
para.40; Monetary Gold Case. ibid., 1954, 19 at 21; 
Nicaraguan Intervention Case. ICJ Reports 1990, 92 at 135, 
para.99.
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party to the proceedings".40 Emphasising the voluntary 
character of intervention under Article 62, Elias commented 
that in the Monetary Gold Case41 the Court fell just short of 
inviting Albania to intervene.42
3. Conditions Necessary for Discretionary Intervention
(a) Who mav intervene under Article 62?
Under the Statute,43 only states may intervene in 
proceedings before the Court. However, it is not clear from 
the wording of Article 62(1) if the procedural faculty of 
intervention is available to all states regardless of whether 
they have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court by being 
signatories to its Statute and members of the United Nations. 
If, however, states other than those which are party to the 
Statute are able to gain access to the Court as is the case 
under the terms of paragraphs (2) and (3) of Article 35 of the 
Statute, it is not inconceivable that such states may, at a 
theoretical level at least, be able to intervene under the 
terms therein specified.44 There is, however, no doubt that 
states which possess the capacity to seek justice from the
40 See the individual opinion of Read J., ibid., 1954, 19 
at 38.
41 See ibid., 32.
42 See Elias, The ICJ. 89? id., "The Limits", 163.
43 See Statute, Articles 34(1), 35 and 62(1). See also 
Oppenheim, 20; Miller, 551? Mani, 255? Singh, 25.
44 See Statute, Article 35, and Article 93(2) of the UN 
Charter. Cf. Elias, The ICJ. 93? id., "The Limits", 167.
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Court under the provisions of the Statute45 concerning the 
competence rationae personae of the Court may intervene within 
the meaning of Article 62(1). The importance of the 
acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Court cannot be over­
emphasised since a state cannot be bound by the decision of 
the Court in the absence of its consent to its 
j urisdict ion.46
(b) The Meaning of "an interest of a legal nature11
Article 62(1) lays down two conditions which a state 
desiring permission to intervene must satisfy. The state 
should consider: (a) "that it has an interest of a legal
nature", and (b) that such an interest "may be affected by the 
decision in a case".47
In common law, a person who has no legal but merely a 
commercial interest in the outcome of a litigation between a 
plaintiff and an original defendant cannot be added as a party 
for the convenience of the Court or otherwise. A person may, 
however, be added as defendant, either on his own application 
or on that of the original defendant, where his proprietary or 
pecuniary rights are or may be directly affected by the 
proceedings, either legally or financially, by any order which
45 See Statute, Articles 34 and 35; see also Farag, 79; 
Mani, 255.
46 See Farag, 80; Mani, 255; Hudson, The Permanent 
Court, 420.
47 See ICJ Reports 1981, 19, para.33; ibid. 1984, 9,
para.13; ibid. 1990, 114, para.52.
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may be made in the action, or where the intervenor may be 
rendered liable to satisfy any judgment either directly or 
indirectly.48 The only reason which makes it necessary for 
a person to be made a party is so that he should be bound by 
the result of the action.49
(i) The Permanent Court of International Justice
The practice of the Permanent Court is of little help in 
explaining the meaning of the expression "an interest of a 
legal nature" since it had no experience regarding the 
operation of Article 62 of its Statute. In the SS Wimbledon 
Case, the Permanent Court observed that intervention under 
Article 62:
is based on an interest of a legal nature advanced by the 
intervening party and the Court should only admit such 
intervention if .... the existence of this interest is 
sufficiently demonstrated.50
Poland's invocation of Article 63 to supplement the basis of
its application originally made under Article 62, led the
Court to observe that:
The attitude thus adopted renders it unnecessary for the 
Court to consider and satisfy itself whether Poland's 
intervention .... is justified by an interest of a legal 
nature within the meaning of Article 62 of the Statute. 
It will suffice .... to note that in this case the 
interpretation of certain clauses of the Treaty of 
Versailles is involved in the suit and that the Polish 
Republic is one of the states which are parties to this
48 See Halsburv's. para.223, 168ff, and para.226, 171ff.
49 See ibid., para.226, 171ff.
50 See PCIJ Series A . No.l, 12.
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treaty.51
In 1931 Iceland notified the Court that it had an interest of 
a legal nature which might be affected by the decision in the 
Legal Status of Eastern Greenland Case, but apparently it did 
not ask to be permitted to intervene.52
The 1922 Rules53 merely provided among others that ”the 
application shall contain (1) a specification of the case in 
which the applicant desires to intervene, (2) a statement of 
law and of fact justifying intervention, (3) a list of 
documents in support of the application; these documents 
shall be attached”. This provision, which does not mention 
"an interest of a legal nature” survived the revision of the 
Rules in 1936.54
(ii) The International Court of Justice
For almost three decades the International Court had no 
experience regarding discretionary intervention.55 In 1973, 
Fiji requested permission to intervene under Article 62 in 
proceedings instituted against France by Australia and New 
Zealand in respect of a dispute as to the legality of
51 See ibid., 13. For the view that Poland had an
interest of a legal nature sufficient to enable it to
intervene under Article 62, see Davi, 3ff, n.6.
52 See Hudson, The Permanent Court. 372.
53 See Article 59 of the 1922 Rules.
54 See Article 59 of the 1936 Rules.
55 Discretionary intervention was brought briefly, if 
indirectly, to the Court*s attention in the Monetary Gold
Case. ICJ Reports 1954, 19 at 32. See also Maltese
Intervention Case, ibid. 1981, 15.
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atmospheric nuclear tests in the South Pacific region. The 
Court deferred action on Fiji’s application until it had given 
a ruling on its jurisdiction to entertain the basic dispute 
between France and Australia and New Zealand. In 1974 the 
Court found that the claims of the applicants no longer had 
any object and that as a result it was not called upon to give 
a decision thereon. In consequence, the Court found that 
there no longer would be any proceedings before it to which 
the application for permission to intervene could relate, and 
that the application of Fiji for permission to intervene had 
lapsed and no further action thereon was called for on the 
part of the Court.56
Like Article 59 of the 1936 Rules of the Permanent Court, 
Article 64(2) of the 1946 Rules of the International Court 
provided that the application for permission to intervene 
shall contain a description of the case, a statement of law 
and of fact justifying intervention and a list of the 
documents in support of the application and that these
56 See Nuclear Tests Cases (Australia v. France) (New 
Zealand v. France). ICJ Reports 1973, 320ff and 324ff, and 
1974, 530ff and 535ff (hereinafter "Fiiian Intervention
Cases11) . A masterly analysis of the Court's attitude to the 
Fijian attempt to intervene in the Nuclear Tests Cases can be 
found in 4 Schwarzenberger, 403-9. For other references to 
this case in the literature, see: Rosenne, The World Court. 
163 and id., Procedure. 174, n.l, 176? Eduardo Jimenez de 
Arechaga, "Intervention Under Article 62 of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice" in Mosler Collection. 463-4 
(hereinafter "Intervention"); McGinley, 673? Decaux, 185, 
n.41, 195-6? Chinkin, 495, n.l, 498, 507-8, n.l, 511, 518-20, 
521-5, 528, 529-30? Mani, 254, 263, 267-8, 411, n.103?
Miller, 554-5? A. Berg, "Nuclear Tests Cases (Australia v. 
France? New Zealand v. France)" in Bernhardt (ed.), EPIL, 
[Instalment 2 (1981)], 216-9 at 218.
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documents shall be attached. This provision was reproduced, 
verbatim, in Article 69(2) of the 1972 Rules.
Article 81(2) of the 1978 Rules requires an application 
made under the terms of Article 62 to specify the case to 
which it relates, and to set out (a) the interest of a legal 
nature, which the applicant state considers may be affected by 
the decision in that case, (b) the precise object of the 
intervention, and (c) any basis of jurisdiction which is 
claimed to exist as between the applicant state and the 
parties to the case. This provision requires far more 
information from an applicant state than had previously been 
the case. In fact, it represents the first serious attempt by 
the Court to come to grips with the various issues associated 
with discretionary intervention. It is also undeniable that 
this attempt to grapple with such issues was in part 
attributable to the Court's experience with the abortive 
application by Fiji for permission to intervene in the Nuclear 
Tests Cases which made the spectre of discretionary 
intervention seem a very real possibility in the eyes of the 
Court. It is therefore no surprise that Article 81(2) lays 
down, among other things, that the state desiring to intervene 
should indicate the interest of a legal nature. This was to 
exclude "political intervention".57
The requirement that the would-be intervenor specify the 
precise object of its intervention is designed to assist the 
Court in deciding whether the state concerned has indeed shown
57 See Oda, "Intervention", 635.
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that it has an interest of a legal nature. In fact the 
distinction between the "interest of a legal nature” and the 
"precise object of the intervention”, if any, is more one of 
form than of substance. Both have been said by the Court to 
be essential to a determination of the precise implications of 
a request for permission to intervene.58 The application of 
Article 62 and the relevant provisions of the 1978 Rules by 
the Court in the cases in which that Article was at issue has 
gone some way towards clarifying the various questions raised 
in connection therewith.
(iii) The Maltese Intervention Case59
By a Special Agreement the Republic of Tunisia 
(hereinafter "Tunisia”) and the Socialist People's Libyan Arab
58 See Maltese Intervention Case. ICJ Reports 1981, 17-8, 
para.30.
59 See ibid., 3, Application to Intervene. For a 
discussion of the case in the literature, see for example, S. 
Rosenne, "Some Reflections on Intervention in the 
International Court of Justice”, 34 NILR (1987) (hereinafter 
"Some Reflections”), 78-9, 85-7, 88-90? id., Procedure. 174, 
n.l, 176, n.l, 180? McGinley, 671-5, 679, 682, 689 and 693? 
de Arechaga, "Intervention”, 453, 454, 461? Decaux, 177-202? 
Elias, "The Limits”, 167, n.15, 168 n.18, 169-72? id., The 
ICJ. 93, n.15, 75, n.18, 96-9? Morelli, 406-8? Jessup, 903? 
4 Schwarzenberger, 406ff? G. Guyomar, Commentaire du 
Realement de la Cour Internationale de Justice. Adopte le 14 
Avril 1978: Interpretation et Practicrue (Paris: Editions A. 
Pedone, 1983), 530ff, 549ff, 553 (hereinafter "Guyomar")? T. 
Licari, "Intervention Under Article 62 of the Statute of the 
ICJ", VIII BJIL. (1982), 167 at 274-86 (hereinafter "Licari"). 
See also, generally, Davi, 17-27? Singh, 186-7, 206, 207-10, 
390, 416. Though this list of page references conflicts with 
that provided in the section of the work entitled "List of 
Cases Cited" (Annexure I, 278) , we believe that it is the 
correct one, since we were unable to find references to the 
case in any of the pages therein listed.
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Jamahiriya (hereinafter "Libya") requested the Court to
indicate the principles and rules of international law which 
may be applied for the delimitation of the area of the 
continental shelf appertaining respectively to them, and to 
specify precisely the practical way in which the aforesaid 
principles and rules apply in this particular situation so as 
to enable the experts of both countries to delimit those areas 
without any difficulties.60 After the parties had filed 
their memorials and counter-memorials, Malta, invoking Article 
62 of the Statute, submitted to the Court a request to
intervene in the case. Since the Maltese application was
opposed by the parties, the Court held public hearings to
ascertain their views and those of the applicant.
Malta*s position was that the only condition prescribed 
by the Statute as necessary to found a request for permission 
to intervene under Article 62 was that the applicant should 
"consider that it has an interest of a legal nature which may 
be affected by the decision" in a case. While noting and 
complying with the requirement concerning jurisdiction in 
Article 81(2)(c) of the 1978 Rules, Malta contended that this 
provision could not create a new substantive condition for the 
grant of permission to intervene. Malta also argued that 
since the intervention for which it had applied would not seek 
any substantive or operative decision against either party, no
60 See Articles of the Special Agreement in the 
Continental Shelf (Tunisia-Libvan Arab Jamahiriya), ICJ 
Reports 1982, 18 at 21-4, paras.1-4 (hereinafter
"Tunisia/Libva Case'M .
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question of jurisdiction, in the strict sense of the word, 
could arise as between it and the parties. Malta explained 
that its "interest of a legal nature” lay in the legal 
principles and rules for determining the delimitation of the 
boundaries of its continental shelf. It considered that, 
regardless of Article 59 of the Statute, its interest might be 
affected by the dispositif and the "effective decisions 
contained in the Court's reasoning”.61 Malta identified the 
precise object of its intervention as being to enable it to 
submit its views to the Court on the issues raised in the case 
without obtaining any form of ruling or decision concerning 
its continental shelf boundaries with either or both parties.
Libya and Tunisia argued that a jurisdictional link with 
the applicant was an essential condition for the intervention 
to be admitted. They also maintained that Malta had no 
interest of a legal nature which might be affected by the 
decision, because the Special Agreement contemplated 
delimitation of the continental shelf by the parties, rather 
than the Court, and secondly because the Court's jurisdiction 
was limited to adjudicating upon the extent of the continental 
shelf boundaries of the parties. They also argued that 
Malta's interests would be safeguarded by the relative effect 
of the Court's judgment under Article 59. They further argued 
that the purpose of intervention was neither to submit views 
nor to argue general law.
61 See Maltese Intervention Case. ICJ Reports 1981, 3 at 
8-9, para.13.
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Tunisia maintained that though Malta in common with other 
states had an interest of a legal nature that might be touched 
but not affected by the decision of the case, that interest 
was not sufficient to justify intervention under Article 62. 
It then suggested that Malta*s avowed object had, in fact, 
already been achieved by the intervention proceedings, in view 
of the explanations she had there been able to give of her 
preoccupations.
After examining whether the interest of a legal nature 
invoked by Malta and the object of its intervention were such 
as to justify the granting of its application on the basis of 
the applicable provisions of the Statute and in the light of 
the particular circumstances of the case, the Court concluded 
that the interest of a legal nature which Malta had invoked 
could not be affected by the decision in the case and that the 
request was not one to which, under Article 62, it might 
accede. The Court stressed that its jurisdiction was limited 
to the dispute submitted to it by the two parties, carrying 
the implication that its decision would not affect Malta*s 
legal interests.
In point of fact, the Court did not expressly deny that 
Malta had an interest of a legal nature directly in issue 
between the original parties.62 The limited object of 
Malta’s intervention led the Court to conclude that its legal 
interest could not be affected within the terms of Article 62
62 See ICJ Reports 1981, 18-9, paras.31 and 33. Cf. also, 
ibid., 12-3, para.19? McGinley, 674.
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of the Statute.63
The position of Malta was a difficult one. The case in 
which it sought to intervene was unique in that, though it was 
a contentious proceeding, no conflicting claims existed 
between the parties at the outset. Their Special Agreement 
requested the Court to identify the principles and rules of 
international law which could be applied to the delimitation 
of their respective areas of continental shelf.64 The object 
of the main case would therefore seem to be "to secure a 
statement from the Court of what the appropriate law will be 
for the delimitation of the respective areas of the 
continental shelf of Tunisia and Libya11.65
On the face of the Special Agreement, the arguments of 
the original parties would be confined to the principles and 
rules of international law applicable to the delimitation of 
the continental shelf and not related to concrete claims to 
any title. It is not clear from the judgment why the object 
of Malta's intervention should go beyond enabling it to 
present its views on the principles and rules of international 
law. Malta's position in the case has been compared to that 
of Cuba when it intervened in the Hava de la Torre Case under 
Article 63 of the Statute, and contrasted with the position of
63 See ICJ Reports 1981, 18-9, paras.31 and 32? 12-3,
paras.19-21; 18-9, para.32; 19-20, para.34.
64 See ibid., 19, para.33 and the separate opinions of 
Judges Oda, ibid., 31-3, paras.19 & 20? and Schwebel, ibid., 
39.
65 See separate opinion of Oda J., ibid., 32-3, para.20.
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Fiji when it sought to intervene in the Nuclear Tests Cases, 
in which the subject matter was clearly defined in terms of 
specific claims. Aside from the question of jurisdiction, 
Fiji could have identified its own interest with those of 
Australia and New Zealand, in specifying the legal interest 
which might have been threatened by the action taken by 
France, the legality of which was in dispute. Thus, although 
Fiji might have been required to specify its own claim as a 
plaintiff together with Australia and New Zealand against 
France, this requirement would have arisen from the very 
nature of the case. After pointing out that the Tunisia/Libya 
Case was of a completely different nature, Judge Oda declared 
that "more cannot be demanded of Malta than of Tunisia and 
Libya”.66
It does not seem right that Malta should have been 
expected to submit its own claims for decision and to expose 
itself to counterclaims by the original parties, when, as 
pointed out by counsel for Malta, as far as could be made out 
from the Special Agreement, neither Tunisia nor Libya had 
advanced particular claims or sought the decision of the Court 
upon them.67 In any event, how could Malta be expected to 
know in what precise ways its interests might be engaged in 
the case when the Court had declined to respond positively to
66 See ibid., 31-2, para.19. See also the observations 
of Schwebel J., 35-6.
67 See ibid., Schwebel J., 39.
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its request for copies of the pleadings?68
The suggestion by the Court that Malta was not willing to
be bound by the decision within the terms of Article 59 of the
Statute, with all due respect, does not appear to have any
basis.69 Responding to the contention that Malta had in
effect indicated that it would not be bound by the Court’s
judgment, the Attorney-General of Malta in the Court's public
sitting of 23 March 1981 declared that "by its application to
intervene Malta submits itself to all the consequences and
effects of intervention whatever they may be". Expatiating on
this statement, counsel for Malta observed that:
Malta has never asserted that it will not be bound by the 
decision of the Court ... What Malta has said is that it 
does not seek an order or a remedy against Libya and 
Tunisia. But that is not the same thing as saying that 
Malta will not be bound by the decision of the Court ... 
What the Court says the law is, is the law and it will 
bind Malta ... And insofar as the Court says what the law 
will be in relation to the continental shelf feature in 
the central Mediterranean Sea, Malta has a legal interest 
which specially and uniquely will be affected by the 
Court's decision.
Malta's counsel particularly stressed that Malta's action was
founded on the view that a decision of the Court relating to
the specific features of the area would inevitably bind Malta
in its relations with Libya and Tunisia simply as a statement
of law.70
The most that Malta could seek to do in the proceedings 
would be to participate therein on the terms of the Special
68 See SepcLadfc, .ofTnW Schwebel J., ibid., 35 and 39.
69 See Schwebel J., ibid., 38.
70 See ibid., 38, 39.
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Agreement concluded by the original parties with the necessary 
modifications so as to enable the Court to indicate the 
principles and rules of international law applicable to the 
delimitation of the continental shelf appertaining to Tunisia, 
Libya and Malta, and to specify the practical way to apply 
them. In that case Malta, like the original parties,would 
have had to submit its own legal interest in the subject 
matter of the dispute for decision and as a party to the 
proceedings.71 In that event the question whether a link of 
jurisdiction with the original parties is a necessary 
condition of the grant of permission to intervene, would have 
called for the Court's immediate consideration.72 Even if a 
third state succeeded in surmounting the obstacle of the 
jurisdictional link and intervened in this way, it would find 
that it would have been much easier to achieve the same 
objective by becoming a party to the Special Agreement 
concluded by the original parties from the outset, thereby 
becoming an original party itself, than through the troubled, 
uncertain and difficult path of intervention.73
71 See ibid., 18, 19, para.32.
72 See ibid.
73 It would seem that after the decision in the Maltese 
Intervention Case, intervention in order to raise fundamental 
issues of international law on behalf of the international 
community cannot be a legitimate purpose of this procedural 
remedy. In this sense, at least, this appears to be a 
reinstatement of the view taken by the Court in the South West 
Africa Cases (Second Phase) in which, by the casting vote of 
its President, the Court refused to allow the applicants to 
take legal action in vindication of a public interest, thus 
limiting contentious proceedings to issues raising direct 
interests of a legal nature between the parties. Such a
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(iv) The Italian Intervention Case74
In 1982 Libya and Malta under a special agreement 
requested the Court to indicate the principles and rules of 
international law which may be applied for the delimitation of 
their respective areas of continental shelf.75
After the parties had filed their memorials and counter­
memorials Italy, invoking Article 62 of the Statute, submitted 
to the Court a request for permission to intervene in the 
case. Since the Italian application was opposed by the 
parties, the Court held public hearings to ascertain their 
views and those of the applicant.
Italy considered that its interests might be affected by 
the decision in the pending case because the area of 
continental shelf to be delimited between the parties belonged
formalistic restriction on the role of international 
adjudication was thought to have been overturned by the 
decision in the Barcelona Traction Case (Merits) where the 
Court recognised that all states can be held to have a legal 
interest in the protection of certain rights, which by virtue 
of their fundamental nature are the concern of all states. 
See Nicaragua/United States Case (Provisional Measures), ICJ 
Reports 1984, 169 at 190, 196, Order of 10 May (Schwebel J. 
dissenting), ibid., 223? ibid. 1966, 6? ibid. 1970, 4 at 32. 
See also Chinkin, 512-3.
74 See ICJ Reports 1984, 3ff. For a discussion of this 
case in the literature see, for example, McGinley, 671; 
Starke, "Locus Standi”, 356; 4 Schwarzenberger, 407ff?
Rosenne, "Some Reflections”, 79, 81; K. Oellers-Framn,
"Stellungrahmen: Anmerkungen zur Intervention Italiens in
Verfahren zur Abgrenzung des Festlandsockels zwischen Malta 
und Libyen", in 44 ZAORV (1984), 840? see also generally, 
Davi, 27-43? Singh, 206, 207, 210-2, 375, 390, 416. See
above, 138, n.59.
75 See Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriva/Malta) . Judgment of 3 June 1985, ICJ Reports 1985, 
13 at 16, para.2 (hereinafter "Libva/Malta Case").
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to the same region of the central Mediterranean of which it is 
a coastal state and in which, consequently, some of the 
continental shelf area over which it considers it possesses 
rights, is located. Its interests were also involved inasmuch 
as it had reservations as to what it understood to be Libyan 
views on such matters as the status of a considerable part of 
the Gulf of Sirte. It was concerned that by indicating the 
rules and principles applicable to a delimitation between 
states other than Italy, the judgment would decide, albeit 
implicitly, that given areas of continental shelf do not 
appertain to Italy. The object of Italy*s intervention was 
"to ensure the defence .... of its interest of a legal nature 
so that the principles and rules of international law .... 
applicable to the delimitation of the continental shelf 
between Malta and Libya and in particular the practical method 
of applying them are not determined .... without awareness of 
that interest and to its prejudice”.76
Italy also undertook to submit to such decision as the 
Court might make with regard to its rights, in conformity with 
the terms of Article 59, and suggested that, once permitted to 
intervene, its status in such circumstances would be that of 
an intervening party entitled to make submissions. While 
contending that there was no provision in Article 62 which 
required the existence of a basis of jurisdiction as a 
condition for intervention, and that Article 81(2)(c) of the 
1978 Rules does no more than lay down a mere requirement for
76 See ICJ Reports 1984, 12, para. 17.
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information to be supplied to the Court, Italy argued that 
Article 62 afforded a sufficient basis either in itself or in 
conjunction with the acceptance of the jurisdictional power of 
the Court by becoming a party to its Statute. Nevertheless, 
Italy cited its being a party to the European Convention on 
the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes in order to satisfy the 
procedural obligations arising under Article 81 of the Rules.
The parties contended that Italy had failed to establish 
a legal interest sufficient to render its intervention 
admissible.77 Moreover, the object of Italy's intervention 
remained obscure. They further maintained that Italy's legal 
interest would not be affected by the decision in the case 
because the Special Agreement put in issue only the rights of 
the parties and was res inter alios acta as regards third 
states.78 They also considered Italy's application
inadmissible because of the absence of a jurisdictional link 
between themselves and Italy.
After having considered Italy's interest of a legal 
nature by assessing the object of its intervention in the 
light of the Statute, the Court found that the intervention 
fell into a category which could not be accepted. 
Nevertheless the Court was satisfied that Italy's legal 
interest would be protected by Article 59 of its Statute in 
particular and the relative effect of international judicial 
decisions in general.
77 See ibid., para.25.
78 See ibid., 17, para.26.
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Once again, the Court rejected an application to 
intervene, but this time for the reason that it understood the 
object of the intervention to amount to the introduction of a 
distinct dispute. It reached this conclusion notwithstanding 
the fact that the absence of a previous dispute had been 
invoked by the original parties to justify the operation of 
the principle of estoppel against Italy.79
Article 59 does not play the role assigned to it in the 
judgment in the Italian Intervention Case. This is 
illustrated by the fact that neither the Court nor the parties 
treated the law on intervention as a tabula rasa, so that 
previous decisions of the Court could be disregarded as 
applying only to the parties involved in the cases in which 
they were rendered. Such prior decisions were invoked by the 
Court and the parties to support their positions. In 
consequence, the legal position of Italy was adversely 
affected by the reasoning adopted by the Court in some earlier 
decisions. The Court relied on its reasoning in the Maltese 
Intervention Case to hold that the decision to grant or refuse 
intervention was not one solely within its discretion, and on 
the reasoning in the Monetary Gold Case, in concluding that 
Italian interests were insufficiently affected to make Italy 
an indispensable party to the proceedings.80
79 See the dissenting opinion of V-P. Sette-Camara, ibid., 
84-5, paras.67-74; Judges Oda, 107, para.33; Ago, 124-5, 
para.16; Schwebel, 131, para.2; Jennings, 150, para.7.
80 See, for example, ICJ Reports 1984, 8-9, para. 12; also 
25, para.40. See McGinley, 691, 692.
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The truth of the foregoing assertion is evident in the 
essential contradiction in the Court*s reasoning, which is 
manifested by its ambivalent attitude to the effect of its 
decision on the legal interests of Italy. While maintaining 
that Italy's interests would be safeguarded by Article 59, the 
Court also said that its future judgment would be expressed 
upon its face to be without prejudice to the rights and 
interests of third states and that such interests would be 
taken into account in the same way as was done in the 
Tunisia/Libva Case.
(v) The Nicaraguan Intervention Case81
In 1986, El Salvador and Honduras, by a special 
agreement, submitted the dispute concerning their land, island 
and maritime frontier to a chamber of the Court. In 1989, 
Nicaragua applied to be permitted to intervene in respect of 
some aspects of the case under Article 62 of the Statute. 
Since the Nicaraguan application was opposed, particularly by 
El Salvador, public sittings were held in order to hear the 
applicant and the parties.
Contrary to the contentions of El Salvador, the Chamber 
considered that for purposes of Article 62, Nicaragua had 
shown an interst of a legal nature which might be affected by 
the Chamber's decision on the question of the existence or 
nature of a regime of condominion or community of interests 
within the Gulf of Fonseca? that the object of Nicaragua's
81 See ICJ Reports 1990, 92.
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intervention was not improper? and that the absence of a 
jurisdictional link between Nicaragua and the parties was no 
bar to intervention being permitted.
Consequently, the Chamber unanimously found that 
Nicaragua had established a legal interest which might be 
affected by part of the judgment on the merits, namely, the 
decision on the legal regime of the waters of the Gulf of 
Fonseca, but that Nicaragua had not shown such an interest in 
respect of any decision which the Chamber might be required to 
make concerning the delimitation of those waters, or any 
decision as to the legal situation of the maritime spaces 
outside the Gulf, or any decision as to the legal situation of 
the islands in the Gulf. The Chamber accordingly permitted 
Nicaragua to intervene in the case "to the extent, in the 
manner and for the purposes set out in the present judgment, 
but no further or otherwise".82
(c) The "interest of a legal nature” and the Precise Object
of Intervention
The Court has declared itself bound to consider the 
object of the application and the way in which that object 
corresponds to what is contemplated by the Statute and to
82 In his separate opinion attached to the judgment, Oda 
J. reasoned that Nicaragua should not have been excluded from 
expressing its views in due course on any delimitation between 
the parties within the Gulf which may fall to be effected by 
the Chamber, and with respect to any delimitation which may 
fall to be effected outside the Gulf in the event that some 
title may have been established in favour of Honduras. See 
generally, ICJ Reports. 1990, 138-46.
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satisfy itself that the object of the intervention corresponds 
to what is envisaged by the Statute.83 Until quite recently, 
the Court has tended to consider the interest of a legal 
nature, mentioned in Article 62(1) of its Statute, and the 
precise object of the intervention, as contained in Article 
81(2)(b) of its Rules, as closely connected and of the same 
value in assisting it to determine the implications of a 
request for permission to intervene.84
This approach is, with respect, flawed. While it is true 
that the object of the intervention may flow from the nature 
of the legal interest, it does not necessarily follow that the 
two requirements are always linked. It has been observed, for 
example, that "A state might well have a genuine interest 
involved in the case but be intervening for the purpose of 
politically embarrassing the main parties”.85 Intervention 
may also be put to other improper purposes. These may 
include, an attempt by the applicant to delay the main case 
for its own motives, to prevaricate or to use intervention 
along with other diplomatic steps against one or more of the 
original parties.86
83 See the Nicaraguan Intervention Case. ICJ Reports 1990, 
128, para.85; ibid. 1984, 18, para.28.
84 See Maltese Intervention Case. ICJ Reports 1981, 12, 
17-8, paras.18, 30. See also Italian Intervention Case. ICJ 
Reports 1984, 18-9, para.28.
85 See McGinley, 678? de Arechaga, "Intervention", 456, 
para.9.
86 Although not directly on the point, an example of this 
type of conduct was the Declaration of Intervention in the 
Nicaragua/United States Case by El Salvador. Order of 4
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Previously the Court accorded precedence to the precise 
object of the intervention, a provision of its Rules, over the 
interest of a legal nature, a provision of its Statute. While 
the Court is bound to safeguard the institution of 
intervention from abuse, it is not right that it should 
elevate a provison of its Rules to the same status as a 
provision of its Statute, or worse still, accord primacy to 
the former over the latter.87
The recent judgment of a special Chamber of the Court in 
the Nicaraguan Intervention Case has gone some way towards 
rectifying this anomaly. Not only did the Chamber accord 
priority to the interest of a legal nature over the object of 
the intervention, but it also shifted the emphasis from the 
issue of the nature of the relationship between both 
requirements to that of the priority of the object of the 
intervention.
In its application, Nicaragua indicated the object of its 
intervention as being, first, generally to protect its legal 
rights in the Gulf of Fonseca and adjacent maritime areas by 
all legal means available. Second, to inform the Court of the 
nature of its legal rights which are in issue in the dispute. 
This form of intervention would have the conservative purpose
October, 1984, ICJ Reports 1984, 215 (hereinafter "Salvadorean 
Intervention Case11) . The declaration was filed while the 
regional initiative known as the Contadora Process was being 
pursued and the political organs of the United Nations were 
also seised of matters relating to the main dispute. See 
Chinkin, 507.
87 See Italian Intervention Case. ICJ Reports 1984, 71 at 
81, paras.52, 53 (V-P. Sette-Camara dissenting).
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of seeking to ensure that the determination of the Chamber did 
not trench upon the legal rights and interests of Nicaragua. 
It further stated that: ”if the Chamber should feel that the
Application ... goes too far, or remains too limited, 
Nicaragua would be willing to adjust to any procedure 
indicated by the Chamber. The only thing that Nicaragua seeks 
is to protect its legal interests in any way the Statute 
allows.1188
Opposing the Nicaraguan application, El Salvador 
contended that Nicaragua had not described the precise object 
of its intervention, and that its stated object was 
improper.89 It further argued that Nicargua did not 
sufficiently indicate its rights, how they may be affected, or 
the substantive purpose of its intervention.90
The Chamber observed that in order to be permitted to 
intervene, a state does not have to show that it has rights 
which need to be protected, but merely an interest of a legal 
nature which may be affected by the decision in the case. It 
identified the substantive purpose of Nicaragua's request as 
being to inform the Chamber of its rights or interests, and to 
protect them by all legal means available, i.e., to prevent 
them from being affected by the Chamber's decision, or to 
ensure that a decision affecting them is only taken after
88 See ICJ Reports 1990, 108-9, para.38? 128-9, para.86.
89 See ibid., 129, para.86; also, 111, para.45.
90 See ibid., para.87.
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Nicargua has been heard.91
El Salvador also argued that:
[The] differing descriptions of the object of the 
intervention ... constitute an attempt to avoid the 
dilemma confronting a State seeking to intervene ... If 
the object of the intervention is to inform the Court of 
its rights or claims, Nicaragua will have a full 
opportunity to do so ... in the oral proceedings to be 
convened in accordance with ... the Rules, without any 
need to allow its intervention. If, on the other hand, 
the object of the application is to protect its claims by 
all legal means, including that of seeking a favourable 
judicial pronouncement on these claims, then such a 
purpose will signify the introduction ... of additional 
disputes requiring a valid link of jurisdiction, which 
does not exist.92
The Chamber rejected the implication of this argument, 
namely, that intervention in most cases would have to be 
refused, if not for the one reason, then for the other, and 
that the purposes of Article 62 would thus be frustrated. In 
the first place, with regard to the stated object of informing 
the Court of the third state*s rights, it is evident that if 
it were necessary for a state which considered that its legal 
interests might be affected by the decision in a case to give 
an exhaustive account of these interests in its application, 
or at the hearings held to consider whether permission to 
intervene should be granted, there would be no point in the 
institution of intervention and in the further proceedings to 
which it should give rise under the Rules.93
In considering Nicaragua*s application, the Chamber
91 See ibid.
92 See ibid., 129-30, para.88.
93 See ibid., 130, para.89.
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looked to the substance rather than to the form of the object 
of the intervention. It considered it as the purpose of 
intervention for an intervenor to inform the Chamber of its 
rights or interests in order to ensure that they may not be 
"affected” without the intervenor being heard, and that the 
use in an application of language more forceful than that of 
Article 62 is immaterial, provided the object actually aimed 
at is a proper one. It does not follow that for a state to 
seek by intervention "to protect its claims by all legal 
means” necessarily involves the inclusion in such means of 
"that of seeking a favourable judicial pronouncement” on its 
own claims. The "legal means available" must be those 
afforded by intervention for the protection of a third state*s 
legal interests. So far as the object of Nicaragua* s 
intervention is "to inform the Court of the nature of its 
legal rights which are in issue in the dispute", it cannot be 
said that this object is not a proper one. It seems indeed, 
to accord with the function of intervention.94
The requirement in Article 81(2)(a) of the Rules, under 
which the applicant has to set out the legal interest which it 
considers may be affected by the decision in the case, would 
appear to be a reinforcement of the condition laid down in 
Article 62(1) of the Statute. Since the Rules cannot alter 
the Statute, it has to be assumed that the indication of the 
precise object of the intervention and the jurisdictional 
requirement embodied in Article 81(2)(b) and (c) are
94 See ibid., 130-1, paras.90-2.
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additional items of information designed to enable the Court 
to appreciate more effectively whether the statutory 
conditions for intervention are fulfilled. The former 
requirement is presumably to enable the Court to assure itself 
how far the object of the intervention is indeed the 
safeguarding of legal rights which may be affected by the 
decision and how far this purpose might be involved. 
Furthermore, the precise object of the intervention would also 
enable the Court to consider what the applicant proposes to 
ask it to do about its legal interests which, it apprehends, 
may be affected by the decision. For instance, were its 
application to be granted, how might it ask the Court to 
modify its decision in the principal case, or in what other 
ways might it desire to be assisted by the Court?95 Apart 
from the conditions stipulated in the Statute and the Rules, 
there are no additional requirements for discretionary 
intervention. So, for example, the requirement that the 
would-be intervenor must show an existing dispute with either 
or both of the original parties or a history of attempted 
negotiation of agreement where the case is about delimitation 
of continental shelf boundaries, which was advanced by the 
parties as a ground for opposing the Italian and Nicaraguan 
applications to intervene, may be said to fall outside the 
purview of Article 62 of the Statute.96
95 See ICJ Reports 1984, 152, paras.12 and 14 (Jennings 
J. dissenting).
96 See ibid., 152-3, paras.15, 16 and 17? ibid. 1990, 
113-4, paras.50-1.
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(d) Classification of an "interest of a legal nature”
In its most restricted form an "interest of a legal 
nature" is the same as the type of legal interest indicated by 
the Court in the Monetary Gold Case.97 In view of the 
importance of some of the observations made by the Court in 
this case to the clarification of some of the issues relating 
to intervention, we should like briefly to review it.
In 1953 Italy instituted proceedings in the Court against 
France, the United Kingdom and the United States in the matter 
of the disposal of the monetary gold removed from Rome by the 
Germans in 1943 which was held by an arbitrator to belong to 
Albania. Italy submitted that the respondents should deliver 
to it any share of the monetary gold that might be due to 
Albania under the Paris Act of 14 January 1946 in partial 
satisfaction of the damage caused to it by the Albanian Law of 
13 January 1945, and that its claim to the monetary gold must
97 See ICJ Reports 1954, 19ff. This case has either been 
discussed or briefly mentioned in, for example: D.H.N.
Johnson, "The Case of the Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 
1943", 4 I CLP (1955), 93-115; P.A. Lalive, "L'Affaire de l'Or 
Monetaire Albancos", 58 RGDIP (1954), 438-60; C. Oliver, "The 
Monetary Gold Decision in Perspective", 49 AJIL (1955), 216- 
21; Miller, 556; Elias, The ICJ. 88; id., "The Limits", 
162; McGinley, 681; Chinkin, 508, 509, 510; Rosenne, The 
World Court. 143-4; id., Procedure, 79; 4 Schwarzenberger,
402; P.M. Eisemann, V. Coussirat-Coustere, & P. Hur, Petit 
Manuel de la Jurisprudence de la Cour Internationale de 
Justice. 2nd ed. (Paris: Editions A. Pedone, 1971), 64-7; 2
Verzijl, 208; C.W. Jenks, The Prospects of International 
Adjudication (London: Stevens & Sons Ltd., 1964; Dobbs Ferry, 
New York: Oceana Publications, 1964), 84, 86, 135, 253, 284, 
678, 703, 705, 723 (hereinafter _ tCProspects'M ; Licari,
269, n.6; Guyomar, 502, 508, 510, 515, 529ff; Wuhler, 195; 
Jones, 559, n.ll; Singh, 22, 201-6, 375, 390, 405. See
above, 138, n.59.
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have priority over that of the United Kingdom to receive the 
gold in partial satisfaction of the judgment in the Corfu 
Channel Case (Compensation).
Italy requested the Court to adjudicate upon the 
preliminary question of its jurisdiction to deal with the 
matters of the claim set forth in the first of its earlier 
submissions. The Court suspended the proceedings on the 
merits in order to consider the preliminary question. At the 
hearing, Italy argued that since the Washington Statement of 
25 April 1951 signed by the respondent states did not 
constitute a sufficient basis upon which to found the 
jurisdiction of the Court to deal with the merits of the claim 
contained in its application, the Court consequently lacked 
jurisdiction to deal with the case.
The United Kingdom contended, inter alia, that in view of 
Italy*s objection to the Court*s jurisdiction, its application 
was at variance with the Tripartite Washington Statement and 
was therefore invalidated. The other respondents did not 
deposit formal submissions.
The Court found that it had been validly seised of the 
Italian application, which contrary to submissions of the 
United Kingdom, still subsisted. It observed that the first 
submission in Italy’s application centred around a claim to 
indemnifications for an alleged wrong committed by Albania.
To determine whether Italy was entitled to receive the gold, 
the Court had to establish whether Albania had committed any J 
international wrong against Italy, and whether it was under an
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obligation to compensate Italy and, if so, to determine the
amount of the compensation. In order to decide such questions
the Court had to determine whether the Albanian law of 1945
was contrary to international law. In the determination of
questions concerning the lawful or unlawful character of
certain Albanian actions vis-a-vis Italy, only those two
states were directly interested. The Court could not go into
the merits of such questions, that is, decide a dispute
between Italy and Albania without the consent of Albania. The
Court observed that ”to adjudicate upon the international
responsibility of Albania without her consent would run
counter to a well-established principle of international law
embodied in the Court's Statute, namely, that the Court can
only exercise jurisdiction over a state with its consent.”98
Responding to the contention that, under the Statute,
proceedings may continue in the absence of an interested third
state which has refrained from intervening, the Court, after
having noted that Albania had not requested to be permitted to
intervene observed:
in the present case Albania's legal interest would not 
only be affected by the decision, but would form the very 
subject matter of the decision. In such a case the 
Statute cannot be regarded by implication as authorising 
proceedings to be continued in the absence of Albania.
98 See ICJ Reports 1954, 32.
99 See ibid. In his individual opinion Read J. concluded 
that Italy in making an application in which Albania was not 
named as a party, failed to make an application for the 
determination of the questions and therefore failed to comply 
with the terms of the offer set forth in the Washington 
Statement. Since Albania was a necessary and indispensable 
party to the proceedings the application, which did not comply
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The Court found that although the parties had conferred 
jurisdiction upon it, that jurisdiction could not be exercised 
to adjudicate on the first Italian claim. It also unanimously 
found that, as a result, it must refrain from examining the 
question of priority between the claim of Italy and that of 
the United Kingdom, since its adjudication under the terms of 
the Washington Statement depended on the first claim being 
decided.
Apart from its observation regarding a state whose legal 
interests would form the very subject matter of the decision, 
the Court made other remarks in this case which are worthy of 
note. First, it asserted that in the determination of rights 
which related to the lawful or unlawful character of certain 
actions by one state against another state, only the two 
states were directly interested. Secondly, it held that it 
could not adjudicate upon the international responsibility of 
a state without its consent. In the circumstances specified 
in the foregoing remarks, the state concerned becomes a 
necessary and indispensable party to the case, and its 
participation in it becomes imperative, since otherwise the 
proceedings will have to be discontinued.
This type of interest is confined to cases which involve 
the responsibility of a third state and possibly the 
encroachment on its interest, so universally recognised that
with the provisions of Article 40(1) of the Statute and 
Article 32(2) of the 1946 Rules, suffered from a fundamental 
defect. See ibid., 38. For a discussion of the concept of an 
indispensable party, see Damrosch, 390-3.
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its right to intervene cannot be denied.100 The Monetary 
Gold Case cannot, however, be regarded as clarifying the 
meaning of an "interest of a legal nature" for purposes of 
discretionary intervention, since in the circumstances of that 
case the third state (Albania) would have been able to
institute independent proceedings against the original
parties. It also provides an excellent example of a scenario 
in which the legal interest of the third state was more than 
affected by the decision.101
The legal interest required for intervention is weaker
than that of Albania in the Monetary Gold Case.102 The fact
that a decision would affect the legal interest of a third 
state does not necessarily mean that the interest of such a 
state would be subject-matter of the decision in the way that 
the interests of Albania were in the Monetary Gold Case. In 
its application for permission to intervene in the case 
between El Salvador and Honduras, Nicaragua cited the Monetary 
Gold Case and argued that its interests were so much part of
100 See McGinley, 682.
101 It has been argued that the Court' s dictum to the 
effect that Albania*s legal interest would form the very 
subject matter of the decision "does not, it seems, finally 
dispose of the issue for example where the third state's 
interests are not the very subject matter of the decision, 
.... the facts of that case were so unique as to make its 
value as a precedent slim", Rosenne, Law and Practice. 431? 
Damrosch, 390.
102 For the view that a weaker legal interest is required 
for intervention than for referring a substantive dispute to 
the Court, see the separate opinion of Jessup J. in ICJ 
Reports 1962, 432-3? see also Chinkin, 512? Miller, 556, 
n. 55.
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the subject-matter of the case that the Chamber could not 
properly exercise its jurisdiction without its 
participation.103 In examining the Monetary Gold Case104 the 
Chamber observed that if, as suggested, Nicaragua's legal 
interests would form part of the very subject-matter of the 
decision, this would doubtless justify an intervention by 
Nicaragua under Article 62 which lays down a less stringent 
criterion.105 While the Chamber found that Nicaragua had a 
legal interest which may be affected by the decision on the 
question whether or not the waters of the Gulf of Fonseca are 
subject to a condominion or a community of interests, of the 
three riparian states, it rejected Nicaragua*s contention that 
its legal interest "would form the very subject-matter of the 
decision" in the sense in which that phrase was used in the 
Monetary Gold Case to describe the interest of Albania.106
This type of legal interest arises where the intervenor 
apprehends that its position could be threatened by the 
Court's decision in the case in relation to either or both of 
the original parties, that is, where the Court's decision 
could prejudice the rights or interests of the intervenor vis- 
a-vis one or more of the original parties, either by direct or 
indirect impact. In the Tunisia/Libva Case, for instance, 
Malta was concerned that the drawing of baselines and the
103 See ICJ Reports 1990, 114, para.52.
104 See ibid., 114-6, paras.52-6.
105 See ibid., 116, para.56.
106 See ibid., 121-2, paras.72-3.
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closing of gulfs would adversely affect its bargaining 
position with Libya. The United States might also have 
apprehended that the Court would indicate Libyan territorial 
claims to the Gulf of Sidra, which would have impinged on its 
interests in the Mediterranean region. This type of interest 
is identical to the Court's conception of "an interest of a 
legal nature", as emerges from its jurisprudence. In the 
opinion of the Court, such an interest must relate to a legal 
interest of the third state directly in issue as between 
either or both parties to a case. For instance, if such an 
interest is in the Court's treatment of the physical factors 
and legal considerations relevant to the delimitation of 
continental shelf boundaries of states within a certain 
defined region, it must be different from those of other 
states within the same region.107 What needs to be shown by 
a state seeking permission to intervene can only be judged in 
concreto and in relation to all the circumstances of a 
particular case.108 For purposes of discretionary
intervention, an applicant state must clearly identify any 
legal interest that may be affected by the decision on the 
merits. A general apprehension is not enough.109
In the Maltese Intervention Case, the Court considered
107 See the Maltese Intervention Case. ICJ Reports 1981, 
12-3, para.19, and 19, para.33.
108 See ICJ Reports 1990, 117-8, para. 61. See also, 
Hudson, The Permanent Court. 371; Elias, The ICJ. 93; id., 
"The Limits", 167; Chinkin, 496.
109 See ibid., 118, para.62.
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that this type of interest must be established for the 
intervention to be permitted.110 In the Italian Intervention 
Case, where this kind of interest was clearly established, the 
Court considered that a legal interest similar to that of 
Albania in the Monetary Gold Case must be shown to exist for 
the case to be discontinued in the absence of a third 
party.111
In the Nicaraguan Intervention Case, the Chamber found 
that Nicaragua had not shown the existence of any interest of 
a legal nature which may be affected either by the decision on 
"the legal situation of the islands, or by any decision of the 
Chamber delimiting the waters of the Gulf of Fonseca, or by 
any decision as to the legal situation of the maritime spaces 
outside the Gulf, including any decision on entitlement or on 
delimitation between the parties.112 As regards the decision 
concerning the legal situation of the maritime spaces within 
the Gulf, the Chamber indicated that Nicaragua had a legal 
interest which may be affected by the decision as to the legal 
regime of those waters, and therefore permitted Nicaragua to 
intervene in respect of that aspect of the principal case.113
Previously, it was believed that an essential feature of
110 See ibid., 19, para.33.
111 See ICJ Reports 1984, 25, para.40. See also McGinley,
682.
112 See ICJ Reports. 1990, 119, para.66; 125, para.79;
128, para.84; 136-7, paras.104-5.
113 See ICJ Reports 1990. 121-2, paras.72-3; 125, para.79; 
128, para.85; 136-7, paras.104-5.
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this type of interest is the requirement that the intervenor 
undertakes to be bound by the decision in the case.114 In 
the Nicaraguan Intervention Case, the Chamber merely noted 
Nicaragua's statement of its intention to subject itself to 
the binding effect of the decision to be given.115 However, 
after having permitted Nicaragua's intervention in some 
aspects of the case, it observed that "the intervening state 
does not become party to the proceedings and does not acquire 
the rights or become subject to the obligations which attach 
to the status of a party under the Statute and Rules, or the 
general principles of procedural law".116
The next type of legal interest exists where a state 
believes that the Court's decision will promote or hinder 
certain rights or interests as regards third states. For 
example, a coastal state may object to special significance 
being accorded to particular geographical or geomorphological 
factors in a dispute in any region for the reason that states 
in its own region may rely by analogy on the Court's finding 
to advance their own claims in future litigation. A state 
may, for the same reasons, object to the adoption of a 
specific principle of law because of the possible impact of 
such a doctrine on its position with other states. By the 
same token, a state could, for instance, object to the concept
114 See McGinley, 681; de Arechaga, "Intervention", 461, 
para.23. Cf. 2 Fitzmaurice, 552-3; id., 34 BYIL (1958) 126- 
7; Miller, 556; Oda, "Intervention", 647, 648.
115 See ICJ Reports 1990, 109, para.38.
116 See ibid., 135-6, para.102.
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of proportionality as a relevant factor in continental shelf
delimitation.117
Amongst the considerations supporting its contention that
it had an interest of a legal nature which must inevitably be
affected by a decision of the Chamber, Nicaragua listed in
paragraph 2 of its application:
... (c) The geographical situation in the Gulf of Fonseca 
and the adjacent maritime areas.
(d) The essential character of the legal principles, 
including equitable principles, which would be relevant 
to the determination of the questions placed on the 
agenda by the special agreement.
(e) The general recognition by authoritative legal 
opinion that the issues relating to the Gulf of Fonseca 
involve a trilateral controversy.
(f) The leading role of coasts and coastal relationship 
in the legal regime of maritime delimitation and the 
consequence in the case of the Gulf of Fonseca that it 
would be impossible to carry out a delimitation which 
took into account only the coasts in the Gulf of two of 
the three riparian states.
(g) The fact that a possible element in the regulation of 
the legal situation of maritime spaces, especially, in a 
case like that of the Gulf of Fonseca, would be the 
designation of one or more zones of joint exploration and 
exploitation: ...118
The Chamber expressly rejected the considerations enumerated
in (c) , (d), (f) and (g) either as involving general legal
rules and principles, or as being too general to justify
intervention.119 It did not consider that an interst of a
third state in the general legal rules and principles likely
to be applied by the decision can justify an intervention even
when the applicant state "does not base its application simply
117 See ibid., 680.
118 See ICJ Reports 1990, 108, para. 37.
119 See ibid., 124-5, paras.76-8.
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on an interest in the Court1 s pronouncements in the case
regarding the applicable general principles and rules of
international law”, but "on quite specific elements”. Under
such circumstances, the interest invoked cannot be regarded as
one which ”may be affected by the decision in the case".120
The Chamber observed significantly that:
Whether a state is entitled to a territorial sea, 
continental shelf, exclusive economic zone, is a question 
to be decided by application of the principles and rules
of the law of the sea on those matters ... An interest in
the application of general legal rules and principles is 
not the kind of interest which will justify an 
application for permission to intervene.121
The broadest type of "an interest of a legal nature", is
the general interest of all states in the development of
international law.122 It has been observed that "so
intermingled have the economic, technological, technical and
geographical interests of states become today that they must
expect the possibility that their bilateral disputes might
impinge upon the interest of a third state, even
tangentially".123 It is thus possible for even a landlocked
state which may not be affected to the same extent as a
coastal state by developments in continental shelf law to
share a general interest in or common concern for the
120 See ibid., 124, para.76.
121 See ibid., 126, para.82.
122 In fact, this is one of the functions of the Court. 
See, for example, Jhabvala, "Scope of Individual Opinions", 
35; McGinley, 691; H. Lauterpacht, Development. 67. It has 
however been observed that this type of interest is more of a 
political character. See Rosenne, "Some Reflections", 79.
123 See Elias, The ICJ. 92; id., "The Limits", 165.
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development of that branch of law. The degree of interest 
shown by a state in the development of a branch of 
international law will usually depend on the extent of the 
impact on that state of the development of that area of law. 
Granted that all states are in some way interested in or 
affected by the development of international law, there is no 
gainsaying the fact that a state inclined to identify a legal 
interest in any dispute before the Court would succeed in 
doing so and therefore be able to request permission to 
intervene in that dispute.124 The Court has rejected 
intervention by a state for the purpose of submitting views on 
the issues raised in the case, that is, the rules and 
principles of international law applicable to the delimitation 
of the continental shelf without placing its own claims vis-a- 
vis the original parties in issue.125
There is, however, no doubt that intervention on the 
basis of a general interest in the development of 
international law was envisaged by the framers of Article 62 
of the Statute of the Permanent Court, on which the same 
Article of the Statute of the present Court was largely 
modelled. The drafting committee of the 1920 Hague Advisory 
Committee of Jurists recommended that more than one form of 
intervention should be allowed on condition that an interest
124 See Fitzmaurice, 34 BYIL (1958), 126-7; 2 id., 552-3.
125 See the Maltese Intervention Case. ICJ Reports 1981, 
17, para.30? 19, para.33? ibid., 1990, 124, para.76.
Intervention for this purpose was rejected by Tunisia and 
Libya, ibid., 10-1, paras.15-6.
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of a legal nature is involved so that political intervention 
will be excluded and the right of decision vested in the 
Court. It is clear that intervention was regarded as a medium 
through which states would play a part in the articulation of 
the law.126
It has also been argued on the basis of the travaux 
preoaratoires that Article 62 does not provide for 
intervention based merely on a general interest in the 
development of the rules and principles of international law. 
The absence of an intervention of this kind in the draft 
Statute of the Permanent Court is proffered as the reason for 
the problem raised by Mr. Balfour in his observation in a note 
on the Permanent Court to the League Council in Brussels in 
October 1920, namely the need for some provision by which a 
state may protest against any ulterior conclusions to which a 
decision of the Court may seem to point. It has been argued 
out that, if this type of intervention were permitted by the 
Statute, then the obvious answer which Mr. Leon Bourgeois 
would have given in his report to the League Council, which 
led to the final approval of the Statute, would have been a 
reference to the existence of Article 62 as constituting the 
solution. After a transparent allusion to Mr. Balfour's 
observation, Mr. Bourgeois stated in his report that the Hague 
jurists had indeed given to non-litigant states the right to
126 See Proces-Verbaux (1920), 747-9; League of Nations, 
Documents, 46, 50. See further McGinley, 683. Cf. the
separate opinion of de Arechaga J.A. in the Italian 
Intervention Case. ICJ Reports 1984, 62, para.22.
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intervene in a case where any interest of a judicial nature
which may concern them was involved.127 He then proposed the
addition to the draft Statute of two new articles apparently
designed to solve the problem, which greatly preoccupied the
then Great Powers, who feared that the existence of the Court
would diminish the predominant influence which they exercised
in the development of international law.
The two new articles inserted by the League Council into
the draft Statute are mutatis mutandis the present Article 57
concerning the right of any judge to deliver a separate
opinion, and Article 59 on the relative effect of the Court's
decision. The need for the addition of these articles to the
draft Statute, it is maintained, demonstrates that Article 62
was not then understood as giving an answer to the
preoccupations of the Great Powers voiced by Mr. Balfour. For
the foregoing reasons, de Arechaga concluded that:
... Article 62 does not authorise intervention merely on 
the basis of a general interest in the development of 
international law. On the contrary, as Judge Anzilotti 
has put it, 'the article in question [Article 62] only 
contemplated cases in which the states desiring to 
intervene had an actual legal interest in the 
dispute.'128 And the views expressed by Judge Anzilotti 
are of significance in respect of Mr. Bourgeois' report 
because, ... Judge Anzilotti, before coming to the Court, 
in his capacity as legal advisor of the Council, had 
greatly assisted Mr. Bourgeois in the preparation of the 
report.129
127 See League of Nations, Documents, 50. See the 
dissenting opinion of Oda J., ICJ Reports 1984, 96, para.13.
128 See PCIJ Series D . No.2, 87 and 90.
129 See de Arechaga, "Intervention", 455-8, esp. 458, 
para.15.
171
Writing without the benefit of judicial guidance, legal 
commentators have suggested a few negative standards as 
regards the interpretation of "an interest of a legal nature”. 
Fitzmaurice thought that the phrase must be taken to be 
intended to exclude cases in which, although the interests of 
a state may be affected, those interests are of purely 
political, economic or sociological nature. In his view the 
Court would probably wish to avoid any interpretation 
admitting of intervention based on an interest which, even if 
technically satisfying the requisite conditions, were of a 
remote or hypothetical character.130 The phrase does not 
seem to involve the interpretation of domestic law131 and 
would also exclude the recovery of alleged damages or specific 
performance of economic obligations.132
The meaning of the expression ”an interest of a legal 
nature” for purposes of discretionary intervention would 
appear to encompass the narrow interpretation placed on it by 
the Court in the Monetary Gold. Maltese. Italian and 
Nicaraguan Intervention Cases. It does not, however, appear
130 See 2 Fitzmaurice, 552-3? id., 34 BYIL (1958), 126-7. 
Hambro has also observed "that the interest must be legal and 
not merely factual or political". E.M. Hambro, "Some 
Observations on the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the 
International Court of Justice", 23 BYIL (1940), 133 at 154 
(hereinafter "Some Observations")? R.P. Anand, Compulsory 
Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (London: 
Asia Publishing House, 1961) under the auspices of the Indian 
School of International Studies, 282 (hereinafter "Compulsory 
Jurisdiction").
131 See Jenks, Prospects. 602.
132 See Smyrniadis, 39? Farag, 93-104.
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to extend to the broad construction placed on it by the 
travaux oreparatoires. Admittedly all states share a general 
interest in the development of international law because the 
reasoning embodied in the Court's judgments forms an important 
part of its jurisprudence, which is employed as a subsidiary 
means for the ascertainment of the rules of law. If such 
general interest were regarded as sufficient for purposes of 
intervention, there could never be a case in which a third 
state would not possess a potential legal interest in the 
result. A free-for-all kind of intervention will not exclude 
political, frivolous or vexatious requests for permission to 
intervene.
A narrow interpretation, according to which the legal 
interests of third states can never be affected by the Court's 
decision, since technically judicial decisions only bind the 
parties and cannot directly deny rights to, or impose 
obligations on, third states, thanks to Article 59, would 
nullify Article 62 and disregard the great persuasive 
authority of the Court's decision.133 Thus, it seems 
reasonable that a state which can show that it has a specific 
legal interest, which it considers to be genuinely threatened 
and likely to be indirectly affected by the reasoning on which 
the conclusions and the decision of the Court in a case are 
based, ought to be granted leave to intervene to protect such 
an interest.
While the Court may be somehow justified in rejecting the
133 See 2 Fitzmaurice, 552; id., 34 BYIL (1958), 126.
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notion that concern over articulations of law can constitute 
an interest of a legal nature which may be affected by the 
decision in a case, there seems to be no grounds for adopting 
the narrow interpretations already indicated and limiting 
intervention to them. Authoritative opinion generally seems 
to support the view that the interests of a state may be 
indirectly affected by the reasoning of the Court and 
therefore will allow intervention in cases where such an 
effect may occur, but not, however, simply on the basis of a 
general concern in the development of international law.134
(e) How the 11 interest of a legal nature1* mav be affected for
Purposes of Discretionary Intervention
Under the terms of Article 62(1) of the Statute, the 
would-be intervenor is not merely required to demonstrate that 
it has "an interest of a legal nature" in a pending litigation 
but such an interest must be one which "may be affected by the 
decision"135 in the case. This requirement has been 
recognised by some tribunals as a general principle of 
law.136 At first sight, it is one that could be easily 
fulfilled. This may not, however, be the case, considering
134 See for example, McGinley, 685.
135 It has been argued that "decision" presumably excludes 
the full hearings and even arguably the reasoning in the case. 
"Decision" is also used in Article 59 with respect to the 
binding force of the judgment on the parties. Chinkin 
therefore sees an obvious overlap between the two articles. 
See Chinkin, 497.
136 See Mani, 257, n.42, at 409.
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that the prospective intervenor is sometimes required to 
satisfy this condition without the benefit of the pleadings of 
the original parties.137
Nor is the would-be intervenor's task necessarily 
rendered any easier where it is given access to the pleadings. 
For, as in the Nicaracruan Intervention Case, the pleadings may 
reveal that the parties are in dispute about the 
interpretation of the very provision of the Special Agreement 
which is invoked in the application for permission to 
intervene. In such circumstances, it is obvious that the 
would-be intervenor will experience some difficulty in framing 
its application.138
In the final analysis, the burden of proof rests entirely 
on the applicant state, which must identify the interest of a 
legal nature which it considers may be affected by the 
decision in the case and show in what way that interest may be 
affected. It has only to show that its interest may be
137 See Chinkin, 511. See also the dissenting opinion of 
V-P. Sette-Camara in the Italian Intervention Case. ICJ 
Reports 1984, 74, para.17? 71, para.3. On the issue of access 
to the pleadings, see Articles 38 of the 1922 Rules, 42 of the 
1931 Rules, 44(2) (3) of the 1936 Rules of the Permanent Court; 
Articles 44(2) (3) of the 1946 Rules, 48(2) (3) of the 1972 
Rules and 53 of the 1978 Rules of the International Court. 
See also ICJ Reports 1981, 5, para.4; ibid. 1984, 5, para.4? 
ICJYB 1963-4, 108-9? cf. ICJ Reports 1990, 98, para.13? 24,
para.47? 30, para*62. See also the separate opinion of
Schwebel J. in ibid., 1981, 35? Jennings J. in ibid. 1984, 
150, para.8; and Singh J.'s separate opinion in ibid. 1984, 
33, para.II. See further, 4 Schwarzenberger, 407? Miller, 
557, 567, n.43? Jessup, 906? Moore, "Organisation", 507? 
Decaux, 183, n.31; Mani, 150-1? Rosenne, Procedure, 119?
Chinkin, 518? Hudson, The Permanent Court. 423; Simpson and 
Fox, 187.
138 See ICJ Reports 1990, 118, para.62.
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affected, not that it will, or must be affected. It does not 
have to show that it has rights which need to be protected, 
but merely an interest of a legal nature which may be affected 
by the decision on the merits. Nor does it have to give an 
exhaustive account of its legal interests. However, a general 
apprehension is not considered enough.139 In the Nicaraguan 
Intervention Case, the Chamber found that Nicaragua failed to 
show that it had an interest of a legal nature which might be 
affected by the decision on the legal situation of the
r
islands, or by any decision delimiting the waters of the Gulf 
of Fonseca or by any decision as to the legal situation of the 
maritime spaces outside the Gulf, including any decision on 
entitlement or on delimitation between the parties. It 
therefore refused Nicaragua permission to intervene in respect 
of those aspects of the case.140
The view that general interest or concern in the 
development of international law constitutes a legal interest 
which may be affected by the decision in a case is supported 
by Article 38(1)(d) of the Statute which enjoins the Court to 
apply judicial decisions as subsidiary means for determination 
of rules of law. Though juristic opinion on the nature of the 
legal interest and the way in which it may be affected by the 
decision is by no means unanimous, it would appear to hold 
that the interest of a state may be indirectly affected by the
139 See ibid., 1990, 114, paras.83-4; 129, para.87; 130, 
para.89.
140 See ibid., 119, para. 66; 125, para. 79; 127-8,
para.84; 136-7, paras.104-5.
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reasoning of the Court and that this should suffice to enable 
such a state to intervene in the case. Such a state may, 
however, possess a particular legal interest which it 
considers to be genuinely threatened. There is great merit in 
this view, for it is only thus that discretionary intervention 
will be able to function as the specific guarantee for the 
protection of the interests of third parties which, after all, 
it was intended to be. In rejecting Italy*s request to 
intervene in the Libva/Malta Case, the Court stated that 
Italy's rights would be safeguarded by Article 59. The Court 
cited an observation of the Permanent Court141 to support its 
interpretation of this provision according to which the 
principles and rules of international law found to be 
applicable to the delimitation between Libya and Malta and the 
indications given as to their practical application could not 
be relied on by them against any other state.142 The 
construction placed by the Court in this case, though 
technically correct, would appear to be misleading as far as 
the practical effects of that provision are concerned.143
Judge Jennings proffered two alternative interpretations 
of Article 59 according to the first of which the principles 
of decision of a judgment are not binding in the sense that
141 See PCIJ Series A . No. 13, 21.
142 See Italian Intervention Case. ICJ Reports 1984, 26, 
para.42.
143 See the separate opinion of Oda J. in the Maltese 
Intervention Case. ICJ Reports 1981, 27, para.9; dissenting 
opinion of Schwebel J., ibid. 1984, 134-5, para.11.
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they might be in some common law systems. However he observed
significantly:
... the slightest acquaintance with the jurisprudence of 
the Court shows that Article 59 does by no manner of 
means exclude the force of persuasive precedent. [For 
this reason] the idea that Article 59 is protective of 
third states' interests in this sense at least is 
illusory.
He points out in his second interpretation that Article 59 may 
be considered as applying also more particularly to the 
dispositif of the judgment and that it is true that the 
particular rights and obligations created by the dispositif 
are addressed to the parties to the case and in respect only 
of that case. It is in this quite particular and technical 
sense that Sir Robert believed that Italy would certainly be 
protected.144 Sir Robert was also of the opinion that if 
Article 59 were to be given the very broad interpretation 
espoused by the Court so that every decision is to be 
analogous to a bilateral agreement and res inter alios acta to 
third states, the Court will in effect disable itself from 
making useful and realistic pronouncements on sovereignty and 
sovereign rights.145
Sir Robert considered it unrealistic even in 
consideration of strict legal principle to suppose that the 
effects of a judgment are wholly confined by Article 59 since 
every state and member of the Court is under a general
144 See ibid. 1984, 158, para.27. Cf. Singh, 186-7.
145 See ibid., 158-9, para.31.
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obligation to respect its judgments.146
The position adopted by individual judges in their 
separate or dissenting opinions with regard to the effect of 
Article 59 in relation to discretionary intervention is 
substantially reflected in the relevant academic literature. 
Jessup points out, for instance, that the Court*s 
interpretation of a Convention in one case is bound to have 
persuasive authority. He admits that though it is possible 
for the Court to alter its conclusion or reasoning with new 
judges on the bench, the weight of precedent is great.147
McGinley has pointed out that Article 59 was not intended 
to play, nor does it play the role assigned to it by the 
Court. He defines the role of Article 59 as being ”to prevent 
the fact that a state failed to intervene from being used 
against it in a subsequent case involving the same point of 
law.”148
The Court's view that Italy's rights will be safeguarded 
by Article 59 throws into sharp relief the issue of the 
relationship between Articles 59 and 62. For, if, as was 
contended, Article 59 always provides such adequate protection 
for third states as to prevent their interests from being 
genuinely affected in a pending case, then Article 62 would 
have no sphere of application and would therefore be rendered
146 See ibid., 158, paras.28-9.
147 See Jessup, 904, 905, 908; Miller, 554, 556, 564;
Starke, "Locus Standi", 356-7; Chinkin, 521.
148 See McGinley, 690; Reisman, Nullity. 136. See also, 
2 Fitzmaurice, 552; id., 34 BYIL (1958), 126; Adede, 74-5.
179
pointless.149 The Court pre-empts this conclusion by 
explaining that Articles 59 and 62 provide a state which 
considers that its legal interest may be affected by the 
decision in a case with a choice, between submitting a request 
for permission to intervene under the terms of the latter 
Article, thereby securing procedural economy of means on the 
one hand, and relying on the former Article on the other.150
If we accept the Court*s analysis of both Articles at 
face value, the object of discretionary intervention, that is, 
to ensure the protection of a legal interest by preventing it 
from being affected by the decision in a case, would appear to 
be transformed into what Judge Schwebel has called "an 
improbable procedural convenience" which is supported neither 
by its terms nor its travaux preparatoires.151
The Court*s view of the relationship between both 
provisions of the Statute would also seem to read Article 62 
out of the Statute, a situation which is patently 
unacceptable.152 For, if Article 59 ensures that the rights 
of third states can never be affected by a judgment this must 
mean that they can never be affected in the sense of Article
149 See Italian Intervention Case. ICJ Reports 1984, 26, 
para.42; 134, para.9 (Schwebel J. dissenting).
150 See ibid., and para. 10 (Schwebel J. dissenting);
ibid. 1990, 115, para.54; 130, para.90.
151 See ibid. 1984, 136, para.14 (Schwebel J. dissenting).
152 See ibid., 134, para.9 (Schwebel J. dissenting);
ibid., 159-60, para.34 (Jennings J. dissenting).
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62.153
The key to the resolution of the issue would seem to lie 
in a proper understanding of the respective meanings and 
objects of both provisions. The fact is often overlooked that 
Article 59 speaks of the "binding force" of the decision of 
the Court, while Article 62 provides for intervention to 
protect a legal interest which may be "affected by the 
decision in a case". Article 59 refers to the decision, that 
is the dispositif or operative provisions of the judgment, 
which in strict law carry binding force. Such a decision 
creates particular rules for the parties to the case in which 
the judgment is given by conferring rights or imposing 
obligations on them alone. Such a decision is therefore res 
inter alios acta as regards third parties. This protection, 
though important, is merely general, formal and technical. It 
cannot and does not prevent the reasoning on which the 
conclusions and the decision are based from passing into the 
jurisprudence of the Court, thus serving as a subsidiary means 
for determination of rules of law within the meaning of 
Article 38(1)(d) of the Statute. The reference to Article 59 
at the beginning of that provision may be said to be for the 
purpose of the avoidance of any doubt likely to arise in 
connection with the meaning and purport of that provision 
under Article 59. Since the jurisprudence of the Court 
recognises the persuasive authority of precedence, Article 59 
may technically protect third parties from the binding effect
153 See ibid.
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of the decisions of the Court? but it cannot prevent the
interests of such third parties from being affected by the
reasoning in the judgment.154
After having stated that Article 59 is intended to
preserve the relative character of res judicata in a general
way, V-P. Sette-Camara noted that:
If it would provide sufficient protection for third 
states in the circumsances under which they are compelled 
to apply for permission to intervene, Article 62 would 
have no place in the Statute.155
He then explained that recourse to Article 62 by a third state
is not by mere choice, as stated in the judgment,156 but that
it was because such a state considered that the decision in
the principal case might affect its legal interest. He
thought that Article 62 provided a form of direct protection
different from the general principle of Article 59 which
confined itself to enunciating the principle that judgments
are res inter alios acta third states.157
It appears that the Court would not grant a request for
154 One may be forgiven for thinking that the use of the 
term "decision" in Articles 59 and 62, implies that both 
provisions refer to one and the same thing, namely the 
dispositif or the operative part of the judgment. Such a view 
disregards the fact that the term "decision" may also be used 
generally to refer to the whole of the judgment. See Jowitt, 
567, 1025. See also The Maltese Intervention Case. ICJ
Reports 1981, 36 (Schwebel J., separate opinion); Italian 
Intervention Case, ibid. 1984, 157, para.27 (Jennings J.
dissenting); and McGinley, 689-92? Chinkin, 502, 521 and 
529.
155 See ICJ Reports 1984, 87, para.81 (V-P. Sette-Camara 
dissenting).
156 See ibid., 26, para.42.
157 See ibid., 87, para.81 (V-P. Sette-Camara dissenting).
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permission to intervene if it considered that the interests of
the requesting state would be protected in its judgment.
While rejecting Italy*s application for permission to
intervene in the Libva/Malta Case, the Court noted that in its
future judgment, it would take account as a fact of other
states having claims in the region. To support its stance,
the Court relied on a dictum of the Permanent Court in the
Legal Status of Eastern Greenland Case that:
Another circumstance which must be taken into account by 
any tribunal which has to adjudicate upon a claim to 
sovereignty over a particular territory is the extent to 
which the sovereignty is also claimed by some other 
Power.158
The Court then commented that this 11 is no less true when what 
is in question is the extent of the respective areas of 
continental shelf over which different states enjoy sovereign 
rights*1.159 It said that its future judgment would, in 
addition to being limited in its effect by Article 59, be 
without prejudice to the rights and interests of third states. 
It would also make it clear that it was deciding between the 
competing claims of Libya and Malta.160
In the Burkina Faso/Mali Case, a Chamber of the Court did 
not consider its jurisdiction restricted simply because the 
end point of the frontier lies on the frontier of a third 
state not a party to the proceedings. The Chamber observed
158 See PCIJ Series A/B. No.53, 46? ICJ Reports 1984, 26, 
para.43.
159 See ibid.
160 See ibid.
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that the rights of Niger, the third state, were safeguarded by 
the operation of Article 59.161 The Chamber then
distinguished the Libva/Malta Case from the case being heard, 
by stating that in the former, the Court confined its decision 
to a certain geographic area because it had no jurisdiction 
either to determine what principles and rules governed the 
limitations with third states or whether the claims of the 
parties outside that area prevailed over the claims of local 
states. The Chamber took the view that the process of 
determining a line of land boundary between two states was 
clearly distinguishable from that of identifying applicable 
principles and rules of continental shelf delimitation. 
According to the Chamber, the legal considerations in 
determining the location of the land boundary between the 
parties do not depend on the position of the boundary between 
the territory of either of those parties and that of a third 
state, even where the rights concerned of all three states 
derive from one predecessor state. Conversely, in continental 
shelf delimitations a perfectly valid and binding agreement 
between the parties may, when the relations between the 
parties and a third state are considered, prove to be contrary 
to the applicable rules and principles of international law 
governing continental shelf delimitations. For this reason, 
the chamber would decline, even if so authorised, to rule upon 
rights relating to areas in which third states may have such
161 See Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkina 
Faso/Reoublic of Mali). ICJ Reports 1986, 554 at 557, para.46 
(hereinafter "Burkina Faso/Mali Case'M .
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claims as may contradict the legal considerations, especially
in regard to equitable principles which would have formed the
basis of its decision.162
The Monetary Gold Case, in which it was clear from the
record that the legal interests of a third state, that is
Albania, would not only be affected by the decision but would
form the very subject-matter of the decision, was
distinguished from the case in hand. In the former, the Court
would decline jurisdiction. The Chamber therefore concluded
that it had a duty to indicate the line of the frontier
between the parties for the entire length of the disputed
area, defining the location of the end point of the frontier
in the East, where this frontier ceases to divide the
territories of Burkina Faso and Mali. This would not amount
to a decision that it is a tripoint which affects Niger, in
accordance with Article 59. The judgment would not also be
opposable to Niger as regards the course of its frontiers.163
Commenting on the leading role of coasts and coastal
relationships in the legal regime of maritime delimitation in
relation to Nicaragua *s contention that it would be impossible
to carry out a delimitation which took into account only the
coasts in the Gulf of Fonseca, of two of the three riparian
states, the Chamber observed, inter alia, that:
It occurs frequently in practice that a delimitation 
between two States involves taking account of the coast 
of a third State? but the taking into account of all the
162 See ibid., 578-9, paras.47 and 48.
163 See ibid., 579-80, paras.49 and 50.
185
coasts and coastal relationships within the Gulf as a 
geographical fact for the purpose of effecting an 
eventual delimitation as between two riparian States ... 
in no way signifies that by such an operaiton itself the 
legal interest of a third riparian State of the Gulf, ... 
may be affected.164
It would appear from the foregoing that, as far as the 
conditions in Article 62(1) are concerned, the interest of a 
legal nature, and how it may be affected by the decision in a 
case, are inseparably linked, and that the former has primacy 
over the latter. Without the interests of a legal nature it 
will not be necessary to ascertain in what way it may be 
affected and requests for permission to intervene will be 
rejected out of hand. Where the interest of a legal nature is 
shown to exist there are a number of ways in which it may be 
affected by the decision in a case. In the first place, if, 
as in the Monetary Gold Case.165 the legal interest of the 
third state will form the very subject-matter of the decision, 
provided all other conditions are satisfied, the Court will 
have no choice but to grant the request for permission to 
intervene. Otherwise it will have to decline jurisdiction in 
the absence of the third state.166
Secondly, the legal interest of a third state may be 
affected by the operative part of the judgment. It would seem 
from the Maltese and Italian Intervention Cases that the Court 
would consider whether a jurisdictional nexus between the
164 See ICJ Reports 1990, 124-5, para.77.
165 See ICJ Reports 1954, 19.
166 See ICJ Reports 1990, 116, para.56.
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would-be intervenor and the original parties is required as a 
condition for the intervention to be allowed. The would-be 
intervenor would also be required to be bound by the decision 
in the sense of Article 59. The absence of such a third state 
can neither frustrate the proceedings nor prevent the Court 
from exercising its jurisdiction.
Thirdly, subject to the technical protection which 
Article 59 affords third states, the Court may employ 
international jurisprudence, including its own, as a 
subsidiary or auxiliary source of law.
Finally, where the legal interest of a third state may be 
affected by the decision, such a state may request to be 
permitted to intervene. The sense in which a legal interest 
of a third state may be affected under Article 62 is to be 
distinguished from that of Article 59, under which the 
decision of the Court is binding only on the parties and in 
respect to that particular case.167 Where the legal interest 
of a state may be affected in the sense of Article 62 it is 
pointless to maintain that such a state will be protected by 
Article 59 if it is not permitted to intervene. This is all 
the more so given that the Court has spelled out the object of 
intervention as being to ensure the protection of the legal 
interest of a state by preventing it from being affected by 
the decision in a case. Article 59 certainly protects third
167 See the observations of Schwebel J. in his separate 
opinion in Maltese Intervention Case. ICJ Reports 1981, 36? 
Italian Intervention Case, ibid. 1984, 133, para.8 (Schwebel 
J. dissenting).
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parties from the binding force of the Court's decision but it 
does not and cannot protect their interests from being 
affected by other elements of the Court's judgments.168 
Rules and principles of international law enunciated by the 
Court bind all states, not by virtue of any particular 
judgment, but because all members of the United Nations have 
undertaken to respect and promote international law.169
We therefore submit that third parties may be said to be 
affected by the decision in a case though they may not be 
bound by the decision in the sense of Article 59. If a third 
party is able to prove that, in addition to the general 
interest which it shares with all other states in the 
development of international law, it has a specific legal 
interest which it considers may be affected by the decision in 
a pending case, such a third party is undoubtedly affected by 
the decision in the sense of Article 62 and ought, therefore,
to be permitted to intervene in the case.
4. Intervention Proceedings
(a) The Role of the Court and the Parties
Under Article 62(1) of the Statute, a state which
considers that it has an interest of a legal nature which may 
be affected by the decision in the case may submit a request 
to the Court to be permitted to intervene. Under Article
168 See ICJ Reports 1981, 36, separate opinion of Schwebel
J.
169 See McGinley, 690-1.
62(2) "it shall be for the Court to decide upon this request". 
Because of the discretion vested in the Court by this 
provision intervention under Article 62 has been variously 
described as discretionary intervention, intervention by leave 
of the Court, or permissive intervention.170 The discretion 
granted to the Court is distinct from, and in addition to its 
duty to ensure that the conditions embodied in Article 62(1) 
are met by states requesting permission to intervene.
Any inquiry must necessarily start with an examination of 
the Court*s rules. The rules are an international example of 
delegated legislation. They are the Court's "political"171 
or operational interpretation of its Statute, cast in the form 
of a general regulatory system. As such they may provide 
useful indications of the approach favoured by the Court when 
it is called upon to deal with requests for permission to 
intervene.
Under Article 59 of the 1922 Rules of the Permanent Court 
an application for permission to intervene was required to 
contain: a specification of the case concerned, a statement of 
law and of fact justifying intervention, and a list of 
documents in support of the application. This requirement 
remained unaltered throughout the lifetime of that Court and 
passed without amendment into Article 64(2) of the 1946 Rules 
and Article 69(2) of the 1972 Rules of the International
170 See separate opinion of de Arechaga J.A., ICJ Reports 
1984, 58, para.9.
171 This term is borrowed from Rosenne, Law and Practice. 
53. See also Licari, 273.
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Court.
Prior to the adoption of the 1978 Rules both Courts 
considered that all they required to assist them in deciding 
an intervention request were, besides the arguments and the 
submissions of the applicant state, a statement of law and of 
fact justifying intervention and supporting documents. These 
would demonstrate the interest of a legal nature of the 
applicant and how it may be affected by the decision.
Since the Permanent Court had no experience of deciding 
an application to intervene under Article 62 of its Statute, 
there is no guidance as to how it would have interpreted the 
relevant provisions of its Rules. During the proceedings on 
Poland*s application to intervene in the SS Wimbledon 
Case.172 that Court observed that intervention under Article 
62 should be admitted if the existence of an interest of a 
legal nature is "sufficiently demonstrated".173
In his declaration in the Fiiian Intervention Cases. 
Judge de Arechaga thought that Article 69(2) of the 1972 Rules 
requiring a statement of law and of fact justifying 
intervention must be interpreted as including a requirement of 
establishing an independent jurisdictional link between the 
would-be intervenor and the original parties.174 It is 
perhaps Judge de Arechaga*s observation, which serves to shed 
some light on the policy considerations concealed in the terse
172 See PCIJ Series A . No.l, 9-14.
173 See ibid., 12.
174 See ICJ Reports 1974, 533 and 538.
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wording of Article 69(2) of the Rules. Such policy 
considerations, which also reflect the unresolved issues 
relating to intervention, engaged the attention of the Court 
during the last revision of its Rules. Article 81(2) of the 
1978 Rules requires an application to intervene to specify the 
case to which it relates and to set out: (a) the interest of 
a legal nature which the applicant considers may be affected 
by the decision in the case; (b) the precise object of the 
intervention? and (c) any basis of jurisdiction which is 
claimed to exist as between the applicant and the parties to 
the case.
The pronouncements of the Court in the Maltese and
Italian Intervention Cases lead one to conclude that it has
taken a narrow view of the discretion conferred on it by 
Article 62(2) of the Statute. In the former case the Court 
stressed that it did not consider Article 62(2) "to confer on 
it any general discretion to accept or reject a request for 
permission to intervene for reasons simply of policy. On the 
contrary, in the view of the Court, the task entrusted to it 
by that paragraph is to determine the admissibility or 
otherwise of the request by reference to the relevant 
provisions of the Statute."175 Thus the Court appears to 
exclude from this restricted view of its discretion
considerations of policy. This position is untenable, not
175 See ICJ Reports 1981, 12, para. 17? ibid. 1984, 8-9, 
para. 12. Although the Court sees its task under this 
provision as one of applying legal standards susceptible of 
objective determination, it is not clear how it means to 
ascertain those standards. See Damrosch, 383.
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least because the Court cannot ignore the dictates of judicial 
policies and principles which underlie the administration of 
justice and to which reference has been made in the judgments, 
individual opinions and the academic literature. In his 
separate opinion in the Maltese Intervention Case. Judge 
Schwebel observed that "there are significant considerations 
of judicial policy” which suggest that the Court should
construe the institution of intervention so as to debar "non- 
party intervention" or "unequal intervention" as being outside 
the ambit of the Statute.176 In the opinion of Judge Oda, 
the problem raised by the objection that intervention based on 
an interpretation of the principle and rules of international 
law would invite many further instances of intervention should 
be considered from the viewpoint of future policy and the 
economy of international justice.177
Another requirement of judicial policy which has been 
mentioned in individual opinions is that of judicial
propriety. Judge Oda, in his separate opinion in the Maltese 
Intervention Case, observed that in exercising the authority 
to decide upon a request for permission to intervene, the 
Court may take into account "considerations of judicial 
propriety".178 In his dissenting opinion in the Salvadorean
176 See ICJ Reports 1981, 35.
177 See ibid. 1981, 12, para. 17? see also Jessup, 907.
178 See ICJ Reports 1981, 23, para.l? see also separate
opinion of Singh J., ibid. 1984, 33, and his separate opinion 
in the Salvadorean Intervention Case, ibid., 218; the joint 
separate opinion of Judges Ruda, Mosler, Ago, Jennings and de 
la Charriere, ibid., 219, para.4.
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Intervention Case. Judge Schwebel thought that "considerations 
of judicial propriety, of the sovereign equality of states 
before the law and of fair play required a hearing"179 to be 
granted to El Salvador. He regretted that he had to dissent 
from the order because the Court's refusal to grant El 
Salvador a hearing departed from the observance of "due 
process of law"180 which the Court had traditionally upheld. 
Judge Schwebel also remarked that if the Court was to deserve 
and maintain "the confidence of States"181 it must act with 
scrupulous regard to the letter and spirit of its rules.
It is clear from the foregoing examples that such 
considerations as judicial policy, judicial propriety, the 
sovereign equality of states before the law, fair play, due 
process of law and the need to win and maintain the confidence 
of states are favoured by individual judges as factors to be 
taken into account by the Court in dealing with requests for 
permission to intervene. Given the controversial nature of 
the procedural faculty of intervention in both municipal182 
and international law it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
see how the Court can exercise the competence conferred on it 
by Article 62(2) to decide upon requests for permission to
179 See ibid., 231.
180 See ibid., 223.
181 See ibid., 231.
182 See the observations of Brown J. in Atlantis 
Development Corporation v. United States. 379f, 2nd 818 at 824 
(5th Circuit 1967)? and Bazelon C.J. in Smuck v. Hobson 
(1969) 408f, 2nd 175 at 179 (District Court Circuit 1969). 
See also Chinkin, 500.
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intervene, on legal considerations alone.
Opinion on the role of the Court is by no means 
unanimous. It has jurisdiction only by consent of the 
sovereign states which refer disputes to it and only so far as 
such jurisdiction is granted. While it is true that in 
principle international adjudication shares some of the 
conflicting goals of intervention which exist in municipal 
legal systems, the conflicting policies concerning 
discretionary intervention may be even more difficult to 
resolve, since they revolve around the jurisdictional 
peculiarity which that provision presents, and which is unique 
to the International Court, namely jurisdiction over the 
parties. If municipal courts are concerned not to disregard 
the interests of the original parties, where the question of 
intervention arises before the International Court, it may 
claim stronger justification for taking the interests of such 
parties into account. It must guarantee the protection of the 
legal interests of third states while observing the 
fundamental principles underlying its jurisdiction, that is 
the principles of consent, of reciprocity of rights and 
obligations and of the equality of sovereign states before the 
law. The Court must give full effect to Article 62 without 
appearing to offend against the principle of party autonomy by 
being too eager to permit intervention and so discourage 
states from submitting their disputes to it for settlement.
Though the Court has stressed that its task under Article 
62(2) is "to determine the admissibility, or otherwise, of the
194
request [to be permitted to intervene] by reference to the 
relevant provisions of the Statute”, it is nevertheless clear 
that in performing this task it takes into consideration such 
other factors as: the Special Agreement concluded by the
original parties, as well as their claims and submissions, the 
claims of third states and the real motives of potential 
intervenors. The Court has declared itself to be necessarily 
sensible of the limits of the jurisdiction conferred on it by 
its Statute and by the parties in their Special Agreement. 
Consequently its findings and the reasoning by which they are 
reached will inevitably be directed exclusively to the matters 
in the Agreement. Therefore no conclusions or inferences may 
legitimately be drawn from such findings or reasons with 
respect to the rights and claims of third states.183
The Court has also asserted that the scope of its action 
is defined by the Agreement which embodies the consent of the 
parties to the settlement of their dispute. The possibility 
of intervention as a feature of its Statute remains open in 
cases brought by Special Agreement but the implementation of 
intervention must in principle be effected within the scope of 
the Special Agreement.184
The Court has also remarked that the scope of its 
decision is normally defined by the claims and submissions of 
the parties to the case, and that it judges whether or not an
183 See ICJ Reports 1981, 20, para. 35.
184 See ibid. 1984, 24, para.38? ibid. 1990, 133,
para.96.
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intervention is admissible by reference to the definition of 
the legal interest and the object of the intervention 
indicated by the applicant. It has explained that in 
considering a request for permission to intervene, it regards 
it as its duty to isolate the real issue in the case, identify 
the object of the claim and ascertain its true purpose by 
going beyond the ordinary meaning of the words used and 
considering all the circumstances and the nature of the 
subject-matter of the proceedings.185
In exercising its discretion the Court will seek to 
establish whether or not the applicant will be adequately 
safeguarded by Article 59 which is included in the "relevant 
provisions of the Statute". Italy's intervention was rejected 
because, among other things, the Court was satisfied that its 
rights and interests would be sufficiently protected by that 
provision.186
Another factor which may weigh with the Court if, for 
example, it is seised of a territorial dispute, is the 
possibility of the existence and the extent of third party 
claims. It may therefore decide that it would take account of 
the rights or interests of such third parties in reaching its 
decision, and refuse an application to intervene.187 This 
factor may be considered as being included in the "relevant 
circumstances", usually referred to in Special Agreements by
185 See ibid. 1984, 23, para.39.
186 See ibid., 26, para.42.
187 See ibid., 26-7, para.43.
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which territorial disputes are submitted to the Court. To 
this end, it may indicate that its judgment in the principal 
case is without prejudice to the rights of third states or 
make it clear that it is deciding only between the competing 
claims of the parties.188
The Court is always mindful of how the intervention, if 
eventually permitted, would affect the position of the 
original parties. What emerges from some of the Court's 
observations in the Maltese Intervention Case is that it 
clearly had in mind the possible attitude of the original 
parties. It would seem that Malta's application was refused 
because in the Court's view Malta sought the opportunity to 
submit arguments to the Court with possibly prejudicial 
effects on the interests of either or both of the original 
parties in their mutual relations. The Court thought that to 
allow such an intervention would, in the particular 
circumstances of that case, also leave the parties uncertain 
as to whether and how far they should consider their own 
separate legal interests vis-a-vis Malta as, in effect, 
constituting part of the subject-matter of the case. A would- 
be intervenor is not entitled to place the parties in such a 
position, especially since it would neither (as Malta proposed 
to do) be submitting its own claims for decision nor be 
exposing itself to counterclaims.189
The Court's attitude in the Maltese Intervention Case
188 See ibid.
189 See ibid. 1981, 19-20, para.34. See also Jessup, 908.
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regarding the position of the original parties stands in 
marked contrast to the somewhat indifferent approach which it 
adopted with respect to the interests of the parties in the 
Italian Intervention Case. In the latter case the Court took 
the view that by objecting to Italy's intervention the 
original parties had indicated their preferences.190
In the final analysis, under Article 62(2) the decision 
on a request for permission to intervene must be seen to be 
taken by the Court.191
In the Nicaraguan Intervention Case, in which Nicaragua's 
intervention in some aspects of the case was not opposed by 
one of the parties,192 the Chamber stated that the views of
the parties regarding the nature or existence of the interests
of the applicant state constitute evidence which it may 
consider.193 The Court can permit an intervention even 
though it be opposed by one or both of the parties to the 
case. For, "the opposition (to an intervention) of the 
parties, is, though very important, no more than one element 
to be taken into account by the Court".194
190 See ICJ Reports 1984, 26-7, para.43. On the approach 
adopted by the Court, see the observations of Morozov J. in 
his separate opinion, ibid., 30, para.4.
191 See Elias, The ICJ. 95-6? id., "The Limits", 168-9.
192 See ICJ Reports 1990, para. 69.
193 See ibid., 118-9, para.63.
194 See ICJ Reports 1984, 28, para.46? ibid. 1990, 133, 
para.96. See in contrast, McGinley, 694. In his separate 
opinion, de Arechaga J.A. apprehended that states would no 
longer have recourse to the Court if intervention were readily 
granted. He thought that they might resort to using other
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The Court*s questionable assertion that it does not 
accept or reject intervention requests on broad overriding 
policy grounds has led it to espouse a very restricted view of 
its discretion.195 In reality, however, this discretion, 
though by no means absolute, is very considerable. This is 
clearly borne out by the requirement embodied in Article 81(2) 
of the 1978 Rules. It is noteworthy that with the exception 
of the condition relating to the interest of a legal nature, 
the other requirements contained in that provision are not to 
be found in the Statute. Judge Oda has observed that the 
Court has certain discretionary powers to allow or disallow 
any requesting state to intervene in the litigation. In his 
view, any danger of the expansive application of Article 62 
will certainly be minimized by the exercise of the Court's 
discretion.196
If interpreted in accordance with the ordinary meaning of
the words used, Article 62(1) does not seem to be as narrow as
the Court makes it appear. It has been rightly observed:
Some international lawyers have long felt that Article 62 
is couched in language far too loose and obscure ... The 
ambiguous words 'interest', 'legal nature' and 'may be
tribunals. This apprehension probably weighed with the Court 
in the Italian Intervention Case. See ICJ Reports 1984, 64, 
para.28. On the role of the parties, see Rosenne, "Some 
Reflections", 83.
195 See Starke, "Locus Standi", 356. Cf. Rosenne, "Some 
Reflections", 77, 89-90.
196 See ICJ Reports 1981, 31, para. 18 (separate opinion of 
Oda J.)? also, ibid. 1984, 106, para.31 (Oda J. dissenting); 
135-6, paras.13-4 (Schwebel J. dissenting); 151, para.9 
(Jennings J. dissenting). See also Oda, "Intervention", 647; 
2 Fitzmaurice, 553; id., 34 BYIL (1958), 127.
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affected' ... should have been supplemented by formulated 
criteria to give more precise effect to the obvious 
purpose of the Article, namely, to provide safeguards for 
states whose vital rights could in the short or long term 
be seriously impaired by the operation of the Court's 
decision.197
Whether the Court must accede to the request when all the 
stipulated conditions are fulfilled or if it still retains 
some residual discretion of rejection is a moot point. A text 
of Article 62 proposed by Lord Phillimore, which would have 
embodied explicit subjective discretion enabling the Court to 
grant the request "if it thinks fit", was rejected.198
Article 62(2) does not spell out any additional grounds 
for the acceptance or the refusal of a request for permission 
to intervene. Neither does Article 62(1) enjoin that the 
request be granted if all the conditions therein specified are 
fulfilled. However, it would seem that the very concept of a 
request might be thought to imply an overriding discretion in 
the decision-maker. The Court's power to interpret the 
determinative concepts of "proper purpose", "legal interest" 
and "may be affected", coupled with its insistence that it 
must decide upon the proper purposes of intervention, gives it 
wide discretion. The Court's insistence on its duty to decide
197 See Starke, "Locus standi", 356. See also Rosenne, 
"Some Reflections", 84. This view contrasts sharply with the 
opinion expressed by V-P. Sette-Camara that if the texts of 
Articles 62 and 63, on which the texts of Articles 31 and 32 
of the Statute of the International Tribunal on the Law of the 
Sea have been closely modelled, were "vague...", they would 
have been "modified ...." during the long and careful exercise 
leading to the drafting of the Statute of the new tribunal. 
See ICJ Reports 1984, 88-9, paras.87-9 (V-P. Sette-Camara
dissenting).
198 See Chinkin, 525.
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upon the proper purposes of intervention as well as the lack 
of clarity in such essential concepts as an "interest of a 
legal nature", "may be affected by the decision" etc., makes 
forming value judgments impossible.199
It is probably in recognition of the wide discretion 
vested in the Court that it has been implied in some 
judgments, and expressly stated in some individual opinions, 
that underlying policies must be evaluated.200 It is even 
debatable whether the Court's refusal to decide requests for 
intervention for reasons simply of policy is not itself an 
important element of judicial policy governing its handling of 
applications for permission to intervene. The policy 
considerations which influence the Court's judgments, once 
identified, will not only lead to a better understanding of 
the way in which intervention requests are dealt with, but 
will also indicate whether the Court favours a broad-based 
notion of intervention or one that operates within tight legal 
restrictions. The preferred policies of the Court will affect 
the outcome of any such request and the different conclusions 
of individual judges will reflect their evaluation of the 
proper role of intervention in international litigation.201
Granted that the Court's discretion is far broader than 
so far admitted, then it should have been possible for it to 
exercise such discretion in formulating the type or types of
199 See ibid.
200 See ibid.
201 See ibid., 500.
201
intervention202 most appropriate to the conflicting demands 
of international adjudication. If this were done in the 
Maltese and Italian Intervention Cases, some difficult issues 
relating to intervention would have been resolved. The Court 
could also use such broad discretion to cure defects in an 
application to intervene which are neither fundamental nor 
substantive, so as to bring such an application within the 
terms of Article 62, and thus render it admissible. The Court 
employed its discretion under Article 63 to modify Cuba's 
declaration of intervention in the Hava de la Torre Case so as 
to bring it within the scope of intervention as of right.203 
Even more recently, a chamber of the Court broke new ground by 
permitting Nicaragua to withdraw its request for the 
reordering of the written proceedings, the reformation of the 
Chamber and the limitation of its mandate.204
One effect of the Court's narrow construction of its 
discretion is a judicial policy which aims primarily at 
confining intervention within very tight legal limits - a 
policy which is clearly at variance not only with the wishes 
which presided at the adoption of the Statute, but also with 
prevailing international legal opinion. This policy is 
probably explicable on the basis that, in proceedings
202 As it did in 1990, when it allowed "non-party" 
intervention by Nicaragua. See ICJ Reports 1990, 92.
203 See ibid. 1951, 77. See also ibid. 1984, 128, para. 20 
(Ago J. dissenting).
204 See ibid. 1990, 99, para.21? 108-9, paras.41-2; 111- 
2, paras.46-9.
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concerning discretionary intervention, the Court is usually 
too willing and ready to defer to the wishes of the original 
parties in maintaining the integrity of their dispute and the 
exclusivity of their relationship. Malta's intervention was 
rejected partly because the Court, which found that to allow 
such an intervention would leave the original parties 
uncertain as to their legal relations with the applicant, 
thought that this was not a proper burden to put on them.205
It has been observed that the tendency of states, which 
have accepted the Court's jurisdiction in a particular case, 
to regard such a proceeding as private or exclusive to 
themselves, is natural and understandable.206 States 
contemplating litigation before the Court ought to anticipate 
the possibility of intervention by third states which may 
perceive their own legal interests to be put at risk by the 
proceedings.207 Such intervention should therefore not be 
considered a hostile act. Nor should states have the freedom 
to negotiate special agreements for the submission of their 
disputes to the Court which completely disregard the interests
205 See ICJ Reports 1981, 19, paras. 33-4? Jessup, 907-8. 
Cf. Chinkin, 511.
206 See Elias, The ICJ. 91? id., "The Limits", 165. This 
tendency may be natural but we find it difficult to see how it 
is understandable, considering that members of the United 
Nations who are also parties to the Statute are supposed to 
know about the existence of the procedural faculty of 
intervention as a feature of the Statute. See ICJ Reports 
1984, 24, para.38? ibid. 1990, 133, para.96. In fact, the 
point is made by Elias himself in the same place. Cf. 
Chinkin, 500. On multilateral disputes, see generally 
Damrosch, 376-400, especially at 376-80.
207 See Elias, The ICJ. 91-2? id., "The Limits", 165.
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of third states or, indeed, encroach upon such interests.208
The failure of the judgments in the Maltese and Italian
Intervention Cases to clarify some difficult aspects about the 
law on intervention has made discretionary intervention look 
like an unavailable remedy. In both cases the utility of the 
institution of intervention within the framework of the
Statute was at stake.209 Malta's application was rejected in 
1981 because it asked too little and drew back from direct 
involvement in the dispute between the parties. Italy's
application was rejected in 1984 because it had asked too 
much.210 It would therefore seem that those who request to 
be permitted to intervene have to strike a delicate balance. 
They risk being accused of referring a dispute to the Court if 
they prove the existence of a legal interest and ask that it 
not be prejudiced. Should they refrain from so doing, it may 
be argued against them that they have no legal interest which 
may be affected by the decision in the case. In the opinion 
of Judge Mbaye, the resulting situation "is tantamount to 
condemning the institution of intervention ... to death."211
It is to be hoped that the acceptance of "non-party" 
intervention in the recent Nicaraguan Intervention Case, which
208 See Elias, The ICJ. ibid.? id., "The Limits", ibid.; 
Chinkin, 502? McGinley, 688-9.
209 See ICJ Reports 1984, 88, para.84 (V-P. Sette-Camara 
dissenting).
210 See ibid., 150, para.7 (Jennings J. dissenting).
211 See ibid., 54 (separate opinion of Mbaye J.), and 129- 
30, para.22 (Ago J. dissenting). Cf. ibid. 1990, 129, 
para.89.
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was rejected in the earlier Maltese Intervention Case, may 
prove to be an attempt to breathe life into the institution of 
intervention. If, however, the earlier precedents are 
followed in future cases, Article 62 will stand in danger of 
becoming a dead letter.
(b) Procedure and Timing of Intervention
Cases may be submitted to the Court, either by 
notification of a special agreement or by a written 
application addressed to the Registrar and specifying in 
either case the subject of and the parties to the dispute.212 
The Registrar is directed to communicate the fact of the 
submission of the case to the Court to all concerned, as well 
as the members of the United Nations through the Secretary- 
General, and any other states entitled to appear before the 
Court.213
The rationale for giving publicity to the institution of 
legal proceedings is to enable third states which are so 
inclined to intervene in the case.214 For, as a feature of 
the Statute, the possibility of intervention should be 
anticipated from the moment a case is referred to the 
Court.215 For this reason, though the Court has to a certain
212 See Article 40(1) of the Statute.
213 See Articles 40(2) and (3) of the Statute.
214 See, e.g., James Brown Scott, "A Permanent Court of 
International Justice”, 14 AJIL (1920), 586; Mani, 261;
Proces-Verbaux. (1920), 587-734.
215 See ICJ Reports 1984, 24, para. 38.
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degree allowed the original parties to amend their submissions
to take account of new developments,216 it seldom permits an
unrestricted use of the amendment procedure.217 In this
respect, it is well settled that an amendment of pleadings
which tends radically to alter the nature of the original
proceedings is impermissible. Authority for this proposition
may be found in the Permanent Court’s observation that:
The Court cannot, in principle, allow a dispute brought 
before it by application to be transformed by amendments 
in the submissions into another dispute which is
different in character. A practice of this kind would be 
calculated to prejudice the interests of third states to 
which ... all applications must be communicated in order 
that they may be in a position to avail themselves of the 
right of intervention ... 218
If, on receipt of the notification of the institution of 
proceedings, a third state decides to intervene under Article 
62, it must present its application for permission to
intervene as soon as possible, and not later than the closure 
of the written proceedings.219 This provision is intended to 
avoid problems that might arise in the event of a belated
216 See Chinkin, 519? H. Lauterpacht, Development. 207? 
4 Schwarzenberger, 401.
217 See Mani, 261.
218 See the Societe Commerciale de Belaioue Case. PCIJ 
Series A/B. No.78, 173. See also, H. Lauterpacht, 
Development. 207? Mani, 261? Chinkin, 519? 4 Schwarzenberger, 
401? Rosenne, Law and Practice. 358.
219 See Article 81(1) of the 1978 Rules. In 1978 the 
closing date for filing an application to intervene under 
Article 62 was advanced from any time before the commencement 
of the oral proceedings to the closure of the written 
proceedings. See 4 Schwarzenberger, 406. Articles 58 of the 
1922 and 1936 Rules of the Permanent Court, Articles 64(1) and 
69(1) of the 1946 and 1972 Rules respectively of the 
International Court.
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intervention. This probably explains why the Permanent Court 
in formulating its Rules employed the term "at the 
latest".220 The application for permission to intervene may 
also be admitted, in exceptional circumstances, at a later 
stage.221 There is no authority on what might be regarded as 
constituting "exceptional circumstances". In any case, the 
decision as to whether exceptional circumstances exist to 
justify the consideration of an application submitted after 
the stipulated time limit would seem to rest with the 
Court.222 It has been explained that this allows for some 
flexibility in the submission of applications to intervene, 
and that this is necessary since circumstances could arise in 
which the political decision to seek to intervene could only 
be taken in the light of all written proceedings.223
As regards Libya*s claim in the Italian Intervention Case 
that Italy*s application, submitted only two days before the 
expiry of the deadline, put the original parties, who were by 
then committed to the arguments, at a disadvantage, the Court 
merely noted that the application was filed before the expiry 
of the time limit fixed by Article 81(1) of the Rules.224 In 
the Maltese Intervention Case, in responding to similar claims
220 See Mani, 268, n.95. See also PCIJ Series D . No. 2, 
add.3, 431.
221 See Article 81(1) of the 1978 Rules.
222 See to the same effect, Mani, 269? Chinkin, 520.
223 See Rosenne, Procedure, 175.
224 See ICJ Reports 1984, 8, para. 10. See also Chinkin,
520.
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regarding the submission of its application, Malta argued that 
it was justified in delaying its request for permission to 
intervene as long as possible because it had not received the 
pleadings and annexed documents. In 1990, a chamber of the 
Court turned down El Salvador's request for the rejection of 
Nicaragua's application as untimely not only in itself, but 
because of the late raising of the matters concerning the 
reordering of the written proceedings, the reformation of the 
Chamber and the limitation of its mandate, which would be 
disruptive of the proceedings.225 Since it is up to the 
third state to determine the most advantageous moment to file 
its application to intervene, it may finely balance the 
request so as to maximise the time available to it, providing 
that it operates within the deadline given. However, the 
intervening state must accept the state of the case at the 
time of its intervention.226
It is not clear at what stage in the proceedings the time 
limits fixed by the Rules apply. It is a moot point whether 
a third state would be able to intervene in such incidental 
proceedings as an application for interim measures and 
preliminary proceedings or the jurisdictional phase of a case. 
It is possible, at least in theory, to intervene during the 
jurisdictional phase because Article 62 speaks of "the 
decision" and under Article 36(6) any dispute concerning the
225 See ICJ Reports 1990, 107, para.35; 112-3, paras.46-
9.
226 See Mani, 267; Chinkin, ibid.
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Court*s jurisdiction is to be settled by the Court itself. It 
is, however, difficult to see how a third state would be able 
to persuade the Court that its legal interests may be affected
i
by a decision settling a dispute about the Court's 
jurisdiction to deal with a case. This probably partly 
explains why the Court deferred consideration of Fiji's 
applications to intervene in the Nuclear Tests Cases, 
preferring instead to give priority to deciding questions of 
jurisdiction and admissibility. It is, however, instructive 
to note that Fiji's intention was to intervene in the 
principal case and not the jurisdictional phase. In the 
Court's view the applications presupposed that it had 
jurisdiction and therefore that the principal case was 
admissible. As it happened France, the respondent in the 
Nuclear Tests Cases, challenged the Court's jurisdiction to 
entertain those cases. The Court, thereupon, directed the 
original parties to address their pleadings first to the 
question of jurisdiction and admissibility. Consequently, it 
had to delay consideration of Fiji's application until it had 
pronounced on these questions.227
It would seem that a third state cannot intervene in 
proceedings for the indication of provisional measures in 
order to protect its legal interest which may be affected by 
the Court's decision, since here no decision in the sense of
227 See ICJ Reports 1973, 320, 321, 324, 325. See also 
Mani, 267, 268.
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Article 62 is called for.228 This is all the more so since 
the status of such a state in relation to the principal case 
remains to be determined. A consequence of the postponement of 
consideration of Fiji's application was the exclusion of Fiji 
from participation in this phase of the proceedings.229 In 
theory, however, if a third state, without asking for interim 
measures, is able to convince the Court that it is seeking to 
intervene so as to safeguard its legal interest in this early 
phase of the principal proceedings, it would seem reasonable 
to entertain the intervention provided ”it can be dealt with 
speedily so as not to delay unduly the application for interim 
measures. ,,23°
After having noted that the problem of the timing of 
intervention is not merely one of policy for both the 
intervening state and the Court, but also one of juridical 
significance, Mani observed that from the perspective of the 
substantive rights of the intervening state, it would probably 
make a big difference if the intervention were timed during 
the merits phase rather than during the preliminary objection 
phase, for during the former the intervenor might not be able 
successfully to challenge the decision terminating the latter
228 See ICJ Reports 1984, 195 (Schwebel J. dissenting). 
See also Chinkin, 521. For the view that a court order of 
interim protection is binding even on this state, see Mani, 
"Interim Measures", 371.
229 See Rosenne, Procedure. 176? Chinkin, ibid.
230 See Chinkin, ibid.
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phase.231
Another relevant issue in connection with the timing of 
intervention is whether a third state, which realises, after 
the Court has disposed of a case, that the decision in that 
case affects its legal interests, has any course of action 
with regard to discretionary intervention. Authority exists 
for the view that a third state which has failed to intervene 
in a case in which final judgment has been rendered, cannot 
later impugn it by intervening in a further proceeding 
concerning the execution of that judgment. Indeed, reopening 
an earlier decision is not a proper purpose of discretionary 
intervention.232
Another point is whether a third state would be able to 
intervene in proceedings concerning the interpretation or 
revision of a judgment. It is difficult to imagine how a 
third state, which did not participate in the proceedings 
which resulted in a final judgment disposing of the principal 
case with the authority of res judicata.233 would 
subsequently be able to intervene in consequential incidental 
proceedings of this kind so as to protect its legal interest
231 See Mani, 267. With all due respect, this 
observation, probably due to a misprint, is somewhat vague, if 
not contradictory. For this observation to be valid, we have 
to assume that the substantive rights of the intervenor can 
never be affected during the preliminary objection phase. If 
this is not so, we see no reason why, in theory, a third state
may not intervene during this phase.
232 See the Court's observation in the Hava de la Torre
Case. ICJ Reports 1951, 76-7. See also Mani, 260? Chinkin,
521.
233 See Rosenne, Procedure. 201.
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which may be affected by the Court*s decision. It is clear 
that proceedings relating to the interpretation or revision of 
a judgment stem from and have an exclusive bearing on matters 
which have already been dealt with by that judgment. The
original parties to the case, to which the judgment to be
interpreted or revised relates, can alone possibly be parties 
to the proceedings.234 However, such proceedings may be open 
to states other than the parties to the original judgment in 
question if they have a collateral bearing on the interests of 
such third states.235
Theoretically, it is possible that the legal interest of 
a third state may be put at risk by proceedings on the
revision of a judgment, thus providing such a state with a
justification for seeking to intervene. This is because an 
application for revision of a judgment must be based upon the 
discovery of some fact of such a nature as to be a decisive 
factor, which fact was, when the judgment was given, unknown 
to the Court, and also to the party claiming revision, always 
provided that such ignorance was not due to negligence. It is 
possible that this kind of fact may be such as to put the 
legal interests of that third state in issue in the 
proceedings. This would be the case especially where a 
discovery of the new fact is likely to lead to a substantial 
revision of the judgment. In such circumstances the revision
234 See Mani, 260. Farag, 108; Rosenne, Procedure. 201,
205.
235 See Mani, ibid.
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would be akin to a retrial, judicial review, or even an appeal 
such as obtains in many municipal legal systems.236 If, 
however, the revision is a minor one, the case for 
intervention by a third state may be weak. Such a state would 
probably have to content itself with the protection afforded 
by Article 59 of the Statute, no matter how imperfect this may 
be. Hypothetically, however, a case may be made for 
intervention in consequential proceedings, concerning the 
revision of a judgment.
The third state which has decided to submit a request to 
the Court to be permitted to intervene in pending primary 
proceedings, is required by the 1978 Rules to state the name 
of an agent in its application and to specify the case 
concerned. Besides the requirements already discussed, the 
application shall also contain a list of the documents in 
support, which documents shall be attached.237
By requiring that the application set out the legal 
interest of the applicant and the precise object of the 
intervention, the 1978 Rules for the first time expressly 
state what has all along been implicit in the earlier 
requirement, that the application contained a statement of law 
and of fact justifying intervention. This, together with a 
requirement that the application shall indicate any basis of
236 See ICJ Reports 1954, 47 at 55. See also Rosenne, 
Procedure. 206.
237 See Article 81(2) of the 1978 Rules reprinted in 
Rosenne, Procedure, 175. Cf. Articles 59 of the 1922 and 1936 
Rules of the Permanent Court and 64(2) and 69(2) of the 1946 
and 1972 Rules of the International Court respectively.
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jurisdiction which is claimed to exist between the applicant 
and the original parties, is designed to enable the Court to 
verify whether an applicant has a legal interest which may be 
affected by the decision in the case.
Under Article 83 of the 1978 Rules, certified copies of 
the application to intervene "shall be communicated forthwith 
to the parties to the case which shall be invited to furnish 
their written observations" thereon. The Registrar is also 
directed to transmit copies of the application to the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations and other states 
entitled to appear before the Court.238 This provision is 
meant to ensure respect for the fundamental procedural rights 
of the original parties by enabling them to be adequately 
informed of the intervention and to be given the opportunity 
to express their view on it. This they may do by raising 
questions concerning the legal interest of the intervenor, the 
legal basis of its claim to intervene, as well as the nature 
and scope of the proposed intervention.239
In 1981, following the publicity under the Rules of 
Malta's application to intervene, the original parties 
submitted written observations in which they opposed the 
intervention.240 Similarly, after Italy's application for
238 For a commentary on this provision, see Rosenne, 
Procedure, 179-80. Cf. Article 59 of the 1922 and 1926 Rules 
of the Permanent Court. See Hudson, The Permanent Court. 725, 
726, n.6.
239 See Mani, 269.
240 See ICJ Reports 1981, 6, paras.6-7.
214
permission to intervene in the Libva/Malta Case was
publicised, the original parties objected to the intervention
in their written observations.241
Under the Rules the Court decides whether an application
to intervene should be granted as a matter of priority. This
provision reinforces Article 62(2) of the Statute, according
to which it shall be for the Court to decide upon a request to
be permitted to intervene. The Rules further lay down that
if, within the time limit fixed by Article 83 ... an
objection is filed to an application for permission to 
intervene ... the Court shall hear the state seeking to 
intervene and the parties before deciding.242
The main novel feature of this article is the introduction of
the concept of priority in Article 84(1) for the decision,
unless the circumstances of the case lead the Court to
determine otherwise.243 Article 84(1) of the 1978 Rules
would appear to consolidate and regularise the practice
followed by the Court in the Fiiian Intervention Cases.
Although Fiji's applications were submitted within a week of
the filing of applications instituting the principal
proceedings and the requests for the indication of provisional
measures and short time limits were fixed within which the
parties could present their observations, the Court showed
itself disinclined to reach a hurried decision on admitting
241 See ibid. 1984, 6, paras.6-7.
242 See Article 84 of the 1978 Rules. See also the 
penultimate paragraph of Article 59 of the 1931 Rules of the 
Permanent Court.
243 See Rosenne, Procedure, 180.
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the interventions. The significance of Article 84 is that an 
intervention only becomes effective with a decision of the 
Court. Whether or not the application is opposed, the Court 
has to satisfy itself that the intervention conforms to the 
provisions of Article 62 of the Statute.244 Though Articles 
64(6) and 69(6) of the 1946 and 1972 Rules envisaged that the 
Court's decision on an application to intervene should be "in 
the form of a judgment", the present rules have omitted any 
specific reference to the form of the Court's decision, thus 
appearing to leave the question open. In the Maltese. Italian 
and Nicaraguan Intervention Cases, however, the Court rendered 
its decisions in the form of judgments.245
The Rules governing the submission of a request for 
permission to intervene, the notification of the intervention, 
proceedings on the admissibility of intervention, and the 
Court's decision thereon, if strictly enforced, would, on the 
one hand, discourage any attempt at intervention which might 
disrupt or unduly retard the progress of a proceeding already 
in motion and far advanced. On the other hand, this would 
provide the parties to the proceedings with ample opportunity 
to be heard on the question of intervention and thus protect
244 See Rosenne, Procedure. 180; Mani, 270.
245 See ICJ Reports 1981, 3; ibid. 1984, 3? ibid. 1990, 
92. See also Mani, 271. The deletion of the rule that the 
Court's decision on discretionary intervention should be given 
in the form of a judgment, introduced in 1926, which 
emphasised the importance of such a decision, fitted into the 
overall policy of the Court of playing down third state 
intervention, especially in the legal interest variant. See 
4 Schwarzenberger, 406-7.
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their substantive procedural rights.246
5. Unresolved Issues of Intervention
(a) The Issue of the Scope of Intervention
Until quite recently the Court deliberately avoided 
dealing with some of the basic issues of intervention as it 
thought that they were not necessary to its decision.247 
These issues, which are interrelated, concern the scope of 
intervention, the status of an intervening state and the need 
for a jurisdictional nexus between the would-be intervenor and 
the original parties. Neither the travaux oreparatoires of 
the Statute nor the 1922 Rules provide much insight into these 
issues.248 As the debates of the Permanent Court on these 
issues in 1922 were inconclusive, it was agreed on the basis 
of a presidential ruling not to try to resolve them in the 
Rules but to leave them to be decided as and when they 
occur.249
The travaux preoaratoires of the Statute and Rules of the
246 See Mani, 268.
247 These issues were considered by a Chamber of the Court 
in the Nicaraguan Intervention Case. See ICJ Reports 1990, 
131-7, paras.93-105.
248 See to the same effect the separate opinion of Oda J. 
in ICJ Reports 1981, 23, para.2; ibid. 1984, 90, para.l (Oda 
J. dissenting). See also Oda, "Intervention”, 640.
249 See PCIJ Series D . No.2, 87-9, 91, 93, 352 and 381. 
See also ICJ Reports 1981, 14, para.23; 26, para.7 (separate
opinion of Oda J.)? 1984, 62-3, paras.22-4 (separate opinion
of de Arechaga J.A.); 72-3, paras.11-3 (V-P. Sette-Camara
dissenting? 97, para.16 (Oda J. dissenting); 145, para.34 
(Schwebel J. dissenting). See further de Arechaga, 
"Intervention", 462-3, paras.26-8.
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Permanent Court provide some evidence to support the view that 
discretionary intervention was meant to have a broader scope 
than that ascribed to it by the Court.250 This view would 
also seem to be supported by some provisions of Article 38 of 
the Statute. In addition to sub-paragraph (1)(d), which 
authorises the Court to apply judicial decisions as subsidiary 
means for determination of rules of law, the fact that a wide 
power of intervention was envisaged is consistent with sub- 
paragraphs (b) and (c) of Article 38(1), whereby the Court was 
expected to find international law in the practice of states 
and general principles of law recognised by them. The 
granting of permission to states to intervene in litigation 
before the Court so as to express their views on developing 
norms that might affect them is one mode of achieving this 
result.251 It is also evident from the Court*s decisions in 
the Maltese and Italian Intervention Cases that some judges 
also share the view that discretionary intervention was meant 
to have a wider scope than that which the Court has attributed 
to it.252
250 See McGinley, 682 and 690? Oda, "Intervention", 635, 
636 and 642-3; Elias, "The Limits", 167-8, n.16? id., The 
ICJ. 94, n.16? see also ICJ Reports 1984, 96, para.13 (Oda J. 
dissenting). See further the Summary of Previous Discussions 
on the Question of the Right of Intervention submitted by 
Beichmann J. at the 17th meeting on 24 February 1922. See ICJ 
Reports 1981, 26-7, para.8 (separate opinion of Oda J) and 
ibid. 1984, 97, para.16 (Oda J. dissenting).
251 See McGinley, 690.
252 See ICJ Reports 1981, 23, paras. 1-2, and 27, para.9 
(separate opinion of Oda J.)? 40 (separate opinion of 
Schwebel J.); and ibid. 1984, 90, para.l, and 93-4, para.8 
(Oda J. dissenting)? 129-30, para.22 (Ago J. dissenting); 145,
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The jurisprudence of the Court in the Maltese and Italian 
Intervention Cases does not clearly define the scope of 
discretionary intervention. In the Maltese Intervention 
judgment the Court appeared to hint that, had Malta agreed to 
submit its legal interests in the litigation for decision in 
relation to either or both of the original parties, the nature 
of its intervention would have been such as to show that its 
legal interest could be considered as one which might be 
affected by the decision in the case. If Malta had desired a 
direct and less limited form of participation in the 
proceedings and assumed the obligations of a party in the 
sense of Article 59, such an intervention could properly have 
been admitted as falling within the terms of Article 62. If 
the Court had stopped at this observation, the meaning and 
scope of discretionary intervention would have been very 
clear. But it further noted that in such circumstances the 
question whether a link of jurisdiction between the would-be 
intervenor and the original parties is a necessary condition 
for the grant of permission to intervene would call for 
consideration.
In the Italian Intervention Judgment the Court observed 
that the consequence of its finding that to permit Italy's 
intervention would involve the introduction of a fresh dispute 
could be defined by reference to either of two approaches to 
the interpretation of Article 62, both of which must result in
para.35, and 147, para.39 (Schwebel J. dissenting); 153-4, 
para.19 (Jennings J. dissenting).
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the Court being bound to refuse the request while giving full 
effect to Article 62. In the view of the Court, both 
interpretations were facets of the single reality, that is 
"the basic principle that the jurisdiction of the Court to 
.... judge a dispute depends on the consent of the parties 
thereto”.253 Consistent with its first method of reconciling 
Article 62 with the principle of consent to its jurisdiction, 
invocations of that provision in which the Court is requested 
to decide on rights claimed not merely to insure that they be 
not affected, should be backed by a basis of jurisdiction.254 
Its second method would be to find that where a would-be 
intervenor asked the Court to give a judgment on the rights 
which it was claiming, this would not be a genuine 
intervention within the meaning of Article 62 . 255 The 
meaning and scope of discretionary intervention would have 
been clarified had the Court indicated on which of these two 
interpretations it based its conclusion that Italy's 
intervention fell into a category which it could not accept. 
Characteristically however, the Court evaded the issue by 
declaring that this conclusion followed from either of the two 
approaches and that it accordingly did not have to decide 
between them.256
In fairness to the Court it must be said that it
253 See ICJ Reports 1984, 22, para. 34.
254 See ibid., 22, para.35.
255 See ibid. 23-4, para.37.
256 See ibid., 24, para.38.
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attempted in its jurisprudence in the Italian Intervention 
Case to differentiate between a genuine intervention under 
Article 62 and what is variously described as "the
introduction of a fresh dispute",257 "main line
application",258 "the instituting of main line proceedings in 
application of Article 36",259 "a direct action",260 and "an 
alternative means of bringing an additional dispute as a case 
before the Court",261 by reference to the object and purpose 
of the intervention. The Court clearly stated the object of 
intervention as being to ensure the safeguarding of the legal 
interests of third states by preventing them from being
affected by the decision.262 When an applicant state
requests the Court to rule upon,263 decide on,264 or to give 
a judgment on265 rights which it claims in relation to the 
original parties, the state would not be considered to be 
seeking a genuine intervention. The story would be the same 
if the would-be intervenor were asking the Court to
257 See ibid., 22, para.34.
258 See ibid., 22-3, para.36.
259 See ibid., 23-4, para.37.
260 See ibid.
261 See ibid.
262 See ibid.; see also ibid., 18-9, para.28.
263 See ibid., 20-1, para.32.
264 See ibid., 22, para.35.
265 See ibid., 23-4, para.37.
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recognise266 or define267 its individual rights vis-a-vis the 
parties to the main case, or if it were seeking to intervene 
for the purpose of asserting an individual right against the 
parties.268 If, however, an applicant state requests the
Court to preserve,269 take account of270 or consider its 
rights271 in its judgment in the principal case so as to
ensure that they are not adversely affected, it would be
considered to be seeking a genuine intervention in the sense
of Article 62. In general, the scope of discretionary 
intervention is limited to the matters covered by the main 
case.272 However, the scope of any particular intervention 
is defined by the legal interest which may be affected by the 
decision in the case. Thus, a third state may be permitted to 
intervene in respect of such an interest, but not to make 
excursions into other aspects of the case. For instance, it 
is not for the intervenor to address argument to the Chamber 
on the interpretation of the Special Agreement concluded 
between the parties, because the Special Agreement is for it
266 See ibid., 19, para.29.
267 See ibid., 21-2, para.33.
268 See ibid., 23-4, para.37.
269 See ibid., 20-1, para.32.
270 See ibid.
271 See ibid., 23-4, para.37.
272 See ICJ Reports 1984, 148-9, para.3; 153, para. 17;
154, para.20.
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res inter alios acta.273
(b) The Issue of the Status of the Intervening Party
Another difficult issue relating to intervention is the 
status of the applicant state which has been permitted to 
intervene. On the basis of the English text of Article 62 of 
the Statute of the Permanent Court, the International Court 
took the view that "... a state permitted to intervene would 
become a party to the case11 .274 However, it has been argued 
that since there is no suggestion in the travaux preoaratoires 
that in 1920 the drafters of the Statute had specifically in 
mind the idea of intervention as a party, it does not seem 
justified to draw conclusions about the meaning of 
intervention "as a third party" based essentially on the 
English text, which is largely a translation from the French 
version.275
273 See ibid 1990, 115-6, para.58? 136, para. 103.
274 See ibid., 15, para.24.
275 See ICJ Reports 1981, 23-4, para.3 (separate opinion 
of Oda J.). See also his dissenting opinion in ibid. 1984, 
95-6, paras.12 and 14. Though the Protocol of the Signature 
of the Statute of the Permanent Court expressly states that 
both the English and the French texts of the Statute are 
authentic, the Preface to the Proces-verbaux of the 
Proceedings of the Advisory Committee of Jurists clearly 
indicates that:
As all the members of the Committee, with the exception 
of Mr. Elihu Root spoke in the French language, the 
English text of the Proces-verbaux is to be looked upon 
as a translation except in so far as concerns the 
speeches and remarks of Mr. Root.
See the Proces-Verbaux (1920), IV.
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The Court's assumption, however weak its basis, is 
certainly not implausible. The circumstances in which 
discretionary intervention found its way into the Statute 
suggest that the idea of this procedural remedy as it existed 
in common law must have been at the back of the mind of the 
Advisory Committee of Jurists, or at least those of its 
members with a common law background.276 In common law the 
only reason a person may be made a party to a case is so that 
he should be bound by the result of the action. This was all 
the more so when one considers that by no stretch of the 
imagination could a purely literal translation of the French 
text of Article 62 of the Statute of the Permanent Court into 
English import the phrase "as a third party" into that text. 
Moreover, where the text of a provision is rendered in two 
languages and it happens that one text is unclear, it does not 
seem unreasonable for the courts to adopt that which is 
clear.277
The deletion of the expression "as a third party" from 
the English text of Article 62 has left that provision in the 
same state as the corresponding French text. If the view of 
the Court - that on the strength of the English text of 
Article 62 the Permanent Court assumed that a state permitted
276 See 128, n.27 above.
277 French is the basic language, or the language in which 
the Statute was drafted. By draft is not meant merely the 
language of the preparatory work but the final text. The 
basic language is the working language in which the treaty was 
negotiated and drafted. See McNair, Law of Treaties. 30 and 
43-5.
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to intervene would become a party to the case - is not 
implausible, it is doubtful whether the International Court 
can now adopt the same position.
In 1981 the Court refused Malta's application to
intervene in the Tunisia/Libva Case so as to submit its views 
with respect to the applicable principles and rules of
international law, without putting in issue its own claim
concerning those same matters vis-a-vis the original parties. 
The Court also thought that the "direct yet limited form of 
participation" in the case for which Malta was seeking 
permission could not properly be admitted as falling within 
the terms of discretionary intervention.278
The type of intervention which Malta was seeking has been 
variously described as "non-party"279 or "unequal"280 
intervention or intervention as a "quasi-party"281 or
278 See ICJ Reports 1981, 19-20, para.33-4.
279 See ibid. 35, 39 (separate opinion of Schwebel J.). 
Also separate opinion, Oda J., 27, para.9. Though Oda J. does 
not specifically use the term "non-party" it is obvious that 
he is referring to the concept of non-party intervention. See 
further ibid. 1984, 98, para.18 (Oda J. dissenting); Oda, 
"Intervention", 644. Here Oda speaks of intervention "not 'as 
a party'". See ibid. 1984, 38 (separate opinion of Mbaye J.). 
Here Mbaye J. expressly refers to "intervention by a non-party 
state" and "position of a non-party intervenor". See Jessup, 
907 (also n.12).
280 See ICJ Reports 1981, 35. (separate opinion of 
Schwebel J.).
281 See Jessup, 907, n.12. Libya in its observations on 
the Maltese application suggested that Malta sought to be a 
quasi-party. Malta said that it sought the procedural 
position of a participant by way of intervention. See ICJ 
Reports 1981, 8, para.12.
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"limited”,282 "strict",283 or "strictly limited"284 
intervention. This type of intervention was recently held to 
be the form of intervention envisaged under Article 62 of the 
Statute. Thus, the intervening state does not become party to 
the proceedings. It does not acquire the rights or become 
subject to the obligations which attach to the status of a 
party under the Statute and Rules, or the general principles 
of procedural law. It has a right to be heard by the Court. 
This right is regulated by Article 85 of the Rules, which 
provides for submission of a written statement and 
participation in the hearings.285
It has been argued that it is ludicrous to accept the 
existence of "non-party" intervention,286 and further that 
intervention on a non-party basis falls outside the purview of 
the Statute, and would violate the principles of fair dealing 
and equality.287
282 See ibid. 1984, 149, para.5 (Jenning J. dissenting).
283 See ibid., 150, para.7 (Jennings J. dissenting).
284 See ibid., 153, 155, 156, paras.17, 24, 25 (Jennings 
J. dissenting).
285 See ICJ Reports 1990, 134, paras.97 and 99-100; 135-6, 
para.102. Cf. Maltese Intervention Case, ibid. 1981, 27,
para.9 (separate opinion of Oda J.); Italian Intervention 
Case, ibid. 1984, 98, para.18 (Oda J. dissenting); 148-9, 
paras.3-5, 153, para.17, 154, para.20, 155, paras.24-5
(Jennings J dissenting). See also Chinkin, 526. Cf. Article 
59 of the Rules of the Permanent Court, as amended in 1926. 
See also Hudson, The Permanent Court. 725-6, n.5. For a
commentary on Article 85, see Rosenne, Procedure. 181.
286 See Elias, "The Limits", 168; id., The ICJ. 95; 
Chinkin, 527.
287 See de Arechaga, "Intervention", 454-5, paras.4, 6-7.
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While accepting non-party intervention in the Nicaraguan 
Intervention Case, a chamber of the Court also kept the 
possibility of intervention as a party open by observing that 
"It is true, conversely, that provided that there be the 
necessary consent by the parties to the case, the intervenor 
is not prevented by reason of that status from itself becoming 
a party to the case".288 Sir Cecil Hurst, a President of 
the Permanent Court, is reported to have once remarked that 
according to Article 62, the English text of which was 
particularly clear, it was only if the Court allowed the 
request of the state desiring intervention that the state 
became a party.289
A state which intervenes as a party should be entitled to 
all the benefits and burdens of a party, since with its 
intervention the proceedings would be transformed into 
tripartite litigation.290 The party intervenor should be 
allowed to submit arguments to the Court forming an essential 
part of the litigation. It would have to submit its own legal 
interest in the subject matter of the proceedings or its own 
claims for decision as between itself and either or both of 
the original parties, while at the same time exposing itself 
to counterclaims and opposing submissions. It would have to 
assume the rights and obligations of a party to the case
288 See ICJ Reports 1990, 134-5, para.99.
289 See Elias, "The Limits", 168, n.19; id., The ICJ. 95,
n. 19.
290 See Chinkin, 526.
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within the meaning of the Statute. In consequence it would 
have to be bound by the decision within the meaning of Article 
59 of the Statute and Article 94 of the Charter of the United 
Nations in its relations with the original parties. It would 
also be liable for its own costs under Article 64 of the 
Statute. It should be able to claim a remedy. It should also 
be entitled to a judge ad hoc under Article 31 of the Statute 
unless it is in common interest with an original party that 
has already appointed a judge ad hoc.291
(c) The Issue of the Jurisdictional Link292
(i) Background
The problem concerning the scope of admissible 
intervention, and that of the status of the intervening state, 
is inextricably bound up with the issue of the need for the 
existence of a jurisdictional nexus between the would-be 
intervenor and the original parties.
When the Permanent Court first revised its rules in 1926,
291 See, for example, the Maltese Intervention Case. ICJ 
Reports 1981, 18-20, paras.32-4; Chinkin, 526. For a
discussion of the position of the intervening state in this 
connection, see ICJ Reports 1981, 6, para. 8. See also
Fachiri, 124; Decaux, 184, esp. n.34; Oda, "Intervention", 
638; Rosenne, "Some Reflections", 85-8; id., Law and 
Practice. 206; id., Procedure. 182, Mani, 273-4; Miller,
569, n.72; Farag, 108. See also de Arechaga, "Intervention", 
465; J.L. Simpson and H. Fox, International Arbitration; Law 
an Practice (London: Stevens, 1959), 48 (hereinafter "Simpson 
and Fox"); Mani, 271-3; Hambro, "Some Observations", 154; 
Anand, Compulsory Jurisdiction. 282. The rules refer to a 
state which has been permitted to intervene as "an intervening 
state". See article 85 of the 1978 Rules.
292 For a discussion see Rosenne, "Some Reflections", 81-
5.
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it had not had any real experience in the operation of Article 
62 in practice and therefore its further debates shed little 
light on the problems connected with its application.293 
Consequently, it would seem that in those early days the need 
for a jurisdictional link was considered doubtful.294
With the exception of a few changes in respect of the 
numbering of the relevant provisions on discretionary 
intervention, no changes were introduced in the substance of 
the 1946 and 1972 Rules of the International Court with regard 
to the problem of the need for a jurisdictional link.295
Thus, when in 1973 Fiji requested permission to intervene 
in the Nuclear Tests Cases, the International Court, like its 
predecessor, had no practical experience concerning the 
operation of discretionary intervention, let alone the way in 
which the question of the need for a jurisdictional link was 
to be resolved. Although the Court never decided on the 
Fijian requests, some individual judges thought that those 
cases had raised for the first time the issue of the 
jurisdictional link. Unlike Australia, New Zealand and 
France, the applicants and the respondent respectively in the 
Nuclear Test Cases. Fiji, which desired to intervene, was not
293 See ICJ Reports 1981, 15, para.24. In the 1936 
revision of the Rules, Articles 58-9 of the 1922 Rules on the 
prerequisites for an application to intervene, remained the 
same except for a few drafting changes. See ibid. 1984, 75, 
para.25 (V-P. Sette-Camara dissenting).
294 See ibid. 1984, 73 and 80, paras. 12 and 50 (V-P.
Sette-Camara dissenting).
295 See ibid., 175, para.26.
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a party to the 1928 General Act and had not accepted the 
optional clause. It nevertheless sought to intervene on the 
side of the applicants and join in their submissions that the 
conduct of France was inconsistent with international law, 
violated their rights and should be discontinued. It has been 
pointed out that if Fiji as an intervenor obtained this kind 
of declaration it could afterwards claim damages against 
France on the basis of the res judicata of the declaratory 
judgment.296
Though Fiji's requests were never determined, the Court 
must have had on its mind certain aspects of those 
applications, the only concrete instances in its history in 
which Article 62 had been invoked, during the drafting of 
Article 81(2)(c) of the Revised Rules adopted in April 
1978.297 This provision actually raised the age-old question 
of the need for a jurisdictional link.298 According to the 
terms of Article 81(2) (c) of the 1978 Rules, an application to 
intervene will set out "any basis of jurisdiction which is 
claimed to exist as between the state applying to intervene 
and the parties to the case”.
This provision is couched in nebulous language and it is
296 See de Arechaga, "Intervention”, 463, para.29. See 
also the declaration attached to the orders dismissing the 
Fijian applications of Judge Onyeama and the joint declaration 
of Judges Dillard and Waldock, ICJ Reports 1974, 531-2 and 
536-7? the declaration of de Arechaga J., and Barwick J.A., 
532-3 and 537-8.
297 See for example, ibid. 1984, 116-7, para.5 (Ago J. 
dissenting).
298 See ibid., 76, para.29 (V-P. Sette-Camara dissenting).
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not clear whether it is a requirement simply for the 
information of the Court or a real prerequisite for the 
admissibility of intervention.299 However, a perusal of the 
drafting records of the 1978 Rules shows there was 
considerable doubt concerning the actual import of Article 
81(2) (c) but that the prevailing opinion was that its purpose 
was merely to draw attention to the point and to ensure that 
a state that could indicate such a title of jurisdiction 
should so inform the Court.300 This is all the more so since 
the rules cannot so modify the Statute as effectively to amend 
it.301
(ii) The Principle of Consent
It is well settled that the Court can only exercise 
jurisdiction over a state with its consent.302 Thus, the 
pattern of international judicial settlement under the Statute 
is that two or more states agree that the court shall hear and 
determine a particular dispute. Such agreement may be given 
ad hoc, by a special agreement or otherwise, or may result 
from the invocation, in relation to the particular dispute, of
299 See ibid., 76, para.32. See also, Rosenne, Procedure.
175.
300 See ICJ Reports 1984, 76, para.31 (V-P. Sette-Camara 
dissenting), 146, para.36 (Schwebel J. dissenting).
301 See ibid. 1984, 76, para. 30 (V-P. Sette-Camara
dissenting)? 116, para.6 (Ago, J. dissenting); 152, para.12 
(Jennings, J. dissenting).
302 See PCIJ Series A . No.2, 16? ICJ Reports 1990, 133, 
para.95? ibid. 1954, 32? ibid. 1984, 22-4, paras.34-7.
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a compromissory clause of a treaty or of the mechanism of 
Article 36(2) of the Court's Statute. Those states are the 
parties to the proceedings, and are bound by the Court's 
eventual decision because they have agreed to confer 
jurisdiction on the Court to decide the case. Normally, 
therefore, no other state may involve itself in the 
proceedings without the consent of the original parties.303 
With regard to discretionary intervention, the issue is 
whether the existence of a valid link of jurisdiction with the 
parties, in the sense of a basis of jurisdiction which could 
be invoked by a state seeking to intervene in order to 
institute proceedings against either or both of the parties, 
is an essential condition for the granting of permission to 
intervene.304 It has been argued that to permit a state 
which has no jurisdictional links with either or both of the 
original parties to intervene in a pending case would run 
counter to the basic principle that the Court's jurisdiction 
to judge a dispute depends on the consent of the parties 
thereto, and violates the principles of equality of states 
before the Court and of the reciprocity of rights and 
obligations.305
In 1981, the Court found it unnecessary to decide the 
issue of the jurisdictional link since it had reached the
303 See ibid. 1990, 133, para.95.
304 See ibid., 132, para.94.
305 see ibid., 134, para. 99; ibid. 1984, 22, para. 35;
30, para.3 (separate opinion of Morozov J.).
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conclusion that, for other reasons, Malta*s request for 
permission to intervene in the Tunisia/Libva Case was not one 
to which it could accede.306 However, it explained that the 
jurisdictional requirement embodied in the Rules was 
introduced to emphasise its importance and in order to ensure 
that when the question did arise in a concrete case, it would 
be in possession of all the elements which might be necessary 
for its decision.307
In 1984, the Court was again able to reach a decision on 
Italy's application to intervene in the Libva/Malta Case 
without generally resolving the vexed question of the "valid 
link of jurisdiction".308 It did so however by stating two 
alternative lines of argument, one on the basis that such a 
link would be required, and one on the basis that it would 
not, and observing that in the circumstances of the case 
before it, either of the two approaches must result in the 
Court being bound to reject the Italian application.309 The 
Court also observed that although the issue of the 
jurisdictional link was a question of its own jurisdiction, it 
had no priority of the kind which relates to jurisdictional
306 See ibid. 1981, 20, para.36.
307 See ibid. 1981, 16, para.27.
308 See ibid. 1984, 28, para.45.
309 See ibid., 22, para.34. See also Elihu Lauterpacht, 
Aspects of the Administration of International Justice, 
(Cambridge: Grotius Publications, 1 9 9 1 ) (hereinafter
"Aspects").
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objections stricto sensu.310 In spite of the Court's refusal 
to rule upon the issue of the jurisdictional link in these 
earlier cases,311 it believed itself to have dispelled some 
of the doubts surrounding the exercise of discretionary 
intervention.312
In 1990, a chamber of the court resolved in a positive 
sense the previously controversial question of whether 
intervention may be permitted in a case in which there exists 
no specific jurisdictional link between the applicant state 
and the original parties, when it concluded that the absence 
of a jurisdictional link was no bar to permission being given 
for intervention. The Chamber reasoned that the Court's 
competence in the matter of intervention is not, like its 
competence to hear and determine the dispute referred to it, 
derived from the consent of the parties, but from the consent 
given, in becoming parties to the Court's Statute, to the 
Court's exercise of its powers conferred by the Statute. 
Acceptance of the Statute entails acceptance of the competence 
conferred on the Court by Article 62. The nature of the 
competence thus created is definable by reference to the
310 See ICJ Reports 1984, 8, para.11? ibid. 1990, 111, 
para.44. In connection with the Court's position on this 
point, see 4 Schwarzenberger, 402? see also Damrosch, 381, 
383. For the view that Italy's application was refused 
because of the absence of a jurisdictional link, see ICJ 
Reports 1984, 35 (separate opinion of Mbaye J.)? 139,
para.18? 146-7, para.38 (Schwebel J. dissenting)? 91-2,
para.5? 98-9, para.19 (Oda J. dissenting).
311 See McGinley, 693-4. Cf. McWhinney, 579.
312 See ICJ Reports 1984, 28, para.45. Cf. ibid. 1990, 
132, para.94.
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object and purpose of intervention; that is, the protection 
of a state's "interest of a legal nature" that might be 
affected by the decision in an existing case already 
established between other states, namely, the parties to the 
case. Citing the location of the institution of intervention 
in the chapter of the Statute captioned "Procedure", and its 
position in the section of the Rules headed "Incidental 
Proceedings", the Chamber noted that incidental proceedings, 
by definition, must be those which are incidental to a case 
which is already before the Court or Chamber. An incidental 
proceeding cannot be one which transforms that case into a 
different case with different parties. Intervention cannot 
have been intended to be employed as , a substitute for 
contentious proceedings. It follows, from the juridical 
nature and from the purposes of intervention that the 
existence of a valid link of jurisdiction between the would-be 
intervenor and the parties is not a requirement for the 
success of an application for permission to intervene. On the 
contrary, the procedure of intervention is to ensure that a 
state with possibly affected interests may be permitted to 
intervene even though there is no jurisdictional link.313 
Finally, the Chamber observed that the use of the words "any 
basis" in Article 81(2)(c) of the rules shows that a valid 
link of jurisdiction is not treated as a sine crua non for
313 On this point see ibid. 1981, 10-2, paras. 15-6; 22, 
para.2 (separate opinion of Morozov J.); 1984, 15-6, para.23; 
22, para.35; 55-6, paras.3-4 (separate opinion of de Arechaga
J.A.). Cf. ibid., 118, para.7 (Ago J. dissenting).
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intervention.314
(iii) Incidental Jurisdiction
Intervention is an incident of procedure, the fate of 
which is determined by the decision of the Court on the 
application to intervene.315 Rather than being based on the 
consent of the parties, it is founded on institutional 
instruments (the Statute or the Rules of Court or both) and 
the jurisdictional fact of a valid seisin of the Court. It 
has an inherent and objective character.
Patterns of incidental jurisdiction include the Court*s 
power to: determine its own jurisdiction under Article 36(6) 
of the Statute, indicate interim measures of protection under 
Article 41(1), make orders for the conduct of a case under 
Article 48, allow intervention by third states under Articles 
62 and 63, interpret a judgment under Article 60, revise a 
judgment, and decide on counter claims. A preliminary 
exercise of incidental jurisdiction occurs before or 
regardless of the determination of the substantive 
jurisdiction. This is possible only in the case of incidental 
jurisdiction under Articles 36(6), 41(1), 48, 62 and 63 of the
314 See ibid. 1990, 133-5, paras.96-101? Ill, para.44;
1984, 44 (separate opinion of Mbaye J.)? 79-80, para.46 (V-P. 
Sette-Camara dissenting); 146, para.36 (Schwebel J. 
dissenting). Cf. Rosenne, Procedure, 176.
315 See ICJ Reports 1951, 76. For a discussion of 
intervention as a procedural incident see ibid. 1984, 56-7, 
paras.5-7 (separate opinion of de Arechaga J.A.); 85, para.75 
(V-P. Sette-Camara dissenting), 118, para.7 (Ago J. 
dissenting), 140, para.22 (Schwebel J. dissenting), 155, 
para.24 (Jennings J. dissenting).
236
Statute. The consequential exercise of incidental
jurisdiction presupposes a determination of the question of 
substantive jurisdiction and is, therefore, consequential upon 
it. This is particularly so in the case of incidental 
jurisdiction under Articles 60 and 61 of the Statute. A third 
state need not establish the existence of a jurisdictional 
nexus with the original parties in order for its application 
to intervene to be considered and even admitted. However, a 
jurisdictional link is required for the introduction of a 
distinct dispute in the guise of an intervention.316
While there is much to be said for the view that, where 
a state is seeking what might be considered a broad kind of 
intervention as understood in municipal law, or where its 
purpose for seeking to intervene is to become a true third 
party in the case, such a state must be required to
316 See ibid. 1990, 133, para.96; ibid. 1984, 38-9, 45-6, 
48-9 (separate opinion of Mbaye J.); 71, paraS.3 and 86,
paras.76-7 (V-P. Sette-Camara dissenting); 93-4, para.8 (Oda 
J. dissenting), 119-20, para.9 (Ago J. dissenting); 133, 
para.8 and 140-3, paras.22-9 ( Schwebel J. dissenting); 150-1, 
para.8 and 155, para.24 (Jennings J. dissenting); ibid. 1981, 
27, para.9 (separate opinion of Oda J.), and 35 (separate 
opinion of Schwebel J.). See further Shihata, 169-70; 
Rosenne, Law and Practice. 318-9, 422-3; Fitzmaurice, 34 BYIL 
(1958), 108-9, 124-5; 2 id., 553-8, 550; Hudson, The
Permanent Court. 125, n.68, 407-8, 419-20; Kelsen 522;
McGinley, 688-9; Merrills, 97. For Judges Morozov, Singh and 
de Arechaga J.A., a valid jurisdictional link is an essential 
prerequisite for discretionary intervention. See ICJ Reports 
1981, 22 (separate opinion of Morozov J.) and ibid. 1984, 30, 
para.3 (separate opinion of Morozov J.) ; 32, para.(i) and 33-
4, para.(iii) (separate opinion of Singh J.), and 56ff, 
paras.5ff (separate opinion of de Arechaga J.A.). See de 
Arechaga1 s declarations in the Fiiian Intervention Cases, ibid. 
1974, 532-3 and 537-8. See also de Arechaga, "Intervention”, 
463, para.30.
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demonstrate its jurisdictional links with the original 
parties.317 But where discretionary intervention is limited 
strictly to the demonstration and safeguarding of the legal 
interest of a third state, it does not seem that a 
jurisdictional link should be required. Such an intervention 
would not violate the principle of consent.318
The Monetary Gold Case illustrates the fact that the 
absence of a third state may have a direct restraining effect 
upon the Court's activities, since as was the case in that 
litigation, the Court would be unable to exercise jurisdiction 
where the legal interest of such a state would form the very 
subject-matter of a decision. The absence of a third state 
from a contentious proceeding can also raise evidentiary 
problems. For instance in the Corfu Channel Case (Merits), 
documents were supplied by the Yugoslav government which did 
not intervene in that case. This caused the Court to note 
that there was a limitation on its reliance on the evidence 
due to the absence of the state which had provided the documents.319
317 This fact is conceded by those who express the view 
that no jurisdictional link with the original parties is 
required for discretionary intervention. See, for example, 
ICJ Reports 1981, 25, paras.5-6 (separate opinion of Oda, J.), 
and ibid. 1984, 92-3, para.6 (Oda J. dissenting) and 117-8, 
para.6 (Ago J. dissenting) and 143, para.27 (Schwebel J. 
dissenting), and 150, para.6, 153, para.17, 155-6, para.24
(Jennings J. dissenting).
318 See ibid. 1984, 148, paras. 2-3 and 149, para. 5 
(Jennings J. dissenting); ibid., 44-5 (separate opinion of 
Mbaye J.). See also Chinkin, 527 and McGinley, 688.
319 See Miller, 556. See also the Corfu Channel Case. ICJ 
Reports 1949, 17. See further, M. Bartos, "L'Intervention 
Yougoslave Dans 1'Affaire du Detroit de Corfou" in 14 CS 
(1975), 42, 47-51.
(iv) The Principle of Ecrualitv
It is difficult to imagine how an intervention for the
purpose of safeguarding the legal interests of a third state
would violate the principle of equality of states before the 
Court. This principle is contained in Article 35 of the
Statute under which the Court is open to parties to the
Statute and to other states under certain conditions; and by 
implication, in Article 36(2), concerning the reciprocity of 
rights and obligations - which also suggests equality.
White this principle is one of general scope,320 it is 
doubtful whether it applies to Article 62. In the Italian 
Intervention Case, the Court regarded the equality of states 
as a fundamental principle underlying its jurisdiction.321 
Even so, this principle is not as valid a consideration when 
dealing with strictly limited intervention as it must be when 
independent contentious proceedings are being instituted. 
Moreover, the idea of inequality is an intrinsic property of 
discretionary intervention.322 However, it is not the 
original parties alone which find themselves in a 
disadvantageous position as far as discretionary intervention 
is concerned. An intervening state may suffer disadvantages 
from lack of access to the pleadings in the principal case, 
the composition of the Court (where it seeks to intervene as
320 See ICJ Reports 1984, 61, para.21 (separate opinion of 
de Arechaga J.A.).
321 See ibid., 22, para.35.
322 See ibid. 1981, 36 (separate opinion of Schwebel J.); 
ibid. 1984, 14, para.19; McGinley, 688.
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a party) and procedural arrangements in connection with the 
hearings on the admissibility of its intervention.323
(v) Reciprocity of Rights and Obligations324
It has also been argued that to allow intervention in the 
absence of a jurisdictional link between the applicant state 
and the original parties would amount to a flagrant violation 
of the principle of the reciprocity of rights and obligations 
established by the Statute between the states parties which 
have accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. 
Though this principle is expressly proclaimed in respect of 
declarations of acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Court 
and Article 36(2), it has been pointed out that it has a wider 
scope and that it applies a fortiori to the jurisdiction 
deriving from Special Agreements by which particular disputes 
are referred to the Court. As regards the principle of 
reciprocity ratione materiae. Article 36(2) requires the 
acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction to be made "in 
relation to any other state accepting the same 
obligation".325
323 See ICJ Reports 1981, 6, para.8? Decaux, 185-6.
324 See generally, T. Minagawa, "Operation of Reciprocity 
Under the Optional Clause", 4 JAIL (I960), 32-41? H.W.A. 
Thirlway, "Reciprocity in the Jurisdiction of the 
International Court", 15 NYIL (1984), 97-138? E.B. Weiss, 
"Reciprocity and the Optional Clause", in L.F. Damrosch (ed.) , 
The International Court of Justice at a Crossroads (Dobbs 
Ferry, N.Y.: Transnational Publishers, 1987), 82-105.
325 See ICJ Reports 1984, 60, para. 17 (separate opinion of 
de Arechaga J.A.). See further, Huber J.'s observation in 
PCIJ Series D . No.2, 87.
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The principle of reciprocity ratione personae derives 
from another provision of Article 36(2), that is, the phrase 
requiring that the acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction may 
be made on condition of reciprocity on the part of certain 
states.326
We consider that in the case of submitting a substantive 
contentious case to the Court, it is beyond question that a 
jurisdictional nexus should exist between the parties if the 
fundamental principles of consent, reciprocity of rights and 
obligations and the equality of states, on which the 
jurisdiction of the Court is founded, are to be observed. 
However, these principles are not violated where a third state
is permitted to intervene to protect its legal interests. It 
has been suggested327 that the necessary reciprocity would be 
extant if all states had a right to intervene in disputes in 
which they feared their interests would be adversely affected. 
In that case states which have acceded to the Court * s 
compulsory jurisdiction would be able to intervene in disputes 
even though they did not have the necessary correlative 
acquiescence to the Court*s jurisdiction as the original 
parties, as they would be able to intervene in disputes 
brought by Special Agreement by states which have acceded to
326 See ICJ Reports 1984, 61, para. 19 (separate opinion of 
de Arechaga J.A.). See also his declaration in the Fiiian 
Intervention Cases, ibid. 1974, 532, 537. To require a
jurisdictional link in such circumstances would probably 
nullify Article 62? see PCIJ Series D . No.2, 88 and 92. See 
also Hudson, The Permanent Court. 420.
327 See McGinley, 688.
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the Court*s compulsory jurisdiction. In other words, there 
would be a general reciprocal right to intervene in cases that 
affected the interests of the intervenor.
(vi) Other Arguments Concerning the Jurisdictional Link
The thesis that a jurisdictional link is not a necessary 
requirement for discretionary intervention is also supported 
by the fact that where it is not considered sufficient 
implicitly to vest the Court with jurisdiction, an express 
reference thereto is made as in the case of Article 53 on the 
default procedure, which like Article 62 is also found in 
Chapter 3 of the Statute. Article 53 enables the Court to 
entertain a case in the absence of one of the parties.328
It has been argued that by analogy with intervention as 
of right enshrined in Article 63, which like Article 62 is 
located in Chapter 3 of the Statute on procedure and for the 
operation of which there is no jurisdictional requirement, the 
existence of a basis of jurisdiction is not a condition 
precedent for discretionary intervention. Moreover, treating 
intervention as of right and discretionary intervention 
differently as regards the jurisdictional requirement cannot 
be justified on the basis of apparent dissimilarity of their
328 See ICJ Reports 1984, 41-4 (separate opinion of Mbaye 
J.)? 86, para.78 (V-P. Sette-Camara dissenting); 142-3
(Schwebel J. dissenting). See further Elias, "Limits", 163-4; 
id., The ICJ. 89-90. On the default procedure see generally 
Elkind; Elias, The ICJ. 33-66; Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, "The 
Problem of the *Non-Appearing* Defendant Goverment", 51 BYIL 
(1980) 89-122. For a contrary view, see ICJ Reports 1984, 58, 
para.11 (separate opinion of de Arechaga J.A.).
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subject-matter, especially where the subject-matter of the 
latter concerns the interpretation of principles and rules of 
international law.329
Those who subscribe to the view that the jurisdictional 
link is a necessary precondition for discretionary
intervention have advanced what we might call the theory of 
the presumption of negligence, according to which all 
reference to the jurisdictional requirement was inadvertently 
left out of Article 62 by the Assembly of the League of
Nations after it abandoned the idea of general compulsory 
jurisdiction in favour of the consensual system. This view 
was first expressed by Judge Altamira, during the formulation 
of the first Rules of the Permanent Court in 1922.330 Though 
this view was denied by other judges, it was subsequently 
reiterated on no less than two occasions by Judge de Arechaga 
who maintained that though Article 62 remained untouched when 
the system of general compulsory jurisdiction was replaced by
the optional clause, it must be interpreted and applied as
still subject to the condition that the intervening state 
would have its own title of jurisdiction in relation to the
329 See ibid. 1981, 30-1, paras. 15-6 (separate opinion of 
Oda J.). See also his dissenting opinion, ibid. 1984, 104, 
para.29; 40 (separate opinion of Mbaye J.)? 86-7, paras.79-80
(V-P. Sette-Camara dissenting)? 119, para.9 (Ago J.
dissenting); 143-4, paras.30-2 (Schwebel J. dissenting); 156- 
7, paras.25-6 (Jennings J. dissenting). For a contrary view 
see ibid., 57-8, paras.8-10 (separate opinion of de Arechaga 
J.A.).
330 See ibid. 1984, 73, para. 15 (V-P. Sette-Camara
dissenting); McGinley, 687. See also PCIJ Series D. No.2, 
89.
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respondents.331
This theory was used by Libya and Malta, the original 
parties in the Italian Intervention Case in their 
pleadings.332 The first opportunity for inserting the 
jurisdictional requirement in the Statute presented itself 
during the debate on the whole subject, when the 1920 Hague 
Advisory Committee of Jurists considered whether or not to 
include the requirement of the jurisdictional link in 
intervention proceedings.
The second opportunity arose during the formulation of 
the General Act of Pacific Settlement of 1928 on the issue of 
peaceful settlement of disputes in the contemplation of 
judicial or arbitral proceedings. During the discussion of 
the issue of compulsory jurisdiction, no specific reference 
was made to any link with intervention proceedings which must 
have been regarded as incidental to judicial or arbitral 
settlement of international disputes. Article 62 was revised 
during the reconsideration of the Statute, including in 
particular the question of . the Court's compulsory 
jurisdiction, by the Washington Committee of Jurists, assigned 
the task of drafting the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice.333 In the light of the foregoing, the theory of the
331 See ICJ Reports 1974, 533, 538; ibid. 1984, 55,
para.3.
332 See ibid. 1984, 73, para. 14 (V-P. Sette-Camara
dissenting).
333 See Elias, "The Limits", 164; id., The ICJ. 90. See
also McGinley, 687; ICJ Reports 1984, 73, paras.15 and 16 (V-
P. Sette-Camara dissenting); 144-5, para.33 (Schwebel J.
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presumption of negligence has been discredited and should be 
abandoned.
We may deduce from the preceding survey of the issue 
concerning the necessity of a jurisdictional nexus, that where 
the intervention is designed to safeguard a concrete legally 
protected interest of the intervenor, such a state should not 
be required to establish any basis of jurisdiction which links 
it with the parties to the principal case. Such an 
intervention is different from the original submission of a 
substantive dispute to the jurisdiction of the Court and 
therefore would not appear to fly in the face of the 
fundamental principles of consent, reciprocity and equality 
which underlie the Court*s jurisdiction in the case of an 
original submission of a dispute. An intervention whose 
purpose exceeds the protection of the vital interests of the 
intervenor and thus enables it to make claims against the 
original parties, however, requires the existence of a valid 
jurisdictional link between it and the original parties. The 
possibility of such an intervention, as far as the 
jurisprudence of the Court is concerned, remains open. It is 
possible to have a situation where a jurisdictional link 
exists between the intervenor and the original parties. This 
may be the case where such a state is linked with the main 
parties by its acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of
dissenting) . It is significant that no advantage was taken of 
any of the opportunities provided by the revision of the Rules 
prior to 1978, either to insert the requirement of the 
jurisdictional link in the Rules or to propose a statutory 
amendment to this effect.
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the Court under the Optional Clause of the Statute or through 
a specific treaty or convention in force, or by concluding a 
special agreement with them. In such circumstances, the third 
state would be able to intervene either on the side of the 
original applicant or respondent, or indeed as an independent 
claimant. The third state would obviously also be able to 
institute proceedings on the same subject before the 
Court.334 The only reason such a state may prefer 
intervention to the submission of a fresh dispute to the Court 
would be its desire to secure what has been termed "procedural 
economy of means”335 or "economy of litigation”.336
To cite procedural convenience as the purpose of 
discretionary intervention is to confer on this protective 
remedy,337 a marginal status which does not seem to accord 
with the wishes and intentions of the framers of the 
Statute.338 Thus, there is room for the view that 
discretionary intervention is perceived as a more useful and 
effective remedy when it is released from the shackles of the 
dubious requirement of a jurisdictional nexus, than when such
334 See ibid. 1981, 25, para.5-6 (separate opinion of Oda 
J.); 1984, 92-3, para.6-7 (Oda J. dissenting). See also Oda, 
"Intervention”, 641-2.
335 See ICJ Reports 1984, 26, para.42; cf. ibid., 47, 
where Mbaye J. expresses doubts about the usefulness of 
intervention in this regard.
336 See ibid. 1981, 25, para. 5? 1984, 93, para. 6 (Oda J. 
dissenting). See also Oda, "Intervention", 641.
337 See ICJ Reports 1984, 18, para. 28 and 23, para. 37.
338 See McGinley, 688.
246
a link is insisted upon at all costs.339
Rigid insistence on the existence of a basis of 
jurisdiction between the intervenor and the original parties 
as a condition for the operation of discretionary intervention 
may be regarded as an indirect way of compelling wider 
acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction, either by accepting 
the compulsory jurisdiction under the Optional Clause or by 
conferring jurisdiction on the Court in treaties and 
conventions. For it would seem that it is only then that 
states would be able to avail themselves of the potential 
rights endowed on them by the Statute. Otherwise, if the view 
of the apologists of the jurisdictional requirement should 
prevail, there is no doubt that for some states, especially 
those which have not accepted the Court's compulsory 
jurisdiction, a remedy like discretionary intervention will 
remain a tantalising mirage. The framers of the Statute could 
not, after having abandoned the system of universal compulsory 
jurisdiction in favour of the consensual system, have devised 
and enshrined in the Statute the procedural faculty of 
intervention which would be available only to those states 
which accept the Court's compulsory jurisdiction or which 
confer jurisdiction on the Court in treaties and conventions, 
without expressly saying so.
The argument that to allow intervention in the absence of 
the jurisdictional link would amount to the introduction of
339 See ICJ Reports 1984, 145, para. 35 (Schwebel J.
dissenting).
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compulsory jurisdiction, and therefore flout the consensual ism 
which underlies the Court's jurisdiction, would seem to be 
valid in so far as the object of the intervention is something 
other than the protection of a legal interest. This argument 
is patently indefensible in the case of a strictly limited 
intervention whose object is to safeguard the legal interest 
of the intervenor. It is the insistence on the existence of 
a jurisdictional link in the case of strictly limited 
intervention which is suggestive of the idea of the indirect 
introduction of at least the spirit, if not the letter, of 
general compulsory jurisdiction, rather than when such a 
requirement is dispensed with.
6. Conclusion
Although in the Nicaracruan Intervention Case the Chamber 
rejected the jurisdictional link as an essential condition for 
discretionary intervention, it kept alive the possibility 
that, in certain circumstances, such a link might be 
required.340 Indeed, in the Maltese Intervention Case, the 
Court remarked that if Malta were seeking to intervene as a 
party, the question of the jurisdictional link would call for 
consideration.341 The Chamber's ruling on the issue of the 
jurisdictional link is, therefore, certainly not the last word 
on the subject.
In conclusion, we submit that respect for the principles
340 See ibid. 1990, 134-5, para.99.
341 See ibid. 1981, 18-19, para.32.
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of consent, reciprocity and equality would seem to be a 
relevant consideration more in relation to principal than 
incidental jurisdiction. If therefore the Court were to 
choose intervention as a party as the only genuine form of 
discretionary intervention, those states which have not 
acceded to the optional clause would be able to intervene in 
proceedings to safeguard their interests. They would, unlike 
those states which have accepted the Court*s compulsory 
jurisdiction, effectively be denied the choice between 
intervention as a party and strictly limited or non-party 
intervention.
In the circumstances the adoption of intervention as a 
party, and strictly limited or non-party intervention, would 
appear to hold the key to the resolution of a problem. Not 
only would this solution enable a state without any valid 
jurisdictional link with parties to a principal case to 
intervene in proceedings in that case to protect its legal 
interests, but it would also give a state with valid 
jurisdictional links with the original parties the freedom to 
choose to intervene on either a party or a non-party basis. 
Above all, it would enable the Court itself, by means of its 
considerable discretion to decide, in the light of the 
circumstances of each particular case, which of the two types 
of discretionary intervention it would grant to the applicant. 
The case for the adoption of this solution may also be 
supported on policy grounds by the natural meaning of Article 
62, as well as by its travaux preoaratoires. Thus, it is
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possible to combine teleological interpretation with the plain 
meaning method of construction, an approach which retains the 
potential effectiveness of Article 62, which would otherwise 
be lost by rigid insistence on the jurisdictional requirement 
as an essential condition for its operation.342 This 
proposed solution also clarifies and reconciles certain 
provisions of the 1978 Rules. It makes it possible to 
reconcile the jurisdictional requirement embodied in Article 
81(2)(c) of these Rules with the relevant statutory 
provisions, especially Article 62. It also clearly highlights 
the distinction between the wording of Articles 38 and 
81(2)(c) as regards the jurisdictional requirement in 
connection with substantive and incidental jurisdiction.
There is a link between Article 81(2)(b) and (c) which 
require the indication of the precise object of the 
intervention and the specification of the existence of any 
basis of jurisdiction between the applicant and the original 
parties, in that they enable the Court in limini litis to 
ascertain whether the applicant intends to intervene as a non- >/ 
party or as a party. Thus, the proposed solution justifies 
the existence of Article 81(2)(b) and (c) . This solution also 
has the merit that respect for the principle of optional 
jurisdiction is ensured, since the jurisdictional link would 
be required in case of an intervention which would give rise 
to a dispute, but not where the intervention does not involve 
a dispute with the original parties. In the latter case, the
342 See to the same effect, Chinkin, 527.
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original parties, which would not be compelled to litigate 
with another state within the meaning of Article 36 of the 
Statute, would have no cause for complaint. Here, the 
principle of consent would not be infringed, as with Article 
63 of the Statute the original parties would merely be 
required to tolerate the participation of a third state which 
does not intend to make claims against them. Another 
advantage of this solution is that it avoids distorting 
Article 62 of the Statute by lending it a meaning which it 
does not convey, and thus enables us to dispense with the 
argument whereby Article 62 is seen as conferring jurisdiction 
on the Court whereas derogating from the principle of 
consensual ism.343
The proposals for two models of discretionary 
intervention would render this procedural remedy more 
effective, and therefore more available and attractive to 
states. Admittedly, frequent recourse to the use of 
discretionary intervention itself depends to a very great 
extent on wider use of the Court by states for the settlement 
of international disputes.344
343 See to the same effect, ICJ Reports 1984, 43-5 
(separate opinion of Mbaye J.).
344 See Jessup, 905. See also Miller, 550. In this 
connection, see generally Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, "Enlargement 
of the Contentious Jurisdiction of the Court", in*Future of 
the Court. 461-99.
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CHAPTER THREE
INTERVENTION AS OF RIGHT1
1. Introduction
In the preceding chapter, we discussed one of the 
specific guarantees which the Statute of the Court provides to 
protect the rights of third states, that is, discretionary 
intervention.
In this chapter we shall deal with the other variant of 
intervention enshrined in the Statute, namely, intervention as 
of right. This type of intervention is contained in Article 
63 of the Statute of the Court according to the terms of 
which:
(1) Whenever the construction of a convention to which 
states other than those concerned in a case are parties 
is in question, the registrar shall notify all such 
states forthwith.
(2) Every state so notified has the right to intervene in 
the proceedings? but if it uses this right the 
construction given by the judgment will be equally 
binding upon it.
Besides exploring the conditions necessary for the 
operation of this kind of intervention, the extent, if any, of 
the discretion exercised by the Court in the matter of 
determining the admissibility of a declaration of intervention 
by an interested third state will also be examined. Another 
issue relates to the impact of the Court’s judgment on a third 
state whose declaration of intervention has either been
1 See generally, Davi, 51-91, 227-63? Guyomar, 525-6.
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allowed or dismissed.
2. Evolution2
Though, as already noted,3 discretionary intervention has
existed in the principal legal systems of the world for
centuries, intervention as of right is peculiar to
international law, and consequently has no parallel in
municipal legal systems. As regards international law, not
only does this latter type of intervention have a longer
history, but also until quite recently it was only with this
type of intervention that the international judicial system
could claim to have any actual experience.4
The first document of international character to
recognise certain elements of discretionary intervention was
the draft rules of international arbitral procedure adopted by
the Institute of International Law on 28 August 1875. Under
the terms of Article 16 of these regulations:
Neither the parties nor the arbitrators can of their own 
accord involve any other states or third persons whatever 
in the case without special authorisation expressed in 
the compromis and the previous consent of the third 
party.
The voluntary intervention of a third party is admissible 
only with the consent of the parties that have concluded
2 See generally, Davi, 91-104? Rosenne, "Some 
Reflections", 75-8.
3 See 119 and 123 above.
4 See Miller, 550; Chinkin, 495. See also the 
dissenting opinion of Ago J. in the Italian Intervention Case 
in ICJ Reports 1984, 115, para.2.
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the compromis.5
The delegates to the 1899 Peace Conference, who accepted 
the principle of limited intervention, must have been inspired 
by the approach adopted by the International Law Institute. 
At that conference, Mr. T.M.C. Asser, the Dutch 
representative, proposed an amendment to the Russian draft of 
an arbitral code which, with minor modifications became 
Article 56 of the Convention of 1899 for the Pacific 
Settlement of International Disputes.6
The 1907 Hague Peace Conference embodied substantially 
the same provision in Article 84 of the 1907 Convention for 
the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes.7
Apart from the Hague Conventions, the only other instance 
in which third party intervention was expressly provided for 
was Article 6 of the 1903 Protocols of Agreement between 
Venezuela and Great Britain, Germany and Italy, to which the 
United States and other states were also parties, which 
resulted in the Venezuelan Preferential Claims Arbitration. 
This provision stated that:
Any nation having claims against Venezuela may join as a
5 See Mani, 251.
6 See Mani, 252; K.S. Carlston, The Process of
International Arbitration (Westport, Conn: Greenwood, 1946),
124; Miller, 550, n.3.
7 See Article 84 of the 1907 Convention for Pacific 
Settlement of International Disputes in, for example, J.H. 
Ralston, International Arbitral Law and Procedure (Boston: 
Ginn & Co., published for the International School of Peace, 
1910), Appendix B, 335; Mani, 252.
254
party in the arbitration provided for by the agreement.8
The draft scheme for the establishment of a Permanent
Court of International Justice, provided in Article 23 for
intervention by third states in cases involving the
construction of conventions.9
This provision was later revised as Article 61 of the
draft scheme, to read as follows:
Whenever the construction of a convention in which states 
other than those concerned in the case are parties is in 
question, the Registrar shall notify all such states 
forthwith. Every state so notified has the right to 
intervene in the proceedings: but if it uses this right, 
the construction given by the judgment will be as binding 
upon it as upon the original parties to the dispute.10
This text was subsequently adopted without any alterations.
The eighth session of the League Council, held in San
Sebastian from 30 July to 5 August 1920, in its resolution of
5 August, approved the draft prepared by the Hague Advisory
Committee of Jurists.11
The tenth session of the Council held in Brussels from 22
to 28 October 1920 adopted a report on a Permanent Court of
International Justice presented by M. Leon Bourgeois of
France.12 The Third Committee of the First Assembly of the
8 See Mani, 253.
9 See Proces-Verbaux (1920), 571. See also Oda,
"Intervention”, 632.
10 See Proces-Verbaux (1920), 659-70; see also Oda,
"Intervention", 634 and 637.
11 See League of Nations, Documents, 38; see also LNOJ, 
No.8, (1920), 12ff; Oda, "Intervention", 636.
12 See League of Nations, Documents. 45-60.
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League, which met from 17 November to 11 December 1920, set up 
a sub-committee13 which presented a draft scheme containing, 
among other things, Article 63, which was identical to Article 
61 of the Brussels text.14 Mr. Hagerup's report on behalf of 
the sub-committee which accompanied the draft scheme did not 
carry any substantive explanations on Article 63.15 The 
third committee discussed the plan for a Permanent Court of 
International Justice submitted by the sub-committee, and this 
article, among others, was adopted without question.16 At 
its twentieth and twenty-first preliminary meetings on 13 
December 1920, the First Assembly of the League unanimously 
adopted a resolution concerning the establishment of a 
Permanent Court of International Justice with little detailed 
discussion on, or amendment of, the provisions of the draft 
scheme. Consequently, the text of Article 63 of the Statute 
of the Permanent Court remained unaltered.17
Article 63 did not undergo any revision when the Statute 
was amended by a protocol concerning the revision of the 
Statute of the Permanent Court which formed the subject of a
13 See ibid., 84-158.
14 See Oda, "Intervention", 638.
15 See League of Nations, Documents, 206-13; see also 
Oda, "Intervention", 637.
16 See League of Nations, Documents. 100-4; see also Oda, 
"Intervention", 638.
17 See League of Nations, Documents. 225-56; see also, 
Oda, "Intervention", 638.
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resolution of the Assembly of the League on 14 September 
1929.18 The protocol came into force on 1 February 1936.
The Committee of Jurists designated by the United Nations 
to prepare and submit to the San Francisco Conference a draft 
Statute for an International Court of Justice met in 
Washington from 9 to 19 April 1945.19 The Committee 
submitted a report on a draft Statute of an International 
Court of Justice to the San Francisco Conference on 20 
April.20 The text of Article 63 of the Statute of the 
International Court, as adopted by the San Francisco 
Conference, was identical to that of Article 63 of the Statute 
of the Permanent Court. In short, Article 63 of the present 
Statute, like its corresponding provision in the Statute of 
the Permanent Court, was borrowed from the provisions of 
Article 84 of the 1907 Hague Convention for Pacific Settlement 
of International Disputes, which was inherited, with some 
minor modifications, from Article 56 of the 1899 Hague 
Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International 
Disputes.
3. Conditions for the Operation of Intervention as of Right
The foregoing resume of the genesis of intervention as of 
right indicates not only that both types of intervention
18 See ibid., 639.
19 See 14 UNCIO, 485. See also Oda, "Intervention", 639.
20 See 14 UNCIO. 648-80. See also Oda, "Intervention",
639.
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enshrined in the Statutes of the International Court have 
separate histories,21 but also that, unlike intervention as 
of right, discretionary intervention had no precursor in state 
practice in the period prior to 1920, when the Statute of the 
Permanent Court was framed.22
(a) The Meaning of Article 63(1)
It is clear from Article 63(1) that for intervention as 
of right to be called into operation the construction of a 
convention must be involved in a case pending before the 
Court. It is understood that construction of a legal document 
means the same thing as its interpretation.23 In fact, 
construction is defined as the process of ascertaining the 
meaning of a written document.24 The term 'construction of 
a convention* cannot and should not be understood to mean that 
the construction of the whole convention must be in question 
in a case before the Court. Rather, it must be taken to mean 
any part of any provision in, and any article or part of an 
article of a convention.
The word "convention” appears in Articles 38 and 63 of
21 See Louis F. del Duca's excellent review of Professor 
Angelo Davi's L'Intervento davanti alia Corte Internazionale 
di Giustizia in 81 AJIL (1987) , 467 (hereinafter "del Duca") .
22 See e.g., Miller, 550-1.
23 See E. Hambro, "The Interpretation of Multilateral 
Treaties by the International Court of Justice", 39 TGS 
(1953), 241 (hereinafter "Interpretation"); also id., 
"Intervention" 391(5).
24 See, for example, I Jowitt, 646: "Construction, the 
noun of ascertaining the meaning of a written document".
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the Statute.25 It may be assumed that it has the same 
meaning in both provisions. According to the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, which may, to a large 
extent, be said to be a codification of international 
customary law, "treaty” means an international agreement 
concluded between states in written form and governed by 
international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or 
two or more related instruments in whatever its particular 
designation.26 It has been noted that the fact that this 
definition rules out conventions between states and other 
international subjects, or between other international 
subj ects inter se does not mean that they are not mutatis 
mutandis covered by the same rules. It has been suggested 
that such treaties should be included for the purpose of 
Article 63 even though they did not play an important role 
during the drafting of the Statute of the Permanent Court in 
1920.27
The most difficult aspect of Article 63(1) is probably 
the meaning of the construction of a convention being "in
25 Fitzmaurice has observed that "... it follows that the 
convention must be a multilateral, or at least a plurilateral, 
and not merely a bilateral one." See 2 Fitzmaurice, 550? 
id., 34 BYIL (1958), 124. Chinkin has observed that: "The use 
of the words 1 states ... are parties1 in Article 63 indicates 
that it must refer to a convention in force". See Chinkin, 
503, n.36.
26 See Hambro, "Intervention", 389-90. See also ICJ 
Reports 1984, 236-7 (Schwebel J. dissenting). The Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties is reprinted in Brownlie, 
Basic Documents. 349-87? Millar, Treaties. 10-44.
27 See Hambro, "Intervention", 390.
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question”. The Court has spoken of certain conventions being 
”in issue”.28 This, however, does not make the meaning of 
the original phrase any clearer. According to one 
interpretation, any mention of a treaty in any pleading should 
be sufficient to bring Article 63 into operation. Another 
interpretation is that Article 63 should be applied only when 
the Convention is the main legal consideration of the 
judgment.29 Neither extreme position is either reasonable or 
acceptable. The requirement that the construction of a 
convention must be in question in a case does not necessarily 
imply that the Court should base its judgment exclusively, or 
even chiefly, on the convention concerned. Furthermore, it 
cannot imply that the convention is construed in the operative 
provisions of the judgment. For even though, in the nature of 
things, the operative provisions constitute that part of the 
judgment which alone in principle is legally binding on the 
parties, to whom it is also usually specifically addressed, it 
is so brief that it rarely includes a construction of a 
convention. The logical solution would seem to be that the 
interpretation of a treaty is found necessary for the judgment 
in question. That is, in addition to being an obiter dictum 
it must also form part of the ratio decidendi of the 
j udgment.30
28 See ICJ Reports 1972, 48.
29 See Hambro, "Intervention", 392; id., 
"Interpretation", 248.
30 See Hambro, "Intervention", 393 and 398? id., 
"Interpretation", 241.
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Intervention as of right is granted to states which are 
parties to the convention in question. The Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties defines a party as a state which has 
consented to be bound by the treaty and for which the treaty 
is in force. It is, however, not absolutely certain that this 
restrictive interpretation need be accepted outside the 
convention itself.31 The Court, in the Reservations Case, 
conferred certain rights on states which had signed but not 
ratified the Genocide Convention.32 This was later 
incorporated into the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties.
It is believed that intervention as of right has 
considerably extended the jurisdiction of the Court.33 
Unlike discretionary intervention, it would seem that as 
regards intervention as of right, any party to a convention, 
the construction of which is in issue in a pending case, 
necessarily has an interest in the matter. In other words, 
the legal interest of such a third state in the proceedings is 
presumed.34
31 See Hambro, "Intervention”, 390; id., 
"Interpretation", 245-6.
32 See ICJ Reports 1951, 28. See also, Hambro,
"Intervention", 391; 2 Fitzmaurice, 550-1; id., 27 BYIL
(1950), 124.
33 See Hambro, "Intervention", 391; id., "The 
Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice", ADIRC 
(1950), 148 and 150 (hereinafter "Jurisdiction"); id., "Some 
Observations", 154; Rosenne, Law and Practice. 433; Anand, 
Compulsory Jurisdiction. 283.
34 See Chinkin, 523; Jessup, 904. See also PCIJ Series 
A, No.1, 13.
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(b) The Practice of the Permanent Court of International
Justice
The provisions concerning intervention as of right in the 
1922 Rules of the Permanent Court do not appear to have 
attempted either to elaborate on or supplement the conditions 
prescribed by its Statute. Article 60 of those rules merely 
provided that any state desiring to intervene under the terms 
of Article 63 should inform the Registrar in writing, before 
the commencement of the oral proceedings. The Court was 
required to enable the intervening state to inspect the 
documents bearing on the interpretation of the convention in 
question in the case and to comment thereon. In spite of the 
lack of detailed provisions in its rules regarding 
intervention as of right, the Permanent Court had to deal with 
this type of intervention in its first contentious case.
(c) The SS Wimbledon Case35
In March 1921, the German authorities denied the British
35 See SS Wimbledon Case (Application by Polish Government 
to Intervene), in PCIJ Series A No.l, 5 at 9-14. For 
references to this case in the literature see, for example, de 
Arechaga, "Intervention", 458-61; Elias, "The Limits", 159- 
61; id., The ICJ. 85-6; Damrosch, 381-2; Hambro,
"Intervention", 87, n.12; Oda, "Intervention", 645;
Rousseau, 308; Mani, 254, 259, 273; McGinley, 673, nn.19, 
20; Miller, 553-5, 557-8; J. Sztucki, "Intervention Under 
Article 63 of the I.C.J. Statute in the Phase of Preliminary 
Proceedings: The ‘Salvadorean Incident'", 79 AJIL (1985),
1005, 1029 (hereinafter "Sztucki"); 4 Schwarzenberger, 211, 
401; Hudson, The Permanent Court. 348, 361, 362, 383, 423, 
543, 588, 627, 635; 2 Fitzmaurice, 552; Chinkin, 495; I.
Von Munch, "The Wimbledon", in Bernhardt (ed.), EPIL 
[Instalment 2 (1981)], 293-4’; Fachiri, 122-5, 166-74;
Smyrniadis, 35, 39-40; Jenks, Prospects, 129; Shihata, 41; 
Guyomar, 545, 553; Davi, 3ff, 7, 8, 58, 59, 76, 148ff, 168, 
223, 228, 229, 257.
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ship, the SS Wimbledon, chartered by a French company, bound 
for Danzig with a cargo of military material destined for 
Poland, free access to the Kiel Canal. This caused the ship 
to remain at the entrance of the canal for a few days. The 
ship then proceeded to Danzig by a longer route, the Danish 
Straits.
In January 1923, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan 
instituted proceedings before the Permanent Court against 
Germany for demurrage, the cost of remaining idle at the 
entrance of the canal, and deviation, the cost of the longer 
trip. Germany sought to justify its action on the grounds 
that a state of war existed between Poland and Russia and that 
its regulations on neutrality prohibited the transit of war 
material through its territory to either country. The 
applicants contended that Germany was obliged nonetheless 
under Article 386 of the Treaty of Versailles to keep the 
canal open.
The issue in the primary proceedings which the Court had 
to decide was "whether the German authorities were within 
their rights in refusing to the SS Wimbledon free access to 
the Kiel Canal and, if necessary, to determine the damages due 
for the prejudice to this vessel by reason of this 
refusal.I|36
In May 1923, Poland, in agreement with the applicants, 
presented to the Court a request to permit it to intervene in 
the suit under Article 62 of the Statute and Articles 58 and
36 See PCIJ Series A . No.l, 12.
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59 of the Rules on their side.37 Although Article 63 of the 
Statute was not expressly mentioned, Poland cited in support 
of its request its participation in the Treaty of Versailles 
and the violation of the rights and interests guaranteed to it 
under Article 380 thereof, resulting from the German 
action.38 Responding to the Polish application, Great 
Britain suggested that Poland's right to intervene arose under 
Article 63 rather than Article 62 of the Statute, inasmuch as 
Poland was a signatory of both the Treaty of Versailles and 
the Court's Statute.39
Poland altered its presentation, and at a public sitting 
of the Court on 15 June 1923, announced that it would avail 
itself of the right conferred upon it as a party to the Treaty 
of Versailles by Article 63 of the Statute and therefore did 
not insist that the grounds submitted as justification for 
intervention under Article 62 should be taken into 
consideration.40 Poland also stated that it would not ask
the German government for any special damages for the
prejudice caused to it in the case of the SS Wimbledon.41
Consequently, the Court thought it unnecessary to 
consider and satisfy itself whether Poland's intervention was 
justified by an interest of a legal nature within the meaning
37 See ibid.
38 See ibid., 12-3.
39 See PCIJ Series C . No.3 Vol.l, 107.
40 See PCIJ Series A . No.l, 13.
41 See ibid. See also ibid. Series C No.3, Vol.2, 118.
264
of Article 62. The Court considered it sufficient to note 
that the suit involved the interpretation of certain clauses 
of the Treaty of Versailles, and that Poland was a party 
thereto. After recording that Poland intended to avail itself 
of the right to intervene conferred by Article 63 on 28 June, 
the Court accepted Poland*s intervention.42 It is clear that 
Poland's application to intervene was granted because Poland 
had abandoned Article 62 as the basis of its claim to 
intervene in favour of Article 63. In consequence, Poland 
disavowed any intention of asking the respondent for any 
damages for the prejudice caused to it.43
This case furnishes sufficient authority for the view 
that it cannot be the proper purpose of intervention as of 
right to seek special damages or make specific claims for 
compensation from either or both of the original parties. 
From the Court's handling of the Polish intervention, we may 
draw the inference that the Court wished to abide strictly by 
the conditions laid down in its Statute to govern the 
operation of intervention as of right so as to confine it to 
cases involving the construction of conventions. This 
approach is consistent with the position which it adopted in 
its Rules.
When the Court decided to revise its Rules in 1926 it had 
handled only one case relating to intervention as of right.
42 See PCIJ Series A . No.l, 31.
43 See the Court's observation, ibid.; de Arechaga, 
"Intervention", 460-1; Miller, 552.
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Since the simple provisions of the Rules on this type of
intervention had been strictly and literally applied to decide
that case, it would seem that there was no interpretation of
the relevant rules in its jurisprudence to be incorporated.
Thus, no attempt was made to seize the opportunity provided by
the revision of the Rules to fill gaps in the provisions
concerning intervention as of right.44 Similarly, the 1931
Rules did not clarify the wording of Article 63. Article 60
of those Rules stipulated that:
The notification provided for in Article 63 of the 
Statute shall be sent to every state or member of the 
League of Nations which is a party to the convention 
relied upon in the special agreement or in the 
application as governing the case submitted to the 
Court... The registrar shall take the necessary steps to 
enable the intervening state to inspect the documents in 
the case, insofar as they relate to the interpretation of 
the convention in question, and to submit its 
observations thereon to the Court. Such observations 
shall be communicated to the parties, who may comment 
thereon in Court. The Court may authorise the 
intervening state to reply.45
During the preparation of the 1936 Rules that the 
Permanent Court modified the provisions concerning 
intervention as of right. Article 66 of those Rules laid down 
that any member of the League or state which is a party to the 
convention in question, and to which the notification has not 
been sent, may file a declaration of intention to 
intervene.46
44 Indeed, it appears to have been assumed that there were 
no gaps to be filled in provisions on intervention under 
Article 63. See, e.g., Sztucki, 1029-30.
45 See Hudson, The Permanent Court. 726.
46 See ibid., 750.
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Article 66(3) provided that such declarations shall be 
communicated to the parties.47 If any objection or doubt 
should arise as to whether the intervention is admissible, the 
decision shall rest with the Court. Under the terms of 
Article 66(4), the Registrar shall enable the intervening 
party to inspect the documents in the case bearing on the 
interpretation of the convention in question and to comment 
thereon.48 Article 66(5) requires these comments to be 
communicated to the other parties, who may discuss them in 
oral proceedings in which the intervening party shall 
participate.49
The framers of the 1936 Rules anticipated the possibility 
of notifications under Article 63 of the Statute not being 
sent to potential intervening states by making it possible for 
such states to file declarations of intervention regardless of 
whether or not they receive the said notifications. By 
leaving the ultimate decision on the admissibility of 
declarations of intervention to the Court, they appeared to 
recognise the fact that no third state has an absolute right 
to intervene.50
47 See ibid.
48 See ibid.
49 See ibid.
50 See Sztucki, 1030? Miller 552? Hambro,
"Interpretation”, 249.
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(d) The Practice of the International Court of Justice
With the exception of the third paragraph of Article 66 
of the 1946 Rules of the International Court, which required 
the Registrar to give publicity to declarations of 
intervention, the rest of that Article is substantially the 
same as the corresponding provision of the 1936 Rules of the 
Permanent Court.51 It was in the Hava de la Torre Case52 
that the International Court, in addition to interpreting 
these provisions, also laid down other conditions to govern 
the procedural remedy of intervention as of right.
(e) The Hava de la Torre Case
In its judgment in the Asvlum Case53, the Court defined 
the legal relations between the parties with regard to matters 
relating to diplomatic asylum in general, and particularly to 
the asylum granted to Senor Victor Raoul Haya de la Torre
51 See Rosenne, Documents, 181-3.
52 See Hava de la Torre Case. Judgment of 13 June 1951, 
ICJ Reports 1951, 71. The Hava de la Torre Case was
considered by the Court to rank formally as a new dispute and 
not simply as a part or a further development of the previous 
proceedings in the Asvlum Case. See 2 Fitzmaurice, 554, n.l. 
For other references to this case by the same author, see 
ibid., 552, n.l, 554-5; id., 34 BYIL (1958), 124, n.l, 126-8. 
For other references, see; Elias, "The Limits”, 161-2? id., 
The ICJ. 86-7; Hambro, "Intervention", 387, 389, 397? id., 
"Interpretation", 240? Oda, "Intervention", 644? Guyomar, 
540, 544, 546, 549, 555? Jenks, Prospects, 667-8, 287, 420; 
4 Schwarzenberger, 401-2? Shihata, 41? Gross, "Treaty 
Interpretation", 109-10? Davi, 7, 8, 48, 57-9, 65ff, 76, 167, 
205, 223, 228ff, 257? Damrosch, 382? Anand, Compulsory
Jurisdiction. 283.
53 See ICJ Reports 1951, 77. See also, Colombian-Peruvian 
Asvlum Case. Judgment of November 20th, 1950, ICJ Reports 
1950, 266 (hereinafter "The Asvlum Case").
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(hereinafter Haya de la Torre) by the Colombian Ambassador in 
Lima on 3-4 January, 1949. The Court found that the asylum 
was not granted in conformity with Article 2(2) of the Havana 
Convention on Diplomatic Asylum of 1928. On the day the 
judgment was delivered Colombia submitted to the Court a 
request for interpretation, which by the judgment of 27 
November 1950 was declared to be inadmissible.54
Following disagreement between the parties on the manner 
of the execution of these earlier judgments, Colombia filed an 
application instituting proceedings against Peru. It cited 
Article 7 of its Protocol on Friendship and Cooperation with 
Peru of 24 May 1934 as the basis of the Court's jurisdiction 
to deal with the case.55
The Court found that since no objection had been raised 
to a decision on the merits, the conduct of the parties was 
sufficient to confer jurisdiction on it.
In January 1951 Colombia informed the Registrar that it 
relied on Article 1(2) of the Convention on Asylum signed at 
Havana in February 1928 and requested that effect be given to 
the provisions of Article 63 of the Statute.56 Accordingly, 
the Registrar informed states which were parties to the 
Convention other than those concerned in the case.
In February 1951 Cuba, which had requested and, after the
54 See ICJ Reports 1951, 77.
55 See ibid., 73.
56 See ibid. See also ICJ Pleadings (1950), Hava de la 
Torre Case. 185.
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parties had been consulted, been granted access to the 
pleadings and annexed documents in the case, addressed to the 
Registrar a letter and a memorandum which contained its views 
concerning the construction of the Havana Convention and its 
general attitude towards asylum.57 This letter, considered 
as a declaration of intervention under Article 66(1) of the 
1946 Rules, was, pursuant to Article 66(2)(3), duly 
publicised. The memorandum attached to the letter, which was 
considered by Cuba as constituting the written observations 
provided for in Article 66(4) of the Rules, was simultaneously 
communicated to the original parties.
Following an objection to Cuba's intervention by Peru, 
the Court, in application of Article 66(2) of the Rules, 
decided to hear the observations of the parties and Cuba on 
the admissibility of the latter's intervention. Peru 
contended that Cuba's intervention was inadmissible owing to 
the declaration of intervention being out of time and because 
of the fact that the declaration and the accompanying 
memorandum did not constitute intervention in the true meaning 
of that term, but an attempt by a third state to appeal 
against the Asvlum Case. Peru was of the opinion that the 
Hava de la Torre Case could not give rise to the construction 
of a convention within the meaning of the Statute and, in 
particular, of the Havana Convention, concerning whose meaning 
judgment was given on 20 November 1950.58
57 See ICJ Reports 1951, 74; ICJ Pleadings, 1950, 117.
58 See ICJ Pleadings, 1950, 123-7; ICJ Reports 1951, 74.
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Regarding Peru's contention the Court observed that:
Every intervention is incidental to the proceedings in a 
case; it follows that a declaration filed as an 
intervention only acquires that character, in law, if it 
actually relates to the subject-matter of the pending 
proceedings.59
The Court explained that the subject matter of the Hava de la 
Torre Case, which concerned the question of the surrender of 
Haya de la Torre to the Peruvian authorities, differed from 
that of the earlier Asvlum Case which was terminated by the 
judgment of 20 November 1950. This question was outside the 
submissions of the parties in that case and was therefore not 
decided by the Asvlum Case. The Court further observed that 
the only point which it was necessary to ascertain was whether 
the object of the intervention of Cuba "is in fact 
interpretation of the Havana Convention in regard to the 
question whether Colombia is under an obligation to surrender 
the refugee to the Peruvian authorities."60
On this point the Court stated that since the memorandum 
attached to Cuba1s declaration of intervention was devoted 
almost entirely to a discussion of questions which the Asvlum 
Case had already decided with the authority of res judicata, 
it did not satisfy the conditions of a genuine 
intervention.61
At a later public hearing, Cuba stated that its 
intervention was based on the fact that the Court was required
59 See ibid., 76.
60 See ibid., 1951, 77.
61 See ibid.
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to interpret an aspect of the Havana Convention which had not 
been considered in the Asvlum Case.62
This led the Court to remark that:
Reduced in this way, and operating within these limits, 
the intervention of the Government of Cuba conformed to 
the conditions of Article 63 of the Statute, and the 
Court, having deliberated on the matter, decided ... to 
admit the intervention in pursuance of paragraph 2 of 
Article 66 of the Rules.63
It is significant that Cuba did not seek to intervene in 
the Hava de la Torre Case in order to claim any specific 
relief for itself. Indeed, it does not appear that it 
obtained any specific profit or material benefit from its 
intervention.64
It was in the Hava de la Torre Case that the Court, while 
underlining some of the characteristics of the "genuine" 
intervention, prescribed additional conditions for the 
operation of this procedural remedy.65
First, the Court described intervention as being 
incidental to the proceedings in a case.66 Thus, 
intervention must take place during proceedings actually in
62 See ibid.
63 See ibid. In accordance with Article 66(5) of its 
Rules, the Court heard a statement on the interpretation of 
the Havana Convention presented by Cuba.
64 See Miller, 553; Oda, "Intervention", 645.
65 See 2 Fitzmaurice, 553-5? id., 34 BYIL (1958), 127? 
Chinkin, 498, 516, n.86. These characteristics, though
spelled out in respect of intervention as of right, would 
apply equally to discretionary intervention.
66 See, for example, Mani, 259; Chinkin, 498? 2 
Fitzmaurice, 553? id., 34 BYIL (1958), 127? Sztucki, 1015. 
See further, ICJ Reports 1990, 134, para.98.
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progress before the Court. It therefore goes without saying 
that no third state can intervene in proceedings in a case 
which has not been commenced or which has been terminated. It 
is noteworthy that it was only after Cuba had stated that it 
based its intervention principally on an aspect of the 
interpretation of the Havana Convention on Asylum which, on 
the Court's own admission, had not been interpreted in the 
previous Asvlum Case. that the Court decided to admit its 
intervention.67 This case also provides some support for the 
view that a third state which has failed to intervene in 
proceedings in a case which culminates in a definitive 
judgment cannot later impugn it by intervening in further 
proceedings concerning its execution.68 It will be recalled 
that when the Court found that the primary proceedings in the 
Nuclear Tests Cases had become moot, it also found, in 
consequence, that Fiji's applications to intervene in those 
proceedings had lapsed.69
Second, the Court observed that the subject matter of the 
intervention must be sufficiently related to the pending 
primary proceedings in order for it to be admissible.70 
Cuba's declaration of intervention was admitted only after it 
had been stripped of irrelevancies and trimmed so as to render
67 See ICJ Reports 1951, 77.
68 See, for example, Mani, 267; Chinkin, 521.
69 See ICJ Reports 1974, 530, 535? Chinkin, 498.
70 See, for example, Chinkin, 498? Mani, 259; 2 
Fitzmaurice, 554? id., 34 BYIL (1958), 128? Miller, 550.
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it sufficiently related to the issue in the main case, namely 
whether in accordance with the Havana Convention on Asylum of 
1928, Colombia ought to give effect to the earlier Asylum 
Judgment by the particular method of causing its Embassy in 
Lima to surrender Haya de la Torre directly into the hands of 
the Peruvian authorities.71
It was in the Hava de la Torre Case that the Court for 
the first time referred to the concept of the true object of 
the intervention. After having differentiated the subject 
matter of the instant case from that of the earlier Asvlum 
Case, the Court remarked that the only point which it was 
necessary to ascertain was whether the object of Cuba*s 
intervention was, in fact, interpretation of the Havana 
Convention in regard to the question whether Colombia was 
under an obligation to surrender the refugee, Haya de la 
Torre, to the Peruvian authorities.72 To the extent that the 
memorandum accompanying Cuba's declaration of intervention 
dealt almost entirely with questions which had been decided in 
the previous Asvlum Case, the Court did not hesitate to find 
that it was not a genuine intervention. Indeed it is 
difficult to see how the true object of an intervention, the 
subject matter of which mainly concerned questions which had 
been settled in a previous judgment, could be an aspect of the 
interpretation of the Havana Convention which had not been
71 For other possible methods of terminating the asylum 
see 2 Fitzmaurice, 555, n.l? id., 34 BYIL (1958), 129, n.l.
72 See ICJ Reports 1951, 77.
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addressed in that earlier judgment. It was only after Cuba 
had altered the basis of its intervention that its true object 
was indeed found to be interpretation of the Havana Convention 
regarding the question of the surrender of Haya de la Torre to 
the Peruvian authorities.
The concept of the true object of the intervention which 
was first mentioned in the Court's jurisprudence in the Hava 
de la Torre Case, and relied on in subsequent cases, was later 
incorporated into the 1978 version of the Court's rules.73 
The characteristics of intervention as of right outlined in 
this case may also be considered as constituting significant 
limitations on the scope and operation of this procedural 
remedy.74
(f) The Position under the 1972 and 1978 Rules
Following the partial revision of the Court's Rules in 
1972, Article 66 of the 1946 Rules concerning intervention as 
of right became Article 71 without any amendment in its 
substance.75 Any substantial modification of the statutory 
provision on this procedural remedy had to await the 
completion of the revision of the Court's Rules in 1978.
73 See Article 81(2)(b) of the 1978 Rules. See also ICJ 
Reports 1981, 12, para.18? 13, paras.19-21, 14, para.23, 15,
para.24, 16, para.27, 17, paras.29-30, 18, paras.31-2; ibid., 
1984, 3 at 8, para. 10, 12, para. 17, 15, paras. 21-2, 17,
para.26, 18, para.28, 19, para.29, 21, para.33, 23, para.36, 
24, para.38.
74 See Mani, 259? Miller, 554? Rosenne, Law and 
Practice. 432? id., Procedure. 177? Sztucki, 1012, 1029.
75 See Rosenne, Procedure. 177? id., Documents. 181-2
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Under the 1978 Rules a state desiring to intervene must 
file a declaration to that effect before the commencement of 
oral proceedings. In exceptional circumstances a declaration 
at a later stage may, however, be admitted. The declaration 
must contain, among other things:
(a) particulars of the basis on which the declarant state 
considers itself a party to the convention?
(b) identification of the particular provisions of the 
convention, the construction of which it considers to be 
in question?
(c) a statement of the construction of those provisions for 
which it contends?
(d) all relevant supporting documents.
Such a declaration may be filed by a state which has not 
received the notification referred to in Article 63 of the 
Statute.
The declaration of intervention is to be communicated
forthwith to the parties to the case? to the Secretary-
*
General and Members of the UN? to other states entitled to 
appear before the Court and to any other states which have 
been notified under Article 63 of the Statute. The parties 
shall be invited to furnish their written observations within 
a time-limit to be fixed by the Court. Under the Rules, the 
Court decides whether a declaration of intervention is 
admissible as a matter of priority, unless in view of the 
circumstances of the case the Court shall otherwise determine. 
If there is an objection to the admissibility of a declaration
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of intervention the Court shall hear the declarant State and 
the parties before deciding. If a declaration of intervention 
is admitted the intervening state shall be furnished with 
copies of the pleadings and documents annexed and entitled to 
comment on the subject matter of the intervention. The 
observations of the intervening state shall be communicated to 
the parties and to any other intervening states for their 
comments.76
The 1978 Rules are cast in such a way as to distinguish 
more clearly than ever between the two forms of intervention 
as enshrined in the Statute, while at the same time
recognising the similarities between them. Certain
consequences that flow from the Court1s meagre experience
regarding intervention have been generalised.77 The Court 
has accomplished this task without dealing with the hybrid 
situation where both types of intervention might be possible 
during proceedings in the same case.78 It has been suggested 
that the reference in Article 82(1) to Article 38(3) 
assimilates the formal aspects of a declaration of
intervention to those of an application for permission to 
intervene under Article 81.79
76 See Articles 82-4 and 86 of the 1978 Rules, which are 
reproduced in Rosenne, Procedure, 177-82? and 73 AJIL (1979), 
774-6. Cf. ICJ Reports 1990, 135-6, para.102.
77 See, to the same effect, Rosenne, Procedure, 173.
78 For a discussion of interventions as of right in the 
general picture of the unitary concept of the institution of 
intervention, see Davi, 227-55 and 289-92.
79 See Rosenne, Procedure, 177.
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That part of Article 82(2) which specifies the contents 
of a declaration of intervention also corresponds to the 
Court's jurisprudence on advisory pleadings and oral 
proceedings in the Hava de la Torre Case, in which the Court 
exercised control over the extent of the intervention to 
ensure that it would remain within the bounds of Article 63 of 
the Statute and concern itself only with the interpretation of 
the Convention in question. It is believed that with the 
introduction of these specific requirements concerning the 
contents of a declaration of intervention, the Court further 
tightened the conditions of intervention as of right.80
The principal innovations in Article 84, which is itself 
new, would seem to be first, the introduction of the concept 
of priority for the decision in paragraph l,81 and secondly, 
the provision for the holding of a hearing in case of an 
objection to the intervention in paragraph 2. The latter 
innovation conforms to the practice of the Court in the Hava 
de la Torre Case and that of its predecessor, the Permanent 
Court, in the SS Wimbledon Case where Poland's intervention 
was not opposed. It is believed that the Court's failure to 
hold a hearing in respect of El Salvador's Declaration of 
Intervention, on the assumption that the intervention was
80 See ICJ Reports 1951, 76; Rosenne, Procedure, 177; 
Sztucki, 1011-5.
81 See Rosenne, Procedure, 180.
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unopposed, amounted to a misapplication of the Rules.82
(g) The Salvadorean Intervention Case83
On 9 April 1984, Nicaragua filed an application
instituting proceedings against the United States in respect 
of a dispute concerning responsibility for military and
paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua. In order to 
found the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the case, the 
application relied on declarations made by the parties 
accepting the Court*s compulsory jurisdiction under Article 36 
of the Statute. The application was immediately communicated 
to the United States and also notified to all other states 
entitled to appear before the Court. At the same time 
Nicaragua filed a request for the indication of provisional 
measures under Article 41.
By an order of 10 May 1984, the Court rejected a request
made by the United States for removal of the case from the
82 See ICJ Reports 1984, 218 (separate opinion of Singh 
J.); 219 (joint separate opinions of Judges Ruda, Mosler,
Ago, Jennings and de Lacharriere); 221 (separate opinion of
Oda J.)? 223ff, especially 227-33 (Schwebel J. dissenting); 
Chinkin, 519-20.
83 See Salvadorean Intervention Case. ICJ Reports 1984, 
215. See ibid., 395-6, para.6 and also ibid. 1986, 16-7. For 
reference to this case in the legal literature, see for 
example: T.M. Franck, ”Icy Day at the ICJ” in 79 AJIL (1985) , 
381; W.D. Rogers, J.A. Beat & C. Wolf, “Application of El 
Salvador to Intervene in the Jurisdiction and Admissibility 
Phase of Nicaragua v. USA". 78 AJIL (1984), 929 (hereinafter 
"Rogers et al”); Sztucki, 1005; 4 Schwarzenberger, 410,
n.73; Chinkin, 495, 498, 503, 509, 512-3, 521, 531;
Damrosch, 384-6; T.D. Gill, Litigation Strategy at the 
International Court: A Case Study of the "Nicaragua v. United
States" Dispute (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,
1989), 145-8; Rosenne, "Some Reflections”, 79-81, 87-8.
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list, indicating, pending its final decision on the 
proceedings, certain provisional measures, and decided that 
until the Court delivered its final judgment, it would keep 
the matters covered by the case continuously under review. By 
the same order, the Court further decided that the written 
proceedings in the case should first be addressed to the 
questions of the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the 
dispute, and to the admissibility of the application.
The pleadings on jurisdiction and admissibility were duly 
filed by the parties within the time limits fixed by the 
President by a further order of 14 May 1984. In its 
pleadings, Nicaragua contended that in addition to the basis 
of jurisdiction, relied on in the application, the Treaty of 
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation signed by the parties in 
1956 provided an independent basis of jurisdiction under 
Article 36(1) of the Statute.
On 15 August 1984, two days before the closure of the 
written proceedings on the questions of jurisdiction and 
admissibility, El Salvador filed a declaration of intervention 
in the case pursuant to Article 63 of the Statute and Article 
82 of the Rules. In accordance with Article 83 of the Rules, 
El Salvador was supplied with the written observations of the 
parties on its Declaration.84
84 This declaration is reproduced in full in 24 ILM 
(1985), 38ff; for extracts from the Salvadorean Declaration 
of Intervention, see also Rogers, et al., 930-1. For the 
antecedents to the Salvadorean Declaration of Intervention see 
ibid., 929? the authors of this note represented El Salvador 
in the proceedings relating to its Declaration of Intervention 
in the case between Nicaragua and the United States.
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El Salvador sought to intervene by right for the sole and 
limited purpose of arguing that the Court lacked jurisdiction 
over Nicaragua's application instituting proceedings against 
the United States and the claims contained therein, and that 
the application and claims were inadmissible. El Salvador 
also wished to make it a matter of record that it considered 
itself under the pressure of an effective armed attack by 
Nicaragua, and along with the other Central American 
countries, felt its territorial integrity, sovereignty and 
independence threatened. The Declaration was later
supplemented by further communications of 10 and 17 September, 
1984.85
The United States did not oppose El Salvador's 
intervention.86 While in principle Nicaragua said it did not 
object to a proper intervention by El Salvador, it felt bound 
to draw the Court's attention to certain deficiencies both as 
to form and substance in the Declaration. In Nicaragua's view 
the Declaration did not conform to the Rules of the Court. 
Nicaragua also pointed out that Article 63 of the Statute did 
not allow intervention for the purpose of opposing 
jurisdiction or to make things a matter of record, but only
85 See ICJ Reports 1984, 215; ibid., 220 (separate 
opinion of Oda J.), and 225 and 230 (Schwebel J. dissenting) 
where the letter of 17 September is also mentioned. For 
excerpts from both letters, see also Rogers et al, (10 
September) 931-2, (17 September) 934-5.
86 See ICJ Reports 1984, 228 (Schwebel J. dissenting). 
Extracts from the United States' observations on El Salvador's 
Declaration of Intervention contained in its letter of 14 
September may also be found in Rogers et al., 933.
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for the purpose of the interpretation of a convention to which 
the declarant state is a party. It states that it agreed to 
El Salvador’s intervention on the understanding that such 
intervention "shall not become the occasion for delaying the 
proceedings”.87
By an order of 4 October 1984, the Court, after having 
noted the fact that El Salvador reserved its right to address 
the interpretation and application of conventions to which it 
was also a party in a later substantive phase of the case, 
decided not to hold a hearing on the declaration of 
intervention and dismissed the declaration as inadmissible in 
as much as it related to the jurisdiction and admissibility 
phase of the proceedings.88
There is no gainsaying the fact that in addition to being 
vague, El Salvador's original Declaration of Intervention was 
so defective in both form and substance that it did not 
remotely resemble a declaration of intervention contemplated 
by Article 63 of the Statute and Article 82(2)(b) and (c) of 
the Rules. Neither did the Declaration contain an 
identification of the particular provisions of the conventions
87 See ICJ Reports 1984, 228-9 (Schwebel J. dissenting). 
For a summary of Nicaragua's observations on El Salvador's 
declaration contained in Nicaragua's letter of 20 September, 
see also Rogers et al., 933-4. There appears to be an 
inconsistency regarding the date of this letter as stated in 
this article and the dissenting opinion of Schwebel J. in ICJ 
Reports 1984, 228 and 24 ILM (1985), 50? in the article the 
date of Nicaragua's letter is given as 14 September.
88 See ICJ Reports 1984, 215-7? ibid., 395, para.6?
ibid., 1986, 17, para.7. The Court's order has also been
reproduced in 24 ILM (1985), 43-4 and Rogers et al., 935-6.
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whose construction it considered to be in question under 
Article 82(2)(b), nor a statement of the construction of those 
provisions for which it contended under Article 82(2)(c).89
Apparently for purposes of curing the defects in its 
original Declaration of Intervention, El Salvador later 
submitted a letter of 10 September 1984 "which amplified its 
Declaration in clearer terms which conformed to the essential 
requirements of Article 82, paragraph 2 of the Rules1*.90 
This letter was followed by another of 17 September 1984. The 
Court does not seem to have attached appropriate weight to 
these later communications from El Salvador. Its order of 4 
October does not even expressly refer to the last-mentioned 
communication.91
An even more puzzling aspect of the Court's attitude in 
the Salvadorean Intervention Case is its stance regarding 
Nicaragua's observations concerning El Salvador's Declaration 
of Intervention. Under the terms of Article 84(2) of the 
Rules, if an objection is filed to the admissibility of a 
declaration of intervention, the Court shall hear the state 
seeking to intervene and the parties before deciding. 
Nicaragua used the ploy of dressing an objection to the 
admissibility of El Salvador's Declaration as consent to the
89 See ICJ Reports 1984, 220 (separate opinion of Oda J.) , 
224 (Schwebel J. dissenting)? 219 (joint separate opinion of
Judges Ruda, Mosler, Ago, Jennings and de Lacharriere).
90 See ibid., 225.
91 See ICJ Reports 1984, 220 (separate opinion of Oda J.) ; 
230 (Schwebel J. dissenting). See also Rogers et al., 934.
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intervention, so as to prevent the declarant state from being 
accorded a hearing under this provision.92 In the previous 
Italian Intervention Judgment, the Court had repeated its 
observation that with reference to an application instituting 
proceedings or a request for permission to intervene, it 
cannot, in ascertaining the true object and purpose of the 
claim, confine itself to the ordinary meaning of the words 
used.93 In the same judgment the Court also recalled a 
previous observation that "whether there exists an 
international dispute is a matter of objective determination. 
The mere denial of the existence of a dispute does not prove 
its non-existence".94
By analogy with both these foregoing observations one 
would have expected that in interpreting the observations of 
the parties on a declaration of intervention, not only would 
the Court consider the ordinary meaning of the words used, but 
also that an objective test would be applied to ascertain 
whether or not the parties object to the intervention. One is 
therefore at a loss to understand why the Court ignored these 
observations which may be considered as fairly accurate 
indications of its approach to the evaluation of the positions 
of parties to proceedings before it, and probably for policy 
reasons which as yet remain obscure, took "at full and face
92 See ICJ Reports 1984, 229-30 (Schwebel J. dissenting).
93 See ibid., 19, para.29.
94 See ibid., 20, para.31.
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value”,95 what Nicaragua said, while at the same time totally 
disregarding the mandatory language of Article 84(2) of its 
Rules and refused to grant El Salvador a hearing.
Though the majority decision not to hold a hearing on El 
Salvador's Declaration of Intervention was reached by nine 
votes to six, a closer examination of the order and the 
accompanying separate and dissenting opinions discloses that 
it was supported by only a bare majority of eight judges to 
seven. Judge Oda, who was convinced that Nicaragua had 
actually objected to El Salvador's Declaration of 
Intervention, voted against granting El Salvador a hearing in 
deference to the Court's view that Nicaragua had not 
objected.96 A hearing would have made it possible for doubts 
raised or questions posed by El Salvador's Declaration of 
Intervention to be satisfactorily resolved.97 Such a hearing 
would also have enabled El Salvador to answer questions which 
at least one judge of the Court wished to put to it.98
Judge Schwebel has quite rightly noted that the Court's 
failure to grant El Salvador a hearing conflicted with the 
precedent which it had set in the Hava de la Torre Case. It 
is significant that the Rules then in force did not provide 
for a hearing in respect of the admissibility of declarations
95 See ibid., 230 (Schwebel J. dissenting).
96 See ibid., 220 (separate opinion of Oda J.); 218
(separate opinion of Singh J) ; 223, 231 (Schwebel J.
dissenting)? see also Sztucki, 1008.
97 See ICJ Reports 1984, 223 (Schwebel J. dissenting).
98 See ibid., 231.
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filed under Article 63 of the Statute." It is difficult to 
comprehend the Court’s failure to observe its Rules by 
refusing to accord El Salvador a hearing or by declining to 
follow the instructive precedent provided by the Hava de la 
Torre Case, by not endeavouring either to cure the defects in 
El Salvador's Declaration or by reducing its scope to 
appropriate permissible limits so as to render it 
admissible.100
It was a practically unanimous Court which decided by 
fourteen to one that El Salvador's Declaration of Intervention 
was inadmissible inasmuch as it related to the jurisdictional 
and admissibility stage of the proceedings. The Court had 
taken note of El Salvador's statement in its Declaration to 
the effect that it reserved the right in a later substantive 
phase of the case to address the interpretation of the 
conventions to which it was also a party relevant to that 
phase.101
The Court's handling of El Salvador's Declaration of 
Intervention may be contrasted with its attitude in the Fiiian 
Intervention Cases.102 Like El Salvador's Declaration of
"  See, to the same effect, ibid., 231.
100 See Sztucki, 1012.
101 This would appear to be an implicit admission on the 
part of El Salvador that the interpretation of those 
conventions was not relevant to the phase of the proceedings 
in which it wished to intervene.
102 In the existing context it was immaterial that the 
ground for intervention invoked in those cases was Article 62 
rather than Article 63. See Sztucki, 1012, n.30.
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Intervention, Fiji's applications for permission to intervene
in the Nuclear Tests Cases were considered to be untimely to
the extent that they related to the jurisdiction and
admissibility phase of the proceedings. Rather than reject
Fiji's applications as untimely, as it did in respect of El
Salvador's Declaration, the Court deferred action on them
until it had decided the question of its jurisdiction to
entertain the primary proceedings. When the Court later
declared the Nuclear Tests Cases moot it found in consequence
that Fiji's applications had lapsed and that no further action
thereon was required.103 While rejecting El Salvador's
Declaration of Intervention as inadmissible, the Court kept
alive El Salvador's right to intervene at the merits phase of
the case. It is not easy to understand why, even if El
Salvador's Declaration had been found to be inadmissible at
the jurisdictional stage of the case, its pendence could not
have been preserved inasmuch as it related to the merits
phase, as happened with the Fijian applications.104
Judge Oda was probably right when he concluded that:
Had El Salvador's initial Declaration been properly 
formulated, had Nicaragua's observations been properly 
interpreted, and had the procedures of the Court been 
properly pursued, El Salvador's Declaration might well 
have been the first case of intervention under Article 63 
... to be considered by the Court at a jurisdictional 
phase of a case.105
103 See ICJ Reports 1974, 531, 536.
104 See ibid., 1973, 321, 325; see, to the same effect, 
Sztucki, 1012-3.
105 See ICJ Reports 1984, 221 (separate opinion of Oda
J.) .
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The Court availed itself of the opportunity afforded by 
Cuba's intervention in the Hava de la Torre Case to develop 
and clarify the law on intervention as of right. By refusing 
to hold a hearing, it failed to take advantage of the chance 
offered by the Salvadorean Intervention Case further to 
clarify the law in the context of actual litigation. 
Consequently this case is not of much help in improving our 
understanding of the conditions for the operation of 
intervention under Article 63. The Salvadorean Intervention 
Case, however, provides doubtful authority for the view that 
intervention as of right is inadmissible in the jurisdictional 
phase of a case.
(h) The Role of the Parties
From the beginning no definite role was envisaged for the 
parties in proceedings relating to intervention as of right. 
The Rules of the Permanent Court from 1922 to 1936 did not 
contain any provisions for the holding of a hearing in the 
event of objection to a proposed intervention. Indeed, it is 
even possible that such objections were considered very 
unlikely.106 This did not, however, prevent the Permanent 
Court from granting Poland a hearing, though its application 
to intervene in the SS Wimbledon Case107 was unopposed.
The possibility that some doubts or objections might 
arise concerning the admissibility of an intervention under
106 See Sztucki, 1029-30.
107 See PCIJ Series A . No.l, 9-14.
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Article 63 was first acknowledged in the 1936 Rules of the 
Permanent Court, Article 66(3)108 of which provided that, in 
case of a challenge to the admissibility of the intervention, 
the decision shall rest with the Court. This provision became 
Article 66 (2)109 of the 1946 Rules of the International 
Court. In the Hava de la Torre Case. Cuba, whose Declaration 
of Intervention was contested by one of the parties, was 
granted a hearing.110 Article 66(2) of the 1946 Rules was 
reproduced verbatim in Article 71(2) of the 1972 Rules111 
with the result that there was still no provision for a 
hearing in the Rules in case of an objection to a declaration 
of intervention. The possibility that the parties to a case 
might object to a proposed intervention, which had to some 
extent been acknowledged in both the Rules and the 
jurisprudence of the Court, received full formal recognition 
in the 1978 Rules.112
It would seem that before 1936, parties to a case in 
which a third state wished to intervene under Article 63 of 
the Statute, were not entitled to be informed of the fact of 
the proposed intervention. The idea of notifying the parties
108 See Hudson, The Permanent Court. 750; see also PCIJ 
Series D . No.2, 3rd addendum, 960.
109 See Rosenne, Documents, 181.
110 See ICJ Reports 1951, 71.
111 Reprinted in Rosenne, Documents. 181, and 67 AJIL 
(1973), 195 at 218.
112 See Articles 83(1) and 84(2) of the 1978 Rules, 
reproduced in Rosenne, Procedure. 179-80, and 73 AJIL (1979), 
775.
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that a declaration of intervention had been filed was 
introduced in the 1936 Rules of the Permanent Court. With the 
introduction of the 1978 Rules the parties were given the 
opportunity to present written submissions on the declaration 
of intervention. Should it happen that either or both parties 
object to the intervention, a hearing would be held to enable 
the parties and the declarant state to be heard on the 
proposed intervention.113
It would appear that the attitude of the parties is not 
a significant factor in the Court*s consideration of a 
declaration of intervention. Thus, it is immaterial whether 
they consent or object to the intervention.114 The decision 
whether to admit or reject the declaration of intervention 
rests solely with the Court. For this reason any prior 
agreement of the parties to allow intervention will be invalid 
and ineffective. The parties may, however, facilitate 
intervention by agreeing not to object to requests for access 
to the pleadings and annexed documents.115
(i) The Role of the Court
As far as intervention as of right is concerned, the 
Court is the principal actor, since it decides whether or not 
the conditions governing the operation of this procedural
113 See Article 84(2) of the 1978 Rules, reproduced in 
Rosenne, Procedure. 180, and 73 AJIL (1979), 718 at 775.
114 See Chinkin, 519-20.
115 See ibid.
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remedy are met.116 This very important role of the Court
which is implied in the provisions of Article 63 of the
Statute was also implicitly recognised in the 1922, 1926 and
1931 Rules of the Permanent Court. According to the terms of
Article 60 of the 1922 Rules, a state which wished to
intervene in a case under Article 63 of the Statute, merely
had to inform the Registrar of this fact in writing. Thus,
the Permanent Court accepted Poland's intervention in the SS
Wimbledon Case after it had significantly observed that:
It will suffice for the Court to note that in this case 
the interpretation of certain clauses of the Treaty of 
Versailles is involved in the suit and that the Polish 
Republic is one of the states which are parties to this 
treaty.
In view of the facts established above, which are 
conclusive, and of the statements made at the hearing by 
the representatives of the applicant powers, who left the 
matter to the decision of the Court, the Court records 
that the Polish government intends to avail itself of the 
right to intervene conferred upon it by Article 63 of the 
Statute.117
Article 60 of the 1922 Rules appears to have been omitted 
from the 1926 and 1931 Rules which were silent on the manner 
in which states had to indicate their intention to intervene 
under Article 63 of the Statute. The possibility that the 
admissibility of a proposed intervention might be contested, 
as well as the Court's power to decide this matter, were
116 For example, the Court must be satisfied that the 
construction of a convention is in question in a case, and 
that the convention is of the kind specified by the Statute. 
The Court must also be convinced that the third state which 
desires to intervene in the case is a party to the convention 
whose construction is in question.
117 See PCIJ Series A . No.l, 13.
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expressly mentioned for the first time in the 1936 Rules 
according to the terms of Article 66 of which, a state which 
desired to avail itself of the right conferred upon it by 
Article 63 of the Statute was required to file with the Court 
a declaration to that effect. If any objection or doubt 
should arise as to whether the intervention is admissible the 
decision shall rest with the Court.
These provisions which expressly admitted that Article 63 
of the Statute was open to interpretation, and that states 
wishing to intervene thereunder "are not the sole masters of 
their intentions”, were later incorporated into the 1946 Rules 
of the International Court. In the Hava de la Torre Case the 
Court exercised this power of decision to narrow the scope of 
Cuba's intervention so as to keep it within the limits of a 
genuine intervention under Article 63 of the Statute.118 The 
idea of making express reference to the likelihood of the 
admissibility of the proposed intervention being challenged, 
as well as the Court's overriding power to decide the issue, 
was further elaborated upon in the 1978 Rules.119 
(j) The Concept of Intervention as of Right
Since the Statute speaks in terms of "right to intervene 
in the proceedings", or "this right", and the Rules also refer 
to "the right conferred by Article 63 of the Statute", it 
would seem that if the Court finds that a state has met all
118 See ICJ Reports 1951, 77? see also above, 268-75.
119 See Article 84 of the 1978 Rules; see also above, 
275-9.
the conditions set for the operation of this procedural 
remedy, then its declaration of intervention is bound to be 
admitted. This appears to be the opinion of the 1920 Advisory 
Committee of Jurists.120
The idea that Article 63 conferred on states a totally 
unqualified right of intervention by virtue of the simple fact 
of their participation in a convention was also articulated 
during the preparation of the 1926 and 1936 Rules of the 
Permanent Court.121 Consistent with this view, since 1936 
the Rules have always spoken of a declaration of intervention 
under Article 63 as distinct from an application for 
permission to intervene under Article 62 of the Statute. 
Indeed, the notion of "intervention as of right”, an "absolute 
right to intervene" or "an automatic right to intervene" is 
reflected in state practice.122 It is an idea that has also 
been canvassed in the legal literature.123
120 See PCIJ, Proces-Verbaux (1920), 746.
121 See PCIJ Series D . No.2, Addendum, 159? Addendum 3,
309, 779. See also Sztucki, 1030, nn.104, 105.
122 See, for example, U.S. observations in the Salvadorean 
Declaration of Intervention in ICJ Reports 1984, 227-8
(Schwebel J. dissenting), also in 24 ILM (1985), 49-50. See 
also Rogers et al., 932-3? Sztucki, 1029, nn.100, 102.
123 See 2 Fitzmaurice, 553? id., 34 BYIL (1958), 127?
Hambro, "Interpretation", 251? id., "Jurisdiction", 149? 
id., "Intervention", 396-7? Oda, "Intervention", 644? Mani, 
259? Elias, The ICJ. 93: id., "The Limits", 166. However in
1984 as President of the Court Elias voted in support of the 
majority view that El Salvador's Declaration of Intervention 
was inadmissible at the jurisdictional phase of the case 
between Nicaragua and the United States. See ICJ Reports 
1984, 216 (Order), 233 (Schwebel J. dissenting)? see also 
Sztucki, 1031.
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While in theory the Court may be said to be vested with 
a much wider discretion in respect of intervention under 
Article 62 than under Article 63 of the Statute, in practice 
the reality would appear to be that there is only a slight 
difference between the Court*s power of decision in both 
cases.124 The similarity between the two types of 
intervention is reflected in Article 84(1) of the 1978 Rules 
which enables the Court to decide whether an application for 
permission to intervene under Article 62 should be granted, 
and whether an intervention under Article 63 is 
admissible.125 Rosenne has therefore concluded that an 
intervention only becomes effective with the decision of the 
Court under this provision.126
From the foregoing we may safely conclude that the right 
conferred by the Statute on a third state to intervene in a 
case in which the construction of a convention to which it is 
a party is in question, is neither absolute nor unqualified in 
that it is subject to the Court*s discretion. This is all the 
more so since a third state whose declaration of intervention 
is dismissed for reasons unrelated to the conditions expressly 
prescribed in the Statute (as happened in the Salvadorean 
Intervention Case) cannot have this right enforced otherwise. 
It would seem that there is no corresponding duty on the part
124 See Sztucki, 1030-1.
125 See ibid.? Miller, 550.
126 See Rosenne, Procedure, 180? id., "Some Reflections”,
76.
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of the Court (if it is disinclined to grant this right) to see 
to it that it is exercised. In this sense at least it would 
appear that the reference to intervention under Article 63 as 
a right is a linguistic ploy used by the framers of the 
Statute to bring out the formal rather than the substantive 
distinction between the two types of intervention allowed by 
the Statute.127
4. Procedure
The purpose of publicising the application or special 
agreement instituting proceedings is to make it easier for 
third states to consider the possibility of intervening under 
either Article 62 or Article 63 of the Statute. Under the 
terms of Article 63(1), whenever the construction of a 
convention to which states other than those concerned in a 
case are parties is in question, the Registrar shall notify 
all such states forthwith.
On the face of it this seems to be a fairly simple and 
straightforward rule.128 Its practical application may 
nevertheless entail such difficult problems as how the 
Registrar determines to which states to send the notification, 
the significance of the receipt of the notification or lack of 
it, at what stage in the proceedings the notification is to be 
sent, the kind of convention concerning whose construction the
127 See Miller, 552; Chinkin, 498.
128 Hambro thought that Article 63 raised potentially 
important questions which might seem purely technical and 
limited in scope. See Hambro, "Interpretation", 240.
notification may be sent, as well as the timing of the sending 
of the notification. Put in other terms, the first issue 
relates to how the Registrar identifies states other than 
those involved in the pending case which are party to the 
convention in question.
(a) Identification of Parties to a Convention
Upon the institution of legal proceedings, the Permanent
Court sought to determine through its Registrar whether the
construction of a convention was in question, and, if so,
which states were party to the convention and therefore
entitled to notification. In this, the Court was usually
guided by information obtainable from the government or
institution depository of the convention. The Registrar
adopted the practice of seeking the decision of the Court if
it was sitting, or of its President if it was not, as to
whether a given state was party to a convention concerned in
a pending litigation.129
Concerning the Registrar's duty to identify the parties
to the Convention for purposes of sending the notification,
Hambro, after having acknowledged that this might not always
be easy, noted that:
The obvious way would seem to be to send an official 
letter to the government or institution which is 
empowered to accept and guard the ratification. This is 
also in practice the way the Registrar proceeds in the
129 See for example, Hudson, The Permanent Court. 421; 
Mani, 262? Hambro, "Interpretation”, 245-6? id.,
"Intervention", 392, n.23? Miller, 551? Chinkin, 504.
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case of most treaties.130
Hambro then went on to hint at some of the difficult problems
which might arise in connection with the identification of the
parties to a convention by observing as follows:
What will happen if a treaty is ratified by a state which 
has subsequently been swallowed up by another, when this 
state of facts is recognised by some but not all members 
of the community or when it is a question of which 
government represents the state, or when a state has been 
divided into two states? [He further observed that] 
other difficulties in the same field may arise if the 
secular states having ratified and been bound by the 
treaty are not the same as the states party to the 
Statute or admitted to plead before the Court. [In such 
a case Hambro firmly asserts that] it is confidently 
believed that Article 63 overrides the limitations on a 
state to appear before the Court. This Article gives an 
absolute right to intervene. It is a means to ensure 
material justice. Such seems also to be the practice of 
the Court. [He adds, however, that] it is a matter of 
course that such a state, in case it would wish to 
intervene, must comply with the conditions laid down by 
virtue of Article 35 of the Statute.131
Another difficult case in this connection is that of
multilateral treaties opened to signature by other states, an
issue which the Court addressed in the Reservations Case, in
which it observed that:
It is evident that without ratification signature does 
not make the signatory state a party to the convention; 
nevertheless, it establishes a provisional status in 
favor of that state. This status may decrease in value 
and importance after the Convention enters into force. 
But, both before and after the entry into force, this 
status would justify more favourable treatment being 
meted out to signatory states in respect to objections 
than to states which have neither signed nor acceded.132
130 See Hambro, "Interpretation”, 246.
131 See ibid.
132 See ICJ Reports 1951, 28. See also Hambro,
"Interpretation”, 247.
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It may be reasonable to assume on the basis of this and 
other judicial pronouncements, that notifications under 
Article 63 in the future may be sent to states other than 
those which have ratified and become bound by the multilateral 
treaty concerned.133
Theoretically, it would appear that the duty of notifying 
parties to a convention whose construction is in question in 
a pending case, which Article 63 imposes on the Registrar, is 
an absolute rule. In practice, however, it would seem to be 
subject to some conflicting considerations. On the one hand, 
it may be argued that since there is an absolute right to 
intervene, the notification should be sent in all doubtful 
cases so as to ensure that the statutory provisions are given 
full effect. On the other hand, it has been pointed out that 
as an international civil servant, the Registrar should not 
take an initiative which could later embarrass the Court. Nor 
should the Registrar under any circumstances try to create 
difficulties by encouraging unnecessary intervention. The 
experience of the Permanent Court, which does not appear to 
have been contradicted by that of the present Court, shows 
quite clearly that the Registrar has considered it a duty to 
apply Article 63 as a matter of routine administration only 
when it is certain that the treaty warrants it.134
133 See ibid.
134 See as to this, Hambro, "Interpretation", 247-8? 
Stauffenberg, Cross and De Janasz, Statut et Reolement de la 
Cour Permanante de Justice Internationale. Elements 
d 1 interpretation (Berlin: Carl Heymanns Verlag, 1934) 
published for Institut fur auslandisches offentliches Recht
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Writing some 22 years after his term as Registrar of the 
present Court from 1946-1953, Hambro confessed that during his 
time as Registrar he was often in doubt whether and when 
notification should be sent. He thought that the cases dealt 
with in the intervening years did not seem to have 
satisfactorily clarified the matter.135 In the Aerial 
Incident Case (Preliminary Objections)136 no notification was 
sent, even though it was quite clear that the case turned on 
a rather difficult, and potentially important issue of the 
interpretation of Article 36(5) of the Court*s Statute. 
Similarly, in the North Sea Cases.137 in which an important 
multilateral treaty was amply discussed by the parties even 
though it may not perhaps be claimed that the whole case 
turned on it, no notification was sent.
The practice of sending notifications has always been 
somewhat confused. However, it seems to be fairly well 
settled that in case of doubt notification is not sent. The 
states concerned may nevertheless be informed in a manner 
suggesting that they might intervene subject to the 
possibility that the Court might reject their claimed rights
und Volkerrecht, 443ff (hereinafter "Stauffenberg")? Hudson, 
The Permanent Court. 419ff. In at least one case the
Registrar is reported to have drawn the attention of the 
states to the stipulation in question but told them that 
Article 63 of the Statute did not really apply.
135 See Hambro, "Intervention1*, 387, n.3.
136 See ICJ Reports 1959, 270ff.
137 See ibid. 1969, Iff. See Hambro, "Intervention”, 388, 
nn.7, 8.
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of intervention.138 Experience appears to indicate that in 
this matter the Registrar has preferred the cautious to the 
bold approach.139
(b) The Significance of the Notification
Another problem which arises in connection with the 
Registrar's duty to notify states other than those involved in 
the pending litigation, but which are parties to the 
Convention whose construction is in question, is the import of 
the receipt of the notification or lack of it. It would 
appear that any state which receives the notification is 
deemed a party to the Convention concerned and ipso facto 
invited to consider exercising its statutory right of 
intervention. The Statute confers the right to intervene in 
the proceedings on every state to which the notification has 
been sent.140 The notification may also be regarded as a 
prima facie indication that the circumstances may be right for 
intervention under Article 63.141 The 1926 and 1931 Rules of 
the Permanent Court merely reinforced the statutory rule by 
requiring that the notification be sent to every state which
138 See Sztucki, 1018, n.49, 1023-4? Mani, 262? Miller 
551? Hambro, "Interpretation", 249.
139 See Hambro, "Interpretation", 247-8.
140 See Article 63(2) of the Statute.
141 See to the same effect, Sztucki, 1018.
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is a party to the convention relied upon in the case.142
The provision in the 1978 Rules by means of which a 
state, that considers itself a party to the Convention, but 
which has not received the statutory notification, may, 
nonetheless, file a declaration to the effect that it desires 
to avail itself of the right of intervention conferred upon it 
by Article 63 of the Statute,143 reflects the stance adopted 
in the 1936 Rules of the Permanent Court which enabled any 
state that was party to the convention in issue, but to which 
the statutory notification had not been sent, to file a 
declaration of its intention to intervene under Article
63.144 Since 1936 a state may not be debarred from 
exercising its statutory right of intervention merely because 
it has not received the notification referred to in Article
63.145
(c) The Character of the Notification
One issue which has arisen in connection with the
142 See Article 60 of the 1926 and 1931 Rules of the 
Permanent Court. Cf. Article 60 of the 1922 Rules of the 
Permanent Court, which was mute regarding the notification.
143 See Article 82(3) of the 1978 Rules of the 
International Court.
144 See Article 66(2) of the 1936 Rules of the Permanent 
Court. See also Article 66(1) and 71(1) of the 1946 and 1972 
Rules of the International Court, respectively. It has been 
explained that "this Rule enables the Court to rectify any 
mistake or omission which may inadvertently have been omitted 
or committed by the Registrar”, see Hambro, "Jurisdiction", 
149, n.3.
145 See as to this: Rosenne, Procedure, 100; Miller 551, 
564. n.9; Sztucki, 1020? Hambro, "Interpretation", 247.
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Registrar’s duty to send the notification is the status of the 
notification itself. At first sight, the sending of the 
notification appears to be a purely administrative duty which 
the Statute imposes on the Registrar. Indeed, this would 
appear to have been the case prior to the adoption of the 1978 
Rules.
In the Pakistan Prisoners of War Case (Interim Measures) , 
Judge Petren dissented from the decision not to consider 
notifying other parties to the 1928 General Act and the 
Genocide Convention until after the decision on interim 
measures. In addition to showing that the statutory function 
of sending the notification may not always be uncontroversial, 
his disagreement from the rest of the Court also indicates 
that this duty may be subject to judicial interpretation.146
The fact that sending the notification which had 
previously been considered as an administrative matter had 
come to assume a distinct judicial character was explicitly 
acknowledged in the 1978 Rules, Article 43 of which provides 
that:
Whenever the construction of a convention to which states 
other than those concerned in the case are parties may be 
in question within the meaning of Article 63, paragraph 
1, of the Statute, the Court shall consider what 
direction shall be given to the Registrar in the 
matter.147
It would appear that this new Article contains an
146 See ICJ Reports 1973, 333-4 (Petren J. dissenting).
See to the same effect, Chinkin, 518, 521.
147 See the text of this Article in Rosenne, Procedure,
100. We should like to observe with respect that there is
room for improvement in the drafting of this provision.
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apparent divergence from the Statute which unequivocally 
assigns the duty of sending the notification to the Registrar. 
This provision, however, conforms to the practice followed by 
the Registrar since the days of the Permanent Court.148 
While it remains to be seen how it will be implemented in the 
context of actual litigation, the fact that the President 
plays no part in the matter when the Court is not sitting, may 
become a source of difficulty in practice.149 The apparent 
strengthening of the Court*s role, in a seemingly purely 
administrative matter, may be ascribed to the practical 
difficulties generated since 1946, partly because of the 
proliferation of multilateral treaties and the actual or 
potential parties to them by the application of Article 
63.150
A possible consequence of the introduction of a judicial 
element into what has heretofore been mainly considered an 
administrative task is that, on the one hand, a state which 
receives the notification sent at the instance of the Court 
might be misled into believing that there is a high 
probability of its declaration of intervention being admitted, 
while, on the other hand, a state to which the notification 
has not been sent might feel disinclined to seek to exercise 
its right of intervention, for the reason that its declaration 
of intervention stands little chance of being accepted. It is
148 See Miller, 551? Hambro, "Intervention" 395, n.40.
149 See for example, Rosenne, Procedure, 100.
150 See ibid.
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submitted that notwithstanding the transformation of this 
administrative statutory function into a judicial one, the 
notification still remains a procedural requirement designed 
to alert eligible third states to the existence of 
circumstances conducive to the invocation of their statutory 
right of intervention. A third state which does not receive 
such notification does not, in consequence, forfeit this 
statutory right.151
(d) The Phase of a Case at which Notification mav be sent
The question regarding the appropriate stage of the 
proceedings in a case at which the statutory notification may 
be sent arises as a direct consequence of the adjudication of 
a dispute submitted to the Court in more than one phase. This 
may happen where the Court's jurisdiction to entertain the 
case is contested by one of the parties, or where one of the 
parties objects to the admissibility of the application 
instituting proceedings before the Court. In either event, 
the Court may decide to deal with the challenge to its 
jurisdiction or the objection to the admissibility of the 
application in a separate proceeding, usually termed the 
preliminary objection phase, and settle the substantive 
dispute in the merits phase, or join the former to the latter 
in a single proceeding.
During the time of the Permanent Court the question as to
151 See Sztucki, 1020, 1023-4; Hambro, "Intervention", 
396; id., "Interpretation", 247; Mani, 261; Miller, 551, 
n.9.
the proper stage of the proceedings at which the notification 
under Article 63 was required does not appear to have been an 
issue. This question was not even addressed by the Rules.152 
While the 1922 Rules of the Permanent Court provided that any 
state desiring to intervene under the terms of Article 63 
should inform the Registrar of this fact in writing before the 
commencement of the oral proceedings,153 the fixing of the 
times within which prospective intervenors were to file any 
cases was left to the Court.154 The relevant provisions of 
the 1936 Rules were mute on this question. There is, however, 
some evidence for the view that the Permanent Court did send 
notifications under Article 63 during the preliminary 
objections phase of proceedings in cases of which it was 
seized.155
The question concerning the right stage in the 
proceedings in a case at which the notification under Article 
63 may be sent was never an issue for the International Court 
prior to the adoption of its 1978 Rules. The pertinent 
provisions of its 1946 and 1972 Rules, which resembled those 
in the 1936 Rules of the Permanent Court, contain no reference
152 The 1922 Rules of the Permanent Court did not even 
mention the notification under Article 63.
153 See Article 60 of the 1922 Rules of the Permanent
Court.
154 See Article 59 of the 1926 and 1931 Rules of the 
Permanent Court.
155 See PCIJ Series C No. 68 at 243, 256 and 264-5? No. 89
at 1381-2; No.85 at 1349, 1356? No.89 at 1370-1. See also
Sztucki, 1018.
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to this question. Before its 1978 Rules came into force, the 
International Court had followed the practice of its 
predecessor on this point.156
In terms reminiscent of, albeit slightly different from, 
the 1922 Rules of the Permanent Court, the 1978 Rules of the 
present Court postulate that a state desiring to exercise the 
right of intervention shall file a declaration to that effect 
before the opening of the oral proceedings.157
There is nothing in either the text of Article 63 of the 
Statute, its drafting history, or the provisions of the Rules 
previously cited, to suggest that they restrict the 
notification relating to intervention as of right to the 
merits phase of the proceedings and preclude its being sent 
during the preliminary objection phase of a pending case. The 
practice of the Court serves to confirm this view.158
The sending of the notification under Article 63, whether 
it be done at the preliminary objection or merits phase of a 
case, is one thing, and the admissibility of a declaration of 
intervention is quite another. It is the latter issue which 
was brought into sharp relief when the present Court decided 
that the Salvadorean Declaration of Intervention was
156 See Corfu Channel Case (Preliminary Objection) , ICJ 
Reports 1947-8 at 17, 20-23; see also ICJ Pleadings (2 Corfu 
Channel) 9ff; ibid. 1952, Anqlo-Iranian Oil Co. Case 
(Preliminary Objections), 741. See further, ICJ Reports 1974, 
255; ibid. 1984, 236-40 (Schwebel J. dissenting); Mani, 263; 
Sztucki, 1018-20; Hambro, "Jurisdiction”, 149-50; esp. n.2 at 
150; id., "Interpretation", 242-4.
157 See Article 82(1) of the 1978 Rules.
158 See ICJ Reports 1984, 234-5 (Schwebel J. dissenting).
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inadmissible inasmuch as it related to the jurisdiction and 
admissibility phase of the dispute between Nicaragua and the 
United States.159 Regardless of the stipulation contained in 
Article 43 of the 1978 Rules requiring the Court to consider 
what direction to give to the Registrar concerning the 
notification, it would seem that the sending of the 
notification was, on the one hand, merely intended to be an 
administrative task to be performed by the Registrar prior to 
the filing of a declaration of intervention, while the 
decision on the admissibility of such a declaration was, on 
the other hand, meant to be a judicial function to be 
exercised by the Court following the filing of the 
declaration.160 If this distinction is obscured, receipt of 
the notification under Article 63 would be regarded as an 
invitation to intervene as of right, which it clearly is not. 
If this were so, this procedural remedy would lose its 
voluntary character. The Court would also certainly cease to 
exercise any meaningful discretion regarding the admissibility 
of declarations of intervention, a situation which, if the 
Court's handling of the Cuban and Salvadorean Declarations of 
Intervention is any guide, the Court itself would be 
disinclined to permit to arise.
(e) The Timing of Filina a Declaration
The question concerning the proper stage of the
159 See ibid., 215 at 216.
160 See Hambro, "Interpretation”, 249.
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proceedings in a case at which the notification under Article 
63 may be sent, is also related to, though different from the 
issue regarding the timing of the filing of a declaration of 
intervention by a third state wishing to intervene as of 
right. Though the former question has never been addressed in 
either the Court's Rules or jurisprudence, it is reasonable to 
infer from the provisions in the Rules concerning the latter 
question that as a rule, the sending of the notification under 
Article 63 should necessarily precede the filing of 
declarations of intervention. The relevant provisions of the 
1922 Rules of the Permanent Court which regulated intervention 
required the would-be intervenors to advise the Registrar in 
writing of their intentions before the commencement of the 
oral proceedings.161 The provisions specifically relating to 
intervention as of right did not carry the proviso, contained 
in those concerning discretionary intervention, to the effect 
that the Court may, in exceptional circumstances, consider an 
application for permission to intervene submitted at a later 
stage. Subsequent versions of the Rules simply provided in 
respect of intervention as of right that the Court, shall fix 
the time within which states desiring to intervene are to file 
any cases.162 While the time-limit for the submission of an 
application for permission to intervene under Article 62 was 
retained in both the 1946 and 1972 Rules of the present Court,
161 See Articles 58 and 60 of the 1922 Rules of the 
Permanent Court.
162 See Article 60 of the 1926 and 1931 Rules of the 
Permanent Court.
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they are significantly silent on the timing of the filing of 
declarations of intervention under Article 63.163 This 
difference of approach to the timing of both types of 
intervention has been attributed to the fact that the 
intervention under Article 63 is an absolute right, whereas 
the intervention under Article 62 is a discretionary 
right.164 The better explanation would seem to be that 
before 1978 neither Court was able to make up its mind as to 
prescribing a time limit for what is, subject to the speedy 
and successful adjudication of a pending case, an apparently 
open-ended statutory right of intervention.
It has been argued that it may be very awkward to admit 
intervention at any stage of the proceedings, and, further, 
that if no rule regarding the timing of intervention is 
prescribed, it might be assumed that there is no time limit 
for intervention as of right.
Such a result [it is maintained] should only be arrived
at if all other means fail.165
The construction which the foregoing argument places on 
intervention under Article 63 is, it is submitted, the correct
163 Mani finds the rationale behind the distinction which 
the 1978 Rules make between the two modes of intervention 
difficult to understand. See Mani, 268? Smyrniadis has 
observed that although Article 66(1) of the 1946 Rules does 
not fix any time limit for the filing of a declaration of 
intervention considering the prescriptions contained in the 
other paragraphs of the same article concerning publicity, it 
may be concluded that the declaration of intervention should 
be filed before the commencement of oral proceedings. See 
Smyrniadis, 33? Miller, 560 and 557, n.65 at 569.
164 See Hambro, "Interpretation", 251.
165 See ibid.
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theoretical interpretation. There is nothing undesirable 
about an open-ended right of intervention providing it does 
not hinder the prompt and successful adjudication for a 
dispute submitted to the Court. In other words the apparently 
open-ended right of intervention under Article 63 may be 
qualified by the need to avoid disrupting or delaying the 
proceedings in a case submitted to the Court.
The 1978 Rules of the present Court have prescribed time 
limits for both forms of intervention. They require an 
application for the permission to intervene to be filed as 
soon as possible, and not later than the closure of the 
written proceedings.166 As regards declarations of
intervention, the Rules demand that they be filed as soon as 
possible, and not later than the date fixed for the opening of 
the oral proceedings. Under the Rules, in exceptional 
circumstances an application or a declaration submitted at a 
later stage may, however, be admitted.167 It will be 
observed that unlike the situation which obtained under the 
1922 Rules of the Permanent Court, the time limits prescribed 
for both types of intervention are different. A much longer 
time limit is prescribed for intervention under Article 63 
than for that under Article 62. In another departure from the
position under the 1922 Rules of the Permanent Court, in
"exceptional circumstances" declarations of intervention 
submitted later than the time specified would be entertained.
166 See Article 81(1) of the 1978 Rules.
167 See Article 82(1) of the 1978 Rules.
310
In the absence of judicial guidance, we are left to 
speculate on the meaning of "exceptional circumstances” for 
purposes of intervention under Article 63. The fact of the 
construction of a convention being in question in a case may 
not always be obvious at the commencement of the proceedings. 
The problem of determining whether the construction of a 
convention is in question does not arise where the convention 
is invoked in the application or special agreement instituting 
proceedings. Treaties may be brought into the case at a later 
stage in the proceedings by either the respondent or even the 
applicant in the course of the pleadings. In view of the fact 
that access by third states to the pleadings and annexed 
documents in a case, which are considered secret and 
confidential by the parties is by no means automatic,168 the 
task of knowing that the interpretation of a treaty is in 
question in the course of the proceedings may be far from 
easy. The possibility of treaties being invoked during the 
oral proceedings cannot be discounted, since it is possible 
for the Court to admit fresh evidence during the oral 
hearings.
Invocation of a convention at a late stage in the 
proceedings may create difficulties for the Court in 
connection with the sending of the notification under Article 
63, as well as third states which are party to that 
convention. It is submitted that in such a situation
168 See Hambro, "Interpretation”, 245. He cites in 
support Fisheries Case. ICJ Pleadings, Vol.4, 628-9.
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11 exceptional circumstances” exist which warrant the operation 
of the rule concerning the acceptance of declaration of 
intervention presented at a later stage. The "exceptional 
circumstances" rule should similarly apply to a third state 
which wishes to intervene, but to which the notification under 
Article 63 has not been sent.169 While such so-called 
"exceptional circumstances" appear to justify an open-ended 
statutory right of intervention, it must be remembered that 
much as it would not be fair to refuse to notify eligible 
third states of the belated invocation of a convention, it is 
necessary not to risk tempering justice by interminable 
delay.170 Thus, the aim must be to achieve a balance between 
enabling third states to exercise their statutory right of 
intervention on the one hand and the speedy and efficient 
administration of justice on the other. The provision in the 
1978 Rules concerning the timing of intervention under Article 
63 goes some way towards doing just that.
(f) Conventions regarding whose Construction Notification may
be sent
In making a preliminary determination as to whether the 
statutory conditions set for the sending of the notification 
under Article 63 obtain, the Registrar must also be satisfied 
that the Treaty whose construction is in issue is of the kind
169 Cf. Hambro, "Interpretation", 251; Chinkin, 504.
170 See Hambro, "Interpretation", 244.
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mentioned in the Statute for purposes of sending the 
notification. The General Act for the Pacific Settlement of 
International Disputes of 16 September 1928 and the Convention 
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide have 
been cited as examples of conventions whose construction in 
the jurisdiction phase of proceedings may be susceptible of 
intervention.171 It therefore follows that where any such 
convention falls to be construed at the preliminary objection 
phase of a case, third states which are party thereto may be 
notified under the terms of Article 63 of the Statute. It 
would appear that both the Charter of the United Nations and 
the Statute of the Court also serve as examples of conventions 
whose construction may attract intervention as of right, 
either in the jurisdiction or merits phase of a case before 
the Court. The Charter of the United Nations represents the 
most important existing component of the body of conventional 
international law. The practice of the Court in the 
implementation of Article 63 of the Statute and the relevant 
Rules, confirms the view that intervention may concern the 
Charter of the United Nations and the Statute.172 By an 
administrative decision of the Court taken early in its 
history under the presidency of Judge Basdevant, and affirmed 
by President Winiarski, the Registrar does not routinely send
171 See ICJ Reports 1984, 235-6 (Schwebel J. dissenting) .
172 For a discussion of the sending of the notification 
under Article 63 in respect of construction of the Charter and 
the Statute, see ibid., 233-40 passim (Schwebel J. 
dissenting). See also Sztucki, 1015-29.
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notifications to the parties when the Charter of the United 
Nations is cited before the Court, particularly because under 
the terms of Article 40(3) of the Statute, the Registrar, when 
a case is brought before the Court, shall forthwith 
communicate the application to the members of the United 
Nations and any other state entitled to appear before the 
Court. It was accordingly decided that since states which 
could intervene under Article 63 had already had the 
application communicated to them under Article 40, there was 
no need to send them a new communication in such cases even 
though their attention had not been expressly drawn to Article 
63.173
Some arguments clearly aimed at differentiating between 
the Charter and the Statute have been advanced against the 
view that the construction of the Statute should be considered 
appropriate for intervention. It has been said that because 
the Court is directed to function in accordance with the 
provisions of each Statute, it cannot be that the Court gives 
cause for intervention under Article 63 on questions that may 
arise regarding those functions. In reply it has been pointed 
out that Article 63 is concerned with the construction rather 
than the application of treaty provisions, and that the latter 
activity does not raise questions of the interpretation of the
173 See ICJ Reports 1984, 233-4 (Schwebel J. dissenting). 
See also Sztucki, 1020 and 1021. He has quite correctly 
observed that "Still it appears that the aforementioned 
administrative decision is just another symptom of the Court*s 
tendency .. . not to encourage intervention, whether under 
Article 62 or Article 63.” See ibid.
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Statute. Furthermore, the Court*s practice has shown that 
Article 63 is activated only if a treaty provision is at issue 
in a case. In that event a third state may be entitled to 
intervene over its construction.174
According to the second argument, treating the Statute as 
a convention within the meaning of Article 63 requires 
notification in every case, as happens under Article 40. 
Unlike Article 40, however, Article 63 assumes exceptional 
notification in some cases rather than routine notification in 
every case. The problem with this thesis is that it ignores 
the different purposes of Articles 40 and 63. Whereas 
notification under the former provision is to inform states 
about the institution of proceedings, notification under the 
latter is designed to alert states to the fact that the 
construction of a convention to which they are parties may be 
in question either at the commencement or during the progress 
of a pending case. Furthermore, notification under Article 40 
cannot be substituted for notification under Article 63 
because intervention under Article 63 does not always result 
from the application or special agreement instituting 
proceedings, but sometimes only from a subsequent piece of 
procedure.175
The view has also been expressed that treating the 
Statute as a convention within the meaning of Article 63 could
174 See ICJ Reports 1984, 239 (Schwebel J. dissenting) ; 
Sztucki, 1022.
175 See to the same effect, ICJ Reports 1984, 239-40 
(Schwebel J. dissenting); Sztucki, 1022.
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lead to a cascade of interventions, since third states which 
are party to the Statute would be entitled to intervene 
whenever there is a jurisdictional dispute between the parties 
to a case. This view does not accord with the real situation. 
Since the judgment in the Corfu Channel Case (Merits), which 
is open to the interpretation that a Statute is a convention 
within the meaning of Article 63, only Cuba and El Salvador 
have sought to intervene under Article 63 on a question 
concerning the construction of the Charter, which establishes 
the Court as the principal judicial organ of the United 
Nations? does it not follow that a state can equally intervene 
in respect of the interpretation of that Statute which is an 
integral part of the Charter?176
(g) Timing of the Notification
It is important not to confuse the question of the timing 
of notification with that relating to the proper stage of a 
case at which the notification may be sent.177 Article 63(1) 
postulates that whenever the construction of a convention to 
which states other than those concerned in a case are parties 
is in question, the Registrar shall notify all such states 
forthwith. The operative term here is "forthwith”.178
176 See ICJ Reports 1984, 240 (Schwebel J. dissenting) ; 
see also Sztucki, 1023.
177 For a discussion of this question, see Hambro,
"Interpretation", 244-5.
178 In the French version of the Statute, Article 40
enjoins the Registrar to inform states of a new case
"immediatement", whereas Article 63 requires that states be
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Though the same term is employed with reference to the 
notification under Article 40, there is a significant 
difference between both notifications. The duty imposed on 
the Registrar in either case is categorical and absolute; but 
whereas the notification under Article 40 is a matter of 
expedition in which the Registrar simply gives publicity to 
the fact of the reference of a dispute to the Court, the 
notification under Article 63 can only be made if, prima 
facie, the necessary statutory conditions are satisfied.179 
Where it is evident from the document instituting proceedings 
that the case involves the construction of a convention, and 
states party to that convention are identified without delay, 
it may be possible for both kinds of notification to be made 
simultaneously. Otherwise some time will be required to 
ascertain whether the requisite conditions for the 
notification under Article 63 are present. Where, however, 
the fact that the construction of a convention becomes 
apparent in the course of the proceedings, the notification 
under Article 63 will necessarily be made much later than that 
under Article 40.
There is, however, one vital respect in which the term 
"forthwith”, as used in both Articles 40 and 63, may be said 
to have the same meaning. For, once the Registrar is 
satisfied that the conditions necessary for the notification
informed "sans delai".
179 See to that same effect, Hambro, "Intervention", 394. 
For a detailed discussion of this point, see ibid., 394-9.
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under Article 63 are fulfilled, the states concerned must be 
notified within a reasonable time, having regard to the object 
of the provision and the circumstances of the case. In other 
words, as with the notification under Article 40, which has to 
be sent at once, the notification under Article 63 must be 
sent with the minimum of delay at whatever stage in the 
proceedings it is considered necessary and feasible. This 
would seem to be the better interpretation of the term 
"forthwith" as employed in Article 63(1) of the Statute.
5. Effect of Intervention as of Right
Article 63(2) confers on every state which has been 
notified that the construction of a convention to which it is 
party is in question in a pending case, the right to intervene 
in the proceedings. This provision further states that if a 
third state exercises this right, the construction of the 
convention given by the judgment will be equally binding upon 
it.180 Theoretically speaking, while the parties to the case 
in which the construction of a convention is an issue will 
certainly be bound by the operative provisions of the 
judgment, the intervening state will only be bound by the 
construction of the convention given by the judgment in that
180 It should be pointed out that Article 62 contains no 
comparable provision concerning the effect of the Court*s 
judgment on the intervener. Professor De Lapradelle, a member 
of the 1920 Hague Advisory Committee of Jurists which drafted 
the proposals for the Permanent Court, made an unsuccessful 
attempt to get the binding effect reference in Article 63 to 
be made applicable to intervention under Article 62. See 
Proces-Verbaux (1920), 650. See also Miller, 556, n.54;
Chinkin, 497.
318
case, as well as in any future litigation concerning the 
application of that instrument in which it may happen to be 
involved.
In practice, however, in view of the value of judicial 
decisions not only as an auxiliary source of international 
law, but also as precedents, the Court is unlikely to 
disregard the construction which it placed on a convention in 
an earlier case, should the same convention fall to be 
construed in a future litigation between different parties. 
This view is widely shared by legal scholars and 
commentators.181
Relationship Between Articles 63 and 59 of the Statute
It would appear that the presence in the Statute of 
Article 59 has rendered Article 63(2) redundant.182 However, 
it is possible to differentiate between both provisions.183 
Whereas in theory, if not in practice, Article 59 seems to 
restrict the binding force of the dispositif of the Court*s 
judgment to the parties, Article 63(2) attempts to limit the 
effects of the interpretation of the convention given by the
181 See Oda, "Intervention”, 646? see also ICJ Reports 
1981, 30, para.14 (Oda J., separate opinion)? ibid. 1984, 
104, para.28 (Oda J. dissenting)? Miller, 554? Smyrniadis, 
34? Jessup, 904.
182 See Smyrniadis, 33.
183 Miller sees "an apparent inconsistency between Article 
59 which limits the impact of a decision to the particular 
case and Article 63 which indicates that the Court's 
construction of a convention will be binding on the 
intervening state”. See Miller, 554, n.34.
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judgment to the parties and the intervening state. Moreover, 
Article 59 deals with the binding force of the decision on the 
parties as such, while Article 63(2) concerns the effect of 
the interpretation of a multilateral treaty contained in the 
judgment on the intervening third states.
One important consequence of this last distinction is 
that a third state which intervenes under Article 63 is not 
accorded the status of a party within the meaning of the 
Statute. For instance, before 1978, the Rules imposed on the 
Court the duty to take the necessary steps to enable a state 
desiring to intervene under the terms of Article 63 to inspect 
the documents in the case, in so far as they relate to the 
interpretation of the convention in question, and to submit 
its observations thereon to the Court within a prescribed time 
limit.184
One other issue which arises as a result of the 
difference between the status of a party to the case within 
the meaning of Article 59 and that of the intervening third 
state under the terms of Article 63(2) is the right to appoint 
judges ad hoc.185 According to the terms of the Statute, 
only parties to a case may appoint judges ad hoc. Any doubt
184 See Articles 60 of the 1922, 1926 and 1931 Rules and 
Article 66(4) of the 1936 Rules of the Permanent Court, as 
well as Articles 66(4) and 71(4) of the 1946 and 1972 Rules of 
the International Court respectively.
185 For a discussion of this issue, see Hambro, 
"Interpretation”, 250? Rosenne, The Law and Practice. 286; 
Mani, 273-4.
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concerning this point is settled by the decision of the 
Court.186 The question of appointing judges ad hoc does not 
arise where a third state intervenes on the side of one of the 
original parties to the principal case.
Since a third state which intervenes under Article 63 
does not become a party187 to the case within the meaning of 
Article 59, it has, in all probability, no right to appoint a 
judge ad hoc.188 The judgment is not res judicata for the 
intervening state outside the convention in question.189 In
186 See Article 31 of the Statute.
187 The Rules of the Permanent Court spoke of the 
"intervening state”. In the SS Wimbledon Case, however, 
Poland was referred to as "the intervener” (see PCIJ Series A . 
No.l, 11). The 1936 Rules of the Permanent Court as well as 
the 1946 and 1972 Rules of the International Court spoke in 
terms of the "intervening party”. Miller observes that "the 
status of party was clearly recognised by the Permanent Court 
when in 1936 it modified paragraphs 4 and 5 of Article 66 of 
its Rules relating to intervention as of right under Article 
63 of the Statute. An intervening state is referred to as a 
party. [Previously], ... the state was not called a party." 
(See Miller 552, n.18 where he cites in support Hudson, The 
Permanent Court. 293; in the Hava de la Torre Case. Cuba was 
referred to as the "intervening party"; see ICJ Reports 1951, 
72; see also Chinkin, 523; the 1946 Rules of the 
International Court, like those of its predecessor employ the 
term "intervening state"; see Rosenne, Law and Practice. 433; 
Hambro, "Interpretation", 240, n.28; id, "Jurisdiction", 
149.) The 1978 Rules of the International Court like those of 
the Permanent Court before 1936 employed the term "intervening 
state". Cf. Anand, Compulsory Jurisdiction. 222-4. See 
further ICJ Reports 1990, 135-6, para.102.
188 See Hambro, "Intervention", 397; Rosenne, "Some 
Reflections", 85-8; id., Procedure, 26-8.
189 See Hambro, "Intervention", 397. Commenting on the 
replacement of the phrase "the other parties" in Article 71(2) 
of the 1972 Rules with the expression "and to any other state 
admitted to intervene" in Article 86(2) of the 1978 Rules, 
Rosenne writes that "this addition may again raise controversy 
over the question whether an intervenor under Article 63 can 
be an independent party for the purposes of appointing a judge
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neither the SS Wimbledon, nor the Hava de la Torre Case did 
the intervening state seek to exercise the right to appoint a 
judge ad hoc. In the former case, Poland renounced its right 
to appoint a judge ad hoc, as it considered this to be 
unnecessary. Cuba made no reference to this subject in
connection with its intervention in the latter case.190
Another significance of the differences between Articles 
59 and 63(2) of the Statute is that Article 63(2) furnishes 
the strongest evidence yet that parts of the judgment other 
than the decision or operative provisions can be binding upon 
states.191
It has been argued in reliance on the final report of the 
1920 Hague Advisory Committee of Jurists that Article 59 of 
the Statute does not refer to the major question of judicial 
precedent, but rather to intervention under Article 63.192 
It has, however, also been argued mainly on the basis of the 
drafting history of both Articles 59 and 63 that the former
ad hoc.” Rosenne, Procedure. 182.
190 See Miller, 558? Hambro, "Interpretation”, 250.
191 See Hambro, "Interpretation", 249. Cf. the statement 
of the Permanent Court to the effect that it is perfectly true 
that all parts of a judgment concerning the points in dispute 
explain and complement each other and are to be taken into 
account in order to determine the precise meaning and scope of 
the operative portion. See PCIJ Series B. No.2, 29-30. See 
also Hambro, "Intervention", 398; V.S. Mani, "A Review of the 
Functioning of the International Court of Justice", 11 IJIL 
(1971), 27 at 32 (hereinafter "Review").
192 See H. Lauterpacht, Development. 8; id., "Schools of 
Thought", 61? Brownlie, Principles. 21; McNair,
International Justice. 13? Hudson, The Permanent Court. 207; 
Stauffenberg, 419-24.
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does not improve the meaning of the latter, and further that
there is no relation between them. It has been pointed out
that Article 59, which was not contained in the draft Statute
originally prepared by the 1920 Hague Advisory Committee of
Jurists for a Permanent Court of International Justice,
stemmed from the comments of Mr. Balfour, the British delegate
at the Council of the League of Nations in October 1920, in
which, inter alia, he called for some provision by which a
third state could enter a protest against any ulterior
conclusions to which a judicial decision might seem to point.
In a report to the League Council, Mr. Leon Bourgeois,
apparently with Mr. Balfour's earlier remarks in mind,
observed with reference to intervention under Article 63 that:
This last stipulation establishes, in the contrary case, 
that if a state has not intervened in a case, the 
interpretation cannot be enforced against it. No 
possible disadvantage could ensue from stating directly 
what Article 61 [now Article 63] indirectly admits.193
The report then proposed the addition to the Statute of the
text of Article 59. It would therefore seem that the drafters
of the Statute apprehended that the Court's interpretation of
international law would be influenced by its previous
judgments and that by adding Article 59 they intended to
inhibit the extension of the modified interpretation of
international law to third states. It has been observed that
interpreted against this background, Article 59 does not add
much to what was contemplated under Article 63 and thus has no
193 See League of Nations, Documents. 50.
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bearing on it.194
6. Amicus Curiae
The absence in the Statute and Rules of the Court of any 
provisions permitting states which enjoy full procedural 
capacity on the international plane195 to appear as amici 
curiae in contentious proceedings is remarkable.196 
Intervention under Article 63 has been perceived in terms of 
intervention as amicus curiae.197
A procedure whereby states may appear as amici curiae is 
both desirable and necessary198 because of the necessity for 
the Court to be in possession of all information likely to 
throw light on questions under consideration, especially in 
view of the partisan nature of contentious proceedings.199 
It is also in the interest of justice that the Court should 
benefit from the aid of objective information in deciding in 
accordance with international law such disputes as are 
submitted to it. It may be difficult in the extreme to 
determine the motive of the amicus curiae. It is possible
194 See Oda, "Intervention”, 645-6. See also ICJ Reports 
1981, 29-30, paras.13-4 (Oda J., separate opinion) and ibid. 
1984, 94, para.9, 102-4, paras.27-8 (Oda J. dissenting).
195 See Article 34(1) of the Statute.
196 See to the same effect, Chinkin, 515, n.83? Damrosch,
387.
197 See del Duca, 465; cf. Chinkin, 515.
198 See Miller, 560; Chinkin, 515, n.83.
199 See Jessup, 909.
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that the contribution of an objective amicus curiae may help
the case of one of the parties to a dispute. It is also
possible that a third state may seek to call attention to an
interest of its own and thus protect it from being prejudiced
by the outcome of the proceedings. This type of participation
is similar to that described by the late Judge Nagendra Singh
in his separate opinion in the Italian Intervention Judgment
in which he reasoned, inter alia, that:
However, as far as cautioning the Court of the interests 
of the third party is concerned, this can always be 
achieved by an application under Article 62 . . . The said 
provision of the Statute has therefore a utility of its 
own, however limited it may be.200
Given the multilateral nature of so many international 
disputes, amicus curiae appearances before the Court would 
make it possible for interests other than those of the parties 
to be represented or brought to the attention of the 
Court.201 While such a procedure would enable third states 
to alert the Court to their interest, its primary purpose 
would be to assist the Court. Considering the Court*s view 
that intervention for the purpose of the assistance or 
convenience of the Court is inadmissible,202 such a function 
may be performed by the amicus curiae. Adoption of this 
proposal would necessitate modification of the Statute
200 See ICJ Reports 1984, 31-4. For the view that perhaps 
both Malta and Italy really wanted to bring matters of 
legitimate concern to the Court*s attention in an official way 
to ensure that the Court could not disregard them, see 
Chinkin, 515.
201 Cf. Chinkin, ibid; Damrosch, 387 and 389.
202 See ICJ Reports 1984, 25, para.40.
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probably along the lines of its Article 66 on advisory 
proceedings.203 Such amicus curiae would not be "parties" in 
the sense of Article 59. Their status would be similar to 
that of participants in advisory proceedings. However, the 
Court would have to overcome its present insistence on limited 
publication of the pleadings initiating contentious 
proceedings and find ways to make public the questions of law 
as to which comments from amici curiae might be received.204 
Participation by states as amici curiae should be at the 
direction and discretion of the Court.
7. Controversial Issues of Intervention as of Right
There are not as many controversial issues relating to 
intervention as of right as there would seem to be regarding 
discretionary intervention. For example, the nature and scope 
of the former are relatively well defined. It is an entirely 
protective remedy limited to the construction of a convention 
which is in question in a case before the Court. Both the 
effect of the intervention and the status of the intervening 
state are fairly well settled. The intervening state is bound 
by the interpretation of the treaty given by the judgment and 
not by the decision in the case. There is, therefore, no 
question of its being a party to the case within the meaning 
of Article 59. The issue of the need for a valid link of 
jurisdiction between the intervening state and the original
203 See Chinkin, ibid? cf. Miller, 560.
204 See Miller, ibid.
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parties does not arise, as the incidental jurisdiction which 
Article 63 confers on the Court is sufficient to enable it to 
admit such intervention.205
(a) Intervention in the Preliminary Objection Phase of a Case 
Consequently, what controversial issue there is regarding 
intervention as of right is necessarily different in nature 
from those of discretionary intervention. The issue in 
question is whether intervention as of right is permissible in 
the preliminary objections phase of a case. It would seem 
that discretionary intervention is limited to the merits phase 
of a pending case, among other things, for the reason that the 
legal interest which a third state may have in the preliminary 
objection phase would be too remote to be admitted.206 This 
view can also be based on the doctrinal proposition that M... 
intervention is merely incidental to the main 
proceedings...".207
205 See ICJ Reports 1990, 133, para.96; ibid. 1984, 58, 
para.9, where in his separate opinion in the Italian 
Intervention Case, de Arechaga J.A. asserted that "The 
assumption that Article 63 does not require a demonstration of 
jurisdiction has never been put to the test". Cf. Rosenne who 
observes that "... in the absence of sufficient judicial 
experience, the question must be regarded as an open one, 
especially where the jurisdiction is based on Article 36(2) of 
the Statute". See Rosenne, Law and Practice. 433-4; id., 
"Some Reflections", 84; McGinley, 689; Hambro,
"Jurisdiction", 148-50; id., "Intervention", 390; Oda, 
"Intervention", 644. See also ICJ Reports 1981, 28, para.11 
(separate opinion of Oda J.); ibid. 1984, 99-100, para.21 
(Oda J. dissenting).
206 See ICJ Reports 1984, 235 (Schwebel J. dissenting). 
See also Sztucki, 1015, n.39.
207 See Mani, 260.
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Sztucki rightly concludes that this assertion is valid
only in respect of the inadmissibility of intervention in
consequential proceedings under Articles 60 and 61, but not in
the case of preliminary objections. He comments that
On this premise, the very idea of one incident of 
proceedings (intervention) being related to another 
incident (preliminary objections) may appear 
inconceivable and unacceptable to a juridical mind, as 
incompatible with the general principles of judicial 
process.208
Sztucki points out that when the drafters of the Statute
laid the groundwork for phased proceedings, they did not think
in terms of their procedural consequences. After observing
that they related all incidents to cases as such, that is,
implicitly to the merits, he notes that:
Still, this does not mean that international jurists of 
the 1920s were unwilling to admit certain procedural 
consequences of phased proceedings in interstate 
litigation - they simply did not give them any thought at 
the inception and in the early years of the Court. But 
when they did, they had to consider the possibility of an 
intervention under Article 63 related to another incident 
of proceedings.209
It appears that the question of barring intervention as 
of right in the preliminary objection phase was never 
subsequently considered by the Court.210 The Court avoided 
answering this question which was first raised in the 
Salvadorean Intervention Case, when it dismissed El Salvador*s
208 See Sztucki, 1016.
209 See ibid. He cites the example of Judge Anzilotti who 
thought that an intervention related to counterclaims if the 
latter involved the interpretation of a multilateral treaty, 
even if the main claim was based on other grounds.
210 See, for example, ICJ Reports 1984, 235 (Schwebel J. 
dissenting).
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Declaration of Intervention as inadmissible in as much as it 
related to the preliminary objections phase without a 
hearing.211 The question whether intervention as of right is 
permissible in the admissibility and jurisdiction phase of a 
pending case was given considerable attention by Judge 
Schwebel in his lengthy dissenting opinion in the Salvadorean 
Intervention Case.212 Judge Schwebel is convinced that the 
plain meaning of the terms of both the Statute and Rules, as 
well as the practice of the Court in respect of the sending of 
the notification under Article 63, support the view that 
intervention is not only admissible in the jurisdiction phase 
of a case, but also as regards the construction of the Charter 
of the United Nations and the Court's Statute.213 The 
construction in bilateral disputes of multilateral conventions 
relating to jurisdictional questions can affect the legal 
position of a third state under such conventions no less than 
it can affect their position under other conventions whose 
clauses are substantive rather than jurisdictional.214
211 See ibid., 216.
212 See ibid., 223 ff.
213 See ibid., 233-40 passim (Schwebel J. dissenting). 
Schwebel J. has argued that it is other conventions or 
declarations rather than the terms of the Statute itself which 
are usually at issue in jurisdictional disputes, because the 
Statute in principle does not directly confer jurisdiction on 
the Court, but merely indicates the means by which this can be 
done, namely, through treaties and conventions under Articles 
36(1) and 37, or declarations under paras.2-5 of Article 36: 
see ibid., 240; also Sztucki, 1024.
214 Schwebel J. cites the following example. If one state 
maintains that the General Act for the Pacific Settlement of 
International Disputes remains in force and is a basis of the
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It has been argued on the basis of the difference in the 
nature and evolution of both forms of intervention as well as 
the peculiarity of jurisdictional decisions in international 
disputes, that intervention as of right is admissible in the 
preliminary objections phase of a case,215
(b) Intervention Regarding Declarations Under the Optional
Clause
One issue which has been discussed in connection with the 
admissibility of intervention under Article 63 in the 
jurisdiction phase of a case, is whether this type of 
intervention embraces disputes over the effect of declarations 
of states under the optional clause of the Statute.216 This 
issue was first raised by Judge Lauterpacht, who reached the 
conclusion in his separate opinion in the Norwegian Loans Case 
that intervention under Article 63 is permissible at the 
jurisdictional phase and not merely with regard to 
interpretation of the Statute, but even in declarations under 
the optional clause. With reference to the self-judging 
element of the submission to the Court's compulsory 
jurisdiction which was at issue in that case, Judge
Court's jurisdiction and another contests those contentions, 
why should not a third state party to the Act be able to 
intervene under Article 63 at the jurisdictional stage of the 
proceedings to submit a statement of the construction of the 
relevant provisions of that Act for which it contends?
215 See Sztucki, 1016-7? Damrosch, 385-6 and 400.
216 For a dicussion of such declarations, see generally, 
Anand, Compulsory Jurisdiction. 141-248.
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Lauterpacht observed that a decision of the Court which may 
affect governments which have had no opportunity to express 
their views on the subject was a cause of concern. ”It would 
have been preferable if, in accordance with Article 63 ... the 
governments which had made a declaration in these terms had 
been given an opportunity to intervene.1,217
In his dissenting opinion attached to the Court's, Order 
of June 1973 in the Nuclear Tests Cases. Judge Petren argued 
that states parties to the 1928 General Act should have been 
consulted on the extent to which that Act could have survived 
the League of Nations and its organs and the effect of such 
survival on declarations made by states accepting the 
jurisdiction of the Court.218 
Chinkin comments that:
There appears to be no reason within the Statute not to 
allow intervention for the purpose of challenging 
jurisdiction or for construing the provisions of the 
Statute on jurisdiction differently from any other 
conventional terms for the purposes of activating Article 
63. [She notes that] This interpretation necessitates 
allowing for the possibility of intervention under 
Article 63 whenever jurisdiction is claimed under Article 
36(2) of the Statute, or under another treaty. Given the 
complexities of Article 36(2), this appears to conform 
with the purpose of Article 63. ... it is likely that
only the scarcity of cases commenced under Article 36(2) 
since then has prevented the development of more
217 See Certain Norwegian Loans. Judgment, ICJ Reports 
1957, 63-4. See also his separate opinion in the Interhandel 
Case. Order of 24 October 1957, ibid., 120.
218 See the Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v. France) , ICJ 
Reports. Order of June 22, 1973, 125 (Petren J. dissenting). 
See also McGinley, 691, n.135 where he cites Article 5 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969 as treating 
constituent instruments on a par with ordinary treaties with 
regard to their interpretation.
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jurisprudence on this point.219
In his dissent in the Salvadorean Intervention Case. 
Judge Schwebel remarked that:
... there is room for another opinion, based on the fact 
that the declarations which States submit pursuant to 
Article 36, paragraphs 2,3 and 4 of the Statute are not 
conventions. May it be maintained that Article 63 - 
which expressly relates to the construction of 'a 
convention' - may be extended to include declarations 
made pursuant to a convention? That appears to be 
questionable. The legal character of declarations made 
under the Optional Clause is at issue in the 
jurisdictional phase of the current case between 
Nicaragua and the United States. At this point, it would 
not be appropriate to note more than that neither Party 
appears to view declarations made under the Optional 
Clause as treaties or conventions.220
While conceding that declarations under the Optional 
Clause are not treaties, and that they establish a consensual 
regime sui generis. Sztucki associates himself with the view 
expressed by Judge Lauterpacht in the Norwegian Loans Case, 
that:
It is irrelevant for the purpose of the view here 
outlined whether the instrument of acceptance of 
obligations of the Optional Clause is a treaty or 
some other mode of creating obligations.221
After identifying and differentiating between two means by
which states may accept the Court's obligatory jurisdiction,
namely treaties or conventions, and declarations under the
Optional Clause, he points out that both sources of
jurisdiction are equivalent, and that the Court recognised
this fact as regards the effect of their construction.
219 See Chinkin, 510, n.64.
220 See ICJ Reports 1984, 241-2 (Schwebel J. dissenting).
221 See ICJ Reports 1957, 48.
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Sztucki makes the point that the construction of a
jurisdictional link based on a declaration under the Optional
Clause can affect the legal position of third states as much
as the construction of such a link based on a provision in a
multilateral treaty. Sztucki then asserts that:
It seems to be at variance with basic considerations of 
equity and logic that states should be allowed to 
intervene under Article 63 on the construction of a 
jurisdictional link established by the means envisaged in 
paragraph 1, but not by the means envisaged in paragraph 
2 of the same article, since the function and purpose of 
both provisions, as well as the effects of their 
construction by the Court, are exactly the same. 
Accordingly,... intervention under Article 63 in respect 
of the construction of the declaration under the Optional 
Clause should be regarded as admissible by way of 
analogy, because of the equivalence of the two 
independent sources of the Court's jurisdiction - at 
least in so far as the effects of their construction by 
the Court (a crucial point in the present context) are 
concerned. This interpretation remains valid even if 
intervention in respect of construction of the Statute in 
general is otherwise regarded as inadmissible, even if, 
consequently, the admissibility of intervention in
respect of declarations under the optional clause could 
no longer be explained by their appurtenance to the 
Statute ... under Article 36(2).222
Sztucki observes that the admissibility of analogies from 
the law of treaties regarding particular aspects of
declarations under the Optional Clause was recently confirmed 
by the Court when in considering their termination and
withdrawal it held that they "should be treated, by analogy, 
according to the law of treaties".223 He refers to the 
separate opinion of Judge Jennings in which he remarked that 
"doubtless some parts of the law of treaties may be applied by
222 See ibid., 1026-7.
223 See Nicaragua/United States Case (Jurisdiction of 
Admissibility), ICJ Reports 1984, 420.
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useful analogy" to these declarations.224 He also makes the 
point that the idea of the admissibility of analogies from the 
law of treaties regarding particular aspects of declarations 
under the Optional Clause is reflected in the legal 
1 i terature.225
Finally, Sztucki finds support for the view that
intervention under Article 63 may be applied to the
construction of declarations made under the Optional Clause in
the history of the Statute. He writes:
The present Article 63 was formulated when the Draft 
Statute did not envisage an Optional Clause or 
declarations thereunder. Neither the records of the 
League of Nations of 1920, nor those of the Committee of 
Jurists of 1929, nor, finally, those of the UN Committee 
of Jurists of April 1945 or of the San Francisco 
Conference reveal any indication that the possible 
effects upon Article 63 of the introduction of optional 
jurisdiction were ever given a thought, or that the 
wording of Article 63 was retained deliberately to 
exclude declarations under the Optional Clause.226
The view that intervention as of right should be extended
to cover the construction of declarations under the Optional
Clause deserves special respect. Indeed there may be
instances in which it would be desirable to hear the views of
third states with optional clause declarations similar to the
224 See ibid.
225 Sztucki cites Crawford to the effect that "the Court 
does not apply to declarations under the Optional Clause rules 
of treaty interpretation as such; rather, such principles are 
extended by analogy, or similar principles are generated 
independently of their application to treaties". See J. 
Crawford, "The Legal Effect of Automatic Reservations to the 
Jurisdiction of the International Court", 50 BYIL (1979), 63, 
77 (hereinafter "Crawford").
226 See Sztucki, 1027.
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one under consideration.227 However, whether this view would 
be acceptable to a Court which has a tendency to interpret the 
forms of intervention enshrined in the Statute rather 
restrictively, must, in the absence of any relevant judicial 
authority, remain an open question, not least because, though 
the construction of declarations made under the Optional 
Clause may have the same effect on the states concerned as the 
interpretation of multilateral treaties, the fact remains that 
such declarations are, technically speaking, not conventions 
under Article 63 of the Statute, except either indirectly or 
by implication. In the circumstances, one wonders whether it 
would not be much easier for a third state to submit to the 
Court a request to be permitted to intervene in a case 
concerning the construction of a declaration made under the 
Optional Clause under Article 62, rather than to seek to use 
the right to intervene conferred on it by Article 63 whenever 
the construction of a convention is an issue in a case. A 
third state which has made a declaration under the Optional 
Clause in similar terms as the parties to the case in which 
the construction of the declaration is in question, clearly 
has an interest of a legal nature which may be affected by the 
construction of the declaration. A third state which is a 
signatory of the Optional Clause would also probably be able 
to prove the existence of a jurisdictional link with the 
parties in the case in which the declaration is to be 
construed. By analogy with Article 63(2) of the Statute, such
227 See Damrosch, 387-8 and 400.
a state would be bound by the construction given to the 
declaration by the judgment, if its intervention is strictly 
limited to the construction of the declaration made under the 
Optional Clause. In theory the Court has sufficient 
discretion to admit intervention in such circumstances. In 
practice, however, considering the habitual reluctance of the 
Court to put a liberal construction on this discretion, it is 
doubtful whether this view would carry any greater favour with 
it than that which was first put forward by Judge Lauterpacht.
8. Conclusion
Poland*s intervention in the SS Wimbledon Case testifies 
to the view that from the beginning, the conditions for 
intervention as of right were given a very liberal 
interpretation by the Permanent Court. The trend of 
restrictive interpretation of this remedy became apparent in 
the 1926 and 1936 editions of the Rules which provided that 
the convention in question meant a convention relied upon or 
invoked in the Special Agreement or application as governing 
the case referred to the Court. Thus, it would appear that 
those rules did not envisage the possibility of the 
construction of a convention being in question at a later 
stage of the proceedings in a case.
It is true that the Rules of the present Court did not 
require that the convention to be construed should have been 
relied upon or invoked in the document instituting 
proceedings; but the degree of control which it exercised
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over Cuba1 s intervention in the Hava de la Torre Case 
indicated the extent to which it limited the scope of 
intervention as of right. The administrative decision by 
means of which the special notification under Article 63 was 
discontinued in respect of the construction of the Charter, is 
another indication of the Court's tendency towards a narrow 
interpretation of intervention as of right. This tendency is 
also reflected in the 1978 Rules which have further tightened 
the conditions for this type of intervention. If further 
confirmation of the trend towards restrictive interpretation 
of intervention as of right were required, it was furnished 
when the Court rejected El Salvador's Declaration of 
Intervention on the basis of written communications.
It may be concluded from this discussion that in 
principle intervention under Article 63 is permissible in the 
preliminary objections phase of proceedings in a case. This 
conclusion is not only supported by the plain meaning of the 
terms of Article 63 itself and the Court's practice in respect 
of the sending of the special notification thereunder, but 
also by the differences between intervention under Articles 62 
and 63, as well as the peculiarity of jurisdictional decisions 
in the judicial settlement of international disputes.
One aspect of this question is whether intervention under 
Article 63 in the preliminary objections phase of a pending 
case also extends to declarations made under the Optional 
Clause of the Statute. Though a considerable case appears to 
have been made out in the individual opinions of certain
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judges and in the legal literature for the extension of such 
intervention to cover the construction of declarations under 
the Optional Clause, the answer to the question, regarding how 
far such an extention would be acceptable to a Court which is 
loathe to put a liberal interpretation on the forms of 
intervention permitted under the Statute must, in the absence 
of judicial experience, remain open. Nevertheless, since it 
is beyond question that a third state which has made a 
declaration under the Optional Clause in the same terms as the 
parties to a pending case involving the construction of such 
a declaration has a legal interest which may be affected by 
the interpretation of such a declaration, it is suggested that 
such a third state might more appropriately submit a request 
to the Court to be permitted to intervene in the case within 
the meaning of Article 62 in order to protect its legal 
interest. A third state which intervenes in such 
circumstances will be bound by the construction of the 
declaration given by the judgment in the sense of Article 
63(2). Indeed, the discretion invested in the Court under 
Article 62 is broad enough to enable it to permit such 
intervention. However, as has been seen every so often, to 
have the necessary discretion is one thing, and to exercise it 
so as to extend the scope of intervention is quite another. 
Another way in which this problem may be solved might be to 
amend the Statute so as to extend the intervention under 
Article 63 in the preliminary objections phase of a pending 
case to cover the construction of declarations made under the
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Optional Clause.
CHAPTER FOUR 
THE IMPACT OF ADVISORY OPINIONS
1. Introduction
In the previous chapters we have explored the general 
safeguards which the Statute of the International Court 
affords for the protection of the rights and interests of 
third parties. We have tried to argue that because of the 
value of judicial decisions as an auxiliary source of law, 
and the adoption by the Court of the substance, if not the 
form, of the doctrine of judicial precedence, as well as 
the tendency of states appearing before the Court to rely 
on earlier decisions when they find it beneficial so to do, 
such general safeguards are imperfect or inadequate.
We have also discussed the particular and more 
specific guarantees, namely the two forms of intervention 
which the Statute provides for the safeguarding of the 
rights and interests of third states. We have attempted to 
show that the Court has so restrictively interpreted both 
variants of intervention as to reduce their effectiveness 
in achieving the purpose for which they were originally 
designed.
Thus far, we have been dealing with the position of 
third parties in relation to the primary contentious 
jurisdiction of the Court. For the sake of completeness, 
we now propose to discuss this subject in the context of 
the Court's secondary advisory jurisdiction which it 
exercises as the judicial arm of the United Nations. Since
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in both a technical and formal sense, there are no parties 
in advisory proceedings, from the outset it is necessary to 
point out that the term "third parties” as employed in this 
part of our study is not intended to carry its conventional 
meaning. In other words, the notion of "third parties" 
herein advanced is not in terms of two litigating parties 
as against third parties. Rather, viewed in terms of 
access to the Court, and the form of participation in 
advisory proceedings, as well as the effect of the advisory 
opinions so rendered, the position of the participants in 
such proceedings is very similar to that of third parties 
in the conventional sense. Besides describing the legal 
basis and purposes of the advisory jurisdiction, it is 
proposed to identify "third parties" in advisory 
proceedings and to attempt an analysis of the impact of 
advisory opinions on them. It is therefore necessary to 
stress at the outset that the task of this chapter consists 
mainly in a study of the impact of the advisory function on 
"third parties", not a general or wide-ranging examination 
of the nature, scope and operation of the advisory 
procedure of the Court.
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2(a) Legal Basis of Advisory Opinions1
Articles 7(1) and 92 of the Charter established the 
International Court of Justice as a principal organ and as 
the principal judicial organ respectively of the United 
Nations.2 While both Article 92 of the Charter and Article 
1 of the Statute enjoined the Court to function in 
accordance with the Statute, the former further states that 
the Statute is an integral part of the Charter of the
1 For a more detailed treatment of the evolution of 
the advisory competence, see, among others, D. Pratap, The 
Advisory Jurisdiction of the International Court (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1972), 1-49 (hereinafter "Pratap”); K.J. 
Keith, The Extent of the Advisory Jurisdiction of the 
International Court of Justice (Leiden: A.W. Sijthoff,
1971), 13-26 (hereinafter "Keith") ; M. Pomerance, The
Advisory Function of the International Court in the League 
and U .N . Eras (London: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1973), 5-44 (hereinafter "Pomerance"); de Bustamante, 253- 
66; Hudson, The Permanent Court. 483-4. For a discussion 
of the advisory function of national courts, see, for 
example, Hudson, ibid., 485-6; id., "Advisory Opinions of 
National and International Courts", 37 HLR (1923-4), 970-84 
(hereinafter "Advisory Opinions"); F. Frankfurter, "A Note 
on Advisory Opinions", 37 HLR (1923-4), 1002-9; id.,
"Advisory Opinions", ESS Vol.l (1930), 475-8; L.M.
Goodrich, "The Nature of the Advisory Opinions of the 
Permanent Court of International Justice", 32 AJIL (1938), 
738, 754-8 (hereinafter "Goodrich?); Pomerance, 9; Keith, 
16; Rosenne, The World Court. 4 th ed. (Dordrecht:
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1989), 80 (this is the edition 
cited . in the rest of this chapter); F. Blaine-Sloan, 
"Advisory Jurisdiction of the International Court of 
Justice", 38 (kl.Jjt (1950), 830 (hereinafter "Sloan"); D.
Negulesco, "L'Evolution de la Procedure des Avis 
Consultatifs de la Cour Permanente de Justice 
Internationale", 57 ADIRC (1936), 5-96 (hereinafter
"Negulesco").
2 See Articles 7(1) and 92 of the Charter. This does 
not exclude the possibility of states submitting their 
disputes to other tribunals or indeed to other means of 
pacific settlement. See, for example, Lissitzyn, 37; 
Pratap, 37; Sloan, 835.
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United Nations.3 The advisory jurisdiction of the Court is 
regulated by Article 96 of the Charter and Articles 65-68 
of the Statute, as well as the provisions of its Rules.4
(b) Purposes Served bv Advisory Opinions5
The primary purpose of the advisory jurisdiction is to 
enable the Court to assist the political organs of the 
United Nations in the pacific settlement of international 
disputes referred to them for conciliation or mediation by 
clarifying the legal aspects of the issues involved.6 
Advisory opinions might also be of assistance to the 
General Assembly in relation to its functions of 
coordinating the policies of the specialised agencies in
3 See Article 92 of the Charter and Article 1 of the 
Statute. See also Pratap, 38, 42 and 117. Cf. the view 
that it is not made explicit whether the Charter is part of 
the Statute. See L. Gross, "The International Court of 
Justice and the United Nations", 120 ADIRC (1967), 319, 323 
(hereinafter "The ICJ and the UN”) for a discussion of the 
institutional integration between the International Court 
and the United Nations. See ibid., passim. See further 13 
UNCIO, 242.
4 See Sloan, 832 ff; Keith, 15 and 35-44 for a 
discussion of the organs authorised to request advisory 
opinions. See also Pratap, 37-8; for the action taken by 
the General Assembly relative to Article 96(2) of the 
Charter, see ibid., 46-7; Pomerance, 35-7; Bin Cheng, 
"The Scope and the Limits of the Advisory Jurisdiction of 
the International Court of Justice I", 24 The Solicitor 
(1957), 188 (hereinafter "Cheng"); E.M. Hambro, "The
Authority of the Advisory Opinions of the International 
Court of Justice", 3 ICLO (1954), 5 (hereinafter
"Authority"). See also, Rosenne, Procedure, 211-2.
5 See generally, Lissitzyn, 84-90.
6 See Pomerance, 9, 27, 33, 40 and 42; Hudson, The 
Permanent Court. 523; Merrills, 97; cf. Singh, 16 for the 
view that the advisory jurisdiction may be used for the 
peaceful settlement of disputes, notwithstanding that its 
primary purpose is to give legal advice and guidance to the 
requesting organ.
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supervising the economic and social activities of the 
United Nations.7 The advisory jurisdiction also makes it 
possible for the Court to assist other organs and 
specialised agencies authorised to request advisory 
opinions in their work, by advising them on legal and 
constitutional questions which may arise within the scope 
of their activities.8
The advisory jurisdiction has also widened access to 
the Court.9 The advisory procedure has also been employed 
as part of the machinery for the judicial review of the 
judgments of administrative tribunals involving individual 
staff members and the organisations in contentious cases.10 
By serving as a means of gaining time, or of shifting the 
theatre of discussion in an acute, tense and delicate 
situation, a request for an advisory opinion may help to 
calm tempers and provide the states concerned with an 
opportunity for a more sober reflection on the matters in 
controversy. The opinion eventually rendered may also help
7 See 14 UNCIO, 177 and 179? Pomerance, 27-8 and 40; 
Pratap, 40.
8 See 9 UNCIO, 161, 166, 202, 246 and 247? Pratap, 43? 
Hudson, The Permanent Court. 523.
9 See LNOJ (1923) 13217 and 1474? Hudson, The 
Permanent Court. 523-4.
10 See D.W. Bowett, The Law of International 
Institutions. 4th ed. Published under the auspices of the 
London Institute of World Affairs. (London: Stevens & Sons, 
1982) 326-8 (hereinafter “International Institutions11) ? 
Pratap, 48-9? M. Lachs, "Some Reflections on the 
Contribution of the International Court of Justice to the 
Development of International Law", 10 SJILC (1983), 239 at 
275-6 (hereinafter "Lachs")? E. Jimenez de Arechaga, "The 
Work and the Jurisprudence of the International Court of 
Justice, 1947-1986", 58 BYIL (1987) 1 at 7 (hereinafter
"Work and Jurisprudence").
344
to defuse the situation.11
3. Effect of Advisory Opinions
(a) The Binding Force of Advisory Opinions
Advisory opinions of the Court lack the binding force 
which attaches to its judgments within the meaning of 
Article 59 of the Statute.12 However, it would seem that 
the finality of an advisory opinion may not be very 
different from that of a judgment and, in practice, they 
are rarely ignored.13
11 See Hudson, The Permanent Court. 523; Rosenne, The 
World Court. 207, 106.
12 See, for example, de Bustamante, 264? Rosenne, The 
World Court. 103-4? K.L. Penegar, "The Relationship of 
Advisory Opinions of the International Court of Justice to 
the Maintenance of World Minimum OrderV 113 UPLR (1965) 535 
(hereinafter "Penegar") ?HAHudson, "The Effect of Advisory 
Opinions of the World Court", 42 AJIL (1948) 631
(hereinafter "Effect"); Lissitzyn, 17? Pratap, 7, 227-8? 
D.W. Greig, "The Advisory Jurisdiction of the International 
Court and the Settlement of Disputes Between States", 15 
I CLP (1966), 361 (hereinafter "Advisory Jurisdiction")?
Sloan, 850, 855, where he argues that the Court's statement 
in the Peace Treaties Cases that an advisory opinion has no 
binding force should not be given a significance beyond the 
context in which it was made. See also ICJ Reports 1950, 
71? 1954, 53? 1956, 84? Hudson, The Permanent Court. 511- 
2? Kelsen, 486? Hambro, "Authority", 5? Rosenne, The ICJ. 
441? Keith, 24-5, 29? F.A. Vali, "The Austro-German
Customs Regime before the Permanent Court with Reference to 
the Proposed Federation of Danubian States", 18 TGS (1932), 
79-96.
13 See Sloan, 853? Keith, 59-66? Pratap, 255-6? 
Bowett. International Institutions. 363-4? Rosenne, The 
World Court. 103, 104-5 and 243? Anand, Compulsory
Jurisdiction. 265-8? H. Lauterpacht, The Function of Law 
in the International Community (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1933), 333*; id., Development. 107-10 and 355? A. Byman, 
"Student Comments: The March on Spanish Sahara, a Test of
International Law", 6 JILP (1976) 75 at 118 (hereinafter
"Byman") ? G. Fitzmaurice, "The Law and Procedure of the 
International Court of Justice: International
Organisations and Tribunals", 29 BYIL (1952), 54-5
(hereinafter "29 BYIL (1952)").
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(b) Advisory Opinions with Binding Force
There are, however, a number of well defined 
circumstances in which advisory opinions may be just as 
binding as judgments. In some cases, parties interested in 
or affected by the opinion may agree in advance to accept 
the opinion. Such opinions, which have been called 
compulsive opinions, are as binding on the interested 
parties as judgments in contentious cases.14
The idea of compulsive opinions is very similar to a 
practice which has been likened to "advisory arbitration", 
whereby organisations authorised to request opinions, and 
states may include in a convention, bilateral treaty, or a 
constituent instrument, a stipulation to the effect that 
they would submit their disputes to the advisory 
jurisdiction of the Court. In some instances, the parties 
to the dispute are required to accept the opinion as 
binding. This practice represents an attempt to overcome 
the procedural incapacity of international organisations to 
appear before the Court in disputes with states.15 The 
advisory procedure has also been used as part of the 
machinery for judicial review of the decisions of the 
administrative tribunals. This usually involves a review 
of the judgment of the tribunal between an individual staff 
member and the organisation. In a contentious case under
14 See as to this, Rosenne, Law and Practice. 682-6; 
Pratap, 47, n.4. for examples of such agreements and 22ff? 
Hudson, "Effect", 631-2; Kelsen, 486; Greig, "Advisory 
Jurisdiction", 361; Keith, 196.
15 See Pratap, 47-8; Kelsen, 486; Rosenne, The ICJ. 
452; Hambro, "Authority", 9; id., "Some Observations", 
155-7; Anand, Compulsory Jurisdiction. 281-2.
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this procedure, the opinions are binding on the tribunals
and organisations concerned.16
Another instance of advisory opinions with binding
force may be cited from the period of the League of
Nations. In cases concerning Danzig which came before the
Permanent Court, the interested parties were bound by the
opinions because under Article 100 of the Geneva Convention
between Poland and Danzig, the power of decision in respect
of disputes between Poland and Danzig and of appeals from
the League High Commissioner for Danzig was vested in the
Council of the League. The parties therefore had no choice
as to the acceptance or rejection of the Court's opinion if
the Council took positive action in relation thereto. It
has therefore been rightly observed that:
In all the Danzig cases then the opinions were 
authoritative [thereby probably meaning binding] 
either because of the power of decision of the Council 
... or as a result of the agreement of Danzig and 
Poland.17
In another category of cases, the Court may give what 
has been termed "negative or passive advice".18 Such 
opinions are binding in a negative sense because it would 
be virtually impossible for a requesting body or interested 
state to suggest that the law was other than the Court 
declared it to be.19 However, strictly speaking, there is 
no prohibitory force attaching to such opinions and the
16 See Pratap, 48.
17 See as to this, Keith, 200.
18 See Pomerance, 341; Keith, 197ff.
19 See to the same effect, Fitzmaurice, 29 BYIL (1952) , 
54-5. See also, Pratap, 228? Sloan, 853; Simpson and 
Fox, 277? Lissitzyn, 32-3? Keith, 197.
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requesting bodies and the states concerned remain free to 
adopt a solution other than that advocated by the Court. 
The authoritative character of advisory opinions makes it 
seem unlikely that they would act in such a manner. 
Indeed, in no case have they acted in a manner contrary to 
the law laid down by the Court in these opinions.20
(c) The Authority of Advisory Opinions
The actual authority and judicial nature of the 
Court's advisory opinions are inseparably bound up with the 
judicial character of the Court itself. The more 
authoritative the opinion, the more likely the Court is to 
insist on a judicial procedure. Conversely, the more 
juridical the procedure followed in order to arrive at the 
opinions, the more authoritative they are likely to be.21 
Although advisory opinions are thought not to be binding in 
a technical and formal sense, their persuasive character 
and substantive authority are considerable.22 This is 
because they are judicial pronouncements of the highest 
international tribunal and the statements of law contained 
in them are of the same high quality as those contained in
20 See Pratap, 252.
21 See Keith, 21 and 109 and the travaux preoaratoires 
therein cited. See further, ibid., ch.5.
22 See Pratap, 227 and 231; Fitzmaurice, 29 BYIL
(1952), 55 and 34; id., 34; ibid. (1958), 144; C.H.M. 
Waldock, "General Course on Public International Law", 106 
ADIRC (1962), 115 (hereinafter "Waldock"); Keith, 196;
Simpson & Fox, 277.
348
judgments.23 As a result, they have substantial moral 
weight and influence.24 Although advisory opinions are 
commonly not regarded as binding on any state or UN organ, 
the organs and agencies concerned have followed them 
faithfully.25
There is some support for the view that the Court 
itself regards its opinions as possessing the same 
authority as its judgments.26 In the Eastern Carelia Case, 
for example, the Permanent Court remarked that answering 
the question posed in the request would be substantially 
equivalent to deciding the dispute between the parties.27 
The way in which the Court cites its previous opinions 
shows that it regards its judgments and advisory opinions 
as being equally authoritative.28 The Court does not make 
any distinction between its judgments and advisory opinions 
in this respect.
The Court’s advisory opinions are also regarded by the
23 See Pratap, 227 and 231 and the individual opinions 
of former members of the International Court therein cited. 
See also, Rosenne, The ICJ. 113; S. R. Crilly, ”A Nascent 
Proposal for Expanding the Advisory Opinion Jurisdiction of 
the International Court of Justice”, 10 SJILC (1983), 215, 
n.2 (hereinafter "Crilly").
24 See Pratap, ibid., and the individual opinions, as 
well as the views of publicists on the authoritative nature 
of advisory opinions therein cited. See also, Rosenne, The
ICJ. 492-3? Penegar, 555-6; Fitzmaurice, 34 BYIL (1958),
142? de Bustamante, 259, 264. Cf. Sloan, 853.
25 See Penegar, 535.
26 See Keith, 196, 222.
27 See PCIJ Series B . No.5, 29. See also Pratap, 231?
Sloan, 854.
28 See, for instance, H. Lauterpacht, Development. 9? 
Pratap, 257? Hambro, "Authority", 5? Sloan, 855.
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requesting bodies and states as authoritative expressions 
of law. For instance, the General Assembly stated in the 
preambles to its resolutions requesting the opinions in the 
Peace Treaties29 and Expenses Cases30 its need for the 
authoritative legal advice or guidance of the Court.31 The 
fact that agreements providing for the acceptance of the 
Court's opinions on disputes as binding are concluded in 
advance (as happens in the case of so-called compulsive 
opinions and advisory arbitration) goes to confirm the 
recognition by parties to such agreements of the 
authoritative character of advisory opinions.32 The 
opinions are also authoritative in the sense that their 
correctness cannot be officially questioned by the organs 
to which they are given.33
It has been suggested that the authoritative quality 
of advisory opinions may depend upon their reception or 
upon the number and merit of the dissenting opinions 
attached to them. In either case, the moral and doctrinal 
value of the opinion might be considerably reduced.34 
Persistent rejection of advisory opinions cannot fail to 
affect the international judicial process, but such effect
29 See ICJ Reports 1950, 65, 67.
30 See ICJ Reports 1962, 151, 152.
31 See as to this, Pratap, 231-2.
32 See Pratap, 231, n.7.
33 See Pratap, 232; Sloan, 853.
34 See in this connection, The Austro-German Customs 
Union and Admission Cases. See also Pratap, 232, n.l and 
the many authorities therein cited. See also Hambro, 
"Authority", 20-2? Lissitzyn, 17.
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goes more to the prestige of the Court than to the merit of 
its opinions, which are widely regarded as representing 
authoritative statements of international law.35 However, 
the point that the authority of an opinion will be reduced 
if it is criticised in more persuasive individual opinions 
which express better law would seem to have some validity. 
At any rate, the record of the reception of advisory 
opinions by the requesting bodies and international 
organisations and states concerned has not been 
unimpressive, as will be seen presently.
4. Third Parties in Advisory Proceedings
(a) Meaning of Third Parties
By "third parties" we mean the participants which are 
affected by or interested in, but are not litigants in 
advisory proceedings.36 Even the requesting organ or body, 
which alone has direct and complete access to the Court in 
such proceedings, is technically not bound by the opinion 
rendered. Still less is the opinion technically binding on 
the other participants, namely, other international 
organisations, states and individuals. In this sense, the 
effect of the advisory opinion is akin to that of a 
judgment on third parties. The position of the requesting 
organ or body and the other participants is also identical 
to that of third parties. Moreover, where a request for an 
advisory opinion relates to a legal question actually
35 See Crilly, 217? Szasz, 507-8.
36 Cf. for example, de Bustamante, 259? Rosenne, The 
World Court. 104? Penegar, 535 and 556? Hudson, "Effect", 
631? Lissitzyn, 17? Pratap, 17, 35, 227.
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pending between two or more states, the requesting organ or 
body is cast in the role of a "third party" which seeks the 
Court’s advice on the legal aspects of a dispute to which 
it is otherwise a complete stranger.
Other international organisations which are not 
authorised to request advisory opinions, but which may, 
nevertheless, be interested in, or affected by such 
opinions, enjoy limited access to the Court in advisory 
proceedings. Their role in such proceedings is one of 
supplying information to the Court. This is very similar 
to the traditional function of the amicus curiae in 
municipal legal systems. In this sense, such international 
organisations may be described as "third parties".
The participation of states in advisory proceedings is 
similarly limited to furnishing the Court with information. 
This is so, notwithstanding that states may be interested 
in advisory proceedings either as members of the requesting 
organ or body,37 or because they may be affected by the 
subject-matter of such proceedings in a particular way, 
especially where such proceedings have the character of a 
quasi-contentious case. Furthermore, not infrequently, the 
implementation of some advisory opinions have been 
influenced by the attitude of state members of the 
requesting organ or body or those states immediately 
concerned.38
The issue of the position of private individuals
37 Cf. Rosenne, The ICJ. 496.
38 For the use of the term "third parties" with 
reference to states, see Damrosch, 389.
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arises in connection with the employment of the advisory 
procedure as part of the machinery for judicial review of 
the judgments of administrative tribunals. Although such 
a procedure is clearly an appeal of process for review in 
continuation of the proceedings before the administrative 
tribunal in which the real parties were the individual 
staff member concerned and the organisation,39 the former 
has, so far, only had indirect access to the Court by means 
of an ad hoc procedural arrangement. For this reason, we 
regard such participants as "third parties".
Last but not least, it may be noted that an important 
reason for the Court's insistence on safeguarding its 
character as a judicial organ even when exercising its 
advisory jurisdiction, and on regarding the rendering of 
advisory opinions as a judicial function,40 consists in the 
fact that the opinion may affect the interested 
participants other than the requesting organ or body.41 It 
is to an examination of the impact of advisory opinions on 
these "third parties" that we shall now turn.
(b) Requesting Organs
39 See Rosenne, The ICJ. 488-9.
40 On the judicial character of the advisory function 
and advisory opinions, see Pratap, 230; Sloan, 848? W. 
Schwartz, "The International Court's Role as an Advisor to 
the United Nations. A Study in Retrogressive Development",
37 BULR (1957) 407 (hereinafter "Schwartz"); Hudson,
"Effect", 630? id., "Advisory Opinions", 1000? Rosenne,
The World Court. 104. On the assimilation of the advisory procajL/u% 
to the contentious procedure, see Pratap, 15-36? Keith,
151-95.
41 For the use of this term in the same sense, see 
Elian, 74.
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The Security Council and the General Assembly of the 
United Nations are directly authorised by the Charter to 
request advisory opinions on legal questions.42 Other 
organs of the United Nations and the specialised agencies 
may be authorised by the General Assembly to request 
advisory opinions on legal questions which arise within the 
scope of their activities.43 The Economic and Social 
Council and the Trusteeship Council have been authorised to 
request advisory opinions.44
The Secretariat, which is a principal organ, is not 
authorised to request advisory opinions.45 The Secretary- 
General may indirectly seek an opinion of the Court by 
asking the General Assembly or another authorised organ to 
make the request.46
Besides the principal organs, the Interim Committee of 
the General Assembly, a subsidiary organ established under
42 See Article 96(1) of the Charter.
43 See Article 96(2) of the Charter. For a general 
discussion of practice regarding this provision, see Vol.5, 
Repertory of Practice of the United Nations Organs. 1955, 
87ff (hereinafter "Repertory”).
44 See GA Res.89(1) of 11 December 1946 in respect of 
the Economic and Social Council, and GA Res.171(II) on the 
need for greater use of the Court of 14 November 1947 and 
GA Res.224(III) concerning administrative unions affecting 
trust territories of 18 November 1948 in respect of the 
Trusteeship Council. See also, Rosenne, The ICJ. 446.
45 For suggestions that the Secretary-General might be 
authorised to request opinions, see for example, Sloan, 
833? C.W. Jenks, "The Status of International 
Organisations in Relation to the International Court of 
Justice", 32 TGS (1946), 13 (hereinafter "Status")? S.M. 
Schwebel, "Authorizing the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations to Request Advisory Opinions of the International 
Court of Justice", in The Lachs Collection. 519-29 
(hereinafter "Authorizing the Secretary General").
46 See Sloan, 833? Rosenne, The ICJ. 446-7.
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Article 22 of the Charter, is authorised to request 
advisory opinions.47 The Committee on Applications for 
Review of Administrative Tribunal Judgments is also 
authorised to request advisory opinions.48 With the 
exception of the Universal Postal Union, which has its own 
internal system for settling disputes, all the specialised 
agencies are now so authorised. Such authorisation may be 
granted by means of a provision in so-called relationship 
agreements concluded between each organisation and the 
United Nations.49
(c) States and International Organizations as Amici 
Curiae in Advisory Proceedings50
^ jGA Res. 196(III) of 3 December 1948 and 295(IV) of 21 
November 1949. See also, Rosenne, The ICJ. 446; Sloan, 
833-4.
48 See GA Res.957(X). See also Rosenne, The ICJ. 445-
6.
49 For a synopsis of the organs of the United Nations 
and of the specialised agencies authorised to request 
advisory opinions, see Rosenne, The ICJ.. 450-2? see also 
ibid., 449-50? id., The World Court. 104-5? Pratap, 45? 
Sloan, 836-7? Penegar, 534-5.
50 See generally, E. Jimenez de Arechaga, "The 
Participation of International Organisations in Advisory 
Proceedings before the International Court of Justice”, 14 
CS (1975), 413-22? Rosenne, The ICJ. 479-80? Mani,
"Review”, 27 at 33-5? E. Lauterpacht, Aspects, 60-5. On 
amicus curiae practice in general see Brian A. Garner, A 
Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1987), 40? Jackson*s Machinery of
Justice, ed. J.R. Spencer (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1987), 495? S. Krislov, "The Amicus Curiae Brief: 
from Friendship to Advocacy”, 72 Y U  (1963), 674, 694?
F.B. Wiener, "The Supreme Court*s New Rules", 68 HLR 
(1954), 20? Moore1s Federal Practice. 2nd ed., Supreme
Court Practice and Rules, Rule 36, Brief of an Amicus 
Curiae? E. Angel1, "The Amicus Curiae: American
Development of English Institutions", 16 I CLP (1967), 1017? 
F.V. Harper and E.D. Hetherington, "Lobbyists before the 
Court", 101 UPLR (1953), 1172? Jowitt, 98? D.M. Walker,
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Suggestions that states be permitted to request 
advisory opinions have never been accepted.51 However, 
under the contentious procedure, states may bring a case 
for a declaratory judgment.52 Furthermore, states may also 
ask an authorised organ to request an advisory opinion. 
This has actually happened on a number of occasions.53
Article 66 of the Statute, the enabling provision 
which grants access to the Court to states and 
international organisations in advisory proceedings, 
stipulates that:
(1) The Registrar shall forthwith give notice of the 
request for an advisory opinion to all states entitled 
to appear before the Court.
(2) The Registrar shall also, by means of a special 
and direct communication, notify any state entitled to 
appear before the Court or international organisation 
considered by the Court ... as likely to be able to 
furnish information on the question that the Court 
will be prepared to receive, ... written statements or 
to hear ... oral statements relating to the question.
(3) Should any such state entitled to appear before 
the Court have failed to receive the special 
communication referred to in paragraph 2 of this 
Article, such state may express a desire to submit a
Oxford Companion to Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980) , 
53; Davi, 282? The Encyclopedia of Words and Phrases. 
Legal Maxims. Canada 1825-1978. 3rd ed., ed. Gerald G. 
Sanagan, v.l (Toronto, Canada: Richard Deboo Ltdf) , 417; 
"The Leff Dictionary of Law", 94 Y U  (1985) 2012; Moore 
and Levi, "Federal Intervention I: the Right to Intervene 
and Reorganisation", 45 Y U  (1935-6), 565? id., "Federal 
Intervention, Procedure, Status and Federal Jurisdictional 
Requirements", 47 Y U  (1937-8), 898.
51 See 3 UNCIO, 182-319, 373, 447 and 850? 13 ibid., 
235 and 496? Pomerance, 28? Pratap, 39-42. See also, the 
Report of the Informal Interallied Committee, paras.64-75, 
reprinted in 39 AJIL (1945), Supp., 20-3.
52 See German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia Case 
(Merits), PCIJ Series A . No.7, 19. See also, Pomerance, 
42.
53 See e.g., The Tunis and Morocco Nationality Decrees. 
PCIJ Series B. No. 4. See also Hudson, 1 World Court 
Reports, 134.
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written statement or to be heard? and the Court will 
decide.
(4) States and organisations having presented written 
or oral statements or both shall be permitted to 
comment on the statements made by other states or 
organisations ... Accordingly, the Registrar shall in 
due time communicate any such written statements to 
states and organisations having submitted similar 
statements.
Article 66 is supplemented by Article 105 of the 1978 
Rules which provides:
(1) Written statements submitted to the Court shall be 
communicated ... to any States and organisations which 
have submitted such statements.
(2) The Court ... shall (a) determine the form in 
which, and the extent to which, comments permitted 
under Article 66 paragraph 4 ... shall be received, 
and fix the time limit for the submission of any such 
comments in writing; (b) decide whether oral 
proceedings shall take place at which statements and 
comments may be submitted to the Court under the 
provisions of Article 66...54
The first paragraph of Article 66 may be regarded as 
a purely administrative duty which the Statute assigns to 
the Registrar. This duty is similar to that which is 
imposed on the Registrar under the third paragraph of 
Article 40 of the Statute when he informs states about the 
submission of a contentious case to the Court. 
Notification under this paragraph does not amount to an 
invitation to present information to the Court. A state 
which purports to be entitled to present information to the 
Court on the basis of notification under this paragraph is 
in no better position than one which pursuant to paragraph 
3 indicates a desire to present information on the 
question. In either case, it lies in the discretion of the 
Court either to accept or to decline the offer to furnish
54 See Rosenne, Procedure. 219.
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information.55
The duty of the Registrar under the second paragraph 
of Article 66 of the Statute to advise states and 
international organisations considered likely to be able to 
furnish the Court with information on the question that the 
Court will be prepared to receive such information, appears 
to involve a judicial element. Not only should it be 
performed in consultation with the Court, but it appears 
that its performance implies an exercise of judgment which 
must necessarily entail appreciation of reasons, factors or 
circumstances which lead to the conclusion that a 
particular state or international organisation is likely to 
be able to furnish information. The notification envisaged 
under this provision would appear to be an invitation to 
the state or international organisation concerned to assist 
the Court with information.
Miller is of the opinion that the notification 
qualifies the state or organisation as a participant. He 
contrasts the import of a notification under Article 66 
with that in connection with intervention and observes that 
"notification under Articles 6256 and 63 does not in itself 
qualify any state as an intervener”. He further notes 
that:
In two cases involving multilateral treaties the Court 
applied Article 63 by analogy in determining the 
states entitled to notice and communicated with all 
parties to the treaties. From this it has been 
reasoned that Article 66 extends to states which would 
have a right to intervene if the case were a
55 See Pratap, 180; Hudson, The Permanent Court. 556.
56 Article 62 does not envisage any notification.
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contentious one.57
Under the terms of the third paragraph of Article 66, 
any state entitled to appear before the Court which has not 
received the notification envisaged in the second paragraph 
may indicate its desire to submit written or oral 
statements to the Court. The decision rests with the 
Court.58
The Court has generally appeared more liberal in 
admitting statements from states than from international 
organisations in advisory proceedings.59 In this
connection, the omission of any mention of international 
organisations in the third paragraph of Article 66 is 
noteworthy.60
Under the fourth paragraph of Article 66, states and
57 See Miller, 558-9? Rosenne, Law and Practice. 734.
58 See Miller, 558.
59 See Jessup, 905? Hudson, Permanent Court. 423-4.
60 See Pratap, 180. In the South West Africa (Status) 
Case. ICJ Reports 1950, 128, the Court agreed in principle 
to receive statements on the legal aspects of the case from 
the International League for the Rights of Man, ibid., 130, 
see also ICJYB 1953-4, 105, although eventually this
organisation did not avail itself of this authorisation, 
ibid? ICJ Reports 1950, 130. See also Cheng, 247? Singh, 
96. The Court declined to receive a statement of views 
from the Federation of International Civil Servants 
Associations in the UN Administrative Tribunal Case, see 
ICJ Pleadings, UN Administrative Tribunal Case. 389-90? 
ICJYB 1953-4, 105. See also Miller, 560? L. Gross,
"Participation of Individuals in Advisory Proceedings 
before the International Court of Justice: Question of
Equality between the Parties", 52 AJIL (1958), 16
(hereinafter "Participation")? Cheng, 247. In the Namibia 
Case, the 0AU*s request to take part in the oral 
proceedings was granted, see ICJ Pleadings, Namibia Case. 
Vol.2, 655 and 658. In the Reservations Case, written
statements were filed by the Organisation of American 
States and by the International Labour Organisation. See 
ICJ Reports 1951, 17-8? see also Singh, 96? Rosenne, The 
World Court. 229, n.26.
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international organisations submitting written or oral 
statements or both are permitted to comment on the 
statements submitted by other states and international 
organisations.61 This provision implies that the purpose 
of the participation of states and international 
organisations in advisory proceedings is much more than the 
need merely to make all the necessary and relevant 
information available to the Court. It would appear that 
the purpose and function of Article 66 is to enable states 
and international organisations to assist the Court by 
providing it with the information which it needs while 
protecting their own interests by bringing such interests 
to the Court's attention.
In advisory proceedings then, such "third parties" 
perform a function which is not very different from that 
served by the amicus curiae in municipal legal systems. It 
is therefore not surprising that Article 66 is generally 
believed to introduce the amicus curiae institution into 
the Statute in respect of advisory proceedings.62
Where the request for an advisory opinion relates to 
a dispute actually pending between two or more states, the 
position of states is much more than that of mere purveyors 
of information, since, apart from the desire to furnish the 
Court with the necessary information to enable it to 
consider the question in all its aspects, the rights and
61 See Miller, 559.
62 See Miller, 559? Pratap, 181? Jenks, "Status", 38? 
id., Prospects, 131, 189 and 221? Rosenne, The ICJ. 479. 
Cf. A. Hammarskjold, Jurisdiction Internationale.. (Leiden, 
1938), 118.
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interests of such states may either be directly or 
indirectly affected by the opinion. In such circumstances, 
the advisory proceedings are quasi-contentious in character 
and the position of the participating states and 
international organisations is in fact not very different 
from that of "third parties" in contentious cases. For 
this reason, the Court may, on account of its judicial 
character and the judicial nature of the advisory function, 
further assimilate the advisory procedure to that followed 
in contentious cases to the extent it deems necessary.63
(d) Intervention bv States in Advisory Proceedings
The application of Article 66(2) and (3) of the 
Statute has led to the view in some quarters that 
intervention within the meaning of Articles 62 and 63 is 
permissible in advisory proceedings.64
63 See Miller, 559? Pratap, 181.
64 See for instance, Hambro, "Jurisdiction", 150. The 
sole authority which Hambro cites is Hudson, The Permanent 
Court, 424, especially n.6. However, if we examine 
Hudson's reflections very carefully, and in their proper 
context, it becomes quite clear that he did not think that 
the provisions of the Statute relating to intervention in 
contentious cases are also applicable in advisory 
proceedings. The nearest that Hudson comes to suggesting 
that intervention is possible in advisory proceedings is 
when he observes, with respect to the practice of the 
Permanent Court regarding the sending of special notices to 
states deemed likely to be able to furnish the Court with 
information under Article 73 of the 1926 Rules, that a 
tendency was manifest in the early years, also, to apply 
the underlying principle of Article 63 of the Statute in 
advisory proceedings. See Hudson, The Permanent Court. 
423-4. Pratap has also expressed the view that the 
provisions of the Statute concerning intervention in 
contentious cases are applicable by analogy in advisory 
cases. See Pratap, 19, 181-2. Cf. ICJ Reports 1984, 43 
where Mbaye J. in his separate opinion does not seem to 
distinguish between the Court's contentious and advisory 
jurisdictions in relation to intervention. See also, de
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We submit that Articles 62 and 63 are not applicable 
in advisory proceedings. In theory it is possible by a 
strained construction of Article 68 of the Statute which 
gives the Court discretion to assimilate the advisory 
procedure to that followed in contentious cases, to hold 
that intervention within the meaning of these provisions 
could, by analogy, be allowed in advisory proceedings.65 
In reality, however, at the present time, considering the 
tendency of the Court to interpret intervention 
restrictively in contentious cases, this, to say the least, 
is most unlikely to happen. When the Court purports to 
apply Article 63(1) by sending notice to states parties to 
treaties whose construction may be in issue in advisory 
proceedings, it may, in reality, only be applying the 
underlying principle contained in that provision. The kind 
of participation granted to Rumania in 1923 in lieu of 
intervention within the meaning of Articles 62 and 63 is 
the only form of participation which the Statute and the 
practice of the Court to date grants to third states in 
advisory cases.
(e) Consent of Interested States in Advisory Opinions
We shall now turn to a brief discussion of the 
relationship of the consent of interested states to the 
advisory function. This will entail an examination of the 
Court's approach to requests for advisory opinions which
Bustamente, 260? Rosenne, The ICJ. 480.
65 Even then this would be an intervention sui generis, 
the necessary conditions and effects of which are beyond 
the pale of the advisory jurisdiction.
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involve the determination of the rights of states, and a 
consideration of the issue whether in a non-binding 
opinion, the Court can ever be said to be disposing of the 
interest of a third state even if the advisory opinion was 
not absolutely needed for the day to day work of the 
organisation.
It is a well established principle of international 
law that the Court can only exercise jurisdiction over a 
state with its consent.66 The Court has stated that where 
the legal interest of a third state would form the very 
subject matter of a decision in a case, that case cannot be 
decided in the absence of the consent of that third state. 
In such circumstances, the protection which the rule in 
Article 59 affords for third states would be unavailing 
because that rule rests on the assumption that the Court is 
at least able to render a binding decision. Without the 
consent of the third state, the Court cannot give a binding 
decision in such a case.67 However, it would seem that 
where the interest of a third state would merely be 
affected by the decision, the case would be decided without 
its consent, as such a third state would in theory be 
protected by the rule in Article 59.68 Of course, the 
specific protection which the institution of intervention 
affords will also be available to such a third state.
As regards the Court's advisory jurisdiction, the
66 See ICJ Reports 1954, 32; ibid. 1984, 22-3,
paras.34-7. See also, Greig, "Advisory Jurisdiction", 325.
67 See ICJ Reports 1954, 33.
68 See, for example, ICJ Reports 1963, 33.
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issue of the necessity of the consent of an interested 
state69 is not uncontroversial. Some advisory opinions may 
be so closely related to interstate disputes as to be 
similar to quasi-contentious cases. While arguably, such
cases are disputes between states as to their respective 
rights and obligations, they come before the Court by way 
of requests for advisory opinions. Even cases primarily
concerned with international, constitutional and
organisational matters, or institutional cases, may contain 
some contentious elements. Indeed, it does not follow that 
a controversy, simply because it involves a disagreement 
over the meaning of certain provisions of the Charter or 
other treaty, is the less vital to the interests of the 
contesting states.70
In contradistinction to the situation regarding
contentious cases, it is now well established that the 
consent of an interested state is not required for the 
exercise of the advisory jurisdiction, although it may be
69 On consent and the advisory function see generally, 
P. Lalonde, "The Death of the Eastern Carelia Doctrine: Has 
Compulsory Jurisdiction arrived in the World Court?", 37 
UTFLR (1979), 80-100 (hereinafter "Lalonde"); Anand,
Compulsory Jurisdiction. 264-82; Pomerance, 287-96? Keith, 
89-123? Pratap, 154-69? Rosenne, The World Court. 105-6, 
107, 159-60? 233-4, and 242? id., The ICJ. 473. On the
nature of the vote required for a request for an advisory 
opinion, see Sloan, 836-8? Pratap, 99-109? Keith, 45-8. 
Cf. A.D. McNair, "The Council*s Request for an Advisory 
Opinion of the PCIJ", 3 BYIL (1926), 11-2? Gross, "The ICJ 
and the UN", 369? Pomerance, 365-8? D. Lenefsky, "A 
Successful Jurisprudence of Advisory Opinions for the 
International Court of Justice", 15/16 IYIA (1966/7), 46-8, 
66 and 67-8 (hereinafter "Jurisprudence")? id., "Advisory 
Opinions as a Problem Solving Process", 11 VLR (1966), 528- 
30, 535-9 (hereinafter "Advisory Opinions").
70 See Lalonde, 80? Greig, "Advisory Jurisdiction",
326.
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considered in relation to the exercise of the Court*s 
discretion.71 The outstanding issue in this connection is 
in what circumstances the Court would exercise its 
discretion against complying with a request for an advisory 
opinion.
The only known instance of a refusal to render an 
advisory opinion is the Eastern Carelia Case.72 which 
concerned allegations by Finland, a member of the League, 
that Russia, a non-member of the League, was not living up 
to its obligations under the Treaty of Peace of Dorpat of 
14 October 1920 and under the annexed declaration given at 
the time of signature by the Russian delegation. Finland 
sought to raise the matter before the League Council, but 
the peaceful settlement procedures of Articles 12-6 of the 
Covenant applied only to members. Article 17 of the 
Covenant did provide for ad hoc acceptance by non-members
71 See ICJ Reports 1950, 72. The Statute directs the 
Court to exercise its advisory jurisdiction in respect of 
legal as opposed to political questions. Moreover, in its 
advisory capacity, the Court has a discretion whether or 
not to answer the question submitted to it. In practice, 
neither limitation has proved a great obstacle to the wide 
exercise by the Court of its advisory powers. 
Consistently, the Court has regarded as legal any dispute 
however serious the political factors involved provided 
that some answer was possible by the application of legal 
rules and techniques. Nor has the Court been prepared to 
accept the political implications of a dispute as a reason 
for exercising its discretion to refuse to give an opinion. 
See Greig, “Advisory Jurisdiction”, 326. On the Court*s 
handling of challenges to its advisory competence, see e.g. 
Pomerance, 282-321.
72 See PCIJ Series B . No.5. See also, Rosenne, Law and 
Practice. 716? L.E. Blaydes Jr., "International Law ... 
Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara 1975", 11 TILJ (1976), 
361 (hereinafter "Blaydes"). The Court in one contentious 
case declined to render a judgment on grounds of judicial 
propriety.^Northern Cameroons Case. ICJ Reports 1963, 29. 
See also, Gross, The ICJ and the UN. 341-2.
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of the pacific settlements procedures. However, Russia 
never availed itself of this provision, maintaining that 
the question of its treatment of the population of Eastern 
Carelia was purely a domestic matter which lay outside the 
competence of the League and the Court.73 The question 
referred to the Court at the instance of Finland required 
it to determine whether the declaration constituted an 
international obligation or whether, as Russia claimed, it 
had been given for information only. The Court did not 
find it necessary to deal with the issue whether a request 
for an advisory opinion relating to matters which form the 
subject of a pending dispute between nations should be put 
to the Court without the consent of the parties.74 The 
Court pointed out that as Russia was not a member of the
73 See PCIJ Series B. No.5, 12-6.
74 See ibid., 27. See also, Hudson, The Permanent 
Court, 489ff ? Cheng, 219; Keith, 93? Pomerance, 287? 
Lalonde, 84. Cf. the view that this case dealt with the 
proposition that the consent of the interested state is one 
of the elements necessary for the establishment of the 
Court's jurisdiction in advisory cases. See T. Sugihara, 
"The Advisory Function of the International Court of 
Justice" 18 JAIL (1974), 23, 33? P.C. Jessup, "The
Protocol for American Adherence to the Permanent Court", 25 
AJIL (1931) 308, 312? Hambro, "Authority", 11-3; H.
Lauterpacht, Development. 107? cf. ibid., 356, n.50. See 
also Pratap, 16-7, 28, n.2 and 155. In connection with the 
second part of the 5th reservation of the Senate Resolution 
concerning the accession of the United States to the 
Statute of the Permanent Court, which raised the question 
of a dispute between a state member of the League and a 
non-member, the 1926 Conference of State Signatories of the 
Protocol of Signature of the Statute referred to the 
Eastern Carelia Case which it believed to appear to meet 
the desire of the United States that the Court should not 
without its consent entertain any request for an advisory 
opinion on any dispute or question in which it had or 
claimed an interest. See ibid., 22; Pomerance, 289? 
Keith, 101-8.
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League, the case fell under Article 17 of the Covenant75 
under which the peaceful settlement procedures were 
applicable only with the consent of the non-member. This 
rule, the Court pointed out, was in keeping with the 
fundamental principle of international law that ”No state 
can without its consent be compelled to submit its disputes 
with other states either to mediation, or to arbitration or 
to any other kind of pacific settlement".76 Such consent 
could be given by acceptance of the Covenant in joining the 
League, but
as concerns states not members of the League, the 
situation is quite different. They are not bound by 
the Covenant. The submission therefore of a dispute 
between them and a member of the League for solution 
according to the methods provided for in the Covenant 
could only take place by virtue of their consent; 
such consent however has never been given by Russia. 
The Court therefore finds it impossible to give its 
opinion on a dispute of this kind.77
The Court gave other cogent reasons which rendered it 
inexpedient for it to render an opinion on the dispute. 
First, without Russia*s participation, it was doubtful that 
the Court would have material sufficient to enable it to 
arrive at any judicial conclusion upon the question of fact 
as to what the parties had actually agreed.78 Secondly, 
"The question put to the Court concerns directly the main 
point of the controversy between Finland and Russia. 
Answering the question would be substantially equivalent to
75 See PCIJ Series B. No.5, 27.
76 See ibid.
77 See ibid., 27-8.
78 See ibid., 28.
367
deciding the dispute between the parties”.79
It may therefore be asserted that in the Eastern
Carelia Case the Court declined to render an opinion
primarily because under the League Covenant the League was
incompetent to deal with the dispute and ipso facto
incompetent to request the advisory opinion. As Russia was
neither a member nor a consenting non-member, the Council
was incapable under the Covenant of dealing with the
dispute without violating the fundamental principle of
international law, namely, the principle of the
independence of states. Moreover, the Council was given no
role to perform under the Treaty of Dorpat.80
This view of the Eastern Carelia Case was confirmed by
the German Settlers Case, in which the same Court said that
The question that has been discussed ... falls under 
two general heads. First, that of the competency of 
the League of Nations to take cognizance of the matter 
and secondly, that of the right of the settlers to
79 See ibid., 28-9.
80 See Pomerance, 287-8? Lalonde, 85; Keith, 96? 
Cheng, 219-20. In his dissent in the Danzig Legislative 
Decrees Case. Anzilotti J. reasoned that the fact that the 
Court1s opinion had been requested on a question which 
related to the municipal law of a particular country apart 
from any question of international law or of an 
international dispute, sufficed to justify the Court in 
declining to accede to the request for the opinion. See 
PCIJ Series A/B. No.65, 62-3. However, it would appear 
that in the Court's view, the fact that the League had 
guaranteed the Danzig constitution meant that it would be 
called upon to pass upon the constitutionality of the 
municipal decrees the interpretatation of which was within 
the competence of the League, the requesting organ. This 
case indirectly supports the view that the Court declined 
to accede to the request in the Eastern Carelia Case on 
account of the incompetence of the requesting organ. See 
Cheng, 220 n.38-9. For a discussion of the Eastern Carelia 
Case. see e.g., Keith, 89-95? Greig, "Advisory 
Jurisdiction", 333-4? Lalonde, 82-5. For the reaction of 
the League Council to the Court's reply, see LNOJ (1923) 
1337, 1502.
368
continue to hold and cultivate the land which they 
occupy. If as Poland has claimed, the subject-matter 
of the controversy is not within the competency of the 
League, the Court will not be justified in rendering 
an opinion as to the rights of the settlers. The 
Court therefore will first consider the question of 
competency.81
The relationship of the consent of interested states 
to the advisory function may also be discussed in 
connection with the Mosul Case.82 Under Article 3(2) of 
the Treaty of Lausanne, Turkey and Great Britain had agreed 
in the event of their inability to fix the frontier between 
Turkey and Iraq to refer the matter to the League Council. 
Like Russia, Turkey was not a member of the League. But 
unlike Russia, Turkey accepted the Council's invitation to 
appoint a representative to it83 and participated fully in 
the Council's debates on the dispute.84 At one point 
Turkey appeared to have agreed to accept in advance any 
decision the Council should make.85 However, after an 
adverse report from the Council's commission of inquiry 
Turkey reversed itself and took the position that Article
81 See German Settlers in Poland advisory opinion, PCIJ 
Series B . No.6, 18-9. Cf. the ILO Administrative Tribunal 
Case. ICJ Reports 1956, 98-9. See also, Cheng, 220; 
Lalonde, 85. Although this interpretation of Eastern 
Carelia has great merit, it has until quite recently 
received very little support in the literature. H. 
Lauterpacht referred to it in a footnote as one possible 
explanation for the Court's refusal to render the opinion. 
See H. Lauterpacht, Development. 356, n.50. Negulesco also 
considered it. See Negulesco, 5.
82 See PCIJ Series B . No. 12, 6.
83 See LNOJ (1924) 1465-6.
84 See LNOJ (1922) 1318-24, 1337-9, 1358-60, 1648-54.
85 See LNOJ (1923) 1337-8, 1358-9.
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3(2) only contemplated the Council’s good offices86 and 
that it would not consider itself bound by the Council’s 
decision. The Council then submitted two questions to the 
Permanent Court, concerning the nature of its powers under 
Article 3 (2).87 Turkey protested88 but did submit some 
documents to the Court89 and did answer certain questions 
put to it by the Court.90 However, as it had apparently 
opposed submission of the request91 in the Council and had 
maintained throughout that the Court was without 
jurisdiction,92 it is doubtful that these actions could 
amount to implied consent.93 If this is correct, then the 
Court was faced with a request in which the dispute 
involved a non-consenting non-member. Moreover, the 
dispute was actually pending between two states and it 
related to one of the state’s most vital interests, 
territory. In affirming its competence the Court 
distinguished the Eastern Carelia Case by holding that
The circumstances in the present case were distinctly
different since the question before the Court referred
86 See LNOJ (1925) 1317-27, 1380-1. Early in the
proceedings a disagreement arose as to the exact nature of 
the Council’s role, ie. whether it was acting as arbitrator 
or mediator. See Lalonde, 86.
87 See LNOJ (1925) 1377.
88 See PCIJ Series B. No. 12, 8-9.
89 See Mosul Case. PCIJ Series C . No.10, 308.
90 See ibid., 317-8, 287-8. See also, Pomerance, 289-
90.
91 See LNOJ (1926) 122.
92 See ibid.
93 See the Western Sahara Case. ICJ Reports 1975, 23. 
See also, Lalonde, 86.
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not to the merits of the affair, but to the competence 
of the Council which had been duly seised of the 
affair and could undoubtedly ask for the Court*s 
opinion on points of law.94
The Court made two distinctions. The first is a
distinction between the substance of the dispute and the
procedure related to its settlement. This distinction is
the one most often relied upon by commentators95 and was
used by the Court itself in a subsequent case.96 However,
this distinction is somewhat suspect in that the question
before the Court in the Eastern Carelia Case did not go to
the substantive merits at all, but merely raised the
preliminary question of whether Russia had any obligation
under international law.97 The second distinction appears
to be more soundly based. The Council *'had been duly
seised of the affair” by virtue of Article 3(2) of the
Treaty of Lausanne or by virtue of Turkey's consent under
Article 17 of the Covenant and could undoubtedly ask the
Court's opinion on points of law. The question submitted
simply related to the nature of that competence, the manner
of its exercise and the legal effect to be attributed to
the Council's decision. At no time was there any question
of the Council's competence to deal with the substantive
dispute.98 These opinions of the Permanent Court indicate
94 See Annual Report of the PCIJ Series E . No.2, 164.
95 See De Visscher, "Les Avis Consultatifs de la Court
Permanent de Justice Internationale”, 26 ADIRC (1929), 5,
33? Hudson, The Permanent Court. 491
96 See ICJ Reports 1950, 72.
97 See Lalonde, 87.
98 See ibid.; Pratap, 167.
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only that lack of consent raises considerations of judicial 
propriety first, when, because one of the parties has 
refused to participate the Court does not have before it 
all of the essential facts, and secondly, when a request 
does not appear to be legitimately required by the 
requesting organ for purposes of its work."
Another, if secondary100 reason why the Court declined 
to render an opinion was that while the Court considered 
itself entitled in principle to answer any question, it 
would decline to do so in cases where to answer would 
conflict with its judicial function. In other words, even 
if the Court is fully possessed of jurisdiction to comply 
with the request for an advisory opinion, it ought not as 
a matter of propriety to do so if this would mean in effect 
making a judicial pronouncement on a matter at issue 
between two states.101 The Court expressly recognised the 
question of propriety when it found that being a court of 
justice, it could not even in giving advisory opinions 
depart from the essential rules102 guiding its activity as
"  See Pomerance, 78; Lalonde, 88.
100 See ICJ Reports 1975, 28.
101 See Fitzmaurice, 29 BYIL (1952), 1, 53? id., 34 
ibid. (1958), 67? Rosenne, "Nonuse”, 3.
102 This statement points to the independent existence 
of certain fundamental principles governing the 
administration of justice transcending the written rules to 
be found in the Court's Statute and Rules. These essential 
rules probably belong to those general principles of law 
recognised by all nations which according to Article 38 of 
the Statute form part and parcel of international law, the 
law to be applied by the Court. See Cheng, 220. See also, 
id., General Principles of Law as Applied bv International 
Courts and Tribunals (Cambridge: Grotius Publications
Ltd., 1953), esp. part 4 dealing with general principles of 
law in judicial proceedings.
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a court.103
The question of the consent of states to the
settlement of their disputes through advisory opinions came
before the International Court in the Peace Treaties Case
(First Phase)104 which involved non-consenting non-member
states. Both the competence of the Assembly to make the
request and the competence of the Court to answer were
vigorously challenged by the Soviet bloc countries.105 No
objections were taken to the Assembly*s competence on the
grounds of lack of consent of the interested states.
Objections on this ground were directed solely to the
competence of the Court.106 The Court responded to this
challenge to its competence by distinguishing its advisory
from its contentious jurisdiction in the following oft-
quoted passage:
This objection reveals a confusion between the 
principles governing contentious procedure and those 
which are applicable to advisory opinions.
The consent of states parties to a dispute is the 
basis of the Court's jurisdiction in contentious 
cases. The situation is different in regard to 
advisory proceedings even where the request for an 
opinion relates to a legal question actually pending 
between states. The Court's reply is only of an 
advisory character? as such, it has no binding force. 
It follows that no state, whether a member of the 
United Nations or not, can prevent the giving of an
103 See PCIJ Series B . No.5, 29? ICJ Reports 1962, 155. 
See also Lalonde, 84? Cheng, 220. On the nature and 
inherent limitations of the judicial function, see the 
Northern Cameroons Case. ICJ Reports 1963, 29-31, 33-4 and 
36-8. For a discussion of the Mosul Case, see Keith, 96- 
101? Greig, "Advisory Jurisdiction", 335? Pomerance, 289- 
90, 295-6? Lalonde, 86-7.
104 See ICJ Reports 1950, 65.
105 See Keith, 114? Pomerance, 284? Lalonde, 89.
106 See Keith, ibid. ? Lalonde, ibid.
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advisory opinion which the United Nations considers to 
be desirable in order to obtain enlightenment as to 
the course of action it should take. The Court*s 
opinion is given not to the states, but to the organ 
which is entitled to request it; the reply of the 
Court, itself an "organ of the United Nations", 
represents its participation in the activities of the 
organisation, and in principle should not be 
refused.107
The Court by affirming in the most unequivocal manner 
that lack of consent of an interested party would not 
affect its jurisdiction sounded the death knell of the 
theory that the Court had assimilated into its advisory 
jurisdiction the requirement of consent, which is one 
interpretation of the ratio of Eastern Carelia. We submit 
that the Court*s position on this point is unassailable. 
Any strict rule that interested states could prevent the 
Court from giving to a requesting organ an opinion 
necessary for guidance in fulfilling its duty will unduly 
inhibit the effective administration of international 
justice.108 Furthermore, such a rule would not only hinder 
the work of the requesting body, but also prevent the Court 
from participating in the work of the United Nations. 
Moreover, can it not be safely assumed that acceptance of 
Art.96 of the Charter implies acquiescence in the right of 
the duly authorised bodies to request and receive the 
Court *s advice?109 A request on a legal question involving 
a subject-matter within the competence of a requesting 
organ which is presented after a decision by an affirmative 
vote of the majority is a request the Court is competent to
107 See ICJ Reports 1950, 71.
108 See Lalonde, 90.
109 See Pomerance, 289, n.39 and 194, n.56.
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answer under the Charter.110 This is not to say that lack
of consent is irrelevant to the exercise of the Court*s
discretion. The Court recognised the relevance of its
power to decline to render an opinion when it observed:
There are certain limits, however, to the Court*s duty 
to reply to a request for an opinion. It is not 
merely an * organ of the United Nations*, it is 
essentially the *principal judicial organ* of the 
organisation...
Article 65 of the Statute is permissive. It gives the
Court the power to examine whether the circumstances of the
case are of such a character as should lead it to decline
to answer the request.111 In other words, it saw the issue
of consent as being relevant to the question of whether the
Court could remain faithful to its judicial character. The
Court then distinguished the Eastern Carelia Case by
stating that in its opinion:
the circumstances of the present case are profoundly 
different from those which were before the Permanent 
Court of International Justice in the Eastern Carelia 
Case (Advisory Opinion No.5) when that Court declined 
to give an opinion because it found that the question 
put to it was directly related to the main point of 
dispute between the parties, and that at the same time 
it raised a question of fact which could not be 
elucidated without hearing both parties.112
It reiterated that the opinion which it was called upon to
give related only to dispute settlement procedures and not
the disputes themselves. If the Eastern Carelia Case had
laid down a rigid rule that lack of consent of disputant
states rendered the Court incompetent to exercise its
110 See Keith, 111? H. Lauterpacht, Development. 357; 
Lalonde, 90.
111 See ICJ Reports 1950, 71-2.
112 See ibid.
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advisory function, then the Peace Treaties Case was a 
complete abandonment of that principle.113 It would seem 
that the Court was accepting that interpretation of the 
Eastern Carelia principle according to which, where a 
request relates to an actual dispute pending between 
states, whether members or not, lack of consent is relevant 
only in so far as it raises questions of judicial 
propriety. The distinction made by the Court between 
matters of procedure and matters of substance is extremely 
tenuous in principle. While a question may be in one 
respect procedural, it often constitutes by itself a 
pivotal point and will exercise considerable influence on 
the course to be followed in examining and settling 
claims.114 The Peace Treaties Case involved a situation in 
which the two sides held clearly opposite views concerning 
the interpretation and the execution of their treaty 
obligations, and it is difficult to see how this conflict 
of views could not be regarded as a substantive part of the 
dispute. In any event, on the facts, no such distinction 
could be drawn between the two cases. In Peace Treaties, 
the Court went beyond mere enlightenment on the question of 
procedure.115 While recognising and accepting the 
proposition that the Court cannot be concerned with the 
motives which may have inspired the request,116 it also
113 See Weissberg, 13; H. Lauterpacht, Development. 
355; Lalonde, 91.
114 See Lalonde, 91.
115 See H. Lauterpacht, Development. 35; Lalonde, 92.
116 See Admissions Case. ICJ Reports 1947-8, 61.
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remains true that "The Court itself and not the parties 
must be the guardian of the Court's judicial integrity”.117 
To this end, the Court recognises its duty to verify that 
the requesting organ has a legitimate interest in the 
subject-matter of the request.118 If the mischief to be 
prevented is the abuse of the advisory function, the Court 
must look beyond the mere form of the request to the 
substance of the question.119
Invoking the Eastern Carelia principle in the 
Reservations Case, the Philippines contended that answering 
the questions raised "would be substantially equivalent to 
deciding the dispute" pending between itself and Australia 
which had objected to the Philippine reservation to the 
Genocide Convention and declined to regard the Philippine 
ratification as valid. This "dispute", the Philippines 
maintained, could come before the Court only by means of a 
joint submission under the Convention's compromisory 
clause.120 The interest of the client, the General 
Assembly, was both incontrovertible and paramount.121 The 
contention that the request related to an existing dispute
117 See Northern Cameroons Case. ibid. 1963, 15, 29. 
In the IMCO Case, the Court rejected any attempt to make it 
exceed the bounds of the normal judicial function. See ICJ 
Reports 1960, 153. See also, Rosenne, Law and Practice. 
707. See generally, L. Gross, "Limitations upon the 
Judicial Function", 58 AJIL (1964), 415-31.
118 See Expenses Case. ICJ Reports 1962, 155-6. See 
also, Lalonde, 92.
119 See Fitzmaurice, 34 BYIL (1958), 143? Lalonde, 93.
120 See Reservations Case. ICJ Pleadings, 1951, 295-7. 
Cf. the Rumanian objection, ibid., 291.
121 See ICJ Reports 1951, 19.
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was not generally acknowledged. Rather, the Court and most 
of the states represented before it stressed the "abstract" 
nature of the question.122 Even if the request in the 
Reservations Case was related to an existing dispute, the 
"Eastern Carelia principle" would have been inapplicable 
since the parties to such a dispute were all members of the 
United Nations.123 It is significant that although other 
objections to the rendering of the opinion were raised, 
there was no dissent regarding the Court's competence to 
give an opinion in this case.124
The "Eastern Carelia principle" was invoked once more 
in the Namibia Case and again found to be inapplicable. 
South Africa argued that since the questions before the 
Court bore directly on an interstate dispute, the Court 
should as a matter of its discretion refuse to entertain 
the request. The participation of South Africa in the 
proceedings was not to be construed as consent to the 
Court's acceding to the request.125 The Court
distinguished the Eastern Carelia Case thus: Unlike
Russia, which was not a member of the League, South Africa 
was a member of the United Nations and bound by Article 96 
of the Charter.126 Furthermore, while Russia did not
122 See ibid., 21. See also Pomerance, 293; II Ro Suh, 
"National Judges in Advisory Proceedings of the 
International Court", 19 IJIL (1979), 32 (hereinafter 
"Suh").
123 See Pomerance, ibid.
124 See Pomerance, ibid., and 305-7.
125 See the Namibia Case. ICJ Pleadings, 1971, 1, 442-7. 
See also, Pomerance, 294.
126 ICJ Reports 1971, 23.
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appear before the Permanent Court in the Eastern Carelia 
Case. South Africa had participated in the Namibia Case.127 
Moreover, the Court denied the "quasi-contentious" 
character of the Namibia Case and emphasised the "client- 
lawyer" aspect. It pointed out that the purpose of the 
request was not to obtain the Court's assistance in the 
exercise of the Security Council's functions relating to 
the peaceful settlement of a dispute pending before it 
between one or more states, but to seek legal advice from 
the Court on the consequences and implications of its own 
decisions.128 The Court insisted that the case involved 
neither an interstate dispute nor even a dispute between 
the United Nations and South Africa.129 The Court saw no 
compelling reasons which prevented it from acceding to the 
request in the Namibia Case. It considered that by 
acceding to the request, it would remain faithful to the 
requirements of its judicial character while also 
discharging its functions as the principal judicial organ 
of the United Nations.130
The Western Sahara Case131 presented the Court with an
127 See ibid., 23-4.
128 See ibid., 24.
129 See ibid. For criticism of the Court's finding as 
representing a purely formal view of the facts of the case 
which does not correspond to reality, see the dissenting 
opinion of Gross J., ibid., 326, the separate opinion of 
Petren J., ibid., 128-30 and the dissenting opinion of 
Fitzmaurice J., ibid., 313-6. Dillard J. recognised the 
existence of a dispute between the United Nations and South 
Africa. Ibid., 155.
130 See ibid., 27.
131 See ICJ Reports 1975, 12.
379
opportunity to clarify the position with respect to the 
consent principle. Spain objected that in such a case lack 
of consent of an interested state rendered the Court 
incompetent? that since in this case advisory jurisdiction 
was being used to introduce compulsory jurisdiction, the 
Court should decline to answer the request; that consent 
was particularly essential where a matter of territorial 
sovereignty was involved, and that the Court was not 
possessed of all the relevant facts and was therefore 
unable to pronounce judicially on the matter before it.132 
The Court observed that the Peace Treaties Case had 
established the principle that "the absence of an 
interested state's consent to the exercise of the Court's 
advisory jurisdiction does not concern the competence of 
the Court, but the propriety of its exercise''.133 In 
discussing the nature of its discretion under Article 
65(1), the Court confirmed its observations in the first 
phase of the Peace Treaties Case to the effect that its 
opinion represented its participation in the activities of 
the UN and that in principle, should not be refused. It 
also reiterated emphatically that as a judicial body it was 
bound to observe the principles and requirements of its 
judicial character even in rendering advisory opinions.134 
The Court found that Spain had by its silence rejected 
Morocco's offer to submit the dispute between them 
concerning Western Sahara to the Court for decision in
132 See ibid., 20-2. See also, Lalonde, 93-4.
133 See ICJ Reports 1975, 21.
134 See ibid.
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contentious proceedings. It further found that in the 
light of Spain’s persistent objections, neither its 
abstension from the vote on the Assembly’s requesting 
resolution, nor its participation in the advisory 
proceedings constituted implied consent. The Court then 
distinguished the Eastern Carelia Case by noting that 
Russia, one of the parties in that case, was neither a 
party to the Statute of the Permanent Court nor a member of 
the League and that lack of competence of the League to 
deal with a dispute involving a non-member state which 
opposed its intervention was a decisive reason why the 
Court declined to accede to the request. In the Western 
Sahara Case, however, Spain was a member of the United 
Nations and had accepted the provisions of the Charter and 
the Statute. It had thereby in general given its consent 
to the exercise by the Court of its advisory jurisdiction. 
It had not objected, and could not validly object to the 
General Assembly's exercise of its powers to deal with 
decolonisation of a nonself-governing territory and to seek 
an opinion on questions relevant to the exercise of those 
powers.135
The Court considered that its opinion was being 
requested on a legal question which arose during 
proceedings in the General Assembly in relation to matters 
with which that body was dealing. It did not arise
135 See ibid., 23-4. See also, Lalonde, 94-5? M.W. 
Janis, ’’The International Court of Justice: Advisory
Opinion on the Western Sahara”, 17 HILJ (1976), 609, 611-4 
(hereinafter "Janis"); L.L. Herman, "Western Sahara 
Advisory Opinion - An Analysis of the World ^Judgment in the 
Western Sahara Case", 41 SLR (1976-7), 141-2 (hereinafter 
"Herman").
*Cour/-£
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independently in bilateral relations.136 Since the dispute 
arose in the General Assembly, Morocco's invitation to 
Spain to submit the matter to the Court's contentious 
jurisdiction did not have the effect of detaching the 
dispute from the decolonisation proceedings of the United 
Nations.137 The Court also found that the terms of the 
Moroccan proposal and the request before it were not 
substantially identical. While the Moroccan proposal 
raised the question of Morocco's legal ties with Western 
Sahara, the Assembly's request raised the overlapping 
claims of Mauritania.138 The Court further observed that 
the Assembly's request raised the possibility of the 
application of General Assembly Resolution 1514, thereby 
placing the legal questions of which it had been seised in 
a broader frame of reference than the settlement of a 
particular dispute.139 In considering the lack of consent, 
the Court attached considerable importance to the perceived 
object and purpose of the request. Consequently, it would 
look beyond the terms of the request to the full text of 
the requesting resolution, to formal communications between 
the parties and to the proceedings in the UN itself.140 
The Court held that the object of the General Assembly was 
not to bring before the Court by way of a request for
136 See ICJ Reports 1975, 25.
137 See ibid., 26.
138 For a criticism of this distinction, see Lalonde,
96.
139 See ICJ Reports 1975, 26.
140 See ibid., 26-7.
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advisory opinion a dispute or legal controversy in order 
that it may later be the basis of the Court's opinion, or 
to exercise its powers and functions for the peaceful 
settlement of that dispute, but to obtain an opinion which 
the General Assembly deemed of assistance to it for the 
proper exercise of its functions concerning the 
decolonisation of the territory.141 While this distinction 
may be open to the criticism142 that the decolonisation 
process is at the heart of the dispute, the significance of 
this pronouncement lies in what it reveals. As long as the 
request is couched in terms of assistance to the requesting 
organ, rather than in terms of the settlement of a 
particular dispute, the Court will neither consider the 
wisdom of the request nor the possible value of the 
opinion. Where the requesting organ deems the opinion will 
be of value to it, the Court will not examine the 
underlying motives. In view of the Court's professed duty 
to participate in the activities of the organisation, there 
exists a presumption in favour of acceding to requests for 
advisory opinions. The onus will rest on the non­
consenting state to demonstrate the impropriety of 
answering the request.143
The Court rejected Spain's assertion that the exercise 
of its advisory jurisdiction was improper because the 
dispute concerned a matter of territorial sovereignty.
141 See ibid., 26.
142 See Blaydes, 360-1.
143 Cf. the individual opinions of Gros, Ignacio-Pinto, 
Petren and Dillard JJ., ICJ Reports 1975, 69ff, 78ff, 
104ff, 116ff. See also, Blaydes, 360.
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While not rejecting the proposition that territorial 
questions always required a state's consent, it pointed out 
that Spain's right to exercise sovereignty over the 
territory was not in issue.144 The Court also rejected 
Spain's contention relating to the alleged insufficiency of 
evidence before the Court, noting that this problem was 
only a secondary reason for the refusal of the Permanent 
Court to accede to the request in the Eastern Carelia Case. 
It stressed that the issue in the Eastern Carelia and the 
Western Sahara Cases was not that there were disputed 
questions of fact and an absent party, but solely whether 
the Court could reach a judicial conclusion on the 
available evidence. The Court found that it was possessed 
of ample evidence and therefore quite capable of reaching 
a judicial conclusion.145
This case also raised many other important 
questions,146 e.g. the definition of a legal question for 
purposes of Article 96 of the Charter and Article 65 of the 
Statute, and whether the Court should answer a question 
that was academic and legally irrelevant or devoid of 
purpose. In so far as these issues raise the fundamental 
question of the nature of the dispute between Morocco and 
Spain, they have some relevance. For if the dispute was 
not over current rights, the importance of consent was 
diminished. In the words of the Court:
The issue between Morocco and Spain regarding Western
144 See ICJ Reports 1975, 28.
145 See ibid. See also Lalonde, 96-8.
146 On its significance, see Blaydes, 355-6.
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Sahara is not one as to the legal status of the
territory today, but one as to the rights of Morocco 
over it at the time of colonisation. It follows that 
the legal position of a state which has refused its 
consent to the present proceedings is not in any way 
compromised by the answers that the Court may give to 
the question put to it.147
The necessity of the consent of a state to the
rendering of an advisory opinion again arose before the 
Court in the Mazilu Case in which Rumania challenged the 
competence of the Court to render the opinion on the basis 
of its reservation to s. 30 of the Convention on the
privileges and immunities of the United Nations according 
to which the United Nations could not without its consent 
submit a request for an advisory opinion in respect of its 
difference with Rumania. This reservation, Rumania argued, 
subordinated the Court's competence to deal with any
dispute that might have arisen between the United Nations 
and Rumania, including a dispute within the framework of 
the advisory procedure to the consent of the parties to the 
dispute. Since Rumania had not consented to the request, 
the Court was without jurisdiction to entertain it.148 The 
Court pointed out that the advisory jurisdiction enabled 
United Nations entities to seek guidance from the Court in 
order to conduct their activities in accordance with the 
law. "These opinions are advisory not binding. As the 
opinions are intended for the guidance of the United 
Nations, the consent of states is not a condition precedent
147 See ICJ Reports 1975, 27. See also, Lalonde, 98. 
Cf. ICJ Reports 1975, 72 and 109, for the views of Gros and 
Petren JJ. respectively that there was no legal dispute 
pending between Spain and Morocco at the time.
148 See ICJ Reports 1989, 188.
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to the competence of the Court to give them.” The Court
declared that its reasoning in the Peace Treaties Case
concerning the basis of the advisory jurisdiction and the
nature of advisory opinions, was equally valid where a
legal question was pending not between two states, but
between the United Nations and a member state.149
Nevertheless, the Court observed that:
While, however, the absence of the consent of Rumania 
to the present proceedings can have no effect on the 
jurisdiction of the Court, it is a matter to be 
considered when examining the propriety of the Court 
giving an opinion. It is well settled in the Court's 
jurisprudence that when a request is made ... for an 
advisory opinion by way of guidance or enlightenment 
on a question of law, the Court should entertain the 
request ... unless there are 'compelling reasons' to 
the contrary.
In the Western Sahara Case the Court adverted to a possible
situation in which such a "compelling reason" might be
present. In that case, commenting on its observations in
the Peace Treaties Case, to the effect that its competence
to give an opinion does not depend on the consent of the
interested states, the Court observed
... that lack of consent might constitute a ground for
declining to give the opinion requested if, in the
circumstances of a given case, considerations of 
judicial propriety should oblige the Court to refuse 
an opinion. In short, the consent of an interested 
state continues to be relevant not to the Court' s 
competence, but for the appreciation of the propriety 
of giving an opinion. In certain circumstances, 
therefore, the lack of consent of an interested state 
may render the giving of an advisory opinion 
incompatible with the Court's judicial character. An 
instance of this would be when the circumstances 
disclose that to give a reply would have the effect of 
circumventing the principle that a state is not 
obliged to allow its dispute to be submitted to 
judicial settlement without its consent. If such a 
situation should arise, the powers of the Court under 
the discretion given to it ... would afford sufficient
149 See ibid., 188-9.
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legal means to ensure respect for the fundamental 
principle of consent to jurisdiction”. (Western Sahara 
Advisory Opinion. ICJ Reports 1975, p.25, paras.32- 
30 ™
The Court considered that in the Mazilu Case, to give a 
reply would not have the effect of circumventing the 
principle that a state is not obliged to allow its disputes 
to be submitted to judicial settlement without its consent. 
The Court then differentiated a dispute between the United 
Nations and Rumania as to the applicability of the 
Convention to Mr. Mazilu as contained in the requesting 
resolution and the question put to the Court in the light 
thereof on the one hand, from the dispute between the 
United Nations and Rumania with respect to the application 
of the General Convention in the case of Mr. Mazilu on the 
other.151 Thus the Court did not find any compelling 
reasons to refuse an advisory opinion.152
The International Court clarifies the scope of the 
Eastern Carelia Case according to which the Permanent Court 
considered the lack of consent of an interested state 
affected its competence to entertain the request in so far 
as it went to the incompetence of the requesting organ to 
deal with the root issue which gave rise to that 
request.153 In the Peace Treaties Case, however, the Court
150 See ibid., 190-1.
151 We find the Court's differentiation both artificial 
and unpersuasive.
152 See ibid., 191.
153 See Keith, 124-6; Pomerance, 282-4; Szasz, 505; 
Pratap, 165; Cf. Hudson, The Permanent Court. 477; 
Fitzmaurice, 29 BYIL (1952), 53. Cf. Pomerance, 296. See 
also, Greig, "Advisory Jurisdiction", 326 for the view that 
the jurisprudence of the present Court, while professing
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demonstrated reluctance to delve too deeply into the 
requesting organ's competence to deal with the root 
issue.154 It could also be argued that this is a moot 
point because there is no provision in the Charter similar 
to Article 17 of the Covenant which authorises the General 
Assembly or the Security Council to act whether the dispute 
is between members or not.155 A non-consenting non-member 
would have to rely for example, on such provisions as 
Article 2(7) to challenge the competence of the requesting 
organ. As the principle of consent is arguably no longer 
relevant to the competence of any requesting organ, 
nevertheless the argument could be made156 that the Charter 
provisions themselves in so far as they purport to involve 
the disputant non-consenting non-members in pacific 
settlement procedures, conflict with the rule of 
international law recognised in the Eastern Carelia Case. 
In this manner, consent could be made relevant to the 
requesting organ's and thereby, indirectly to the Court's 
competence. Even though this argument might be available 
to the non-member of the UN, the Court has impliedly 
rejected it. In the Western Sahara Case. the Court 
impliedly accepted the proposition that any matter 
plausibly falling within the very wide scope of the United
support for the Eastern Carelia principle, has largely 
undermined its authority.
154 See ICJ Reports 1950, 71. See also, Pomerance, 284,
n. 20.
155 See Pratap, 157; Greig, "Advisory Jurisdiction",
338.
156 See Keith, 129-30.
Nations Charter and formulated in general terms so as not 
to raise the objection of Article 2(7), is one with which 
a requesting organ is competent to deal.157 In
distinguishing the Eastern Carelia Case, the Court in 
effect confined that case to its peculiar facts. The Court 
seems to be of the view that the Charter has effected a 
qualitative change in international law. Thus, the lack of 
consent of a non-member will probably never again go to the 
competence of the requesting organ to deal with the
dispute.158 And even if it should, it appears that for the 
Court it is still a matter of propriety.159 But after 
establishing this principle, the Court failed to indicate 
precisely when lack of consent would cause it to exercise 
its discretion to refuse an answer. The example it cites 
is circular and merely restates the problem.160 One can, 
however, glean from its handling of objections an
indication of those factors the Court will examine in 
relation to the consent principle, and perhaps, more
importantly, those it will not.161
The Court would decline to entertain a request for an 
advisory opinion, the sole object of which is to assist the 
requesting organ or body in the settlement of a dispute
157 See Lalonde, 95.
158 See Keith, 131-2? Lalonde, 96.
159 See ICJ Reports 1975, 25.
160 See ibid., 25. See also, Blaydes, 360.
161 See Blaydes, 360-1; Lalonde, 96-8 and 99;
Pomerance, 295-6.
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between states.162 Furthermore, in so far as advisory 
opinions are formally and technically speaking, not binding 
on either the Court, the requesting organs or bodies and 
other "third parties", it is not true to say that in an 
advisory opinion the Court may dispose of the rights and 
interests of "third parties". Since, however, in practice 
such opinions are backed by the Court's authority and 
prestige, their legal effect is very similar to that of 
judgments.163 Consequently, in spite of the non-binding 
character of advisory opinions, the Court is not likely to 
depart from the reasoning contained in previous opinions if 
they are found to be applicable in later cases. To this 
extent, the Court will dispose of the rights and interests 
of "third parties" in discharging the advisory function. 
Moreover, it has undoubtedly been the usual situation for 
an advisory opinion to pronounce directly upon the rights 
and obligations of the states or parties concerned or upon 
the conditions which if fulfilled would result in the 
coming into existence, modification, or termination of such 
a right or obligation.164
(f) Advisory Opinions as Precedents165
162 See ICJ Reports 1971, 24? ibid. 1975, 26.
163 See Byman, 188? Singh, 26, 41 and 96? Pomerance, 
9 and 10, n.16? Elian, 148, n.46? Lalonde, 92? Weisberg, 
149? Fitzmaurice, 34 BYIL (1958), 142? Greig, "Advisory 
Jurisdiction", 363.
164 See ICJ Reports 1975, 20, para.19.
165 On this topic, see for example, Keith, Ch.2? Pratap, 
257-9? Lissitzyn, 18-21? McNair, International Justice. 
12-4? Adede, 61-75.
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We begin this section by observing that the remarks in 
the earlier discussion166 on the subject of the attitude of 
the Court concerning the doctrine of stare decisis in 
respect of its judgment in contentious cases are also 
equally true, indeed if not more so, of its practice as 
regards advisory opinions. In order therefore at best to 
avoid unnecessary repetition, and to reduce necessary 
repetition to the barest minimum, this section will of 
necessity be relatively brief. Its chief purpose is 
through the highlighting of some salient features of the 
Court's adherence to the doctrine of judicial precedence to 
illustrate the long-term, if indirect, impact of advisory 
opinions on "third parties".
First of all, it is necessary to explain that in the 
performance of its advisory function, the Court is not 
bound by Article 59 of its Statute in the same sense that 
it would seem it must be, if only in theory, by that 
provision in the exercise of its contentious jurisdiction. 
This is not so only because its advisory jurisdiction is 
regulated by a different set of rules, separate and 
distinct from those governing its contentious jurisdiction, 
but also because of the fact that technically speaking, 
there are no parties before the Court in such proceedings 
for whom the decision in the case would be binding in the 
sense of Article 59.
One result of this situation is that in theory the 
issue of the relationship between Article 59 of the Statute
166 See Chapter 1, above.
391
and advisory opinions does not arise.167 This would also 
be the case on the basis of the other thesis, according to 
which Article 59 is believed to refer only to intervention 
under Article 63 of the Statute.168
Another consequence is that both in theory and in 
reality, therefore, it would appear that the Court has 
greater liberty to follow the doctrine of judicial 
precedence in carrying out its advisory function than it 
would theoretically seem to possess when exercising its 
contentious jurisdiction. A good reason for this view 
consists in the fact that there is no rule to be found 
among the provisions of the Statute governing the Court*s 
advisory procedure which is similar in effect to Article 
59.169
The Court cites its own advisory opinions170 as well 
as those of its predecessor, the Permanent Court.171
167 If the thesis that as regards the Court's 
contentious jurisdiction, Article 59 refers only to the 
operative part of the judgment, rather than to the judgment 
as a whole, has any validity, it would appear that there is 
no difference between judgments and advisory opinions in 
respect of their value as precedent. See as to this, 
Chapter 1 above. See also, Keith, 28-30.
168 See as to this, Ch. 3 above. See also, Keith, 27-8; 
McNair, International Justice. 13.
169 Cf. Sloan, 851-2.
170 See Keith, 32; Pratap, 259.
171 The practice of referring to previous judgments and 
advisory opinions goes back to the time of the Permanent 
Court. See for example, Keith, 31; E. Jimenez de 
Arechaga, "Judges Ad Hoc in Advisory Proceedings", 31 ZAORV 
(1971), 722 (hereinafter "Judges Ad Hoc"). See also 
Pratap, 259; Lissitzyn, 20; McNair, International 
Justice. 12. It is curious to observe that while in this 
work McNair did not differentiate between judgments and 
advisory opinions in terms of their respective value as 
legal precedents, in a later edition of a more substantive
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The Court has not been successful in its attempts 
expressly to prevent the effect of certain aspects of an 
opinion from serving as precedents in future cases. In the 
ILO Administrative Tribunal Case, for instance, the Court 
attempted to confine the ad hoc procedural arrangements to 
that particular case by declaring that it was "not bound 
for the future by any consent it gave, or decisions which 
it made with regard to the procedure thus adopted".172 
However, the same procedural arrangements were adopted in 
subsequent cases of a similar nature.173
As far as referring to its previous holdings and 
pronouncements is concerned, the Court, in keeping with the 
practice of its predecessor, does not distinguish between 
its judgments in contentious cases and its advisory 
opinions.174 Consequently, it is perfectly normal for the
work, he seemed to have changed his view on the subject. 
See as to this note 174 below.
172 See ICJ Reports 1956, 77 at 86.
173 See, for example, the Fasla Case. ICJ Reports 1973, 
166; and the Mortished Case. ICJ Reports 1982, 325. See 
also Pratap, 258.
174 See, for instance, Lissitzyn, 18-9, esp. at 19 where 
he notes that the Court "has expressly referred to a 
previous advisory opinion as a precedent". See further, 
Sloan, 851-2? Hambro, "Authority", 5; Pratap, 257, 258; 
Rosenne, The ICJ. 493, n.2? Keith, 32. Cf., however, the 
view expressed by a former President of the Court, Lord 
McNair, with reference to the Reservations Case (ICJ 
Reports 1951, 15) that "From the point of view of their 
value as legal precedents, the opinions of the Court are 
not on the same level as its judgments." See McNair, Law 
of Treaties. 168. The sole authority cited for this 
statement is Hudson, The Permanent Court. 512. However, as 
Keith has quite rightly pointed out, "Hudson is there not 
concerned with the precedent value of opinions, but with 
their actual binding force, clearly a different matter, and 
does not support Lord McNair*s statement in any way." See 
Keith, 32, n.27. Hudson’s statement has also been referred 
to in the context of advisory opinions as precedents
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Court to refer to a principle, rule or pronouncement in an 
earlier judgment when delivering an advisory opinion and 
vice versa. To do otherwise would amount to a denial of 
the authoritative quality of advisory opinions which 
usually embody the Court's considered views of the 
questions of law posed in the requests. This might render 
the law uncertain and therefore adversely affect the 
prestige and standing of the Court.175 It is also not 
unusual to find references to both previous judgments and 
advisory opinions in an opinion actually being rendered or 
in a judgment actually being delivered.
A noteworthy feature of the Court1s adherence to 
judicial precedent176 is that there is no instance in which 
it has considered itself unable to follow a certain course 
or reach a certain decision on account of a principle, rule 
or pronouncement in an earlier opinion or decision. Thus 
the Court's preoccupation with the consistency of its 
decisions and opinions has gone hand in hand with the need 
to maintain the flexibility and dynamism necessary for the 
development of the law. It is aided in the accomplishment 
of this task by the technique of distinguishing which is 
another aspect of the doctrine of judicial precedent 
employed by the Court.177
without Comment in Pratap, 257, n.3.
175 See, for instance, Keith, 33-4? Pratap, 259? 
Lissitzyn, 19. See generally, Lachs, 237-78? Anand, 
Studies, 152-90.
176 See Keith, 34? Lissitzyn, 21? McNair, International 
Justice. 13-4.
177 See Keith, 33? Pratap, 259? Lissitzyn, 19.
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(g) Advisory Opinions as a Source of Law 178
Article 38(1)(d) directs the Court to apply among 
others, "judicial decisions” as subsidiary means for the 
determination of rules of law subject to Article 59 of the 
Statute. It is believed that the omission of any express 
reference to advisory opinions in Article 38(1)(d) was 
inadvertent and that there is no distinction between 
judgments and advisory opinions in this respect.179
The potential contribution of advisory opinions to the 
development of international law has also received clear 
recognition from the General Assembly of the United 
Nations. Included in the considerations embodied in a 
resolution which that organ adopted on 14 November 1947 
recommending greater use of the Court by the organs and 
specialised agencies of the UN through the referral of 
"difficult and important points of law” for advisory 
opinions, is a recognition by the General Assembly that it 
is of "paramount importance that the Court should be 
utilised to the greatest practicable extent in the 
progressive development of international law both in regard 
to legal issues between states and in regard to 
constitutional interpretation. ”180
178 See, for example, Pratap, 259-63? Lissitzyn, 14-6.
179 See H. Lauterpacht, Development. 22? Pratap, 257,
n.3.
180 See Resolution 171 of 14 November 1947, Official 
Records of the Second Session of the General Assembly, 
Resolutions of 16 September-29 November 1947, p.103? ICJYB 
1947-8, 19. See also Lissitzyn, 30? Pratap, 260-1? 
Rosenne, The ICJ. 216. Cf. Review of the Role of the 
Court, ICJYB 1970-1, 114-6? 1971-2, 126-7? 1972-3, 143-4?
1973-4, 129-30? 1974-5, 124-7. See further Singh, 44-50.
See the interesting anecdote concerning a suggestion by a
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The role played by advisory opinions in the 
clarification and development of international law has also 
been acknowledged in the legal literature.181
(h) Judges Ad Hoc and Advisory Proceedings182
One of the safeguards which the advisory procedure 
provides to enable states to protect their interests which 
may be involved in advisory proceedings, is the institution 
of the judge ad hoc or the national judge. This device 
ensures equality of treatment before the Court for such 
states. Indeed, the institution of judges ad hoc in the 
Court*s Statute is a corollary of the basic principle of 
the equality of the parties before the Court.183 The true 
function of the judge ad hoc is one of understanding and 
interpretation. If during deliberations in a case it 
appears that despite the best efforts of counsel for a 
party the case presented by that party has not been clearly
prominent lawyer and statesman in the early years of the 
Court that the Court might assist the General Assembly in 
the fulfilment of its functions with regard to the 
progressive development of international law and its 
codifcation, in Sloan, 840 and Pratap, 261.
181 See e.g. Hudson, "Advisory Opinions”, 999-1000; 
Sloan, 840-1? Lissitzyn, 14; Crilly, 220-1. See also 
S.M. Schwebel, "Widening the Advisory Jurisdiction of the 
International Court of Justice without Amending its 
Statute", 33 CULR (1984), 355, 361 (hereinafter "Advisory 
Jurisdiction") ; T.O. Elias, "How the ICJ Deals with 
Requests for Advisory Opinions", in The Lachs Collection. 
355 at 360*
182 See generally, Denise Mathy, "Un juge ad hoc en 
Procedure Consultative devant la Cour Internationale de 
Justice", 12 RBDI (1976), 528-54? Pratap, 203-8. On judges 
ad hoc in general, see K.S. Chatterjee, "The Role of the Ad 
Hoc Judge in the International Court of Justice", 19 IJIL 
(1979), 372-81.
183 See de Arechaga, "Judges Ad Hoc", 697-8.
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understood, the judge ad hoc is best placed to appreciate 
this and to expound to his colleagues just what it is that 
the party concerned has in mind. This is not to say that 
the judge in question necessarily considers that party's 
view to be right or that the Court should adopt it as the 
basis for its decision. However, he can ensure that any 
rejection of that approach, whether he himself favours 
rejection or not, is so reasoned as to reassure the party 
that its point of view has been understood and that justice 
has been done. The institution of judges ad hoc therefore 
provides a means to inspire confidence among the parties 
that their viewpoints and interests will receive full 
attention and consideration. It also ensures that nothing 
will be done in secrecy without the knowledge of the judges 
ad hoc, since they have total equality in every respect 
with the other members of the Court.184
Although the 1920 Hague Advisory Committee of Jurists 
recommended the appointment of judges ad hoc when a dispute 
pending between two or more states came before the Court 
for an advisory opinion,185 both the Statute of the 
Permanent Court and its Rules which operated until 1927 
were silent on the matter. Consequently, no judges ad hoc 
participated in advisory proceedings in a number of 
instances in which none of the interested states was 
represented on the Court, and even in cases where one of
184 See Singh, 193-4.
185 See Proces-Verbaux (1920), 211 and 731. See also, 
de Arechaga, "Judges Ad Hoc", 699.
the interested parties had a national judge on the 
Bench.186
In 1926, a proposal to amend the Rules to permit the 
appointment of judges ad hoc in advisory proceedings was 
turned down because of doubts as to the constitutionality 
of such an action.187 In 1927 the issue of the seating of 
judges ad hoc in advisory proceedings arose in an acute 
form when, in The European Commission on the Danube Case188 
all the interested states except Rumania were represented 
on the Court. However, as the French judge was unable to 
sit, the Rumanian deputy judge was summoned to take his 
place.189 The Rules were amended in September 1927 to 
permit the appointment of judges ad hoc when a question 
relating to an existing dispute between two or more states 
is submitted to the court for an advisory opinion.190 
Subsequently, judges ad hoc participated in a number of
186 See the Eastern Carelia Case. PCIJ Series B . No.5, 
7? Series B . No.10, 6? Series E. No.3, 223-4? Series B . 
No. 12, 6. See also de Arechaga, "Judges Ad Hoc", 700? 
Hambro, "Authority", 7-8? Keith, 183.
187 See PCIJ Series D . No.2 (Add), 185-93 and Series E . 
No.3, 224. See also, de Arechaga, "Judges Ad Hoc", 700-1? 
Hambro, "Authority", 8? Keith, 183.
188 See PCIJ Series B. No. 14, 6. This case involved a 
dispute between Great Britain, France and Italy on the one 
hand, and Rumania on the other.
189 See PCIJ Series E . No.4, 77. See also, de Arechaga, 
"Judges Ad Hoc", 702? Keith, 183-4.
190 See PCIJ Series E . No.4, 72-8 and 196-7. See also, 
de Arechaga, "Judges Ad Hoc", 702-4? M. Pomerance, "The 
Admission of Judges Ad Hoc in Advisory Proceedings: Some 
Reflections in the Light of the Namibia Case", 67 AJIL
(1973), 447-8 (hereinafter "Admission")? Hambro,
"Authority", 8? Keith, 184.
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advisory opinions delivered by the Permanent Court.191 
Applications for the appointment of judges ad hoc were 
turned down in The Austro-German Customs Union Case192 and 
the Danzia Legislative Decrees Case.193 In The Minority 
Schools in Albania Case.194 the Albanian government 
apparently did not apply to be permitted to seat a judge ad 
hoc, but the Court expressed the view that the question did 
not relate to an existing dispute and that Article 71(2) of 
the Rules was therefore inapplicable.195
The introduction of the principle of allowing the 
appointment of judges ad hoc in advisory proceedings was 
reinforced by Article 68, a new provision concerning 
advisory opinions, which was written into the Statute of 
the Permanent Court as a result of the 1929 revision 
protocol. This provision, which granted the Court a 
general discretion196 to assimilate its advisory procedure 
to that followed in contentious proceedings, would by 
implication appear to include the principle of permitting
191 See Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig. PCIJ 
Series B . No.15, 4; Greco-Bulgarian Communities. PCIJ 
Series B . No.17, 4; Railway Traffic between Lithuania and 
Poland. PCIJ Series A/B. No.42, 108? Polish War Vessels in 
the Port of Danzig. PCIJ Series A/B. No.43, 128? Treatment 
of Polish Nationals in Danzig. PCIJ Series A/B. No.44, 4. 
See Pomerance, "Admission”, 448? de Arechaga, "Judges Ad 
Hoc", 704. See also, Suh, 20-1.
192 See PCIJ Series A/B. No.41, 88.
193 See PCIJ Series A/B. No. 65, 69.
194 See PCIJ Series A/B. No. 64, 4.
195 See ibid., 6. For a discussion of these cases, see 
also, de Arechaga, "Judges Ad Hoc", 704-6? Pomerance, 
"Admission", 448-9? Hambro, "Authority", 9? Keith, 184.
196 See ICJ Reports 1950, 72? ibid., 1951, 19. See 
also, de Arechaga, "Judges Ad Hoc", 708.
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the seating of judges ad hoc in appropriate advisory 
cases.197 It has however been argued that the wide 
discretionary power which is granted to the Court under 
Article 68 must by its very nature be considered to be of 
an exceptional character, not susceptible of being enlarged 
by an extensive interpretation. This power has been 
granted in respect of those provisions of the Statute which 
apply only in contentious cases, but not with regard to the 
category of statutory provisions appearing in the chapter 
of the Statute concerning the Court's organisation, which 
are of an ambivalent character in that they apply directly 
and ex proorio vigore both to contentious and advisory 
proceedings. These provisions must be applied and not 
merely serve as a guide both in contentious and advisory 
proceedings, and they must be applied to the full extent, 
and not to the extent to which the Court recognises them to 
be applicable. They must also be applied in every case in 
which the precise circumstances which they define are 
present. Therefore, in every advisory case in which the 
Court sees before it contesting parties, in order to ensure 
equality between them regarding their representation on the 
Bench, the Court is both empowered and obliged to apply 
Article 31 of the Statute and to admit judges ad hoc as the 
case may be. According to this argument, this is the 
principle contained in the Rules of Court. If in a given 
case, the Court finds that the conditions laid down in the 
Rules do not exist, it has no discretion to appoint a judge 
ad hoc for reasons of convenience or preference. A judge
197 See Suh, 25? Hambro, "Authority", 8.
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ad hoc who participates in the proceedings on terms of 
complete equality with his colleagues, the regular judges, 
cannot be added to the Court unless the legal conditions 
prescribed are present.198 Article 68 of the Statute of 
the Permanent Court has been retained in the Statute of the 
International Court. The provisions of the Rules 
concerning judges ad hoc in advisory proceedings have, with
certain drafting changes, also found their way into the
Rules of the International Court.199 Since the
International Court has so far not followed its
predecessor's practice of publishing the minutes concerning 
the elaboration of its Rules, there is no way of knowing to 
what extent the judges intended to apply Article 31 of the 
Statute in advisory proceedings.200
The International Court rejected an application by 
South Africa for the appointment of a judge ad hoc in the
198 See as to this, de Arechaga, "Judges Ad Hoc", 708-
10.
199 The phrase "any dispute or question" in Article 82 
of the old Rules was replaced by the phrase "any legal 
question" in order to take account of the substitution of 
the phrase "any legal question" in Article 96 of the UN 
Charter for the phrase "any dispute or question" in Article 
14 of the League Covenant. See ICJYB 1946-7, 103. See 
also, Suh, 27-8? Hambro, "Authority", 9-11. See further, 
Articles 82(1) and 83 of the 1946 Rules, Articles 87(1) and 
89 of the 1972 Rules and Article 102 of the 1978 Rules. 
The expression "legal question actually pending between two 
or more states" is evidently wider than the word "dispute". 
However, it is doubtful whether this difference is 
significant. What seems certain is that if there is a 
dispute between two states, then there is a legal question 
actually pending between them. See Singh, 94.
200 See Suh, 28; Pomerance, "Admission", 451; Rosenne, 
The ICJ. 445? Hambro, "Authority", 9.
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Namibia Case.201 In the view of the Court, there was no 
dispute or any legal question actually pending between two 
or more states.202 The fact that the Court in order to 
answer the question put to it for an advisory opinion may 
have to rule on disputed issues, does not necessarily make 
the question a dispute or a legal question actually pending 
between two or more states.203 The Court also stated that 
it had no residuary discretion to permit the seating of 
such a judge.204 However, there is room for the view that 
the court could have granted South Africa's request not as 
a matter of right pursuant to Rule 83, but as a matter of 
the Court's discretion under Article 68 of the Statute and 
Article 82 of the Rules. Even assuming that the request 
does not relate to a legal question actually pending 
between two or more states, the latter provision would 
still leave room for the exercise of discretion. Although 
the legal pendency test is paramount, it is not 
determinative. It would seem that Article 68 gives the 
Court a measure of flexibility to make such an appointment 
under other circumstances. This provision operates as an
201 See ICJ Reports 1971, 12. See generally, Pomerance, 
"Admission”, 446-64.
202 Cf. ICJ Reports 1962, 319 where the Court found that 
a dispute existed between South Africa and the applicants, 
Ethiopia and Liberia. This finding was used by South 
Africa as the basis for the case for its application. For 
a discussion of the arguments of South Africa, see 
Pomerance, "Admission", 449ff.
203 See ICJ Reports 1971, 24, para. 34.
204 See ICJ Reports 1971, 24-7. See also, de Arechaga, 
"Judges Ad Hoc", 706ff? Suh, 36-7. Cf. Preston Brown, 
"The 1971 ICJ Advisory Opinion on South West Africa 
(Namibia)", 5 VJIL (1971), 213, 224-6 (hereinafter
"Brown").
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assurance to states that the fact that a particular 
interstate dispute is handled in the context of a request 
for an advisory opinion does not signify that the parties 
to that dispute lose the protection of the principles and 
rules of judicial procedure which operate in the context of 
a contentious case. Even in its absence, the Court would 
have been bound to see that such protection was available, 
since, as a court of justice, it is bound to observe the 
essential rules which govern all judicial activity.205 It 
may also be argued that since in its 1966 judgment the 
Court had held that the applicants lacked the locus standi 
to bring a case against South Africa,206 the request in the 
Namibia Case did not relate to a legal question or dispute 
actually pending between two or more states. Indeed, South 
Africa was hard pressed to specify precisely with which 
states it was in dispute.207 This is not of course to say 
that as far as the Namibia Case was concerned, South Africa 
was not an interested state. South Africa's interest in 
the case was undeniable.
In the Western Sahara Case. in which Spain, the 
administering power of the territory of Western Sahara and 
one of the parties directly interested in the case, was 
represented on the Court, Mauritania and Morocco, the other 
parties directly interested in the case, each applied to 
the Court to be permitted to seat a judge ad hoc. In their 
view, there was a legal question actually pending between
205 See PCIJ Series B. No.5, 29. See also, Singh, 94.
206 See ICJ Reports 1966, 6.
207 See Pomerance, "Admission”, 452.
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each of them and Spain over the territory. Morocco*s 
application was granted, but that of Mauritania refused. 
The Court found that at the particular time, there appeared 
to be a legal dispute between Morocco and Spain regarding 
the territory of Western Sahara, that the questions 
contained in the request for the opinion may be considered 
to be connected with that dispute and that in consequence, 
for purposes of the application of Article 89 of the 
rules208 the advisory opinion requested in that resolution 
appears to be one on a legal question actually pending 
between two or more states.209
We find the Court*s refusal to allow Mauritania to 
seat a judge ad hoc very puzzling. First, Mauritania, 
whose interest in the case was considerable, was 
undoubtedly a "third party” in the proceedings according to 
the definition of "third parties" suggested in this 
chapter. Secondly, it is true that had Spain accepted 
Morocco*s earlier proposal to submit their dispute over 
Western Sahara to the Court's contentious jurisdiction, 
Mauritania which laid independent rival claims to the 
territory would, in the context of such proceedings, have 
been a classic third party entitled to intervene therein.
208 See Article 102 of the 1978 Rules.
209 See ICJ Reports 1975, 71. Cf. ibid., 103-5,
declaration of Singh J, for a critical appraisal of this 
decision. See also, Singh, 94? Suh, 37; B.O. Okere, "The 
Western Sahara Case", 28 ICLO (1979), 299-301 (hereinafter 
"Okere")? Janis, 609-10? Blaydes, 354-5. For a criticism 
of the rejection of Mauritania's application to seat a 
judge ad hoc, see Okere, 300-1? F. Wooldridge, "The 
Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice in 
the Western Sahara Case", 8 ALR (1979), 92 (hereinafter
"Wooldridge").
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By amending its rules to permit the seating of judges 
ad hoc in advisory cases, and by introducing Article 68 
into the Statute, the Court was deliberately assimilating 
its advisory procedure to that followed in contentious 
cases in order to remain faithful to the requirements of 
its judicial character even when it is performing its 
advisory function*210 However, as things stand at present, 
in advisory proceedings it is not always possible to ensure 
fairness and equality of treatment to all "third parties" 
as regards representation of their interests on the Court. 
For instance, if a dispute between an international 
organisation and a state in whose territory the 
headquarters of that international organisation is based is 
referred to the Court for a binding advisory opinion, as is 
required by several of the treaties regulating the status 
of the headquarters of international organisations, their 
privileges and immunities, the disputant state may have a 
judge on the Court. On the Danzig precedent,211 the 
disputant organisation would be in a position of inequality 
as to representation on the Court.212
The same situation would obtain in advisory 
proceedings concerning such UN activities as decolonisation
210 See for example, the report of Loder, Moore and 
Anzilotti JJ. and the comments of V-P. Weiss in PCIJ Series 
E, No.4, 75-7 and 73 respectively, as well as the comment 
of Lord Finlay, ibid., 78.
211 In the Danzig Legislative Decrees Case, the 
application of the Danzig Senate for a judge ad hoc was 
refused because of the absence of a dispute between states. 
See PCIJ Series C . No.77, 171; ibid. Series A/B. No.65, 
69.
212 See as to this, Keith, 184-5.
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and the promotion of the principle of self-determination. 
If a dispute exists in a case of this kind, it is certainly 
a dispute between the UN and whichever state or states 
which might happen to be most directly interested or 
concerned. Clearly, since such a dispute is not one 
between states, the need to ensure equal representation is 
probably not a critical consideration. However, assuming 
that it is, it is difficult to see how it can be satisfied 
in respect of the UN, which is not a state. That such a 
scenario falls outside the purview of the rules concerning 
the seating of judges ad hoc in advisory proceedings might 
help to explain the Court's refusal to grant South Africa's 
application for a judge ad hoc in the Namibia Case. This 
reason might also account for the rejection of Mauritania's 
application to seat a judge ad hoc in the Western Sahara 
Case, since the Court there found that there was no dispute 
pending between Mauritania and Spain. However, the analogy 
between the position of South Africa in the Namibia Case 
and that of Mauritania in the Western Sahara Case cannot be 
carried any further, since in the latter case the Court 
found, probably on the basis of the antecedents of the 
case, that there was a dispute between Morocco and Spain. 
Although prior to the request for the opinion Mauritania 
had not suggested to either Spain or Morocco to submit 
their differences over Western Sahara to the Court for 
settlement, Mauritania had made known its own independent 
and rival claims to Western Sahara.213 Even if,
213 The merit of the Mauritanian case for a judge ad hoc 
was reflected in the closeness of the vote on its 
application. The application was rejected by one vote.
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technically speaking, there was no dispute between 
Mauritania and either Spain or Morocco, the fact still 
remained that Mauritanian interest in the proceedings was 
considerable. Surely, the need to preserve the judicial 
character of the Court even in advisory proceedings entails 
not only the need to ensure equal representation on the 
Court of interested parties, but also, the need to afford 
such states the means to protect their interests. The 
institution of the judge ad hoc could serve this purpose. 
For this reason, South Africa and Mauritania might have 
been permitted to seat a judge ad hoc in the Namibia and 
Western Sahara Cases respectively.214 Furthermore, the 
fact that a request for an advisory opinion relates to a 
dispute between a state or states and the UN, rather than 
between states does not dispense with the need to ensure 
confidence in the impartiality of the Court in the 
proceedings, as well as the credibility of the proceedings 
themselves.
Two policy considerations have been identified as 
being either singly or jointly responsible for the Court*s 
attitude to the institution of judges ad hoc. First, the 
Court appears to consider that the right to appoint judges
214 Although in both these cases, the representation of 
South Africa and Mauritania by judges ad hoc would have 
made little difference in the outcome of the proceedings, 
the Austro-German Customs Union Case shows that the 
presence of the judge ad hoc could have a decisive 
influence on the outcome of a case. In that case, the vote 
on the substantive question was 8-7. Had Austria*s 
application for a judge ad hoc been accepted - acceptance 
of the Czechoslovakian application was not endorsed by any 
of the judges - the vote would probably have been evenly 
divided 8-8 and with the casting vote of the President, a 
member of the minority of 7, 9-8 in favour of the Austrian 
position. See Pomerance, "Admission”, 447, n.9.
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ad hoc should be held to the barest minimum required by the 
Statute and the Rules. Such a restrictive approach to the 
system of judges ad hoc is entirely consistent with 
longstanding doctrinal criticism of that system as an 
undesirable relic of the concept of arbitration grafted on 
to the Court and detracting from that body's role as an 
international magistrature.215
The second policy consideration is related to a 
general policy with respect to advisory opinions. Unlike 
its predecessor, the International Court has tended to 
ignore and isolate the quasi-contentious elements involved 
in advisory opinions and to view all requests in a strictly 
formalistic light as matters concerning solely the 
requesting organ and the Court. This tendency has been 
accompanied by the enunciation of a new doctrine based on 
the organic relationship between the Court and the UN and 
involving a duty to cooperate with UN organs barring 
countervailing compelling reasons. The wisdom of such a 
restrictive attitude towards the system of judges ad hoc in 
situations in which it is essential to the character of the 
Court as a judicial body and the judicial nature of the 
advisory function to ensure equality and fairness between 
the interested parties as regards representation on the 
bench, may, however, be questioned.
One result of the Court's attitude is that states 
directly concerned in and dissatisfied with particular
215 See Pomerance, ''Admission”, 461-2. Cf. Singh, 194 
for the view that "Recognising... that the Court is dealing 
with sovereign states as parties, the institution of ad hoc 
judges ... is, nevertheless, one with utility in the 
international context".
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advisory opinions have frequently refused to accept them. 
The court has in effect discouraged states from lending 
their participation which is so critical to the Court’s 
effectiveness.
Once the form of the requests for advisory opinions 
rather than the reality behind them becomes determinative 
for the Court, it tends to see only one kind of advisory 
opinion, and the differentiation between the contentious 
and advisory jurisdictions become sharper. The Court has 
tended in practice to abolish the distinction between 
dispute and question with respect to advisory opinions. 
The Court has thus, albeit for different reasons, moved 
towards partial acceptance of the thesis advocated by Judge
Azevedo in the early years of the International Court.216
Judge Azevedo had argued that the substitution of the new 
formula "any legal question” in Article 96 of the UN 
Charter for "any dispute or question” in Article 14 of the 
League Covenant signifies the intention to suppress the 
anomaly of advisory arbitration and to allow opinions only 
of a theoretical or abstract nature as far removed as 
possible from concrete situations of fact. Henceforward, 
there could only be one category of advisory opinions and 
Articles 82 and 83 of the 1946 Rules, which endeavoured to 
maintain an obsolete system represented by the dangerous 
distinction between a question and a dispute were therefore 
objectionable and should be abolished.217 Judge Azevedo in 
effect advocated in place of the former process of
216 See ICJ Reports 1948, 73-81 and ibid. 1950, 79-88.
217 See ICJ Reports 1950, 85-6.
assimilation of the advisory and contentious jurisdictions 
the building of "a wall between the contentious and 
advisory functions”.218
In fairness to the Court, it must be noted that with 
the exception of the Namibia and the Western Sahara 
opinions, there has been no request for the appointment of 
judges ad hoc. Both the Statute and the Rules make it 
quite clear that the initiative for any appointment must 
come from the states concerned. Since such requests have 
not been as forthcoming as it would seem they might have 
been, the Court has not been called upon to consider the 
issue as often as might have been expected.219 In the 
Peace Treaties Case, after having found that the states 
accused of the violation of human rights provisions of the 
peace treaties and their accusers held clearly opposite 
views, the Court concluded that a dispute existed between 
the two sides.220 In that case, some of the dissenting 
judges thought that the consent of the three states 
concerned was necessary for the Court to accede to the 
request for the opinion, and that the appointment of judges 
ad hoc would have signified such consent. Since the three 
states concerned had refused to take part in the 
proceedings, let alone apply to be permitted to seat judges
218 See ICJ Reports 1950, 88. See also, Pomerance, 
"Admission”, 462-4.
219 See Keith, 185; Pomerance, "Admission”, 457; PCIJ 
Series A/B. No.41, 37-40. It has been reported that
tentative enquiries made by South Africa in the 1950 South 
West Africa (Statusl Case concerning the appointment of a 
judge ad hoc were not pursued. See Rosenne, Procedure, 
215, n.7.
220 See ICJ Reports 1950, 74.
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ad hoc, it is difficult to see how the Court could, proorio 
motu. have allowed them to nominate judges ad hoc to 
represent them in the proceedings.221
The thesis that the Court has no residuary discretion 
under Article 68 of the Statute to permit the seating of a 
judge ad hoc is flawed not only because it wrongly gives 
precedence to the Rules over the Statute, but also in view 
of the fact that it puts a much narrower construction on 
Article 68 than its spirit and tenor, if not its letter 
would appear to suggest. Considering that the Rules are 
subordinate and supplementary to the Statute, which they 
interpret and apply, the conditions which they prescribe 
for the seating of judges ad hoc in advisory proceedings 
constitute their construction of the relevant statutory 
provisions. Consequently, a finding by the Court that the 
conditions specified by the Rules for the seating of judges 
ad hoc in advisory proceedings are absent, also amounts to 
a finding that Article 68 which grants the Court the 
latitude to assimilate the advisory to the contentious 
procedure, is inapplicable.
(i) Individuals or Private Persons 222
221 See ICJ Reports 1950, 91? JJ. Winiarski, 100-1; 
Zoricic,1 107; Krylov, 111. See also Suh, 31.
222 See generally, H. Lauterpacht, "The Subjects of the 
Law of Nations: Parts I, II and III", 63 LQR (1947), 439-4 
and 450-60? I. Brownlie, Principles of Public
International Law. 4th ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 
580-602? this is the edition cited in the rest of this 
chapter? J.G. Starke, The Introduction to International 
Law. 10th ed. (London: Butterworths, 1989), 58-70
(hereinafter "International Law"): Mani, "Review", 33-5?
E. Lauterpacht, Aspects. 67-72.
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The final category of "third parties” are private 
persons or individuals, for whom in keeping with the 
traditional notion that only states have full procedural 
capacity in international law there is no access to the 
International Court either in contentious or advisory 
proceedings.223 This is so notwithstanding that in this 
century various attempts have been made to grant such 
persons access to other international tribunals.224 
However, both the Permanent Court and the present Court 
have at various times been faced with the problem of access 
to such "third parties” in advisory proceedings involving 
petitioners from minority groups and individual employees 
of international organisations. For either Court, the 
problem has always been how to reply to requests for 
opinions involving such "third parties”, while still 
remaining faithful to its judicial character by observing 
such requirements of justice as the principles of audiatur
223 See E.M. Hambro, "Individuals Before International 
Tribunals”, 35 ASILP (1941), 22 (hereinafter
"Individuals”); S. Frey, "L'Individu devant les
Juridictions Internationales", 39 RDIDC (1962), 437-68,
esp. 437-9 (hereinafter "Frey"). An exceptional situation 
of the Court being open to individuals is when it is 
empowered to establish a procedure for dealing with 
disputes between the Registrar and the staff of the 
Registry under Article 17 of the staff regulations. 
Disputes over pensions, however, are referred to the UN 
Administrative Tribunal. See ICJYB 1946-7, 66. See also, 
Bowett, International Institutions. 318. On individuals or 
private persons in international law see generally J.J. 
Lador-Lederer, "The Individual and his Access to 
International Jurisdiction", Israeli Reports to Sixth 
International Congress of Comparative Law (Hebrew 
University of Jerusalem, Institute for Legislative Research 
of Comparative Law, 1962), 113-35.
224 For instances of such attempts, see Hambro, 
"Individuals", 24ff. For instances in Europe in which this 
has been successfully accomplished, see Frey, 437-68.
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et altera pars and the necessity to marshall all the 
necessary information relevant to the question submitted 
for an opinion. The procedure and the substantive 
applicable law which have been employed to solve the 
problem have been far from satisfactory.
The procedure followed in advisory proceedings 
involving minority groups in states bound by minority 
treaties, may be briefly noted in connection with the 
problem of access by individuals to the Court. In such 
cases, the parties to the disputes were usually the 
petitioners, who were nationals of the defendant state. 
Although such minority groups might have been entitled to 
access to the Court on terms of complete equality with the 
opposing parties, the fact of the matter is that, with the 
exception of the Polish-German Upper Silesia Convention,225 
they had no status whatsoever under the minority treaties 
before the Council of the League. It was only as a "matter 
of grace" that the Council, on the suggestion of the 
committee of three of its members specifically set up for 
this purpose, actually considered the petitions. In those 
circumstances, the petitioners could make no claim to be 
directly represented before the Council, let alone before 
the Court. Nor was it possible under any customary rule of 
equality before international tribunals for them to be 
represented in minority cases by the defendant states of 
which they were invariably inhabitants. In such cases they 
were under the rules as to equality represented by the
225 Which was relevant only to the German Minority 
Schools Case.
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states with which they had the closest connection. Such 
states were always notified of the requests in the minority 
cases involving petitioners and were permitted to appear 
before the Court, thus avoiding any suggestion that the 
principle of equality was not observed. One commentator 
has therefore remarked that "whether the petitioners had 
any status before the Court, and they generally did not, 
the state with which they were most closely connected other 
than the defendant state took full and equal part in the 
proceedings".226
Another instance of the problem of access to the Court 
by individuals in advisory proceedings arose in the Danzig 
Legislative Decrees Case, in which there was a dispute 
between the defendant, the government on the one hand, and 
the petitioners (three minority parties in the opposition) 
on the other, as to the consistency of two decrees amending 
the Penal Law which were adopted by the Danzig Senate. The 
latter could send documentation to the Court through the 
Secretary-General of the League whereas the former was 
represented before the Court. There was no state to which 
the petitioners were closely connected which could 
appropriately adopt their case as happened with the 
minority opinions. The parties to the dispute were 
therefore in a position of inequality before the Court.
The League Council probably had at the back of its 
mind the problem of the inequality of the parties which 
arose in the Danzig Legislative Decrees Case when, in a 
resolution of 14 December 1939 requesting the Court*s
226 See Keith, 162.
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opinion in the matter of the ex-officials of the governing 
commissions of the Saar teritory, it included elaborate 
provisions to ensure equality between the Secretary-General 
of the League and the ex-officials and to forestall the 
possible necessity of the appearance of the latter or their 
representatives before the Court. The resolution provided 
for exchanges of memoranda between the Secretary-General 
and the claimants and for such documents to be submitted to 
the Court along with the request for the advisory opinion. 
The League Council also renounced its right under Article 
66 of the Statute to present written and oral statements to 
the Court. The outbreak of war frustrated the request.227 
Had the Court dealt with the request, the waiver by the 
League Council of its rights would have resulted in a 
truncated procedure which would have deprived the Court of 
the benefit of the contentious procedure provided for in 
Article 66 of the Statute. Although the procedure adopted 
might have brought about equality between the parties, it 
would also have resulted in the paradox of there being no 
parties at all before the Court.228
In the case of the present Court, the problem has 
arisen in connection with its special role as a review 
tribunal for the administrative tribunals of the United 
Nations and the ILO. This special procedure is intended to 
resolve disputes arising between international
227 See PCIJ Series E . No. 16, 60ff; LNOJ 1939, 502-3? 
see also, Pratap, 189-90; Cheng, 246? Pomerance, 318? 
Keith, 168.
228 See Gross, "Participation'1, 16 at 18
; Pratap, 190.
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organisations and their personnel.229 The problem arose in 
an acute form in the ILO Administrative Tribunal Case230 in 
which the Executive Board of UNESCO requested an advisory 
opinion on matters arising out of the Administrative 
Tribunal's decision allowing the appeal of some employees 
of UNESCO against the refusal of the Director-General of 
that organisation to renew their contracts of employment. 
This challenge procedure was clearly an appeal of process 
for review in continuation of the proceedings before the 
Tribunal in which the real parties were the former 
employees and the organisation. Under the provisions of 
the Statute governing both the contentious and advisory 
procedure of the Court, the former employees of UNESCO 
could not appear before the Court. It was only UNESCO 
which could enjoy this right. Pursuant to Article 66(2) of 
the Court's Statute, the President advised members of 
UNESCO entitled to appear before the Court, the ILO and 
other organisations which had recognised the jurisdiction 
of the Administrative Tribunal, that they were entitled to 
present statements to the Court. Further procedure was
229 The Court's jurisdiction may also be invoked when 
a party is dissatisfied with the decision of the 
appropriate administrative organ of a specialised agency. 
Cf. the ICAO : ~ Case. By virtue of Article 84 of the 
Chicago International Civil Aviation Convention, 1944, 
Article 2, s.2 of the International Air Services Transit 
Agreement of 1944 and the Council's rules for the 
settlement of differences a party may appeal "to an ad hoc 
arbitral tribunal agreed upon with the other parties to the 
dispute or to the ICJ". See as to this, Lachs, 239, 275.
230 For a distinction of this case from the earlier UN 
Administrative Tribunal Case. see Pratap, 190, n.3; 
Rosenne, The ICJ. 247? Keith, 171, n.119.
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reserved.231 Following correspondence involving counsel 
for the former employees of UNESCO, the legal advisor to 
UNESCO and the Registrar, it was agreed that UNESCO would 
forward to the Court without verifying their contents the 
statements of the former employees,232 as an appendix to 
the statement of UNESCO. The Court dispensed with oral 
hearings and in lieu thereof, allowed states and 
international organisations a further opportunity to 
present written statements. Supplementary observations 
prepared by the former employees commenting on statements 
already filed were also sent to the Court annexed to the 
reply of UNESCO.233
The Court then observed that as a judicial body it was 
bound to remain faithful to the requirements of its 
judicial character in the exercise of its advisory 
functions.234 In this connection, the Court noted the 
overriding importance of the concept of the equality of the 
parties to judicial proceedings.235 The Court recognised 
that both in their origin and in their progress, the 
advisory proceedings involved a certain absence of equality 
between UNESCO and its former staff members.236 The 
original inequality which pertained to the pre-trial stage
231 See ICJ Reports 1955, 127? Keith, 172.
232 See ICJ Pleadings 1956, 235-6, 237-8, 245-6, 247-8, 
249, 253, 254 and 256. See also Keith, 172-3.
233 See ICJ Pleadings, ibid., 170-83, 219-23, 258-9 and 
266. See also Keith, 173.
234 See ICJ Reports 1956, 84.
235 See ibid., 85.
236 See ibid.
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stemmed from the fact that under Article XII237 of the 
Statute of the Administrative Tribunal, only the Executive 
Board of UNESCO can request an advisory opinion of the 
Court in respect of the judgments of the Tribunal. The 
inequality in the progress of the proceedings related to 
the lack of procedural capacity of the former UNESCO 
employees under Article 66 of the Statute of the Court.
The Court held that the absence of equality between 
the parties under Article XII of the Statute of the 
Tribunal, which pertained to the origin of the instant 
proceedings, did not in fact constitute an inequality 
before the Court because it was antecedent to the 
examination of the question in the case and did not affect 
the manner in which that examination was undertaken. A
237 The amended Article XI of the Statute of the UN 
Administrative Tribunal sought to minimise the difficulties 
resulting from the absence of equality between UNESCO and 
its former employees in advisory proceedings by attempting 
to place states, the Secretary-General and the employees of 
the organisation on a relatively more equal footing in the 
pre-trial stage. The Article established a Committee on 
Applications for review which can in certain circumstances 
on the request of a member state, the Secretary-General or 
the individual affected by the judgment seek advisory 
opinions. If this procedure is invoked, the Secretary- 
General is required to arrange to transmit to the Court the 
views of the individual affected by the judgment. Further, 
the Secretary-General undertook to consider it his 
responsibility to ensure as far as possible an equality of 
rights with regard to the staff member concerned and 
accordingly, proposed to follow the procedure adopted by 
the League Council in the case of the ex-officials of the 
Saar. See GA(X) , a.l, 49, 38. The General Assembly
recommended that member states and the Secretary-General 
should not make oral statements before the Court in any 
proceedings under the new Article. See GA Res.957 (X). See 
as to this, Keith, 169-70 and 175, n.151; Pratap, 68-71 
and 194. The point has however been made that given the 
provisions of Article XVII of the ILO Administrative 
Tribunal Statute and the amended Article XI of the UN 
Administrative Tribunal Statute, more and perhaps more 
serious difficulties may be anticipated in the future. See 
Pomerance, 313.
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consideration which might seem to support better the 
Court's conclusion, although the Court made little use of 
it, would consist in the fact that the Administrative 
Tribunal constitutes in reality an additional safeguard 
created at their own expense by international organisations 
purely for the benefit of their officials and, in the case 
of the ILO also other persons with whom the I.L.O. has 
concluded a contract which provides for the submission of 
disputes concerning its execution to the Administrative 
Tribunal. Under such circumstances, the unilateral right 
of the international organisation concerned not to appeal 
against its judgments but only to challenge them on the 
grounds of invalidity may not perhaps appear to be so great 
an inequality as to prevent the Court from cooperating in 
its review procedure.233 The Court further pointed out 
that the absence of equality between the parties to the 
judgments was somewhat nominal since the former employees 
had been successful in the proceedings before the 
Administrative Tribunal and there was accordingly no 
question of any complaint on their part. The Court 
therefore considered it unnecessary to pronounce on the 
legal merits of Article XII of the Statute of the 
Administrative Tribunal.239 As regards the difficulty 
relating to the absence of equality between the parties to 
the advisory proceedings resulting from Article 66(2) of 
its Statute, the Court observed that:
The difficulty was met on the one hand by the
238 See Cheng, 246.
239 See ICJ Reports 1956, 85-6.
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procedure under which the observations of the 
officials were made available to the Court through the 
intermediary of UNESCO and on the other hand, by 
dispensing with oral proceedings. The Court is not 
bound for the future by any consent which it gave or 
decisions which it made with regard to the procedure 
thus adopted. In the present case, the procedure 
which was adopted has not given rise to any objection 
on the part of those concerned. It has been consented 
to by counsel for the officials in whose favour the 
judgments were given. The principle of the equality 
of the parties flows from the requirements of the good 
administration of justice. These requirements have 
not been impaired in the present case by the 
circumstance that the written statements on behalf of 
the officials was submitted through UNESCO. Finally, 
although no oral proceedings were held, the Court is 
satisfied that adequate information has been made 
available to it. In view of this, there would appear 
to be no compelling reason why the Court should not 
lend its assistance to the solution of a problem 
confronting a specialised agency of the United Nations 
authorised to ask for an advisory opinion of the 
Court. Notwithstanding the permissive character of 
Article 65 of the Statute in the matter of advisory 
opinions, only compelling reasons could cause the 
Court to adopt in this matter a negative attitude 
which would imperil the working of the regime 
established by the Statute of the Administrative 
Tribunal for the judicial protection of officials. 
Any seeming or nominal absence of equality ought not 
to be allowed to obscure or defeat that primary 
ob j ect.240
The procedure adopted in the ILO Administrative 
Tribunal Case was followed in a later proceeding involving 
a review of United Nations Administrative Tribunal Judgment 
No.158. The Court considered written statements of the 
views of Mr. Mohammed Fasla, the former United Nations 
staff member affected by the judgment through the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations and statements of 
the Secretary-General on behalf of the organisation. The 
Court decided not to hold public hearings for the
240 See ibid.
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submission of oral statements in the case.241 The 
procedure employed in this case would appear to resemble 
very closely that envisaged under the amended Article XI of 
the Statute of the UN Administrative Tribunal.
The procedure adopted in these cases to get around the 
difficulty relating to the problem of equal access to the 
Court for the parties is unsatisfactory,242 notwithstanding 
the fact that it was consented to by the persons concerned 
or their representatives, because far from solving the 
problem of inequality of the parties before the Court, it 
probably only succeeded in minimising it.243 Indeed, the 
lack of equality between the parties was the common ground 
on the basis of which the dissenting judges in the ILO 
Administrative Tribunal Case argued either that the Court 
should have exercised its discretion against giving the 
opinion,244 or that the Court lacked the competence to
241 See the Fasla Case. ICJ Reports 1973, 166. See also 
the Mortished Case. ibid. 1982, 325; the Yakimetz Case, 
ibid. 1987, 18.
242 Cf. the Fasla Case. ICJ Reports 1973, 172; the 
Mortished Case. ibid. 1982, 342. See also, Lachs, -
, \ 276.
243 The unsatisfactory nature of the procedure is 
underlined by the fact that one of the parties had to 
submit its views to the Court through the intermediary of 
the other party, its adversary. The decision to dispense 
with oral proceedings deprived the Court of a means by 
which it usually obtains clarification of the issues before 
it. A request by a state or international organisation 
mentioned under Article 66(2) of the Statute for a hearing 
would have placed the Court in a dilemma and amounted to a 
veto on its right to reply. See the dissenting opinions of 
JJ. Winiarski, Klaestad and Zafrulla Khan in ICJ Reports 
1956, 107-8, 110 and 114-5 respectively. See also Keith, 
176-80.
244 See the dissenting opinions of JJ. Winiarski, 
Klaestad and Zafrulla Khan in ICJ Reports 1956, 104, 109 
and 114 respectively.
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deliver the opinion.245 Similarly, in the Danzig
Legislative Decrees Case. Anzilotti J. in his dissenting
opinion reasoned as follows:
The essential point to my mind is that the Court in 
order to be able to give its opinion was obliged 
either to set aside its rules and create a procedure 
ad hoc, or to deviate from a rule so fundamental as 
that of the equality of the parties. This may thus 
suffice to lead to the conclusion that the opinion 
asked for was outside the scope of the functions for 
which the Court has been created and organised and 
that it should not have given the opinion.246
The problem of lack of equality between the parties is
not solved however by simply denying access to individuals
in proceedings before the Court on the ground that they
have not been given any procedural capacity under the
Statute and the Rules. The difficulty arises because a
request for an opinion may directly concern the rights of
individuals and in such a situation the Court must, in
order to do justice effectively, provide them with the
opportunity to submit their views whether or not they are
parties as a matter of procedure. To give the opinion
without hearing them would be violating the principle of
audiatur et altera pars.247
In this connection, two possible solutions have been
suggested. First, in reviewing judgments of the ILO
Administrative Tribunal, the Court may admit verbal and
oral statements from private individuals directly affected
245 See the dissenting opinion of J. Cordova in ICJ 
Reports 1956, 155ff.
246 See PCIJ Series A/B. No. 65, 66.
247 See I. Brownlie, "The Individual Before Tribunals 
Exercising*Jurisdiction”, 11 ICLP (1962) 719 (hereinafter 
"Individuals"); Pratap, 189.
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by such judgments. While Articles 66 and 67 of the Statute 
envisage participation by states and international 
organisations in advisory proceedings, they do not 
expressly exclude participation in such proceedings by 
private individuals. Article 34 of the Statute which 
provides that only states may be parties in cases before 
the Court should be seen as being applicable only to the 
contentious procedure. The idea of an international court, 
required to apply international law, allowing private 
persons to appear before it may seem very strange. 
However, once the Court has in principle accepted the 
function of reviewing judgments of administrative 
tribunals, it has, by implication, considered that it is 
able directly to apply the law governing the activities of 
such tribunals, namely, international administrative law. 
If this is so, it follows that the Court can permit the 
employees of those international organisations which 
recognise the jurisdiction of such tribunals, the subjects 
of international administrative law, to appear before it.
Alternatively, employees of international 
organisations directly affected by judgments of 
administrative tribunals which fall to be reviewed in 
advisory proceedings may be granted access to the Court 
through non-governmental international organisations. The 
Permanent Court permitted a number of such organisations to 
participate in both the oral and written phases of advisory 
proceedings.248 While such non-governmental international
248 See Hudson, The Permanent Court. 400 ff. On the 
practice of the International Court in this connection, see 
above, 359, n.60.
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organisations are not specialised agencies under Article 57 
of the UN Charter, and therefore cannot be authorised under 
Article 96(2) to request advisory opinions, there would 
appear to be no reason why, on the strength of the 
precedent in the South West Africa (Status) Case, they 
should not be included among those international 
organisations which under Articles 66 and 67 are entitled 
to participate in advisory proceedings. It is instructive 
to note that whereas in contentious cases the Statute in 
Article 34(2) speaks of receiving information from public 
international organisations with regard to advisory 
proceedings, it refers in Articles 66 and 67 to states and 
international organisations without the qualification that 
they must be of a public or intergovernmental character. 
The objective of granting private persons directly affected 
by the judgments of administrative tribunals which are 
being reviewed in advisory proceedings access to the Court 
through non-governmental international organisations, may 
be achieved either with or without appropriate amendments 
to the statutes or other such constitutional documents of 
the tribunals. This would allow non-governmental
international organisations like staff associations to 
represent the claims of employees who may be parties before 
the tribunals either from the beginning or only during the 
review procedure. If either of these suggestions were
adopted, a patent inequality in the procedure for review of 
judgments of administrative tribunals would be removed and 
the Court would be able to lend its cooperation to that 
procedure without resort to ad hoc devices or straining the
424
bounds and limits which govern the exercise of its advisory 
j ur isdict ion.249
Criticism of the system of review of the judgments of 
the administrative tribunals is not confined to the 
procedural arrangements adopted to deal with the problem of 
access to the Court by individuals. The scope of the 
competence, the substantive applicable law and the marked 
difference with regard to the officials subject to the 
jurisdictions of both administrative tribunals are also 
unsatisfactory and call for serious improvements. This 
difference has led to calls for the establishment of a 
single administrative tribunal for all organisations in the 
United Nations family through the unification of the 
systems of review for the equal protection of personnel 
employed by all organisations. It is gratifying to note 
that such calls have not gone unheeded.250 While the 
foregoing proposals would doubtless help to improve the 
situation regarding access to the Court by private persons 
and individuals, it is suggested that the problem can only 
be completely solved by amending the Statute to grant such 
"third parties" full and direct access to the Court in 
respect of both contentious and advisory proceedings. The 
requirements of the good administration of justice demand 
no less than that such "third parties" be afforded the
249 See to the same effect, Cheng, 247-8.
2gLGA Res.119 (xxxiii) UNGAOR Supp. No.45 at 201, UN 
Doc. A/34/495 1978; GA Res.438(xxxiv) UNGAOR Supp. No.46 at
274, UN Doc. A/34/771, 1979. Cf. also The Mortished Case.
ICJ Reports 1982, 423-33^ See further, Lachs,
276; Bowett, International Institutions.
328.
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opportunity to participate fully and directly in judicial 
proceedings in which they may be involved.251
5. The Impact of Advisory Opinions on MThird Parties11; 
A Brief Empirical Study
(a) Introduction
So far, the International Court has rendered 21 
advisory opinions on diverse legal matters. Of these, 13 
have been requested by the General Assembly, three by the 
Committee on application for review of judgments of the UN 
Administrative Tribunal and one each by the Security 
Council, the ECOSOC, the IMCO, the ILO and the WHO. We 
propose to review very briefly the effect (short and long 
term and direct or indirect) of these opinions on the 
"third parties” concerned, namely, the requesting organs or 
bodies and interested states. Since our purpose in this 
chapter is the limited one of examining the impact of 
advisory opinions on "third parties”, it is not possible to 
do more than give a succinct account of the facts and 
holding of each opinion, an indication of the participants, 
explore the response of "third parties” thereto and allude 
to its contribution to the Court's jurisprudence and the
251 Cf. Bowett, ibid., where he notes that the principle 
that individuals have no locus standi before the ICJ is 
undergoing modification, however indirectly. Not only is 
the Court able to decide disputes other than pension 
disputes between the Registrar and the staff of the 
Registry of the Court, in its capacity as an administrative 
tribunal, but it is also, by way of advisory opinions, 
becoming a kind of appellate court from the administrative 
tribunals of the ILO and the UN under the review procedure. 
In his view, this development, notwithstanding its 
procedural complications, is nevertheless well worth 
attention.
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clarification and development of international law.
It is necessary to explain at the outset that while 
various advisory opinions are treated separately, where 
possible, those relating to the same general subject or 
matter are considered together under one rubric. For 
instance, all the advisory opinions concerning South West 
Africa and Namibia are examined under one heading, as are 
those pertaining to the review of judgments of 
administrative tribunals. The opinions concerning the 
admission of states to the United Nations are also 
considered together. So are those relating to the 
interpretation of peace treaties.
(b) The Admission and Competence Cases252
As a result of a protracted stalemate on the Security 
Council since early 1946 regarding the admission of new 
members from both the East and the West to the United 
Nations, the General Assembly in November 1947 decided253 
to request an advisory opinion from the Court on the 
question whether a member which is called upon to express 
itself by its vote either in the Security Council or in the 
General Assembly on the admission of a state to membership 
was juridically entitled to make its consent to the 
admission dependent on conditions not expressly provided 
for in Article 4(1) of the Charter. In particular, could
252 See ICJ Reports 1948, 57. See also, Rosenne, The 
World Court. 158-9; Singh, 425? Elian, 132-3; P.O. Humber, 
"Admission to the United Nations", 24 BYIL (1947), 90-115? 
Greig, "Advisory Jurisdiction", 340-5.
253 See GA Res. 113b (II) of 17 November 1948.
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such a member, while recognising the conditions to be 
fulfilled, subject its affirmative vote to the condition 
that other states would be admitted together with that 
state? This request was apparently designed to obtain a 
ruling on the legality of a possible package deal by which 
all outstanding applications for membership would be 
accepted.254
The competence of the Court to give the opinion was 
challenged on the grounds that the question was a political 
one and therefore fell outside the jurisdiction of the 
Court, that it was abstract and that the Court is not 
entitled to interpret the Charter.
After dismissing these objections, the Court answered 
both questions in the negative.255
Two separate opinions were filed by judges forming 
part of the majority which deviate in some important 
regards from the majority opinion, which itself contained 
important qualifications. These individual opinions seemed 
to indicate that despite their juridical answer, political 
considerations could not be regarded as irrelevant. This 
led to considerable confusion as to the actual opinion and
In these proceedings written statements were 
submitted by China, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
India, Canada, the United States, Greece, Yugoslavia, 
Belgium, Iraq, the Ukraine SSR, the USSR and Australia. 
Oral statements were made on behalf of the Secretary- 
General, France, Yugoslavia, Belgium, Czechoslovakia and 
Poland.
255 See Rosenne, The World Court. 158? The United
Nations, The International Court of Justice. 9th ed. 
(Department of Public Information, New York, 1983), 35
(hereinafter "The UN")? Pratap, 249.
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reasoning of the Court.256
After a long debate in the ad hoc political committee 
in which the opinion was subjected to severe criticism by 
the Soviet bloc and France, the General Assembly at its 
third session adopted a number of resolutions. In 
Resolution 197A(III) after citing the Court's conclusions, 
the Assembly recommended that "each member of the Security 
Council and of the General Assembly in exercising its vote 
on the admission of new members should act in accordance 
with" the Court's opinion. In Resolution 197B(III) "having 
noted" the Court's advisory opinion and "the general 
sentiment in favour of the universality of the United 
Nations", the Assembly asked the Security Council to 
reconsider certain pending applications? and in Resolution 
197C-H (III) after determining that certain states had
fulfilled the requirements laid down in Article 4(1) of the
Charter, the Assembly requested the Security Council to
reconsider the applications of those states in the light of 
the Assembly's determination and the Court's opinion.257
These and later resolutions which referred to the 1948 
opinion258 proved ineffectual in overcoming the 
difficulties regarding admission of new members to the
United Nations, a problem the solution of which was widely
256 See Rosenne, The World Court. 158; Keith, 205, 207.
257 See GAOR (III 1) Plenary, 177th meeting, 8 December 
1948, 797. See as to this, Pomerance, 342? Rosenne, The 
World Court, ibid.? id., The ICJ. 494? Pratap, 250; Keith, 
198. For a summary of the debates on this case, see Keith, 
205-8.
258 See e.g., GA Res.506 (VI) 1 February 1952, and 
620(VII) 21 December 1952.
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believed to require agreement between the permanent members 
of the Security Council.259 The stalemate over the 
admission of new members was ultimately broken when a 
package deal was concluded between the USSR and the USA. 
By a resolution of 14 December 1955, 16 new members were 
admitted. It has been suggested that this solution was 
clearly inconsistent with the 1948 advisory opinion.260 
However, there was general relief that a solution had 
eventually been found, the legality of which has apparently 
never been seriously questioned.261 It would seem that in 
the eyes of the UN membership, the overriding goal of 
universality apparently justified this retreat from a 
position of strict legality.
It may therefore be safely concluded that this opinion 
had no influence on the final solution of the problem.262 
In the nature of things, its effect could hardly have been 
otherwise. Even if there had been no such "package deal” 
the opinion could have had little effect because of the 
fact that it was confined to statements made before the 
voting and did not cover the real reasons for actual 
voting. A state could comply with the opinion simply by 
explaining its vote on the basis of its view that the
259 See Pomerance, 342.
260 See Pomerance, ibid; Rosenne, The World Court. 159? 
id, The ICJ. 494, n.2. Cf. the view that it is difficult 
to substantiate this suggestion. See Keith, 208, n.396.
261 See Rosenne, The World Court, ibid.
262 See Pomerance, 342; Pratap, 250; 2 Verzijl, 207; 
Schwartz, 425; Sloan, 856; G. Schwarzenberger, "The 
Impacts of East-West Rift on International Law", 36 TGS 
(1950), 234; Hambro, "Authority", 19; Rosenne, The ICJ. 
51, n.2, 494, n.2.
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applicant did not meet the conditions of Article 4 of the 
Charter and remain at the same time free to take into 
account any other factor which it considered relevant. The 
political problem of the admission of new members did not 
originate in the explanations given for the negative vote, 
but in the underlying political situation of which those 
votes were merely an expression. The request for the 
advisory opinion did not and indeed could not bring out 
that aspect, and the practical wisdom displayed by the 
General Assembly in requesting the opinion and in trying to 
tie its hands on the issue of the package deal is therefore 
highly questionable.263 
The Competence Case264
The failure of the opinion in the Admissions Case to 
break the deadlock over the admission of new states to the 
United Nations led to the emergence of a view according to 
which in the absence of a recommendation of the Security 
Council, the General Assembly could nevertheless admit new 
members. The General Assembly decided265 to request an 
advisory opinion on the interpretation of Article 4(2) of 
the Charter.266
263 See Pratap, ibid.; Rosenne, The World Court. 158-9? 
Schwartz, 410? Hudson, "The 27th Year of the World Court", 
43 AJIL (1949), 10.
264 See ICJ Reports 1950, 4. See also, Rosenne, The 
World Court. 159-60? Singh, 425? Elian, 137.
265 See GA Res. 296 (IV) of 22 November 1949.
266 In these proceedings written statements were 
submitted by the Secretary-General and by the Byelorussian 
SSR, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, the Ukraine SSR, the United 
States, Argentina and Venezuela. An oral statement was 
made by France.
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After summarily rejecting challenges to its 
jurisdiction similar to those which had been advanced in 
the earlier Admissions Case, the Court replied that 
admission to membership could not be effected by a decision 
of the General Assembly when the Security Council has made 
no recommendation for admission by reason of the candidate 
failing to secure the requisite majority, or a veto in the 
Security Council.267
This opinion, which did not call for any action, could 
not be expected to produce any positive effect because it 
confined itself to the negative statement that the Assembly 
cannot admit a member without a positive recommendation 
from the Security Council. However, the criticism that the 
General Assembly should not have requested the opinion in 
the Competence Case because it did not raise any serious or 
difficult points of law268 is unwarranted. The request for 
the opinion resulted from political considerations and not 
from the difficulties of that legal question. The Court's 
opinion prevented extravagant claims being put forward in 
the General Assembly and performed a very good function in 
keeping the dispute confined within given limits.269 The 
opinion was tacitly adopted by the General Assembly.270
267 See Rosenne, The World Court. 159; The UN, 35-6.
268 See e.g. Hambro, "Authority", 20, n.69.
269 See Rosenne, The World Court. 159; Pratap, 251.
270 See GA Res.495(V), 4 December 1950. For Assembly 
discussion on the Court's opinion, see GAOR (V) Plenary 
318th meeting, 4 December 1950, 565-86 passim. See also, 
Keith, 198-210; Pomerance, 343; Hambro, "Authority", 14; 
Rosenne, The ICJ. 494-5.
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(c) The Reparations Case271
Following the assassination in 1948 in Jerusalem of 
Count Bernadotte, the United Nations mediator in Palestine, 
and other members of the United Nations mission to 
Palestine, the General Assembly asked the Court272 whether 
the United Nations had the capacity to bring an 
international claim against the state responsible with a 
view to obtaining reparation for damage caused to the 
organisation and to the victim. If this question were 
answered in the affirmative, it was further asked in what 
manner the action taken by the United Nations could be 
reconciled with such rights as might be possessed by the
271 See ICJ Reports 1949, 174. See also, Elian, 133-4? 
Rosenne, The World Court. 160; Singh, 426; Nawaz, 531? 
2 Verzijl, 36-45; Hambro, Case Law. 133-4? M.J.L. Hardy, 
"Claims by International Organisations in Respect of 
Injuries to Their Agents", 37 BYIL (1961), 516-26?
Tornaritis, 34, 40? H. Lauterpacht, "Restrictive
Interpretation and the Principle of Effectiveness in the 
Interpretation of Treaties", 26 BYIL (1949), 56-7? Saxena, 
676, 689; E. Gordon, "The World Court and the
interpretation of constitutive treaties", 59 AJIL (1965), 
794, 803 (hereinafter "Gordon"); W Friedmann, "The
International Court of Justice and the Evolution of 
International Law", 14 AV (1969-70), 314-6 (hereinafter
"Evolution"); A. Gros, "Concerning the Advisory Role of 
the International Court of Justice", in Transnational Law 
in a Changing Society; Essays in Honor of Philip C. Jessup, 
ed. W. Friedmann, L. Henkin & O.J. Lissitzyn (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1972), 313-21; E. Lauterpacht, 
"The Development of the law of International Organization 
by the Decisions of International Tribunals", 152 ADIRC 
(1976), 400-1, 406, 408-9, 423-4, 430-1, 434, 442, 449,
456-7, (hereinafter "Law of International Organisations"); 
1 Fitzmaurice, 3, 18, 22-7, 56, 59-60, 71-4, 80-91, 110, 
123? Jenks, Prospects. 482-5, 487, 496, 498; R.P. Anand, 
"Role of International Adjudication", in Gross (ed.) Future 
of the Court. 508, n.71? 529, n.139 (hereinafter
"International Adjudication")? Weissberg, 139-45, 146-7, 
148-50.
272 See GA Res. 258 (III) of 3 December 1948.
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state of which the victim was a national.273
In its advisory opinion of 11 April 1949, the Court 
held that the organisation was intended to exercise 
functions and rights which could only be explained on the 
basis of the possession of a large measure of international 
personality and the capacity to operate upon the 
international plane. It followed that the organisation had 
the capacity to bring a claim and to give it the character 
of an international action for reparation for the damage 
that had been caused to it. The Court further declared 
that the organisation can claim reparation for damage 
caused not only to itself, but also in respect of damage 
suffered by the victim or persons entitled through him. 
Although, according to the traditional rule, diplomatic 
protection had to be exercised by the national state, an 
organisation should be regarded in international law as 
possessing the powers which, even if they are not expressly 
stated in the Charter, are conferred upon the organisation 
as being essential to the discharge of its functions. The 
organisation may require to entrust its agents with 
important missions in disturbed parts of the world. In 
such cases it is necessary that the agent should receive 
suitable support and protection. The Court therefore found 
that the organisation had the capacity to claim appropriate 
reparation, including also, reparation for damage suffered 
by the victim or by persons entitled through him. The risk
273 Written statements were submitted by India, China, 
the United States, the United Kingdom and France. Oral 
statements were made on behalf of the Secretary-General, 
Belgium, France and the United Kingdom.
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of possible competition between the organisation and the 
victim's national state could be eliminated either by means 
of a general convention or by a particular agreement in any 
individual case.
The General Assembly, after a debate,274 adopted a 
resolution noting275 the opinion and authorising the 
Secretary-General, in accordance with his proposals, to 
bring an international claim against the government of a 
member state or non-member of the United Nations alleged to 
be responsible, with a view to obtaining the reparation due 
in respect of the damage caused to the United Nations, and 
in respect of the damage caused to the victim, or to 
persons entitled through him, and, if necessary, to submit 
to arbitration under appropriate procedures such claims as 
cannot be settled by negotiation. It also authorised him 
to take steps to negotiate in each particular case the 
agreements necessary to reconcile action by the United 
Nations with such rights as may be possessed by the state 
of which the victim is a national.276 The opinion in the 
Reparations Case proved effective in that the Secretary- 
General was successful in recovering the United Nations 
claim for pecuniary reparation from the Government of 
Israel. It has however been said that Israel at that time
274 For a summary of the debate, see Keith, 208-9? 
Pomerance, 358-61.
275 A proposal that the Assembly accept the opinion of 
the Court as an authoritative expression of international 
law on the questions considered was not adopted. See 
Pomerance, 343, n.68.
276 See GA Res.365(IV) 1 December 1949. See also, 
Pomerance, 343? Hambro, "Authority", 14? Rosenne, The ICJ. 
494.
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was in a difficult position. It paid the reparation
because it could not have afforded to be recalcitrant to 
the resolutions of the body that created it.277 Other
states concerned did not pay, contesting the basis of 
calculation for damages.278 The Reparations Case stands 
out as a wholly successful opinion in the sphere of
practical politics, presumably because that question did 
not create any political friction.279
By this opinion, the Court made a significant
contribution to the development of international law in 
respect of the nature and attributes of international legal 
personality. The Court attributed to international 
organisations like the United Nations, international legal 
personality through the enunciation of the principle of 
implied powers. Such personality gave the organisation the 
capacity to provide functional as opposed to diplomatic 
protection for its agents.280 This extension of the rights 
of the organisation as embodied in the Charter for the 
purpose of achieving effectiveness undoubtedly created a
277 See Pratap, 250-1; Schwartz, 424. For details of 
claims made pursuant to the resolution, see L.B. Sohn, 
Cases on United Nations Law (Brooklyn: The Foundation
Press Inc., 1956), 265-70. See also, Pomerance, 343, n.69 
and 364.
278 See Pratap, 251? Jenks, Prospects, 665.
279 See Hambro, "Authority", 19? Keith, ibid.
280 See Fawcett, 131? Elias, Africa. 77? Lissitzyn, 
25? H. Lauterpacht, Development. 178ff? Bowett, 
International Institutions. 336-7, 340 and 341? Starke, 
International Law. 65, 66 and 604? Brownlie, Principles. 
680-2 and 683? R. Higgins, "The Court and South West 
Africa", 575? D.A. Rice, "South West Africa Cases: 
Parties in Interests", 47 CJIL (1965), 78; cf. Rosenne, 
Law and Practice. 62, n.l; Suh, 23.
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new principle in international law. Through the opinion 
the Court expressed the unspoken premise behind the Charter 
and reflected its spirit. It is probably no exaggeration 
to state that the opinion in the Reparations Case had the 
sweep of Marbury v. Madison281 in the constitutional law of 
the United States of America. In sum, this opinion has 
supplied important underpinning for the development of the 
concept of the legal personality of international 
intergovernmental organisations in international law, now 
a standard feature of the law.282
(d) The Peace Treaties Cases283
From 1948 the General Assembly had been discussing the 
observance of human rights clauses of the Peace Treaties 
with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania which were being accused 
of gross violations of those provisions. The Treaties each 
contained a clause for the settlement of disputes which 
provided among other things for the reference of the 
dispute to a three-man commission of which the third member 
should be appointed by the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations in the event of disagreement. Attempts to refer 
the disputes to the commissions having failed, because of 
the refusal of the three states to appoint their 
commissioners, the question arose in 1949 whether the 
Secretary-General could make the third appointment. The
281 See 1 Cranch 137 (1803).
282 See Rosenne, The World Court. 160.
283 See ICJ Reports 1950, 65 and 221. See also, Elian, 
134-7; Rosenne, The World Court. 165-6; Singh, 426-7; The 
UN, 37.
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General Assembly decided284 to request an advisory opinion 
on four legal questions:
(a) Was the existence of disputes disclosed by the
diplomatic correspondence? If so;
(b) Did the provisions of the Peace Treaties for the
settlement of disputes come into operation? If the
answer to those questions was in the affirmative, and
if after a delay of one month the national 
commissioners had not been appointed;
(c) Was the Secretary-General authorised to proceed to the 
appointment of the third commissioner? and
(d) If so, would such a commission be competent?285
As with the previous advisory opinions which 
originated in *'Cold War”286 issues, here too the competence 
of the Court was challenged on the ground essentially that 
if there were concrete disputes, the invocation of the 
advisory procedure was, in fact, a surreptitious attempt to
284 See GA Res. 294 (IV) of 22 October 1949.
285 In the first stage of these proceedings written 
statements were submitted by the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Bulgaria, the Ukraine SSR, the USSR, the 
Byelorussian SSR, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and 
Australia. Oral statements were made on behalf of the 
Secretary-General, the United States and the United 
Kingdom. In the second phase a further written statement 
was submitted by the United States and oral statements were 
made on behalf of the Secretary-General, the United States 
and the United Kingdom.
286 This term is used to describe the hostility between 
the USA and the Soviet Union and their respective allies 
following World War II. The term was first used in 1947 by 
the US politician Bernard Baruch. Fear of nuclear war 
prevented a military confrontation, and the Cold War was 
fought on economic, political and ideological fronts. At 
its most virulent in the 1950s, it had given way by the 
1970s to the movement towards detente. See The Macmillan 
Encyclopedia. "ColdWar" (London: Macmillan, 1986), 293.
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introduce a form of contentious case and the Court was not 
authorised to deal with such a case in the absence of the 
consent of all the parties. The Court rejected these 
contentions, and in its first advisory opinion of 30 March 
1950 the Court answered the first two questions in the 
affirmative. In its second opinion of 18 July it answered 
the third question in the negative, and therefore did not 
consider the fourth question.
Fqllowing a discussion in the ad hoc political 
committee, the Assembly took note of the two opinions and 
condemned the wilful refusal of the states concerned to 
fulfil their obligations under the Peace Treaties, "which 
obligations had been confirmed by the International Court 
of Justice". Member states, especially parties to the 
Peace Treaties involved, were invited to submit evidence in 
relation to the question to the Secretary-General for 
transmission to member states of the UN.287
The subsequent policy of the three states concerned 
was not influenced by the Court's advice on the question of 
arbitration. These states, which had never recognised the 
right of either the Assembly or the Court to consider the 
question, persisted in their refusal to nominate their 
representatives to the respective treaty commissions in 
accordance with the opinion. Nevertheless, they were all 
admitted to membership in the UN in 1955.288
287 See GA Res. 385 (V) 1950. See also, Pomerance, 343? 
Keith, 198, 209-10? Pratap, 251; Rosenne, The World Court. 
166? id., The ICJ. 495? Hambro, "Authority", 14.
288 See Lissitzyn, 93? Pomerance, ibid.? Hambro, 
"Authority", 19? Pratap, ibid.. For a criticism of the 
Assembly's action, see Rosenne, "Non-Use", 42? id., "The
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An indirect effect of the opinions might have been to 
introduce quasi-compulsory adjudication of disputes by 
permitting the United Nations indirectly through recourse 
to the advisory procedure to compel adjudication of 
disputes.289 They also encouraged the international 
community to develop new forms of political and arbitral 
procedures.290
The real significance of the opinions lies in the fact 
that "they showed once and for all that the Soviet Union 
and its allies were not prepared to enable the advisory 
procedure to be employed to handle disputes relating to the 
Cold War”.291 However, one wonders whether this was 
entirely a Cold War case. Humanitarian feelings were 
strong in the General Assembly at the time and in some 
quarters there were demands for action by the United 
Nations although it was evident that no effective action 
could be taken. The opinions had some "value” in creating 
the "impression” that something was being done about the 
alleged violations of the human rights provisions of the 
Peace Treaties by the ex-enemy states.292
By rejecting the contention that the General Assembly 
request was ultra vires because in dealing with the 
question of the observance of human rights and fundamental
Court and the Judicial Process”, 19 10 (1965), 531? id, 
The ICJ. 495-6.
289 See Pratap, ibid.? Schwartz, 415.
290 See Rosenne, The World Court. 166.
291 See Rosenne, ibid.
292 See Lissitzyn, ibid., n.104; Pratap, 251-2.
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freedoms it was intervening in matters essentially within 
the domestic jurisdiction of states, and holding instead 
that the question of human rights came within the scope of 
specific provisions of the Charter, especially Article 55, 
the Court in effect refused to consider the question of 
human rights as a matter falling within the domestic 
jurisdiction of member states. Thus, it contributed to the 
international protection of human rights.293
From a legal standpoint, the questions put to the 
Court were on the whole not difficult. The disputes were 
rooted in a more intractable political situation which the 
other organs of the United Nations could not solve. It may 
be concluded that the real and enduring significance of the 
Peace Treaties Cases may be seen in the considerable light 
which they shed on the differences between the Court*s 
contentious and advisory jurisdictions and the 
clarification, no matter how imperfect, of the nature and 
the legal effect of the latter function. For this reason, 
we regard as unjustified the criticism that the opinion 
should never have been requested, or that it might have 
been better for the Court in order to safeguard its 
prestige, to decline to render the opinion.294
293 See de Arechaga, "Work and the Jurisprudence", 3-4. 
Cf. the view that through this opinion the Court in effect 
withdrew’ from an active role in the sphere of human rights. 
See Rosenne, The World Court. 166.
294 See Lissitzyn, 93. See generally, Greig, "Advisory 
Jurisdiction", 325-68? Anand, Compulsory Jurisdiction. 
280-1? C. de Visscher, Theory and Reality in Public 
International Law (translated by P.E. Corbett), 3rd ed. 
(Princeton University Press: 1968), 330. Cf. Rosenne, The 
World Court. 107. This criticism recalls the grand debate 
about political and legal questions, or justiciable and 
non-justiciable disputes, which is beyond the scope of this
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(e) The South West Africa and Namibia Advisory Opinions295
(i) The South West Africa (Status) Case296
This advisory opinion was concerned with the 
determination of the legal status of the territory of South 
West Africa, the administration of which had been placed by 
the League Council in 1920 under the mandate of the Union 
of South Africa. Under the terms of the C class mandate 
conferred on South West Africa the mandatory had full 
powers of administration and legislation over the mandated 
territory as an integral portion of its own territory, 
subject to a number of obligations, and the League was to
study. For a discussion of legal and political questions, 
see e.g. Rosenne, The ICJ. 454-60? Keith, 50-62;
Pomerance, 296-303? Pratap, 86-91 and 126-30? F.B. Shick, 
"Council and the Court of the UN”, 9 MLR (1946), 97-104. 
In any case, as every dispute has generally some 
justiciable or legal aspect, the requirement that there 
must be a "legal question" to enable a reference to be made 
to the Court should be satisfied in the great majority of 
cases. See Singh, 26 and 97? Rosenne, Law and Practice. 
94? id., The World Court. 243? Lenefsky, "Advisory
Opinions", 525? G.C. Doub, "The Unused Potential of the 
World Court", 40 FA (1961-2), 463 at 467 (hereinafter
"Doub"). Besides, any fear that the Court might attempt to 
resolve political problems should have been removed by the 
Court's own action. In each case where it has been 
contended that the question was political and not legal, 
the Court has declared that it is competent to answer legal 
questions only. See, for example, ICJ Reports 1947-8, 61? 
ibid. 1962, 155. See also, Doub, 466. Cf. the view that 
there is much to be said for avoiding reference to a 
judicial body of issues yhich are essentially political 
conflicts even though these may turn upon the 
interpretation of constituent treaty provisions. See 
Bowett, International Institutions. 278 and 364.
295 See generally, Anand, Studies. 119-51? R.H.F. 
Austin, "Namibia and Zimbabwe: Decolonisation and the Rule 
of International Law", 35 CLP (1982), 203-32? L. Meret, 
"Canada and Namibia", 17 CYIL (1979), 314-23.
296 See ICJ Reports 1950, 128. See also, Elian, 138-41? 
Singh, 427-9. For the background to and a discussion of 
the South West Africa and Namibia Opinions, including the 
contentious cases, see Rosenne, The World Court. 166-72; 
Pomerance, 148-57.
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supervise the administration and see to it that the 
obligations were fulfilled. After the Second World War the 
League disappeared and with it the machinery for the 
supervision of the mandates. Moreover, the Charter of the 
United Nations did not provide that the former mandated 
territories should automatically come under Trusteeship. 
Difficulties over the interpretation and application of the 
mandate, which had appeared already in the League era, came 
to a head in the United Nations, when South Africa refused 
to convert the mandate into a trusteeship agreement, 
despite repeated urgings by the General Assembly. In 1949 
the General Assembly decided297 that the Court*s opinion on 
a number of legal questions was desirable for its further 
consideration of the matter.298
In its opinion of 11 July 1950, the Court held that 
the dissolution of the League of Nations and its 
supervisory machinery had not entailed the lapse of the 
mandate and that the mandatory power was still under an 
obligation to give an account of its administration to the 
United Nations which was legally qualified to discharge the 
supervisory functions formerly exercised by the League of 
Nations. The degree of supervision to be exercised by the 
General Assembly should not however exceed that which 
applied under the mandate system and should conform as far 
as possible to the procedure followed in this respect by
297 See GA Res. 338 (iv) of 6 December 1949.
298 Written statements were submitted by Egypt, South 
Africa, the United States, the Netherlands and India. Oral 
statements were made on behalf of the Secretary-General, 
the Philippines and South Africa. The competence of the 
Court to give this opinion was not challenged.
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the Council of the League of Nations. On the other hand, 
the mandatory power was not under an obligation to place 
the territory under Trusteeship although it might have 
certain political and moral duties in this connection. 
Finally, it had no competence to modify the international 
status of South West Africa unilaterally.
The General Assembly accepted this advisory opinion 
and commenced a long series of efforts to implement it.299 
Although South Africa refused to cooperate with the General 
Assembly in this connection, it nevertheless desisted from 
annexing the territory of South West Africa as it had 
proposed to do.300
(ii) The South West Africa (Voting^ Case301
In the course of dealing with the problem of South 
West Africa, further questions arose concerning the 
interpretation of certain passages in the 1950 Opinion on 
the basis of which the General Assembly had established the 
Committee on South West Africa,302 broadly analogous to the
299 See GA Resolutions 449A(V) and 570A(VI) . This 
latter resolution is remarkable for the degree of interest 
it evinces for the authority of international law and the 
Court. Rosenne, Law and Practice. 750; id., The World 
Court, 167; Keith, 211. See also, ICJYB 1950-1, 74 and 
1951-2, 73-6; Keith, 212; Pomerance, 344-5 for a 
description of these efforts and for the background to both 
resolutions. These efforts were largely unsuccessful 
because they lacked the cooperation of the South African 
Government which never accepted the opinion for the reason 
that it was given in ignorance of certain facts and should 
accordingly be reviewed. See Keith, ibid.
300 See J. Barber, "South Africa, The Regional Setting”, 
42 WT (1986), 8, 11 (hereinafter "Barber”); Pratap, 252.
301 See ICJ Reports 1955, 67. See also, UN, 38.
302 See GA Res. 749A (VIII) . This marked the beginning 
of attempts to implement the 1950 opinion without South 
African cooperation. See also, Pomerance, 345.
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Permanent Mandates Commission of the Council of the League. 
The General Assembly on 11 October 1954 adopted303 a 
special rule F on voting procedure to be followed in taking 
decisions on questions relating to reports and petitions 
concerning the territory of South West Africa. According 
to this rule, such decisions were to be regarded as 
important questions within the meaning of Article 18, 
paragraph 2 of the United Nations Charter, and would 
therefore require a two-thirds majority of members of the 
United Nations present and voting. The General Assembly 
therefore decided304 to ask the Court for an advisory 
opinion on that question.305
In its advisory opinion of 7 June 1955 the Court 
considered that rule F was a correct application of its 
earlier advisory opinion. It related only to procedure and 
procedural matters were not material to the degree of 
supervision exercised by the General Assembly. Moreover, 
the Assembly was entitled to apply its own voting procedure 
and rule F was in accordance with the requirement that the 
supervision exercised by the Assembly should conform as far 
as possible to the procedure followed by the League 
Council. The General Assembly accepted this opinion306 and
303 See GA Res. 844 (IX) of 11 October 1954.
304 See GA Res. 904 (IX) of 23 November 1954.
305 Written statements were submitted by the United 
States, Poland, India, Israel, China, Yugoslavia and the 
Secretary-General. No state requested to make an oral 
statement.
306 See GA Res.937 (X). South Africa rejected the 1955
opinion which was an interpretation of the 1950 opinion
which it had always considered to be erroneous. See Keith, 
212. See also, ICJYB 1955-6, 73? Pomerance, 345-6;
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persevered with its efforts to solve the problem of South 
West Africa.
(iii) The South West Africa (Committee) Case307
The Court again found it necessary to seek308 an
advisory opinion on the question whether it would be 
consistent with the 1950 opinion for it to authorise the 
Committee on South West Africa to grant oral hearings to 
petitioners.309 The underlying purpose in granting oral 
hearings was to supplement the Committee’s information on 
the situation in South West Africa.310
In its advisory opinion of 1 June 1956 the Court
considered that it would be in accordance with the advisory 
opinion of 1950 on the international status of South West 
Africa for the Committee on South West Africa established 
by the General Assembly to grant oral hearings to 
petitioners on matters relating to the territory of South 
West Africa if such a course was necessary for the 
maintenance of effective international supervision of the 
mandated territory. The General Assembly was legally 
qualified to carry out an effective and adequate
supervision of the administration of the mandated
Rosenne, The World Court. 167-8? id., The ICJ. 495.
307 See ICJ Reports 1956, 23. See also, UN, 39.
308 See GA Res. 942 (X) of 3 December 1955.
309‘'Under the original mandate system, petitioners could 
only submit their petitions in writing and the question udo^S. 
whether oral petitions would constitute an excess in the 
degree of supervision^ See Rosenne, The World Court. 168.
310 In addition to the Secretary-General * s statement, 
written statements were submitted by the United Nations, 
China and India and an oral statement was made on behalf of 
the United Kingdom.
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territory. Under the League of Nations the Council would 
have been competent to authorise such hearings. Although 
the degree of supervision to be exercised by the Assembly 
should not exceed that which applied under the mandate 
system, the grant of hearings would not involve such an 
excess in the degree of supervision. Under the
circumstances then existing, the hearing of petitioners by 
the Committee on South West Africa might be in the interest 
of the proper working of the mandate system.
The General Assembly accepted and endorsed this
advisory opinion311 and authorised the Committee on South 
West Africa to grant hearings to petitioners. However, 
none of the Court's opinions, or the Assembly resolutions 
implementing them, was bringing the UN any closer to the 
goal of establishing effective supervisory authority with
respect to South Africa's administration of South West
Africa. While the reports of the Committee and the 
resolutions of the Assembly grew ever more critical of 
South African administration, the South African Government 
grew ever more intransigent in its refusal to submit to any 
measure of international accountability in respect of the 
territory.312 This prompted the Assembly to search for new 
courses of action. In particular, the Assembly requested 
the Committee on South West Africa to study the question
311 See GA Res. 1047 (VI) . See also, Pomerance, 346? 
Keith, 212-3? Rosenne, The ICJ. 495.
312 The opinions on South West Africa have clarified in 
large measure the complicated legal situation. See 
Rosenne, The ICJ. 112-5? de Arechaga, "Work and 
Jurisprudence”, 1, 4? Pratap, 252. See also, 5 Repertory, 
1955, 83. Their practical effect has been considerable in 
that they have contained the situation.
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what legal action was open to UN organs, UN members, or 
former League members "acting either individually or 
jointly to ensure that the Union of South Africa fulfills 
the obligations assumed by it under the mandate”.313 
Although the possibility of seeking further advisory 
opinions was not discounted in subsequent reports and 
resolutions, the main thrust of Assembly thinking on the 
matter was towards the invocation of the compulsory 
jurisdiction in the hope that the 1950 opinion would be 
transformed into an enforceable judgment. The institution 
of contentious proceedings was encouraged in two Assembly 
resolutions.314
Following a further unsuccessful attempt by the UN to 
reach a negotiated settlement with South Africa, a good 
offices committee was established in 1957 to discuss with 
the Union Government ”a basis for an agreement which would 
continue to accord to the territory of South West Africa an 
international status”. A partition proposal contemplated 
by the Committee was rejected by the full Assembly.315 The 
1959 discussions were totally unproductive.316
313 See GA Res. 1060(XI) . See also, Pomerance, ibid.
314 See GA Resolutions 1142A(XII) and 1361(XIV). See 
also, Pomerance, ibid.? Pratap, 252; Rosenne, The World 
Court. 168.
315 See GAOR (XIII) Annexes A139, 2-10 (UN Doc. A/3900) 
and 4th committee meetings 756-63 10-16 October 1958, 57- 
97.
316 See ibid. (XIV) Annexes A138, 1-5 (UN Doc. A/4224). 
See Pomerance, 347.
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(iv) The South West Africa Cases317
Contentious proceedings were instituted by Ethiopia 
and Liberia in November I960318 concerning the continued 
existence of the mandate for South West Africa and the 
duties and performance of South Africa as mandatory power. 
The Court was requested to make declarations that South 
West Africa remained a territory under a mandate; that 
South Africa had been in breach of its obligations under 
that mandate and that the mandate, and hence the mandatory 
authority, were subject to the supervision of the United 
Nations. In May 1961 the Court made an order finding the 
applicants to be in the same interest and joining the 
proceedings. South Africa filed four preliminary
objections to the Court's jurisdiction. In December 1962 
the Court rejected these and upheld its jurisdiction. 
After pleadings on the merits had been filed within the 
time limits requested by the parties, the Court held public 
sittings from 15 March to 29 November 1965 in order to hear 
oral argument and testimony, and judgment in the second 
phase was given in July 1966. By the casting vote of the 
President, the vote having been equally divided 7-7, the 
Court found that the applicants could not be considered to 
have established any legal right or interest appertaining 
to them in the subject-matter of their claims and 
accordingly decided to reject those claims.
317 See ICJ Reports 1962, 319? ibid. 1966, 6. See also 
Singh, 412. Although these cases are not advisory 
opinions, we recount them here as part of the narrative.
318 This action was commended by the Assembly. See GA 
Res.1565(XV). See Pomerance, ibid.
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During the course of these protracted proceedings, the 
Assembly continued to deal with the South West Africa 
issue319 on the basis of the existence of the mandate, 
although the Assembly was on occasion urged to divest South 
Africa of the mandate.
(v) The Namibia Case320
In October 1966 the General Assembly decided321 that 
the mandate for South West Africa was terminated and that 
South Africa had no right to administer the territory. The 
General Assembly assumed direct responsibility for South 
West Africa until its independence. Attempts by the 
General Assembly to persuade South Africa to withdraw from 
the territory of South West Africa proved unsuccessful. 
Early in 1968 the question of South West Africa was brought 
to the Security Council by the African states.322 On 25 
January 1968 the Security Council adopted Resolution 245 
(1968) in which it backed the General Assembly's 1966
319 On the basis of the sub iudice principle, South 
Africa repeatedly objected to Assembly consideration of the 
South West Africa question. However, the Assembly majority 
considered the principle inapplicable. Cf. Rosenne, Law and 
Practice, 84ff.
320 See ICJ Reports 1971, 16. See also, H. J.
Richardson II, "Constitutive Questions in the Negotiations 
for Namibian Independence", 78 AJIL (1984), 76, 97, 98, 99, 
100, 114 and 115 (hereinafter "Richardson"); N.K.
Hevener, "The 1971 South West African Opinion - A New 
International Judicial Philosophy", 24 ICLQ (1975), 791- 
810; Brown, 213-42; Pratap, 271-3. For the change of the 
name from South West Africa to Namibia, see GA Res. 
2372(XXII).
321 See GA Res.2145(XXI) . See also, Rosenne, The World 
Court, 170; Pomerance, 347-8. The compatibility of this 
action with the 1950 opinion is doubtful. See Pomerance,
347.
322 See Rosenne, The World Court. ibid. ; Pomerance,
348.
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decision. This was followed by Resolution 246 (1968) of 14 
March, censuring South Africa for its refusal to abide by 
the earlier resolutions. Further resolutions were adopted 
in 1969, and on 30 January 1970, in Resolution 276 (1970), 
the Security Council established an ad hoc subcommittee to 
study ways and means for the effective implementation of 
the Council's resolutions. At the same time, the Security 
Council called upon South Africa to withdraw its 
administration from the territory and declared that the 
continued presence of South African authorities was illegal 
and that all acts taken by the South African Government on 
behalf of or concerning Namibia after the termination of 
the mandate were illegal and invalid. It further called 
upon all states to refrain from any dealings with the South 
African Government that were incompatible with that 
declaration. One of the recommendations of the
subcommittee was for a further advisory opinion to be 
requested of the Court, and on 29 July 1970, in Resolution 
284 (1970), the Security Council decided to ask the Court 
what were the legal consequences for states of the 
continued presence of South Africa in Namibia 
notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970).
The Court was asked to transmit its opinion to the Security 
Council at an early date.323
323 The President decided that states members of the 
United Nations were likely to be able to furnish 
information on the question. Accordingly, the Registrar 
sent them the special and direct communication provided for 
in Article 66 of the Statute: Sea^ ICJ Reports 1971, 17-8.
Written statements were submitted by the United Nations, 
Czechoslovakia, Finland, France, Hungary, India, the 
Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Poland, South Africa, the 
United States and Yugoslavia. Oral statements were made on
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In its advisory opinion of 21 June 1971 the Court 
found that the continued presence of South Africa in 
Namibia was illegal and that South Africa was under an 
obligation to withdraw its administration immediately. The 
Court was further of the opinion that states members of the 
United Nations were under an obligation to recognise the 
illegality of South Africa's presence in Namibia and the 
invalidity of its acts on behalf of or concerning Namibia 
and to refrain from any act implying recognition of the 
legality of or lending support or assistance to such 
presence and administration. Finally, it was of the 
opinion that it was incumbent on states which were not 
members of the United Nations to give assistance in the 
action which had been taken by the United Nations with 
regard to Namibia.
The Security Council, inter alia, took note with 
appreciation of the advisory opinion and expressed 
agreement with it.324 In its interpretation of Articles 24 
and 25 of the Charter, the Court had attributed binding 
force to the relevant Security Council resolutions even 
though they had not been adopted under Chapter VII of the 
Charter. This part of the Court's reasoning was 
particularly objectionable to many Council members. Some 
members (most notably, the African states), accepted the
behalf of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the 
Organisation of African Unity, Finland, India, the 
Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, South Africa, Vietnam and 
the United States.
324 See SC Res.301 (1971). On the reception of the
opinion, see Rosenne, The World Court. 172; Pomerance,
352-4.
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opinion's conclusions and its legal premises. Others 
(including the United States, Japan and Belgium), accepted 
the conclusions but not the premises. And still others 
(France and the United Kingdom)325 accepted neither the 
conclusions nor the premises.326
Amongst its many arguments, South Africa advanced the 
view that GA Resolution 2145 of 1966 terminating its 
Mandate over South West Africa was invalid, as were 
Security Council resolutions based thereon. It maintained 
that these resolutions were at most recommendations which 
UN members were free to accept or reject after 
consideration. It further alleged that Security Council 
Resolution 276 of 1970 was ultra vires so far as Chapters 
VI and VII of the Charter were concerned.327
The General Assembly adopted Resolution 2871(XXVI) in 
which it "noted with satisfaction the advisory opinion", 
Security Council Resolution 301 (1971) and welcomed the
operative provisions of the former. It also called upon 
all states to respect strictly General Assembly and 
Security Council resolutions concerning Namibia and the
325 The United Kingdom rejected the opinion because it 
saw no basis in the Charter for the attribution to the 
General Assembly of a competence to adopt resolutions which 
are other than recommendatory in effect. Furthermore, the 
Security Council could take decisions generally binding on 
member states only when it had made a determination under 
Article 39 of the Charter. See the statement of the 
representative of the United Kingdom in S/PV1589, at 26 and 
28. See also R. Higgins, "The Advisory Opinion on Namibia: 
Which UN Resolutions are Binding Under Article 25 of the 
Charter?", 21 ICLP (1972), 270 at 273 and 277 (hereinafter 
"Which UN Resolutions").
326 see Pomerance, 353.
327 See R. Higgins, "Which UN Resolutions", 272.
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advisory opinion and invited the Security Council to take 
effective measures in conformity with the relevant 
provisions of the Charter to secure the withdrawal by South 
Africa of its illegal administration from Namibia and the 
implementation of General Assembly and Security Council 
resolutions designed to enable the people of Namibia to 
exercise their right to self-determination.328
The Court's opinion, it seems, had little instant 
effect on the Council's continued consideration of the 
Namibia issue. As in the pre-request stage, the Council 
remained deadlocked over the issue of invoking Chapter VII 
and as for measures short of Chapter VII, these had 
practically been exhausted in any case. The opinion may, 
in a sense, have had a cathartic effect. For although the 
Council remained committed to bringing the Namibian 
population to self-determination and independence, 
henceforward this aim was to be pursued through dialogue 
with South Africa rather than by a dogmatic insistence on 
South Africa's withdrawal from that territory in strict 
compliance with the advisory opinion.
To this end, a proposal for the initiation of contacts 
with South Africa was adopted by the Council at its Addis 
Ababa meeting in February 1972.329 As a result of these 
contacts 330 maintained by the "Contact Group"331 and the
328 See ICJYB 1971-2, 144-50.
329 See S.C. Res. 309 (1971) and 310 (1972). See also 
Pomerance, 354.
330 See in this connection, SC Resolutions: 385 (1976) , 
418 (1977), 431, 435 and 439 (1978); GA Resolution ES-8/2 
of 1981.
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"Front Line States",332 and such other factors as the end 
of Portuguese colonial rule in Angola and Mozambique,333 
the willingness of the superpowers to cooperate in the 
settlement of regional conflicts generated by the improved 
international political climate, and, above all, the 
liberation struggle waged by SWAPO,334 Namibia attained its 
independence under the stewardship of the United Nations on 
21 March 1990, after more than a century of colonial 
rule.335
In addition to helping to bring about the independence 
of Namibia, the advisory opinions on South West Africa in
331 This group comprised the five Western Security
Council members, namely, the United States, The United
Kingdom, France, West Germany and Canada. On its formation 
and authority, see Richardson, 78-9 and 82-8; Barber, 11.
332 This group of states included Botswana, Mozambique, 
Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe with Angola and Nigeria in 
key supporting roles.
333 See Barber, 11; M. Spicer, "Namibia, Elusive
Independence”, 36 WT (1980), 407 (hereinafter "Spicer”).
334 In October 1966, the South West Africa People's
Organisation (SWAPO), a nationalist movement formed in 1960 
from the labour-orientated Ovamboland People's Party, began 
a campaign to liberate Namibia by force since 
constitutional change was being frustrated by South Africa. 
See Spicer, 406-7; Richardson, 77, 81, 108, 117 and 119- 
20. In 1976 the General Assembly recognised SWAPO as "the 
sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people”. 
GA Res.31/152 (20 December 1976). See also, Barber, 11; 
Richardson, 81, n.18.
335 See 1987 Secretary-General' s report on the work of 
the Organisation,**^; ibid., 1988 GAOR 43rd session, Supp. 
No. 1 (A/43/1), 1; ibid., 1989 GAOR 44th session, 1-2. See 
also R. Higgins, "The United Nations: Still A Force For
Peace?”, 1988 Manchester University Peace Lecture 
(unpublished), 23 (hereinafter "Peace Lecture"); Sir
Patrick Moberly, "Towards an Independent Namibia", 45 WT 
(1989), 168-9 and 171; J.E. Spencer, "A Deal for Southern 
Africa", 45 WT (1989), 80; "Namibia: Independence at
Last", UN Chronicle. June 1990, 4-10; "New Era for Last 
African Colony", The Times. 21 March 1990.
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general, and that on Namibia, in particular, which contain 
several points of major legal interest, have enabled the 
Court to make a significant contribution to the development 
of some aspects of international law. These aspects 
include the law of the international protection of human 
rights? the law of treaties and the law of international 
organisations, especially the law of the United Nations. 
These opinions afforded the Court the opportunity to 
clarify issues relating to decolonisation and the principle 
of self determination; the powers of the General Assembly 
and the Security Council;336 voting in the Security 
Council? the legal implications for other states of the 
continuing presence of South Africa in Namibia? duties of 
non-member states? and the interpretation of treaties.337
(f) The Reservations Case338
336 e.g. the significance of some General Assembly 
resolutions; and the legal effect of Security Council 
resolutions adopted pursuant to Articles 24 and 25 of the 
Charter? see generally, R. Higgins, "Which UN 
Resolutions", 270-86.
337 See Singh, 140-1, 151-2, 158-9, 161 and 259-61?
Lachs, 239, 255-62 and 277? de Ar6chaga, "Work and
Jurisprudence", 1-6, 31 and 32? Richardson, 79.
338 See ICJ Reports 1951, 15. See also, Rosenne, The 
World Court. 173-4? I. Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties (Manchester University Press, 1984), 
56-8 (hereinafter "Sinclair"); Singh, 429-30? Elian, 141- 
2? The UN, 40? Nawaz, 534-5? 2 Verzijl, 71-81? Hambro, 
Case Law. 9-25, 245? Crawford, 64, 78; Fitzmaurice, 34 
BYIL (1958), 138-49? Rosenne, "Non-Use", 40? Brownlie, 
"Use of Force", 214? G. Fitzmaurice, "Hersch Lauterpacht -
The Scholar as Judge: Part III", 39 BYIL (1963), 176, 178; 
Jenks, Prospects, 498, 503, 512? Nantwi, 78; S. Rosenne, 
"Res Judicata: Some Recent Decisions of the ICJ", 28 BYIL
(1951), 37? Jones,
-r 20 TILJ (1985), 557, 559 n.17;
R. Kearney & R.E. Dalton, "The Treaty on Treaties", 64 AJIL 
(1970), 495, 509-10? Szasz, 505, nn.43 and 50? Weissberg, 
136, 145, 147, 149, 150. On reservations to multilateral
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In November 1950, the General Assembly asked the Court 
a series of questions as to the position of a state which 
attached reservations to its signature of the multilateral 
Convention on Genocide if other states, signatories of the 
same Convention, objected to these reservations.339 The 
Court considered, in its advisory opinion of 28 May 1951, 
that, even if a convention contained no article on the 
subject of reservations, it did not follow that they were 
prohibited. The character of the convention, its purposes 
and its provisions must be taken into account. It was the 
compatibility of the reservation with the purpose of the 
convention which must furnish the criterion of the attitude 
of the state making the reservation, and of the state which 
objected thereto. The Court did not consider that it was 
possible to give an absolute answer to the abstract 
question put to it. As regards the effect of the 
reservation in relations between states, the Court 
considered that a state could not be bound by a reservation 
to which it had consented. Every state was therefore free
treaties, see C.G. Fenwick, "Editorial Comment: 
Reservations to Multilateral Treaties", 45 AJIL (1951), 
469-74; id., "Reservations to Multilateral Conventions: 
The Report of the International Law Commission", 46 AJIL
(1952), 145-8; D.R. Anderson, "Reservations to
Multilateral Conventions: A Re-examination", 13 I CLP
(1964), 450-81; D.W. Bowett, "Reservations to Non-
Restricted Multilateral Treaties", 48 BYIL (1977), 67-92; 
J.K. Gamble, Jr., "Reservations to Multilateral Treaties: 
A Macroscopic View of State Practice", 74 AJIL (1980), 372- 
94.
339 Written statements were submitted by the United 
Nations, the Organisation of American States and the ILO 
and by the United States, USSR, Jordan, the United Kingdom, 
Israel, Poland, Czechoslovakia, the Netherlands, the 
Ukrainian SSR, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR and the 
Philippines. Oral statements were made on behalf of the 
Secretary-General, Israel, the United Kingdom and France.
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to decide for itself whether the state which formulated the 
reservation was or was not a party to the convention. The 
situation presented real disadvantages, but they could only 
be remedied by the insertion in the convention of an 
article on the use of reservations. A third question 
referred to the effects of an objection by a state which 
was not yet a party to the convention, either because it 
had not signed it or because it had signed but not ratified 
it. The Court was of the opinion that, as regards the 
first case, it would be inconceivable that a state which 
had not signed a convention should be able to exclude 
another state from it. In the second case, the situation 
was different: the objection was valid, but would not
produce an immediate legal effect, it would merely express 
and proclaim the attitude which a signatory state would 
assume when it had become a party to the convention.340
The same question had been submitted simultaneously to 
the ILC which had been charged with the codification and 
progressive development of international law, and to the 
Court for an advisory opinion.341 When the Assembly 
discussed the question of reservations and the opinion of 
the Court, at its 6th session, it was faced with two 
separate matters, namely, the opinion which by its terms 
was restricted to the Genocide Convention, and a report of 
the ILC. Thus, pre-request apprehensions by several
340 In all of the foregoing, the Court adjudicated only 
on the specific case referred to it, namely, the Genocide 
convention.
341 For a constructive criticism of this approach, see 
Lissitzyn, 33.
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delegates that the Assembly might be faced with conflicting 
pronouncements were fully substantiated. The Assembly had 
also to consider what instructions to give to the
Secretary-General. Throughout the debates, the speakers, 
with only a few minor exceptions, expressly or impliedly 
accepted the opinion as authoritative. This was the
general attitude of delegates, whether they agreed with the 
opinion or not. The real area of dispute concerned the 
general question of reservations. Nevertheless, after the 
recognition of the respect due to the Court, most of the 
sharpest opponents of the compatibility rule agreed to see 
the opinion applied in relation to the one convention to 
which it was ostensibly confined, namely, the Genocide
Convention. Finally, the Assembly and the Committee
adopted a resolution which noted both the opinion and the 
ILC report, recommended to states that they be guided in 
relation to the Genocide Convention by the opinion and 
requested the Secretary-General in relation to the 
Convention to conform his practices to the opinion.342
This resolution did not, however, limit application of the 
Court's rule to the Genocide Convention. It went far 
towards extending the rule, though in its objective
variant,343 to future conventions concluded under UN
34<£eaGA Res.598 (VII) of 12 January 1942. For the 6th 
Committee debates, see GAOR(VI) 6th Committee, meetings 
264-78, 5 December 1951 to 5 January 1952. See also Nawaz, 
535? Rosenne, The World Court. 174 ? id., The ICJ. 495?
Keith, 211-2? Pomerance, 348-9? Pratap, 253.
343 In its objective variant, the rule boils down 
essentially to the Pan-American Union rule for 
reservations. See G. Fitzmaurice, "Reservations to 
Multilateral Conventions", 2 I CLP (1953), 1-26 (hereinafter 
"Reservations"). See also, Pomerance, 348.
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auspices.
The Court*s opinion was initially received with 
disfavour in many quarters. Particular criticism was 
directed towards the compatibility test on the ground that 
it is fundamentally subjective and uncertain in its 
application and would prove to be unworkable in 
practice.344 Certain of the critics, in addition to
expressing doubts about the compatibility test as such, 
also pointed out that the Court*s response to question 2 
significantly undermined the principle of the integrity of 
the text of the treaty and could result in fragmenting 
multilateral conventions into bilateral treaties of 
variable content.345
With time, however, support for generalising the 
Court's ruling increased. The expansion of the
international community and the corresponding need for more 
international legislation in the form of treaties militated 
against strict conformity with the unanimity rule. 
Universality of participation in a convention appeared more 
important than the absolute integrity of the convention. 
The question of the propriety of the Secretary-General's 
handling of the "Indian Reservation" to the IMCO Convention 
resulted in a further Assembly resolution under whose terms 
the Assembly extended its previous directive to the 
Secretary-General to all conventions concluded under UN
344 See Fitzmaurice, "Reservations", 1-26? id., "The 
Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice 
(1952-4): Treaty Interpretation and Other Treaty Points", 
33 BYIL (1957) 272-93? Rosenne, The ICJ. 495.
345 See Sinclair, 58.
460
auspices, i.e., even to those concluded prior to January 
1952 (provided of course, that no contrary provisions were 
contained in the convention) .346
In its 1951 report the ILC rejected for general
application and impliedly criticised the Court's
compatibility rule.347 The ILC took the view that the 
criterion of compatibility of a reservation with the object
and purpose of a multilateral convention applied by the
Court to the Convention on Genocide was not suitable for 
application to multilateral conventions in general.348 It 
is significant that the ILC subsequently reversed itself on 
the question of reservations and endorsed the Court's rule 
in its objective variant for general application.349
The test laid down in the Reservations Case was 
ultimately sanctified in Article 19(C) of the convention 
regime on the reservations of the Vienna Convention on the
346 See GA Res. 1452B (XIV) 7 December 1959; Part A dealt 
specifically with the IMCO Convention. For a summary of 
the 6th Committee's discussions, see UN Doc. A/4311, 1 
December 1959. See Pomerance, 349; Keith, 211-2.
347 See IlCYB 1951-11, 238, report, para. 24. See 
further, Pomerance, ibid.; Pratap, 252.
348 See ILCYB 1951-11, 125.
349 See Articles 18-21 of the 1962 draft on the Law of
Treaties, IL.C.YB 1962-11, 175ff and Articles 16-19 of the 
1966 draft, ibid., 1966-11, 202ff. The compatibility rule 
was thought to be impracticable for determining the status 
of the reserving state. Nevertheless, the Court's 
criterion was said to "express a valuable concept to be 
taken into account both by states formulating a reservation
and by states deciding whether or not to consent to a
reservation". First report on the Law of Treaties by Sir 
Humphrey Waldock, ibid., 1962-11, 65-6. See also Pratap, 
253. For a summary of the developments in the ILC, see 
Sinclair, 58-61.
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Law of Treaties.350 It may be concluded that the advisory 
opinion on reservations to the Genocide Convention had 
brought about a movement away from the traditional 
unanimity rule whereby a reservation in order to be valid 
must receive the assent of all the signatory states. 
Conversely, adherents of the extreme sovereignty rule 
school of thought according to which every state had an 
absolute right to make reservations at will were not 
satisfied with the limited move away from the unanimity 
rule represented by the principle underlying this advisory 
opinion.351
(g) Review of Administrative Tribunal Judgments352
Five cases involving judgments of the United Nations 
and ILO Administrative Tribunals have come before the Court 
for an advisory opinion. In some of these cases, the 
issues are highly technical involving appreciation of 
relevant staff regulations. No oral proceedings were held 
in the last four of these cases.
350 See Articles 19-21, UN Doc. A/Conf 39/27, 23 May 
1969. See also Sinclair, 61? Pomerance, 349; Rosenne, The 
World Court. 174; McNair, Law of Treaties. 166, 168; H. 
Lauterpacht, Development. 184ff.
351 See Sinclair, 13-4.
352 See generally, Rosenne, The ICJ. 486-92; id., Law 
and Practice. 737-9; Bowett, International Institutions. 
317-31; Brownlie, Principles. 580, 581-3, 590-2 and 594; 
W. Friedmann and A. Fatouros, "The United Nations 
Administrative Tribunal", 11 10 (1957), 13-28; Woon Sang 
Choi, "Judicial Review of Administrative Tribunal 
Judgments", Contemporary Issues in International Law: 
Essavs in Honor of Louis B. Sohn.XBueroenthal (ed.) (Kehl, 
West Germany: Engel, 1984), 347-70.
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(i) The UN Administrative Tribunal Case353
The United Nations Administrative Tribunal was 
established by the General Assembly to hear applications 
alleging non-observance of contracts of employment of staff 
members of the United Nations secretariat or of the terms 
of appointment of such staff members. This case concerns 
the rights of former employees of the organisation, 
nationals of the United States, who had been dismissed for 
refusing to answer questions put to them by an 
investigating committee of the United States Senate 
relating to membership of the Communist Party or subversive 
activities in the United States. Following their 
discharge, they sought redress from the UN Administrative 
Tribunal which found that the circumstances of the 
discharge gave rise to a claim for compensation. In 
accordance with normal procedure, the Secretary-General 
included appropriations in the 1953 budget to meet the 
compensation thus awarded. His action was challenged on 
the ground that the General Assembly was entitled to 
override the decision of the Administrative Tribunal. The 
General Assembly decided354 to seek an advisory opinion on 
the legal issues.355
353 See ICJ Reports 1954, 47. See also, The UN, 41; 
Singh, 430? Elian, 143-4.
354 See GA Res.785 A (VIII) of 6 December 1953.
355 Written statements were presented by the United 
Nations, the ILO, France, Sweden, the Netherlands, Greece, 
the United Kingdom, the United States, the Philippines, 
Mexico, Chile, Iraq, China, Guatemala, Turkey, Ecuador, 
Canada, the USSR, Czechoslovakia and Egypt. Oral 
statements were made on behalf of the United Nations, 
France, the United States, Greece, the United Kingdom and 
the Netherlands.
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In its advisory opinion of 13 July 1954 the Court 
considered that the Assembly was not entitled on any 
grounds to refuse to give effect to an award of 
compensation made by the Administrative Tribunal in favour 
of a staff member of the United Nations whose contract of 
service had been terminated without his assent. The 
tribunal was an independent and truly judicial body 
pronouncing final judgments without appeal within the 
limited field of its functions and not merely an advisory 
subordinate organ. Its judgments were therefore binding on 
the United Nations Organisation and thus also on the 
General Assembly.
Following this advisory opinion, the General Assembly 
decided to "take note of" the Court's opinion, adopted in 
principle judicial review of Administrative Tribunal 
judgments, set up a special committee to study the question 
and established a special indemnity fund to pay the awards 
of compensation made by the Administrative Tribunal.356 
While the United States joined other states in "taking note 
of" the opinion and in agreeing to pay the awards, it was 
its insistence which led to payment of the awards out of 
the special indemnity fund rather than out of the regular 
budget. This insistence was prompted by a United States 
Congressional resolution which declared that no part of the 
funds appropriated by the Congress should be used for 
paying the controversial awards.357
356 See GA Res.888 (IX) of 17 December 1954.
357 See Pomerance, 350? Pratap, 253; Rosenne, The 
World Court. 179-80? id., The ICJ. 495; Keith, 198, 212.
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The Special Committee on Review of Awards of the
United Nations Administrative Tribunal proposed that a 
screening committee composed of delegates to the General
Assembly should be established and authorised to ask for
opinions relating to the awards at the request of the
Secretary-General, the individual concerned or a member 
state.358 The Committee on Application for Review of 
Administrative Tribunal Judgments was established and 
authorised in terms of Article 96(2) of the UN Charter to 
request advisory opinions.359
(ii) The ILO Administrative Tribunal Case360
The statute of the Administrative Tribunal of the ILO, 
the jurisdiction of which had been accepted by UNESCO for 
the purpose of settling certain disputes which might arise 
between the organisation and its staff members, provides 
that the tribunal*s judgments shall be final and without 
appeal subject to the right of the organisation to 
challenge them. It further provides that in the event of 
such a challenge the question of the validity of the 
decision shall be referred to the Court for an advisory 
opinion which will be binding. In this case, the recourse 
to the Court was initiated by the executive board of UNESCO 
which wanted to avail itself of the procedure for review 
existing under the Statute of the ILO Administrative
358 See report of the Special Committee on Review of 
Awards of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, UN 
DOC.A/2909, GA(X) AI 49; Iff.
359 See GA Res.957(X). See also, Keith, 37.
360 See ICJ Reports 1956, 77. See also, The UN, 41-2? 
Singh, 430? Elian, 144-6. The background of this case is 
similar to that in the 1954 case.
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Tribunal and challenge decisions of that Tribunal 
confirming its own jurisdiction.361 When four UNESCO staff 
members holding fixed term appointments complained of the 
Director-General's refusal to renew their contracts on 
expiry, the Tribunal gave judgment in their favour. UNESCO 
challenged these judgments contending that the staff 
members concerned had no legal right to such renewal and 
that the tribunal was competent only to hear complaints 
alleging non-observance of terms of appointment of staff 
regulations. Consequently, UNESCO maintained, the Tribunal 
lacked the requisite jurisdiction.362
In its advisory opinion of 23 October 1956 the Court 
said that an administrative memorandum which had announced 
that all holders of fixed term contracts would, subject to 
certain conditions, be offered renewals, might reasonably 
be regarded as binding on the organisation and that it was 
sufficient to establish the jurisdiction of the Tribunal 
that the complaints should appear to have a substantial and 
not merely artificial connection with the terms and 
provisions invoked. It was the Court's opinion that the 
Administrative Tribunal had been competent to hear the 
complaints in question.
Since in this case the opinion was binding under the 
terms of Article XII of the ILO Administrative Tribunal 
statute, the executive board took note of the Court's 
opinion and approved a proposal by the Director-General
361 See resolution of the executive board of UNESCO of 
25 November 1955.
362 Written statements were submitted by UNESCO, the 
United States, France, the United Kingdom and China.
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regarding payment of the awards granted by the ILO 
Administrative Tribunal.363
(iii) The Fasla Case364
On 28 April 1972, the United Nations Administrative 
Tribunal gave in judgment No.158 its ruling on a complaint 
by a former United Nations staff member concerning the non­
renewal of his fixed term contract. The staff member 
applied for a review of this ruling to the committee on 
application for review of Administrative Tribunal judgments 
which decided that there was a substantial basis for the 
application and requested the Court to give an advisory 
opinion on two questions arising from the applicant's 
contentions.365
In its advisory opinion of 12 July 1973, the Court 
decided to comply with the committee's request and 
expressed the opinion that contrary to these contentions, 
the Tribunal had not failed to exercise the jurisdiction 
vested in it and had not committed a fundamental error in 
procedure having occasioned a failure of justice.
363 See UNESCO, 45 Ex/17 1 November 1956 45 Ex/decisions 
14 item 11 doc.l and 45 Ex/SR9 6 November 1956, 57. See 
also, Repertory, Supp.2, Article 96, paragraph 10 N8. The 
United States representative criticised the Court's opinion 
but agreed not to contest it. UNESCO 45 EX/SR9 6 November 
1956, 50. See Pomerance, 354-5; Pratap, 253? Keith, 198, 
218.
364 See ICJ Reports 1973, 166. See also, The UN, 43; 
Singh, 432.
365 Since the Court considered that the United Nations 
and its member states were likely to be able to furnish 
information on the question, the Registrar notified the 
organisation and its member states that the Court would be 
prepared to receive written statements from them: ICJ 
Reports 1973, 167. Written statements were submitted by 
the Secretary-General (including the staff member).
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(iv) The Mortished Case366
A former staff member of the United Nations 
secretariat had challenged the Secretary-General *s refusal 
to pay him a repatriation grant unless he produced evidence 
of having relocated upon retirement. By a judgment of 15 
May 1981, the United Nations Administrative Tribunal had 
found that the staff member was entitled to receive the 
grant and therefore to compensation for the injury 
sustained through its non-payment. The injury had been 
assessed at the amount of the repatriation grant of which 
payment was refused. The United States Government 
addressed an application for review of this judgment to the 
committee on applications for review of Administrative 
Tribunal judgments and the committee decided to request an 
advisory opinon of the Court on the correctness of the 
decision in question.367
In its advisory opinion of 20 July 1982, the Court, 
after pointing out that a number of procedural and 
substantive irregularities had been committed, decided 
nevertheless, to comply with the committee's request whose 
wording it interpreted as really seeking a determination as 
to whether the Administrative Tribunal had erred on a 
question of law relating to the provisions of the United
366 See ICJ Reports 1982, 325. See also, The UN, 45; 
Singh, 433-4.
367 The President decided that the United Nations and 
its member states were to be considered as likely to be 
able to furnish information on the question. Accordingly, 
the Registrar notified the organisation and its member 
states that the Court would be prepared to receive written 
statements from them. Written statements were filed by 
France, the United States and the Secretary-General 
(including the staff member). See ICJ Reports 1982, 327.
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Nations Charter or had exceeded its jurisdiction or 
competence. As to the first point, the Court said that its 
proper role was not to retry the case already dealt with by 
the Tribunal and that it need not involve itself in the 
question of the proper interpretation of United Nations 
staff regulations and rules further than was strictly 
necessary in order to judge whether the interpretation 
adopted by the Tribunal had been in contradiction with the 
provisions of the Charter. Having noted that the Tribunal 
had only applied what it had found to be relevant staff 
regulations and staff rules made under the authority of the 
General Assembly, the Court found that the Tribunal had not 
erred on a question of law relating to the provisions of 
the Charter. As to the second point, the Court considered 
that the Tribunal's jurisdiction included the scope of 
staff regulations and rules and that it had not exceeded 
its jurisdiction or competence.
Following this advisory opinion, the United Nations 
Secretary-General informed the 5th Committee of the General 
Assembly that judgment No.273 became final when the 
Tribunal confirmed it in the light of the advisory opinion 
and that Mr. Mortished had been paid as ordered by the 
Tribunal. He also announced his intention to treat similar 
claims in the same manner as decided by the Tribunal in the 
Mortished Case.368
After studying the Secretary-General's note, the 
United Nations Advisory Committee on administrative and 
budgetary questions reported to the 5th Committee that as
368 See UN Doc. A/C.5/37/26.
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a result of its examination of the Secretary-General1s 
note, it had decided not to contest the Secretary-General *s 
conclusion and intention as therein stated,369 In the 
remainder of the report, the Committee proposed a number of 
steps designed to enable the Assembly to monitor more 
effectively the implementation of the staff regulations in 
order to ensure that in future acquired rights would not be 
based on applications of the regulations which are contrary 
to the intent of the General Assembly.370
(v) The Yakimetz Case371
Mr. Yakimetz, the applicant, was a Soviet national, 
employed in the Russian translation service of the United 
Nations who had applied for asylum in the United States of 
America, resigned from the service of the Soviet Government 
and unsuccessfully applied for further extension of his 
contract or a career appointment with the United Nations. 
After having failed to secure a reversal of the decision 
not to extend his fixed term appointment beyond its 
expiration date of 26 December 1983, Yakimetz filed an 
application with the UN Administrative Tribunal. Following 
the rejection of his application, Mr. Yakimetz presented an 
application for review of the judgment to the Committee on 
Applications for Review of Administrative Tribunal 
Judgments in which he asked the Committee to request an 
advisory opinion on all the grounds set out in Article XI 
of the Tribunal*s statute. The Committee found that there
369 See UN Doc. A/37/675.
370 See ICJYB 1982-3, 128-31.
371 See ICJ Reports 1987, 18. See also, Singh, 434-5.
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was a substantial basis for the application on two of the 
grounds advanced, namely that the Tribunal had failed to 
exercise the jurisdiction vested in it and that it had 
erred on a question of law relating to the provisions of 
the UN Charter. The committee therefore decided to seek an 
advisory opinion on the following questions. 1. In its 
judgment No.333 of 8 June 1984 did the United Nations 
Administrative Tribunal fail to exercise the jurisdiction 
vested in it by not responding to the question whether a 
legal impediment existed to the further employment in the 
United Nations of the applicant after the expiry of his 
contract? 2. Did the UN Administrative Tribunal in its 
judgment No.333 err on questions of law relating to the 
provisions of the Charter of the United Nations?372
The Court decided to comply with the request for an 
advisory opinion and proceeded to find that the United 
Nations Administrative Tribunal in its judgment No.333 did 
not fail to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it by not 
responding to the question whether a legal impediment 
existed to the further employment in the United Nations of 
the applicant after the expiry of his fixed term contract 
on 26 December 1983. Secondly, that the United Nations 
Administrative Tribunal in the same judgment No.333 did not 
err on any question of law relating to the provisions of
372 The President decided that the United Nations and 
its member states were to be considered as likely to be 
able to furnish information on the question. Accordingly, 
the Deputy Registrar notified the organisation and its 
member states that the Court would be prepared to receive 
written statements from them. Written statements were 
filed by Canada, Italy, the USSR, the United States and the 
Secretary-General (including the staff member). See ICJ 
Reports 1987, 20.
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the Charter of the United Nations.
The opinion in the first UN Administrative Tribunal 
case had a constitutional effect in that it clarified the 
powers of the General Assembly in relation to the Tribunal. 
The first two opinions also served to establish and protect 
the judicial character of the two Tribunals. Thus, the 
employment of the advisory procedure as part of the 
machinery for judicial review of the decisions of the 
Administrative Tribunals represents an important 
contribution towards the creation of an independent 
international civil service on which the effective 
functioning of the system of international organisations 
depends. In reviewing the judgments of Administrative 
Tribunals, the Court applies international administrative 
law,373 i.e. the law governing relations between 
international organisations and the members of their staff. 
The Court has thus had the opportunity either by its own 
findings or by its attitude to the findings of the United 
Nations Administrative Tribunal in the relevant cases, to 
contribute to the development of this international 
administrative law or what may also be termed the 
employment law of the United Nations. This system of 
judicial review, notwithstanding its procedural 
imperfections, affords judicial protection of the rights of 
staff members of the United Nations and other international
373 The term "international administrative law" is here 
used in a narrow sense. It may, however, be employed in a 
wider sense to refer, for instance, to the common thread 
that draws together the diverse subjects of international 
regulation. See generally. D. G. Partan, "International 
Administrative Law", 75 AJIL (1981), 639-44? Starke,
International Law. 256.
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organisations. This protection is "essential to ensure the 
efficient working of the secretariat and to give effect to 
the paramount consideration of securing the highest 
standards of efficiency, competence and integrity".374
(h) The IMCO Case375
The IMCO, now the International Maritime Organisation, 
comprises among other organs an Assembly and a Maritime 
Safety Committee. Under the terms of Article 28(a) of the 
convention for the establishment of the organisation, this 
committee consists of 14 members elected by the Assembly 
from the members of the organisation having an important 
interest in maritime safety "of which not less than eight 
shall be the largest ship-owning nations". At the first 
meeting of the IMCO Assembly in 1959 the question arose as 
to whether this phrase meant those nations possessing the 
largest amount of registered tonnage or those beneficially 
owning the largest amount of tonnage. Beneath this formal 
dispute lay the vexed question of "flags of convenience", 
i.e. the registration of ships in a foreign country usually 
for purposes of tax relief or for other reasons. If the 
first interpretation were adopted, Liberia and Panama under 
whose flags over ten million and over four million tons of 
merchant shipping respectively were registered at that
374 See Lachs, 275-6? Pratap, 253? Rosenne, The World 
Court, 179-81? Singh, 163-4? Cheng, 247? de Arechaga, 
"Work and Jurisprudence", 7? Greig, International Law. 36- 
7? Elias, Africa. 77, 78.
375 See ICJ Reports 1960, 150. See also, Rosenne, The 
World Court. 179-81? Singh, 431? Elian, 146-7? The UN, 
42.
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time, would have been entitled to be members of the 
Maritime Safety Committee. When on 15 January 1959, the 
IMCO Assembly for the first time proceeded to elect the 
members of the committee, it elected neither Liberia nor 
Panama although the two states were among the members of 
the organisation which possessed the largest registered 
tonnage. Subsequently, the Assembly, recognising that 
differences of opinion had arisen regarding the correct 
interpretation of the constitution, unanimously adopted a 
proposal by Liberia376 to request an advisory opinion on 
the question whether the Maritime Safety Committee was 
constituted in accordance with the convention for the
establishment of the organisation.377 In its advisory 
opinion of 8 June 1960, the Court replied to this question 
in the negative and held that the committee had not been 
properly constituted and that as the proper criterion was 
registered tonnage, Liberia and Panama were entitled to be 
elected.
The opinion in this case was effective in that it was 
promptly implemented. The previous Maritime Safety 
Committee was dissolved and replaced by a new one
constituted in accordance with Article 28 of the IMCO
Convention "as interpreted by the Court in its advisory
376 See Resolution A.12(i) adopted by the Assembly of 
the IMCO on 19 January 1959.
377 Written statements were presented by Belgium, 
France, Liberia, the United States, China, Panama, 
Switzerland, Italy, Denmark, the United Kingdom, Norway, 
the Netherlands and India. Oral statements were made on 
behalf of Liberia, the United States, Panama, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom.
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opinion".378 The significance of this case is that it is 
the first instance in which the Court has held to be 
unconstitutional action taken by the plenary organ of an 
international organisation.379 On the other hand, the 
advisory opinion makes no attempt to solve the legal 
problems arising from the existence of the flags of
convenience. The Court's opinion was for the most part 
based on a textual analysis of the relevant clause of the 
IMO constitution. The question of flags of convenience on 
the other hand, was left to the political organs. The 
general topic of the nationality of ships is covered by
Article 92 of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea and
the United Nations Convention on the Conditions for the 
Registration of Ships of 1986. By an amendment to the 
constitution of 1974, in force from 1978, the Maritime 
Safety Committee now consists of all members of the
organisation.380
378 See IMCO Assembly Resolution A.II/Res.21, 6 April 
1961. In the same resolution the measures taken by the 
Maritime Safety Committee from 1959-61 were adopted and 
confirmed. New elections took place on 13 April 1961. For 
discussions of the Court's opinion, see IMC0/A.II/SR.4, 6 
April 1961. See also, Pomerance, 355? Rosenne, The World 
Court, 190; Keith, 218; Pratap, 253; Bowett, 
International Institutions. 363-4. For a penetrating 
analysis of the post-opinion actions in the IMCO case, see 
E. Lauterpacht, "The Legal Effect of Illegal Acts of 
International Organisations", Cambridge Essays in 
International Law. (London, Stevens and Sons Ltd., 1965), 
100-6 (hereinafter "Legal Effect").
379 See Rosenne, ibid.; Pratap, ibid., E. Lauterpacht, 
"Legal Effect", 100.
380 See Rosenne, ibid.
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(i) The Expenses Case381
Article 17, paragraph 2 of the Charter of the United 
Nations provides that "The expenses of the organisation 
shall be borne by the members as apportioned by the General 
Assembly".382 In December 1961, the General Assembly
381 See ICJ Reports 1962, 151. For discussions of and 
references to this case in the legal literature, see for 
instance, R. Higgins, "Policy Considerations and the 
International Judicial Process", 17 I CLP (1968), 58 and 80; 
T.O. Elias, New Horizons in International Law (Alphen Aan 
den Rijen; Sijthoff & Noordhoff? Dobbs Ferry, New York: 
Oceana Publications, 1979), 76? Gordon,
: - " 59
AJIL (1965), 794, 803, 825? Rosenne, "Non-Use", 1, 42 and 
543? E. Lauterpacht, "Law of International Organisation", 
384, 405, 410, 411, 415, 419, 435, 439, 447, 451, 453, 454, 
455, 458? Friedmann, "Evolution", 313, 314, 319? Jenks, 
Prospects. 32, 77, 192, 257-8, 277, 285, 482, 487-9, 496, 
665, 687? K.R. Simmonds, "The UN Assessments Advisory
Opinion", 13 ICLO (1964), 854-898 (hereinafter "Simmonds")? 
Greig, "Advisory Jurisdiction", 325, n.l, 326, 334, 345-60? 
R.Y. Jennings, "Notes, International Court of Justice, 
Advisory Opinion of July 20, 1962, Certain Expenses of the 
United Nations (Article 17, Para.2 of the Charter)", 11 
ICLO (1962), 1169-83 (hereinafter "Advisory Opinion")? S. 
Slonim, "The Advisory Opinion of the International Court of 
Justice on Certain Expenses of the United Nations: A
Critical Analysis", 10 H U  (1964), 227-76 (hereinafter
"Slonim")? Anand, "International Adjudication", 11? Szasz, 
504, 504n, 43, 508? Weissberg, 136, 137, 138, 139, 148, 
149, 150. See also, The UN, 42-3? Rosenne, The World
Court, 192-3; Singh, 431? Elian, 148-50? D.W. Bowett, 
United Nations1 Forces: A Legal Study of United Nations
Practice, published under the auspices of the David Davies 
Memorial Institute (T->ndon: Stevens & Sons, 1964) , 95-9
? id., International Institutions. 
418-21? A. D. Phar*nd, "Analysis of the Opinion of the 
International Court of Justice on Certain Expenses of the 
United Nations", 1 CYIL (1963), 272-97? T.S. Rama Rao,
"The Expenses Judgment of the International Court of 
Justice - A Critique", 12 IYIA (1963), 134-160? G.S. Raju, 
"The Expenses of the United Nations Organisations", 2 IJIL
(1962), 485-90.
382 For a full account of the United Nations' financial 
history and structure, see J. David Singer, Financing 
International Organisation: The United Nations Budget 
Process (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961). An excellent 
short account is given in J. G. Stoessinger, Financing the 
United Nations (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
November 1961). See also, e.g. Bowett, International 
Institutions. 412-21? G.J. Mangone & A.K. Srivastava,
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adopted a resolution requesting an advisory opinion on 
whether the expenditures authorised by it relating to 
United Nations operations in the Congo (ONUC) and to the 
operations of the United Nations Emergency Force in the 
Middle East (UNEF)383 constituted "expenses of the 
organisation" within the meaning of the provision of the Charter.384
"Budgeting for the UN", 12 10 (1958), 473? C.W. Jenks, 
"Some Legal Aspects of the Financing of International 
Institutions", 38 TGS (1943), 93. Finances of the UN are 
dealt with in part 1, section 5 of the Yearbooks of the UN 
(entitled "Administrative and Budgetary Questions").
383 On UN peacekeeping, see generally, A. Verrier, 
International Peacekeeping; United Nations Forces in a 
Troubled World (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1981)? A. James, 
"UN Action for Peace I. Barrier Forces", 18 WT (1962), 478- 
86? id., "UN Action for Peace II. Law and Order Forces", 
ibid., 503-12? id., The Politics of Peacekeeping (London: 
Chatto and Windus for the Institute of Strategic Studies,
1969)? id., Peacekeeping in International Politics 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990)? B. E. Urquhart, "United 
Nations Peacekeeping in the Middle East", 36 WT (1980), 88- 
93? id., "United Nations Peace Forces and the Changing 
United Nations: An Institutional Perspective", 17 10
(1963), 338-54? L. L. Fabian, "Towards a Peacekeeping
Renaissance", 30 ibid. (1976), 153-61? L.M. Goodrich and 
G.E. Rosner, "The United Nations Emergency Force", 11 
ibid., (1957), 413-30? L.P. Bloomfield, "Headquarters-
Field Relations: Some Notes on the Beginning and End of 
ONUC", 17 ibid. (1963), 377-92. On non-UN peacekeeping, 
see Ramesh Thakur, "The Olive Branch Brigades: Peacekeeping 
in the Middle East", 40 WT (1984), 93-101.
384 See GA Res. 1732 (XVI) 20 December 1961. For the 
background to the request for the advisory opinion, see R. 
Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping 1946-67. Documents 
and Commentary. I. The Middle East, issued under the 
auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs 
(London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1969) 
(hereinafter "1 R. Higgins"), 415-38? id., United Nations 
Peacekeeping. 1946-67. Documents and Commentary. III. 
Africa (London, New York, Toronto, Melbourne: Oxford 
University Press, 1980) (hereinafter "3 R. Higgins"), 274- 
82? Slonim, 227-9? Greig, "Advisory Jurisdiction", 345- 
50? Simmons, 858-61. For excerpts from the advisory 
opinion, see 1 R. Higgins, 438-48? 3 id., 282-94. Since 
the President considered that the states members of the 
United Nations were likely to be able to furnish 
information on the question, the Registrar sent to them the 
special and direct communication provided for in Article 
66(2) of the Statute. Written statements were submitted by
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In its advisory opinion of 20 July 1962 the Court 
replied in the affirmative that these expenditures were 
expenses of the United Nations. It pointed out that under 
Article 17, paragraph 2 of the Charter the expenses of the 
organisation are the amounts paid out to defray the cost of 
carrying out the purposes of the organisation. After 
examining the resolutions authorising the expenditures in 
question, the Court concluded that they were so incurred. 
The Court also analysed the principal arguments which had 
been advanced against the conclusion that these 
expenditures should be considered as expenses of the 
organisation and found these arguments to be groundless.
The opinion thus made clear that UNEF and ONUC were 
legally established and that the costs incurred were indeed 
"Expenses of the Organisation" under Article 17. The 
implication of the opinion was that states failing to pay 
their assessed dues for UNEF and ONUC would become liable 
for the application of Article 19 which stipulates that a 
member in arrears on its contributions shall lose its vote 
in the Assembly if the amount of its arrears equals or 
exceeds the amount of the contributions due from it for the
Australia, Bulgaria, Byelorussia SSR, Canada, 
Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Mexico, the Netherlands, the Philippines, Poland, Portugal, 
Rumania, South Africa, Spain, the Ukraine SSR, the USSR, 
the United Kingdom, the United States and Upper Volta (now 
Burkina Faso). The Secretary-General submitted a
comprehensive introductory note to the documentation. In 
the oral proceedings statements were made by Australia, 
Canada, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, the USSR, 
the United Kingdom and the United States. It is 
significant to note that the Soviet Union made an 
unprecedented appearance before the Court. The power of 
the Court to give the opinion in the terms requested was 
challenged both in the General Assembly and before the 
Court. See ICJ Reports 1962, 153.
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preceding two years.385 After prolonged debate and 
negotiation in both the Fifth Committee and Plenary of the 
17th session of the Assembly, during which certain states 
had urged that the Court's opinion be merely "noted”,386 on 
19 December 1962 the Assembly adopted Resolution 1854 (XVII) 
by which it accepted the opinion of the Court.387 In a 
separate part of the same resolution388 the Assembly also 
re-established and enlarged the working group which had 
been set up in 1961 to study special methods for financing 
peacekeeping operations involving heavy expenditure.389
385 See 3 R. Higgins, 294; L. Gross, "Expenses of the 
United Nations for Peace Keeping Operations; The Advisory 
Opinion of the International Court of Justice", 17 10
(1963), 1-2 and 11-26 (hereinafter "Expenses").
386 It is generally acknowledged that acceptance as 
opposed to taking note of the opinion implied incorporation 
of the Court's ruling into the "Law recognised by the 
United Nations" and such incorporation entailed, as a 
logical corollary, employment of Article 19 in appropriate 
circumstances. See Pomerance, 351, n.108. Cf. Singh, 211? 
Rosenne, The World Court. 233.
387 See 1 R. Higgins, 449; 3 id., 294; id., "United 
Nations Peacekeeping, Political and Financial Problems", 21 
WT (1965), 324, 327 (hereinafter "UN Peacekeeping"); T. 
Higgins, "The UN Financial Crisis", 21 WT (1965), 92
(hereinafter "Financial Crisis"); id., "The Politics of 
United Nations Finance", 19 ibid. (1963), 380, 387
(hereinafter "UN Finance"); Gross, Expenses. 27; Slonim, 
270; Simmonds, 882; Rosenne, The World Court. 193;
Pomerance, 351. For the discussion that preceded the 
adoption of the resolution, see ibid., 361-4; Keith, 213- 
8.
388 See GA Res. 1854b(XVII) .
389 The fact that no permanent arrangements exist for 
defraying the costs of UN peacekeeping operations means 
that such operations have always had a precarious and 
insecure financial basis. See R. Higgins, Peace Lecture, 
4; T. Higgins, "UN Finance", 380-1; R. Higgins, United 
Nations Peacekeeping. Documents and Commentary. IV. Europe 
1946-79 (Oxford, New York, Toronto, Melbourne: Oxford 
University Press, 1981),* (hereinafter 4 R. Higgins) . In 
spite of the Court's opinion in the Expenses Case. 
virtually all of the peacekeeping operations have had
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This group was asked to consider such criteria as the
clauses that require funding by rather special provisions 
because of the failure of some states to comply with the 
Court's opinion. Although a different procedure from the 
one applied to meet expenditures of the regular budget is 
required to meet the cost of UN peacekeeping operations, 
such expenses are considered expenses of the organisation 
to be borne by member states in accordance with Article 
17(2) of the Charter of the United Nations. Thus, finances 
for some peacekeeping operations have been raised in ad hoc 
and special accounts (e.g. UNEF and ONUC. On the financing 
of UNEF, see 1 R. Higgins, 415ff? cf. ONUC, 3 id., 274ff) 
and supplemented by voluntary contributions in cash and in 
the form of services and supplies. This method has been 
applied to the financing of: the UN Observer Group in
Central America, UN.Doc. A/47/847 (1989), the UN
Peacekeeping Force in the Middle East: UN Disengagement 
Observer Force, Report of the 5th Committee 
(UN.Doc.A/44/887 (1989), 44th session, agenda item 133a). 
Some peacekeeping operations have been financed out of the 
regular budget of the United Nations and the assessment of 
UN members in accordance with their scale of contributions. 
Such operations have been treated for budgetary purposes as 
special missions and related activities, or "investigations 
and enquiries" provision for which falls quite normally 
within the regular budget, e.g. UNTSO, UNOGIL, UNSCOB. 
(See 1 R. Higgins, 133ff, 566ff and 4 id., 55ff.) Some
operations are financed outside of the UN budget. The 
Korean enforcement action was financed by bilateral 
agreements between the United States and other 
participants. Se^R. Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping. 
Documents and Commentary. II - Asia 1946-67 (London, 
Bombay, Karachi, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press,
1970), 245ff (hereinafter 2 R. Higgins). Some peacekeeping 
activities have been financed either by requiring the 
parties to the dispute to bear all the costs, as happened 
with UNSF and UNYOM in West Irian and the Yemen (see 2 R. 
Higgins, 134ff) or by voluntary contributions in addition 
to payments by the parties most directly involved, as 
happened with regard to UNFICYP in Cyprus. (See 4 R. 
Higgins, 286ff; Bowett, International Institutions. 420). 
On some of the various methods of financing peacekeeping 
operations, see 1 R. Higgins, 133, n.l? id., "UN 
Peacekeeping", 325-6. On the financial problems of the UN, 
see the 1987 Secretary-General's Report on the Work of the 
Organisation, GAOR 42nd session, Supp.l A/42/1 4 and 8-9? 
ibid., 1988, GAOR 43rd session, Supp.l, A/43/1 9-10; ibid. 
1989, GAOR 44th session, Supp.l, A/44/1 4-5. A renewed 
effort is needed by the world community to set aside the 
jumble of financing arrangements by which peacekeeping 
operations have been funded in the past, and to establish 
an agreed system under which all of the UN member states 
will regularly contribute in proportion to their ability to 
do so. See F. Lester, "Exploiting the Recent Revival of 
the United Nations", 9 IR (1989), 419, 429 (hereinafter
"Lester").
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special financial responsibility of the Security Council; 
special factors which might be relevant in any particular 
case; the degree of economic development of each member, 
and whether or not it was receiving technical assistance 
from the UN, as well as the collective financial 
responsibility of UN members.390
The advisory opinion and the resolution accepting it 
did not lead to a speedy solution of the crisis which was 
not only financial,391 but also political and 
constitutional in nature.392 Indeed, the opinion probably 
only served to aggravate it by introducing intractable 
questions of prestige into the diplomatic scene.393 While 
some member states paid their arrears, others, including 
France and the Soviet Union refused to do so.394 In the 
course of 1963, the General Assembly passed further 
resolutions designed to deal with the financial aspect of 
the crisis.395 Expectations that the advisory opinion and 
the resolutions would serve as the basis for resolving the
390 See 1 R. Higgins, 450-1; 3 id., 294; Gross, 
Expenses. 27.
391 See Gross, Expenses. 2 and 15, n.39; T. Higgins, 
"Financial Crisis", 92-5; id., "UN Finance", 380-9.
392 See R. Higgins, "UN Peacekeeping", 324-37.
393 See Rosenne, The World Court. 193.
394 See 1 R. Higgins, 449-50; 3 id., 294; T. Higgins, 
"Financial Crisis", 92; id., "UN Finance", 380 and 387; 
Rosenne, The World Court. ibid.; Pratap, 253; Slonim, 
247.
395 See GA Resolutions 1863 (XVII), 1874-9 (S-IV) . See 
1 R. Higgins, 451; 3 id., 294-7; id., "UN Peacekeeping", 
327; T. Higgins, "UN Finance", 388-9; Rosenne, The World 
Court. ibid.
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crisis proved unfounded.396
Division among the membership over the financing of 
these peacekeeping operations persisted and by the 
beginning of the 19th session the Soviet Union and a number 
of East European countries had accumulated more than two 
years arrears and under the terms of Article 19 were, in 
principle, liable to be deprived of their vote. Both the 
UK and the US held that Article 19 applied to the Soviet 
Union as much as to any other state and would operate 
automatically without the need for the Assembly to vote to 
apply the sanction.397 The Assembly was postponed until 
December 1964 in the hope that a solution would be found. 
"What was ultimately arranged was an undignified but 
perhaps necessary procedure whereby no voting would be 
needed".398 Where there was no ready consensus on an 
issue, members could privately indicate their preference to 
the President of the Assembly. Final voting was thus 
avoided. But the scope of the Assembly's work was 
pathetically reduced by this manner of operation. The 
Assembly limped into recess in February 1965, by which time 
France found itself among those who were two years in 
arrears as regards payment of their assessed dues.399
396 See Rosenne, The World Court, ibid.; T. Higgins, 
"Financial Crisis", 93.
397 On the Secretary-General' s position on the 
application of Article 19 of the Charter, see T. Higgins, 
"UN Finance", 382 and 387.
398 See R. Higgins, "UN Peacekeeping", 328; T. Higgins, 
"Financial Crisis", 93; Rosenne, The World Court. 193.
399 See 1 R. Higgins, 453-4; 3 id., 298; id., "UN 
Peacekeeping", 328; T. Higgins, "Financial Crisis", 94-5; 
Pratap, 254; Rosenne, The World Court. ibid., where he
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Before the beginning of the 20th session, after profound 
internal and agonising reappraisal, the UN decided that its 
position was untenable. The US took the opportunity of an 
August meeting of the special committee on peacekeeping 
operations to announce a change in policy in time for the 
forthcoming Assembly session.400
Although the constitutional aspect of the crisis was 
settled, the political and financial aspect remained 
unresolved. The states in arrears with the payment of 
their assessed contributions in respect of peacekeeping 
operations persisted in their refusal to pay up. It is, 
however, gratifying to note that with the extraordinary 
improvement in the international climate during the past 
few years, there has been a new demand and a new enthusiasm 
for peacekeeping operations. Even more heartening is the 
fact that peacekeeping operations now have the political 
support of all the permanent members of the United Nations 
Security Council. The wide recognition of the value of 
peacekeeping operations is reflected in the award to the UN 
Peacekeeping Forces of the well deserved Nobel Peace Prize 
in 1988.401 Although the financial support from member
comments that in many respects this session of the General 
Assembly provided the jumping-off point for the evolution 
of the concept of "consensus”.
400 See 1 R. Higgins, 454-6; 3 id., 297-9? Pomerance, 
351-2? Pratap, 253-4? Rosenne, The World Court. ibid.; 
Slonim, 271-4? N.J. Padelford, "Financing Peacekeeping: 
Politics and Crisis", 19/2 10 (1965), 444-53.
401 See Report of the Secretary-General. 1989, 1 and 4- 
5? Rosenne, The World Court. ibid.? Lester, 429. See 
also, "1988 Nobel Peace Prize Awarded to UN Peacekeeping 
Forces", UN Chronicle (December 1988), 4-9? "The Growing 
Demand for UN Peacekeepers, Stretched to the Limits", The 
Times, 18 September, 1989.
states is far from adequate, it is to be hoped that now 
that the political will to address the problem of the 
financing of such operations appears to exist, a solution 
may not be far off. In this connection, it may be noted 
that a direct consequence of the positive Soviet attitude 
towards the United Nations and its role in world affairs is 
generated partly by the new political thinking in which it 
has engaged since the latter part of the last decade, and 
partly by the improved international political climate now 
prevailing.402 In 1987, the Soviet Union pledged to 
cooperate actively in overcoming the budget difficulties 
that have arisen within the United Nations. Subsequently, 
it settled its outstanding debts to the United Nations, 
including the expenses of peacekeeping operations, the
402 On the implications of the new international 
political climate for the work of the United Nations, see 
Report of the Secretary-General. 1987, 1 and 4? ibid.,
1988, 5, 9 and 10? ibid., 1989, 1, 4 and 5. See
generally Lester, 419-38. On this new Soviet political 
thinking, the new international climate and their effect on 
Soviet policy on the United Nations, see "Reality and 
Safeguards for a Secure World", an article by Mr. Mikhail 
Gorbachev first published in the Soviet press and later 
circulated as an official UN document, General Assembly 
42nd session, agenda item 73, Comprehensive System of 
International Peace and Security. (A42/574) the Security 
Council 42nd year, S/19143 passim, especially 2 and 6-11. 
See also, his address to the 1988 session of the General 
Assembly, the United Nations General Assembly, Doc. 
A/43/pv.72, 43rd session, Provisional verbatim Record of 
the 72nd meeting, passim, especially 17-26? Ronald Reagan, 
"The Future of East-West Relations", 44 WT (1988), 135-6? 
Sir Geoffrey Howe, "Soviet Foreign Policy Under Gorbachev", 
45 WT (1989), 40, esp. at 43? R. Higgins, Peace Lecture, 
19-21. On attitudes to the UN, see generally, B.S. Wong, 
"Communist China*s Changing Attitudes Toward the United 
Nations", 20 10 (1966), 677-704? R.H. Cory Jr., "The Role 
of Public Opinion in United States* Policies Toward the 
United Nations", 11 ibid. (1957), 220-4? L. P. Bloomfield, 
"American Policy Toward the UN - Some Bureaucratic 
Reflections", 12 ibid. (1958), 1-16? A. Dallin, "The
Soviet View of the United Nations", 16 ibid. (1962), 145.
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payment of which it had so bitterly resisted in the past. 
Even more significant is the admission by the Soviet Deputy 
Foreign Minister Petrovsky on 6 July 1988 that "we were 
wrong not to pay for peacekeeping operations. We are 
paying up. We were wrong towards international civil 
servants. Now we accept permanent contracts... We were 
wrong to oppose an active role for the Secretary- 
General" .403
It has been said that this case and its aftermath are 
an excellent illustration of the basic problems which can 
arise when courts are put in a position of answering 
questions of a political character and that the request for 
the opinion was an instance of abuse of the General 
Assembly and the advisory process by some of the great 
powers which did nothing to enhance the standing of the 
judicial process in the United Nations.404 Although this 
opinion was not successful in solving the immediate crisis, 
which prompted consultation of the Court, its long term 
effect cannot be overestimated. For it was to provide a 
solid legal basis for the development of the peacekeeping 
activities of the United Nations in a form not foreseen in 
the Charter, and thus to avoid the stultification of the 
United Nations as an organ for the maintenance of 
international peace and security in the foreseeable future
403 See R. Higgins, Peace Lecture, 20.
404 See Keith, 213-8? Greig, "Advisory Jurisdiction", 
358-60 and 367-8? Cf. Gross, Expenses. 28-30? Rosenne, The 
World Court. 193.
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and perhaps, permanently.405
Whatever the practical impact of the opinion, 
undoubtedly it represents a major contribution to the 
development of the constitutional law of the United Nations 
Charter and can truly rank as one of the landmarks in the 
development of international law and United Nations law by 
the Court. The Court in its reasoning did not limit itself 
to a narrow determination of the issue presented, but 
rather discussed broader organisational issues related to 
the functioning of the United Nations. Among the more 
important issues for which the Court's opinion has 
significant implications are the following: the nature of 
the Court's advisory function, the Court's independence of 
the other principal organs, the residual responsibility of 
the General Assembly for the maintenance of international 
peace and security, the scope of its apportionment power, 
the effect of ultra vires acts of United Nations organs, 
the role of the Secretary-General as an agent of the 
Security Council and the General Assembly, the significance 
of travaux preparatoires. the probative value of the 
practice of a UN organ, and, above all, the principle of 
effectiveness in Charter interpretation.406
405 see Rosenne, The World Court. ibid. ; Jennings, 
"Advisory Opinion", 1169? Simmonds, 854.
406 See Pratap, 253-4 and 263; Slonim, 227; Gross, 
Expenses. 3-11 and 26-35? Bowett, International 
Institutions. 363-5.
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(j) The Western Sahara Case407
In December 1974, the General Assembly requested408 an 
advisory opinion on the following questions:
(i) Was Western Sahara (Rio de Oro and Sakiet el 
Hamra) at the time of colonisation by Spain a territory 
belonging to no-one (terra nulliusl? If the answer to the 
first question is in the negative,
(ii) What were the legal ties between this territory 
and the Kingdom of Morocco and the Mauritanian entity?409
In its advisory opinion delivered on 16 October 1975, 
the Court replied to question (i) in the negative. In 
reply to question (ii) , it expressed the opinion that the 
materials and information presented to it showed the 
existence at the time of Spanish colonisation, of legal 
ties of allegiance between the sovereign of Morocco and 
some of the tribes living in the territory of Western 
Sahara. They equally showed the existence of rights,
407 See ICJ Reports 1975, 6. See also, Singh, 432; 
Janis, 609-21; M. Shaw, "The Western Sahara Case”, 49 BYIL 
(1978), 119-54; Okere, 296-312; Wooldridge, 86-122; M.A. 
Smith Jr., "Sovereignty Over Unoccupied Territories - The 
Western Sahara Decision”, 9 CWRJIL (1977), 135-59 
(hereinafter "Smith”); Karin Oellers-Framn, "Western 
Sahara (Advisory Opinion)", in Bernhardt (ed.), EPIL 
Instalment 2 (1982), 291-3; The UN, 43-4.
408 See GA Res. 3292 (XXIX) of 13 December 1974.
409 In this case, the Court decided that the member 
states of the United Nations were likely to be able to 
furnish information on the question submitted. 
Accordingly, the special and direct communication provided 
for in Article 66(2) of the Statute was addressed to them. 
Written statements were submitted by Chile, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, France, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Morocco, Nicaragua, Panama, Spain and the 
Secretary-General. Oral statements were made on the merits 
by Algeria, Mauritania, Morocco, Spain and Zaire. See ICJ 
Reports 1975, 15.
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including some rights relating to the land, which 
constituted legal ties between the Mauritanian entity as 
understood by the Court, and the territory of Western 
Sahara. On the other hand, the Court's conclusion was that 
the information presented to it did not establish any tie 
of territorial sovereignty between the territory of Western 
Sahara and the Kingdom of Morocco or the Mauritanian 
entity. Thus, the Court did not find any legal ties of 
such a nature as might affect the application of the 
General Assembly's 1960 Resolution 1514(XV) containing the 
declaration on the granting of independence to colonial 
countries and peoples in the decolonisation of Western 
Sahara and, in particular, of the principle of self- 
determination through free and genuine expression of the 
will of the peoples of the territory.410
In making this decision, the Court was in effect 
signalling to the General Assembly that despite the 
existence of legitimate interests on the part of both 
Morocco and Mauritania, there was no legal obstacle to the 
exercise of self-determination by the inhabitants of the 
area in the form of their accession to independence, i.e. 
that the territory was neither a priori a part of either 
Morocco or Mauritania.411
The General Assembly at its 2435th plenary meeting,
410 See Rosenne, The World Court. 202-4? Herman, 137- 
42; Blaydes, 354-68. For a discussion of the Court's 
substantive treatment of the questions posed in the 
request, see ibid., 361-4.
411 See Rosenne, ibid., 204. For a discussion of the 
Court's treatment of the principle of self-determination, 
see Blaydes, 364-7? Byman, 98ff? Janis, 615-21.
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adopted Resolutions (A) and (B) 3458 (XXX) of 10 December 
1975 in which it noted with appreciation the advisory 
opinion, and requested Spain as the administering power in 
accordance with the advisory opinion to take immediately 
all necessary measures in consultation with all the parties 
concerned and interested so that all indigenous Saharans 
could exercise freely and fully under United Nations 
supervision their inalienable right to self-determination. 
The resolution also requested the Secretary-General in 
consultation with Spain and the special committee on the 
situation with regard to the implementation of the 
declaration on the granting of independence to colonial 
countries and peoples, to make the necessary arrangements 
for the supervision of the said act of self-determination, 
and urged all the parties concerned and interested to 
exercise the necessary restraint and to desist from any 
unilateral or other action outside the decisions of the 
General Assembly on the territory. The other part of the 
resolution noted the tripartite agreement concluded at 
Madrid on 14 November 1975 between Mauritania, Morocco and 
Spain, reaffirmed the inalienable right to self- 
determination in accordance with General Assembly 
Resolution 1514(XV) of all the indigenous Saharan 
populations. It also requested the parties to the Madrid 
Agreement to ensure respect for the freely expressed 
aspirations of the Saharan populations and asked the 
interim administration to take all necessary steps to 
ensure that all the indigenous Saharan populations would be 
able to exercise their inalienable right to self­
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determination through free consultations organised with the 
assistance of a representative of the United Nations 
appointed by the Secretary-General.412
Following the publication of the advisory opinion, 
Morocco decided to march into Western Sahara.413 Moroccan 
troops entered parts of the territory at the end of October 
1975, clashing with forces of the Polisario Front.414 A 
few days later, on 14 November, in Madrid, Spain signed an 
agreement with Morocco and Mauritania on the transfer of 
administrative powers in the territory.415 Under this 
agreement, a transitional tripartite administration was set 
up involving the parties. Spanish administration formally 
ended on 26 February 1976. While a session of the 
Djemma416 voted the same day for integration with Morocco 
and Mauritania,417 another body, the pro-Pol isario
Provisional Saharawi National Council, proclaimed the 
founding of an independent state, the Saharawi Arab
412 See ICJYB 1975-6, 125-8. See also, J. Gretton, "The 
Western Sahara in the International Arena", 36 WT (1980), 
343, 345 (hereinafter "Gretton").
413 It justified this action in part by citing the 
Court's finding of legal links between it and Western 
Sahara.
414 The Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguiet el 
Hamra and Rio de Oro (Polisario Front) was founded in 1973 
to pursue an armed struggle against Spain for the 
independence of Western Sahara. See Rosenne, ibid.? 
Blaydes, 368; Byman, 97; Janis, 619; Smith, 136.
415 See Janis, ibid.; Smith, ibid.; Gretton, 345.
416 This is a consultative assembly set up in the 
territory by the Spanish authorities in 1967.
417 See Smith, 137; Gretton, 346. The UN Secretary- 
General refused to give this Moroccon-sponsored kind of 
self-determination his seal of approval.
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Democratic Republic (SADR) on 27 February 1976.418 
Tensions also developed between Morocco and Algeria which, 
after abandoning its own rival claims to a stake in the 
Western Sahara, gave its full support to the Polisario 
Front.419 Western Sahara was partitioned by Morocco and 
Mauritania in April 1976.420 However, in 1979, Mauritania 
signed a peace agreement with the Polisario Front 
renouncing its territorial claims over Western Sahara.421 
A few days later, Morocco annexed the former Mauritanian 
zone. What at first amounted to a partition of the 
territory by the two pretenders to sovereignty then became 
a conflict between Morocco and the Polisario Front.
The war in the Western Sahara also became a matter of 
growing concern for the OAU which had previously considered 
the issue of the Western Sahara as a question for the 
UN.422 At its Monrovia summit in July 1979 the OAU adopted 
the recommendations of its subcommittee by just a two- 
thirds majority thus committing itself in binding fashion 
to seeing that the conflict was solved through the exercise 
of a referendum.423 In June 1983, an OAU summit conference
418 See Janis, 619; Gretton, 344 and 346.
419 See Smith, 137. On the opposed Moroccan and 
Algerian strategies on the Western Sahara question, see
Gretton, 343ff. See also, J. Mercer, "Confrontation in the
Western Sahara”,32 WT (1976), 230-9.
420 See Janis, ibid.? Smith, 136.
421 See Gretton, 349.
422 See Gretton, 345-6.
423 See Gretton, ibid. On developments concerning 
Western Sahara other than the delivery of the advisory 
opinion until 1979, see generally Wooldridge, 118-22.
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in Addis Ababa adopted Resolution AHG/Res. 104(XIX) which 
laid down a broad framework for solving the conflict 
involving direct negotiations between the Polisario Front 
and Morocco to bring about a ceasefire in order to create 
conditions for a peaceful and fair referendum. This was 
subsequently incorporated in resolutions adopted by the UN 
General Assembly. Resolution 39/40, adopted by the UN 
General Assembly in December 1984 requested the parties to 
the conflict, Morocco and the Polisario Front, to undertake 
direct negotiations with a view to bringing about a 
ceasefire to create the necessary conditions for a peaceful 
and fair referendum for self-determination of the people of 
Western Sahara under the auspices of the OAU and the UN. 
In December 1985, the General Assembly in Resolution 40/50 
invited the Chairman of the OAU and the UN Secretary- 
General to exert every effort to persuade the parties to 
the conflict to negotiate in the shortest possible time and 
in conformity with Resolution AHG/Res. 104(XIX) and the 
present resolution, the terms of a ceasefire and the 
modalities for organising the said referendum. Although in 
1981 Morocco had announced its acceptance of the holding of 
a referendum in the Western Sahara it rejected direct 
negotiations with the Polisario Front. However, in 
pursuance of the mandate conferred by Resolution 40/50, the 
UN Secretary-General held frequent consultations with the 
parties in close cooperation with the OAU. In late 1987, 
a UN technical mission visited Western Sahara to gather 
data to assist the joint UN/OAU effort to find a peaceful 
settlement to the conflict. The Secretary-General1s
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mediation efforts gathered pace in 1988. Meanwhile, the 
climate became more propitious for a just and peaceful 
settlement of the conflict following the restoration of 
diplomatic relations by Morocco and Algeria in May 1988, 
ending a diplomatic freeze that began in March 1976 shortly 
after the outbreak of the war in Western Sahara.
After intensive consultations with the OAU, the 
parties to the conflict and the leaders of Algeria and 
Mauritania, a settlement plan designed to find a just and 
durable solution to the problem, jointly worked out by the 
UN and the OAU, was accepted by the parties. A special 
representative of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara 
was appointed with responsibility for the implementation of 
the settlement plan. A United Nations technical commission 
was established to facilitate and accelerate the process of 
the implementation of the settlement plan. Clarification 
of the arrangements and modalities for the implementation 
of this peace plan, which involves a ceasefire and a 
referendum, is being provided by the United Nations.424 It 
is to be hoped that with the necessary will on all sides, 
a final settlement of the problem will be achieved to which 
the Court's advisory opinion will undoubtedly have made an 
important contribution.425
424 Meanwhile, it seemed that Morocco was no longer 
opposed to direct negotiations with the Polisario Front. 
See The Times. Wednesday 4 January 1989, "Polisario Men Fly 
to Hassan Talks". On the progress made in respect of the 
solution of the problem of Western Sahara in recent years, 
see, e.g., Report of the Secretary-General. 1987, 2;
ibid., 1988, 2, and ibid., 1989, 2-3. See further, the 
Secretary-General's Report on the Question of Western 
Sahara, UN Doc. A/44/634 (1989).
425 See Janis, 620-1.
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While the denouement of the Western Sahara drama is 
being awaited, it is well to bear in mind the significance 
of the Court’s opinion to the development of customary 
international law, especially in the area of decolonisation 
and self-determination.426
(3c) The WHO Case427
As a result of the general hostility felt towards 
Egypt amongst Arab states after it concluded a peace 
treaty428 with Israel in 1979, a concerted campaign was 
mounted, which was designed to isolate Egypt diplomatically 
from the Arab world. This led to the proposal in the World 
Health Assembly of 1980 for the removal from Egypt of the 
Eastern Mediterranean headquarters of the WHO which was 
based in Alexandria and had operated on the basis of a
426 See Singh, 153-5 and 259? de Arechaga, "Work and 
Jurisprudence”, 5-6 and 31.
427 See ICJ Reports 1980, 67, 73. See also, The UN, 44? 
Singh, 433? Rosenne, The World Court. 207.
428 On the various initiatives which culminated in the 
signing of the Egypt-Israel peace treaty, all of which 
combine to provide the political background to the request 
for this advisory opinion, see inter alia. Keith Kyle, 
"President Sadat's Initiative”, 34 WT (1978), 1-4? 
Yehonnathan Tommer, "Mr Begin's Peace Plan: The Domestic 
Reaction", ibid., 77-9? A.I. Dawisha, "Syria and the Sadat 
Initiative", ibid., 192-8? L. L. Whetten, "Changing 
Perceptions about the Arab-Israeli Conflict and 
Settlement", ibid., 252-9? P. Mangold, "America, Israel 
and Middle East Peace: The Limits of Bilateral Influence", 
ibid., 458-66? Avi Plascov, "The Palestinian Predicament 
After Camp David", ibid., 467-71. On the peace treaty and 
its implications, see Patrick Seale, "The Egypt-Israel 
Treaty and its Implications", 35 ibid. (1979), 189-96? M. 
Akehurst, "The Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel", 7 
IR (1981), 1035-52. On continuing divisions in the Arab 
world in the aftermath of the treaty and this advisory 
opinion, see Mohammed Anis Salem, "Arab Schisms in the 
1980s: Old Story or New Order?", 38 WT (1982), 175-84.
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"host agreement" of 1951 between Egypt and the WHO. This 
proposal met with strong opposition, and in the end a 
compromise was reached on the basis of which an advisory 
opinion was to be requested on the following questions 
concerning the interpretation of the 1951 host agreement:
(i) Are the negotiations and notice provisions of 
s.37 of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the World 
Health Organisation and Egypt applicable in the event that 
either party to the Agreement wishes to have the regional 
office transferred from the territory of Egypt?
(ii) If so, what would be the legal responsibilities 
of the World Health Organisation and Egypt with regard to 
the Regional Office in Alexandria during the two-year 
period between notice and termination of the Agreement?429
The Court expressed the opinion that in the event 
of a transfer of the seat of the regional office to another 
country, the WHO and Egypt were under mutual obligations to 
consult together in good faith as to the conditions and 
modalities of a transfer, and to negotiate the various 
arrangements needed to effect the transfer with the minimum 
of prejudice to the work of the organisation and to the 
interest of Egypt. The party wishing to effect the
429 In these proceedings, the President decided that 
member states of the WHO who were also entitled to appear 
before the Court, and the Organisation itself, were likely 
to be able to furnish information on the question. 
Accordingly, the special and direct communication provided 
for in Article 66(2) of the Statute was addressed to those 
states and the WHO. Written statements were filed by the 
Director-General of the WHO and by Bolivia, Egypt, Iraq, 
Jordan, Kuwait, Syria, the United Arab Emirates and the 
United States. Oral statements were made by the WHO, 
Egypt, Syria, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates and the 
United States. See ICJ Reports 1980, 75.
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transfer had a duty despite the specific period of notice 
indicated in the 1951 Agreement to give a reasonable period 
of notice to the other party and during this period, the 
legal responsibilities of the WHO and of Egypt would be to 
fulfil in good faith their mutual obligations as set out 
above.430
On 18 May 1981 the World Health Assembly at its 34th 
session held in Geneva adopted by consensus a resolution431 
in which it accepted the opinion and recommended to all the 
parties concerned to be guided by it. The Resolution also 
requested the Director-General to initiate action as 
contained in the opinion and to report the results to the 
69th session of the Executive Board in January 1982 for 
consideration and recommendation to the 35th World Health 
Assembly in May 1982, and to continue to take whatever 
action he considered necessary to ensure the smooth 
operations of the technical, administrative and managerial 
programmes of the Regional Office for the Eastern 
Mediterranean Region during the period of consultation. 
The Resolution finally asked Egypt to hold consultations 
with the Director-General.432
In 1982 the Executive Board at its 69th Session and 
the 35th World Health Assembly, requested the Director- 
General and Egypt to continue their consultations in 
accordance with the advisory opinion. Meetings were held 
between the representatives of Egypt and of the Director-
430 See Rosenne, The World Court, ibid.
431 See WHA 34.11.
432 See ICJYB 1980-1, 139-40.
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General of WHO in March and November 1982. The 35th World 
Health Assembly also requested that a comprehensive study 
on the question be carried out. This study was presented 
to the 36th World Health Assembly in May 1983.433
The 36th World Health Assembly in Resolution WHA36.18 
thanked the Director-General for his report and asked him 
to continue the implementation of Resolution WHA 35.13 and 
to report to the 37th World Health Assembly on the action 
he had taken in respect thereof.434
The 37th World Health Assembly in Resolution WHA 37.20 
thanked the Director-General for his report and asked him 
to continue the implementation of Res. WHA35.13.435
The Court was well aware of the political background 
of the question submitted to it but decided to ignore it. 
It achieved this by deftly interpreting the questions it 
was required to answer and then proceeding to answer the 
questions purely as a matter of treaty interpretation, the 
treaty itself forming one of a whole series of host 
agreements, the workings of which should not be disturbed. 
In this way, the tense political situation which faced the 
World Health Assembly in 1980 became defused and the issue 
was dropped. This case affords a good example of the 
prophylactic use of the advisory procedure to depoliticise 
an awkward political situation confronting a technical
433 See 35th World Health Assembly, Geneva 3-24 May 
1982, "Resolutions and Decisions, Annexes", published by 
the World Health Organisation, WHO 35/1982/REC/l, 829 
(hereinafter "WHA Resolutions").
434 See 36th WHA Resolutions, 16.
435 See 37th WHA Resolutions, 12.
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specialised agency.436 The significance of this case lies 
in the contribution which it has made to the development of 
the law of treaties. It enabled the Court to contribute to 
a better understanding of the customary law created by the 
practice of states surrounding the host agreements 
concluded with international organisations. This area of 
law also formed the background the interpretation of the UN 
Headquarters Agreement Case.437
(1) Interpretation of the United Nations Headquarters 
Agreement438
In December 1987 the United States Congress enacted 
anti-terrorism legislation which declared illegal the 
establishment or maintenance of offices of the Palestine 
Liberation Organisation (PLO) within the United States, and 
required the closing of all such offices, including the 
office of its permanent observer mission to the United 
Nations in New York. This PLO office had been established 
in 19 7 4439 when the UN had granted the PLO observer status 
and had operated without objection from the government of 
the United States.440 The Attorney General indicated that 
as it was the justice department's duty to enforce United 
States statutory law, orders would be given for the
436 See Rosenne, The World Court. 207. See also Vol.39 
Yearbook of the United Nations (1985), 1308.
437 See Singh, 160-3 passim.
438 See ICJ Reports 1988, 12. See also, Singh, 435-6.
439 See GA Res. 3237 (XXIX) of 2 November 1974.
440 See Rosenne, The World Court. 226; R. Higgins, 
"Peace Lecture", 14.
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shutting of the PLO office. To this end, appropriate 
proceedings were initiated in the competent Federal Court 
of New York. In an extraordinary manifestation of a 
divided government, the State Department let it be known 
that it regretted the legislation and regarded it as
incompatible with the US's obligations under the 
Headquarters Agreement to allow persons to enter and remain 
in the United States to carry out their official functions 
in the UN, and the US delegation to the UN said in terms to 
that body that it had opposed the legislation in
question.441
The Secretary-General took the view that closure of
that office would be a violation of the Headquarters
Agreement between the United States and the United Nations 
of 26 June 1947. Eventually, he formally invoked Article 
21 of that Agreement regarding settlement of disputes not 
resolved by negotiation that envisages an international 
arbitration.442 The General Assembly adopted Resolution 
42/210 (b) calling upon the host country to abide by its 
treaty obligations. The United States found this 
inappropriate and untimely, especially as no immediate 
steps had in fact yet been taken to close the PLO office. 
But the call to proceed under s.21 of the Headquarters 
Agreement was supported by all America's allies. By 
resolution 42/229B of 2 March 1988 the General Assembly
441 See R. Higgins, "Peace Lecture", ibid.
442 The Headquarters Agreement contained a provision in 
s.21 that any dispute between the UN and the US concerning 
the invocation or application of the agreement should be 
resolved by negotiation within the framework of designated 
dispute settlement procedures.
499
requested an advisory opinon on the question whether the 
United States was "under an obligation to enter into 
arbitration” under the Headquarters Agreement.
The Court immediately assembled to consider the 
matter, and in a procedural order of 9 March decided that 
the United Nations and the United States of America were 
considered likely to be able to furnish information on the 
question in accordance with Article 66(2) of the Statute. 
The Court also decided that any other state party to the 
Statute which desired to do likewise might submit to the 
Court a written statement on the question.443 Written 
statements were later submitted by the Secretary-General 
and by the German Democratic Republic, Syria and the United 
States. An oral statement was made on behalf of the United 
Nations. By the same order, the Court decided for the 
first time to adopt an accelerated procedure as envisaged 
in Article 103 of the 1978 Rules. This order was unusual 
in so far as it did not only deal with purely procedural 
matters, but also called upon the United States to ensure 
that no action would be taken that would impinge on the 
current arrangements for the official functions of the PLO 
mission.444 Without referring to that aspect, the United 
States later informed the General Assembly that no further 
steps would be taken to close the office until US courts 
had determined whether the law in question required that
443 See ICJ Reports 1988, 14.
444 See Rosenne, ibid. This may be seen as a small but 
significant step in the direction of assimilating the 
advisory to the contentious procedure as regards interim 
orders of protection under Article 41 of the Court*s 
Statute.
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office to be closed. After accelerated written and oral 
proceedings, on 26 April, the Court was unanimous in 
anwering the question in the affirmative by finding that 
the United States was under such an obligation.
In Resolution 42/232 of 13 May 1988, the General 
Assembly among other things, expressed its appreciation to 
the Court for having accelerated its procedure, took note 
of and endorsed the advisory opinion and urged the host 
country to act consistently with it. The Assembly also 
requested the Secretary-General to continue his efforts to 
ensure the constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal provided 
for under s.21 of the Headquarters Agreement and to report 
without delay on developments in the matter. It finally 
decided to keep the matter under active review.445
The United States court subsequently determined that 
the law did not require the closing of the offices of the 
PLO observer mission to the United Nations if that meant a 
breach of the Headquarters Agreement.446 The conclusion of 
the district court stated, inter alia, that the anti­
terrorism act did not require closure of the PLO Permanent 
Observer Mission to the United Nations. Nor did its 
provisions impair the continued exercise of the appropriate 
functions of that mission as a permanent observer at the 
United Nations. The district court saw the PLO mission to 
the United Nations as an invitee of the United Nations 
whose status is protected by the Headquarters Agreement.
445 See ICJYB 1987-8, 154-6? Rosenne, The World Court.
ibid.
446 See Rosenne, The World Court, ibid. ? R. Higgins, 
"Peace Lecture”, 15.
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It considered that the Headquarters Agreement remained a 
valid and outstanding treaty obligation of the United 
States which had not been superseded by the anti-terrorism 
act, a valid enactment of general application.447
In a report to the General Assembly on the decision of 
the United States district judge, the Secretary-General 
referred to the United States' Department of Justice 
announcement of 29 August 1988 that the United States had 
decided not to appeal against the decision of the district 
court and concluded that the decision by the United States 
not to appeal was welcomed and that the dispute between the 
United Nations and its host country concerning the PLO 
observer mission had come to an end.448 This advisory 
opinion proved useful in helping to find an effective 
solution to the problem confronting the United Nations and 
the host state.
Ironically, it was yet another public arm of the US, 
the New York District Court, that facilitated a resolution 
of the matter. The United States district court might have 
been persuaded by the arguments of international law in 
reaching its decision. Similarly, the Justice Department, 
no doubt heavily urged by the State Department, decided not 
to appeal against the District Court's judgment.449
447 See ICJYB 1987-8, 156-7.
448 See ICJYB 1988-9, 168? R. Higgins, "Peace Lecture",
ibid.
449 See R. Higgins, "Peace Lecture", ibid.
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(m) The Mazilu Case450
In 1985, the Subcommission on the Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities,451 an organ of 
the Commission on Human Rights,452 a subsidiary organ of 
the ECOSOC, requested its special rapporteur, Mr. Dumitru 
Mazilu, a Romanian national, to prepare a report on human 
rights and youth. The Romanian authorities denied him 
permission to travel to the Centre for Human Rights of the 
UN Secretariat in Geneva for consultations. All efforts by 
the Centre for Human Rights to contact or locate him proved 
futile. When contacted by the Secretary-General *s office, 
the Romanian Government took the position that any 
intervention by the UN Secretariat and any form of 
investigation would be considered interference in Romania's 
internal affairs. Eventually, at the instance of the 
Subcommission, the Commission recommended that the ECOSOC 
request an advisory opinion from the Court. The ECOSOC, by 
resolution 1989/75 of 24 May 1989, concluded that a 
difference had arisen between the UN and Romania as to the 
applicability of the Convention on the Privileges and 
Immunities of the United Nations453 to Mr Mazilu, and 
requested on a priority basis an advisory opinion on the 
question of the applicability of Article VI, s.22 of the 
Convention in the case of Mr. Mazilu. Meanwhile, Mr Mazilu 
completed the report, which he transmitted to the Centre
450 See ICJ Reports 1989, 177.
451 Hereinafter "the Subcommisson".
452 Hereinafter "the Commission".
453 Hereinafter "the Convention".
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through various channels, as he could not travel to Geneva 
either to present it in person or to participate in its 
consideration.454
The Court noted that the question presented to it was 
a preliminary one relating to the applicability of the 
Convention in the case of Mr. Mazilu but not to the 
consequences of what privileges and immunities Mazilu might 
enjoy as a result of his status and whether or not these 
had been violated. The Court also took the view that the 
question was a legal question arising within the scope of 
the activities of the ECOSOC. The Court unanimously held 
that Article VI, s.22 of the Convention was applicable in 
the case of Mr. Mazilu.
454 The President decided that the UN and the states 
parties to the Convention were likely to be able to furnish 
information on the question in accordance with Article 
66(2) of the Statute. The registrar addressed a special 
and direct communication provided for in that Article to 
the UN and to these states. Written statements were 
submitted by Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, the 
Socialist Republic of Romania, and the United States. Oral 
statements were made on behalf of the Secretary-General of 
the UN and by the United States. Romania challenged the 
competence of the Court to give the advisory opinion by 
invoking its reservation to s.30 of the Convention, under 
which the UN could not without the consent of all the 
parties, submit a request for an advisory opinion in 
respect of differences between it and Romania. The Court 
found that since the request was not made under s.30 of the 
Convention, but under Article 96 of the UN Charter, it did 
not need to determine the effect of the Romanian 
reservation. The Court also rejected the Romanian 
contention that if it were accepted that disputes 
concerning the application or interpretation of the 
Convention could be brought before the Court on a basis 
other than s.30 of the Convention, that would disrupt the 
unity of the Convention by separating its substantive 
provisions from those relating to dispute settlement which 
would amount to a modification of the content and extent of 
the obligations entered into by states when they acceded to 
the Convention. The Court found that the Romanian 
reservation did not affect its jurisdiction to entertain 
the request.
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At the 14th plenary meeting of its 1990 session, held 
on 25 May 1990, the ECOSOC in Resolution 1990/43 welcomed 
with appreciation the Court's opinion455 which, under the 
Convention in question, is binding or decisive of the 
applicable law.
Barely a week after the delivery of this opinion, the 
government, whose action had necessitated the request for 
the opinion, was swept away in a bloody revolution.456 The 
country was administered by a transitional or caretaker 
government457 until May 1990, when the present regime 
assumed the reins of government as a result of free and 
fair elections.458 One would expect that the present 
Romanian government would behave differently from its 
predecessor by reacting favourably to the opinion. Such an 
attitude would not only help the positive international 
image which the new administration is seeking to build for 
itself, but it would also serve to underscore the dramatic 
political changes that have occurred in that country and in 
Eastern Europe at large. Above all, such an attitude would
455 See ICJYB 1989-90, 165-6. This was the first 
instance of the exercise by the ECOSOC of its rights to 
request advisory opinions.
456 See generally The Times. 23 December 1989; see also 
"Ceaucescus are tried and shot”, The Times. 26 December,
1989.
457 See "Communists named in Salvation Front 
Government", and "New Prime Minister defends immediate 
killing of Ceaucescu", The Times. 27 December 1989; "Hint 
of master plan for Romania uprising", The Times. 3 January
1990. For an interesting account of the immediate post­
revolution era, see M. Popham (ed.), The Best of From Our 
Own Correspondent 1989/90 (Bath: Broadside Books Ltd., 
1990), 30-32.
458 See George Fodor, "Romania: Why The Front Won", 46 
WT (1990), 125-6.
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reflect the changed international political climate brought 
about by the demise of the Cold War.459
This case has enabled the Court to contribute to the 
clarification and development of international law. First, 
the Court has held that the principle that the consent of 
states is not a condition precedent to its competence to 
give advisory opinions applied even when the request for an 
opinion relates to a legal question pending between the 
United Nations and a member state. Secondly, the fact that 
a state makes a reservation to a multilateral treaty or 
convention in order to avoid the Court's advisory 
jurisdiction does not prevent that jurisdiction from being 
engaged on any other basis, especially, Art.96 of the 
Charter. Although the Court did not find it necessary to 
determine the effect of the Romanian reservation, it is 
probably true that such a reservation460 would be held to 
be inapplicable by the Court because of the operation of 
the principle that the consent of states is not a condition 
precedent to its competence to give advisory opinions. If 
this is correct, then such reservations may not be as 
useful as they may seem at first sight.
459 We understand from the legal adviser of the UN in 
New York that immediately after the revolution Mazilu was 
allowed to leave Romania and resume his project and has 
been very much in evidence at the UN since that time. 
Although this is really attributable to the revolution 
rather than the advisory opinion, it is reasonable to 
assume that the advisory opinion will very much have 
focused the minds of the new government on the issues and 
facilitated the decision that they probably would have 
taken in any event.
460 A reservation by the terms of which the advisory 
jurisdiction can be engaged only with the consent of all 
the parties.
506
6. Conclusion
The effectiveness of advisory opinions is not 
infrequently thought to lie in their ability to help in 
finding speedy solutions to the difficulties which prompted 
consultation of the Court.461 Not only does this represent 
an unrealistic view of the function of advisory opinions 
which should not be expected to be as effective as 
judgments,462 but it is also an oversimplification of their 
impact, which has been complex and various. Although the 
advisory jurisdiction may be used for the peaceful 
settlement of disputes,463 its primary purpose is to give 
legal advice to the requesting organ or body.464 Besides, 
the Court is averse to the advisory jurisdiction being used 
indirectly to settle disputes between states.465 At any 
rate, advisory opinions do not purport to resolve problems 
but to put the responsible organs in the best shape to deal 
with such problems.466
461 See Pratap, 247? see generally, Lenefsky, "Advisory 
Opinions", 525-45? id., "Jurisprudence", 31-71.
462 The fact that The Corfu Channel Case (Compensation) , 
ICJ Reports 1949, 244 and the Nicaragua v. United States of 
America Case (Merits), ICJ Reports 1986, 14 to date remain 
without effect, shows that noncompliance is not confined to 
advisory opinions. See Keith, 210 and 220? Rosenne, The 
World Court. 106? id., The ICJ. 492.
463 Cf. Rosenne, The ICJ. 496 and 497-8.
464 See Singh, 26.
465 See ICJ Reports 1971, 24, para. 32? ibid. 1975, 20 
and 21, paras.20 and 23. See also, Anand, Compulsory 
Jurisdiction. 268? Rosenne, The ICJ. 462, n.l and 496.
466 Cf. the view that evaluation of the advisory 
procedure depends essentially upon whether it has 
facilitated the solution of legal questions which have 
faced states. See Rosenne, The ICJ. 496.
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Nevertheless, in some cases, advisory opinions have 
helped in finding solutions to problems confronting the 
United Nations and the specialised agencies.467 In others, 
they have assisted in deflecting tension into peaceful 
channels and thus enabled constructive diplomacy to 
operate. Where they have not been seen to contribute 
positively to the solution of the root problems, this has 
not been because the opinions are defective, or because the 
Court has misused its discretion by rendering an opinion on 
a political question,468 but rather, because some 
interested states have withheld their cooperation in the 
implementation of such opinions.469 However, the immediate 
practical effect of the opinion is a political470 rather 
than a legal matter. As regards the long term (or broad) 
impact of the opinion, it is the latter which counts.
In this connection, it may be noted that the advisory 
procedure has sometimes been useful in adopting 
authoritative answers to legal questions of general
467 Examples may be seen in the advisory opinions in the 
Reparations. Reservations. IMCO and WHO Cases, as well as 
those concerning the review of the judgments of the UN and 
ILO administrative tribunals. See Pomerance, 364? 
Lenefsky, "Jurisprudence", 53, n.135; id., "Advisory 
Opinions", 542-3.
468 It would seem that those who accuse the Court of 
exercising its advisory jurisdiction in political cases 
often ignore the quasi-political nature of the Court as the 
judicial arm of the UN in whose activities it is bound to 
participate. See e.g. ICJ Reports: 1950, 71; 1951, 19;
1971, 27, para.41? 1975, 21 and 24, paras.23 and 31; and
1989, 188-9, para.31. See further, Byman, 116? Janis,
619-21. Anyhow, the determination of the appropriateness 
of requests is primarily the responsibility of the
requesting organs or bodies. See Pomerance, 377.
469 See Rosenne, The ICJ. 495
470 See Pomerance, 373.
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international concern. Illustrations can be seen in the 
questions about the capacity of the UN to advance 
international claims in respect of damages it has suffered? 
about the effect of objections to reservations to 
multilateral conventions? about the binding character of 
awards rendered by the administrative tribunals? about the 
legal obligations arising under Security Council decisions 
relating to Namibia? about the site of the Eastern 
Mediterranean regional office of the WHO in a situation of 
tension in the Middle East? and about the legal basis of 
UN peacekeeping activities which were not foreseen by the 
framers of the UN Charter.471 The various advisory 
opinions concerning South West Africa and Namibia provided 
the legal framework within which that territory eventually 
attained its independence under the auspices of the UN. In 
its quest for a solution to the problem of Western Sahara, 
the UN has been guided by the advisory opinion concerning 
that territory. In this sense, advisory opinions have made 
a substantial contribution to the clarification and 
development of relevant international law. They have 
earned a place in the jurisprudence and are received and 
expounded in the doctrine.472 In this respect also, it may 
be observed that in terms of their effect on third parties, 
advisory opinions are hardly distinguishable from 
judgments. Advisory opinions have also been largely 
successful in putting the requesting organs or bodies in
471 See Rosenne, The World Court. 106? id., The ICJ.
496.
472 See Gross, "The ICJ and the UN”, 419-20? Lenefsky, 
"Advisory Opinions", 525.
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the best position to handle problems which arise in the 
course of their activities. That the advisory function, 
whose introduction into the international judicial system 
was greeted with much opposition has proved an unqualified 
success is borne out by the ever increasing demands for its 
expansion and greater use.473
473 See Singh, 26 and 97-8. Also, see generally, L. 
Gross, "The International Court of Justice: Consideration
of Requirements for Enhancing its Role in the International 
Legal Order”, 65 AJIL (1971), 253-326; Crilly, 215-21;
Schwebel, "Advisory Jurisdiction”, 335-61; id.,
"Authorising the Secretary General, 519-29; Szasz, 499- 
533; L.B. Sohn, "Broadening the Advisory Jurisdiction of 
the International Court of Justice”, 77 AJIL (1983) 124-9. 
Cf. Pomerance, 378-80.
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CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
The protection which Article 59 of the Statute 
provides for third parties is a general, formal and 
technical one. It applies to the res judicata effect of 
the decision, but not to the place of the judgment in the 
Court's jurisprudence or indeed, its contribution to the 
development and clarification of international law. This 
latter role of judicial decisions is sanctioned by Article 
38(1)(d) of the Statute, under whose terms they are a 
source of international law. This general protection is 
imperfect and deceptive.
Consequently, the Statute has provided more specific 
safeguards in the form of intervention, of which there are 
two kinds. First, under Article 62 a state which considers 
that its legal interest may be affected by the decision in 
a case may request to be permitted to intervene therein. 
The decision on such a request rests with the Court.
The "interest of a legal nature" must relate to a 
legal interest of its own directly in issue as between it 
and either or both parties to a case. In the doctrine an 
"interest of a legal nature" has been variously described 
as a special interest, a legitimate, relevant and genuine 
interest. It does not include interests of a purely 
political, economic or sociological nature. Neither must 
it be of a remote or hypothetical character. It is thought 
to exclude the interpretation of domestic law and the 
recovery of alleged damages or the specific performance of
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economic obligations. A state which can show that it has 
a specific legal interest which it considers to be 
genuinely threatened or likely to be indirectly affected by 
the reasoning on which the conclusions and the decision of 
the Court are based ought to be permitted to intervene. 
The interest of a legal nature required for discretionary 
intervention is weaker than that required when the Court is 
seised of a substantive dispute.
Article 59 deals with the "binding force" of the 
Court’s decision. It refers to the operative provisions of 
the judgment which carry binding force. The decision 
creates particular rules for the parties by conferring 
rights or imposing obligations on them alone. As regards 
third parties, such a decision is res inter alios acta. 
Thus, Article 59 cannot protect the interests of third 
parties from being affected by the reasoning in the 
judgment. It does not protect third parties from the 
effect of the natural operation of the persuasive force of 
judicial precedents. It does not protect third parties 
from the consequences that flow from the status of the 
Court's judgments as authoritative holdings of 
international law. It does not discharge third parties 
from the general obligation of every state and member of 
the United Nations to respect the Court's judgments.
Article 62 deals with intervention by a third state to 
protect its legal interests from being affected by the 
decision in a case. The Court's view that the rights of a 
third state would be safeguarded by Article 59 can give 
little comfort to such a state, especially where a right
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eraa omnes is at issue in the principal case. Nor can the 
fears of such a state be allayed by mere assurances from 
the Court, as it sought to give in the Maltese and Italian 
Intervention Cases. that it would, proorio motu. in its 
future judgment, act through its pronouncements to protect 
the state*s interests. The view that a third state may 
choose either to intervene under Article 62, or to rely on 
the protection afforded by Article 59 is flawed for a 
number of reasons. First, it is clear that the object of 
Article 62 is not the securing of procedural economy of 
means. To so maintain is to transform a potentially 
effective third party remedy into an improbable procedural 
convenience. Secondly, such a view leaves Article 62 
without any sphere of application, and therefore, renders 
it pointless. This could not have been intended, because 
Article 62 is just as much a part of the Statute as Article 
59. Thirdly, it seems to imply that these provisions are 
mutually exclusive rather than complementary. The 
protection which Article 59 provides for third states is 
automatic but imperfect and very limited, covering as it 
does only the binding force of the decision. Even if the 
term "decision” in Article 62 is taken to carry the same 
meaning as it is generally believed to have in Article 59, 
that is, the dispositif of the judgment, the meaning of the 
expression "affected by the decision in a case” cannot be 
"to be subject to the binding force of the decision in a 
case” in the sense of the latter provision. Therefore, if 
Article 59 ensures that the rights of a third state can 
never be affected by a judgment, this must mean that they
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can never be affected in the sense of Article 62. In other 
words, the expression "may be affected by the decision in 
a case” in Article 62 does not mean "may be subject to the 
binding force of the decision in a case” within the meaning 
of Article 59. We submit that third parties may be 
affected by the decision in a case without being bound in 
the sense of Article 59. Therefore, if a third party is 
able to prove that besides the general interest which it 
shares with all other states in the development of 
international law, it has a specific legal interest which 
may be affected by the decision in a pending case, it 
should be allowed to intervene under the terms of Article 
62.
The Court has taken a narrow view of the discretion 
conferred on it by the Statute and would exclude 
considerations of policy from the exercise of its 
discretion in this respect. However, it is difficult to 
see how the Court, in exercising such discretion, can 
disregard underlying judicial policies and principles of 
the administration of justice like considerations of 
judicial propriety, the need to avoid a cascade of 
interventions, the sovereign equality of states before the 
law, fair play and the economy of international justice, 
due process, as well as the need to win and maintain the 
confidence of states. Moreover, the Court cannot exercise 
its discretion without taking the conflicting policies on 
intervention into account.
In deciding on requests for intervention the Court 
also considers such other factors as the limits of its
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jurisdiction under the Special Agreement submitting the 
principal case for decision, the claims and submissions of 
the original parties and of other states, as well as the 
actual motives of the state seeking to intervene. It also 
bears in mind the effects of intervention on the original 
parties. The Court has, however, stated that the 
opposition of the original parties to an intervention 
request is, though very important, no more than one element 
to be taken into account.
That the Court's discretion is much broader than the 
Court is willing to admit is borne out by the requirements 
for discretionary intervention embodied in Article 81(2) of 
the 1978 Rules. Besides the condition relating to an 
interest of a legal nature the other requirements therein 
specified are not expressly prescribed by the Statute. The 
Rules constitute the Court's interpretation of the Statute 
as guided by judicial policy, a task the accomplishment of 
which entails the exercise of a large measure of 
discretion. The same discretion is involved in the 
application of Article 62 and the relevant Rules to 
concrete cases.
Read and interpreted in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning of its text, Article 62(1) does not appear to be as 
narrow as the Court makes out. It does not provide that if 
all the conditions therein specified are fulfilled, the 
intervention request must be granted. The Court's power to 
decide whether the conditions are satisfied or not, coupled 
with its power to interpret such concepts as "interest of 
a legal nature", "may be affected", "proper purpose" etc.,
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imply the exercise of a wide measure of discretion.
The Court determines the admissibility of an 
intervention by reference to the definition of the interest 
of a legal nature and the object of the intervention. They 
would presumably enable the Court to assure itself how far 
the purpose of the intervention is indeed the protection of 
legal rights which may be affected by the decision and how 
far this purpose might be involved. Furthermore, the 
precise object of the intervention would also enable the 
Court to consider what the state seeking to intervene 
intends to ask it to do about its legal interests which it 
apprehends may be affected by the decision. The Court's 
rejection of the jurisdictional requirement contained in 
the rules as an essential condition for intervention has 
gone a long way towards clarifying the law on intervention.
If a third state requests the Court to take account of
its rights in a judgment so as to ensure that they are not
adversely affected, the intervention which it seeks would 
be regarded as that contemplated by Article 62. However, 
the view that discretionary intervention was meant to have 
a much wider scope is supported by the travaux
preoaratoires of the Statute and Rules of the Permanent 
Court, some provisions of Article 38 of the Statute and 
some individual opinions appended to the Maltese, Italian 
and Nicaraguan intervention judgments.
It is clear from the jurisprudence and doctrine that 
a third state need not prove the existence of a
jurisdictional link with the original parties in order for 
its intervention request to be granted. However, where a
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state is seeking to intervene as a party, it must be 
required to demonstrate its jurisdictional links with the
original parties. Thus, the discretion vested in the Court
is sufficient to enable it to fashion the form or types of 
discretionary intervention most appropriate to the
conflicting demands of international adjudication.
Article 63 of the Statute confers a right of 
intervention on states whenever the construction of a 
convention to which they are party is an issue in a case 
before the Court. The ultimate decision on the
admissibility of a declaration of intervention rests solely 
with the Court which decides whether the conditions have 
been fulfilled in each particular case. The control which 
the Court exercises over proceedings concerning this kind 
of intervention has always been formally recognised by the 
Rules. This control was also graphically illustrated in 
the Hava de la Torre Case. The discretion which the Court 
exercises with regard to intervention under Article 63 
means that in spite of the wording of this provision, the 
right to intervene is, in practice, not unqualified.
The practice regarding the sending of the notification 
under Article 63(1) has always been somewhat confused, and 
in doubtful cases, no notification is sent. The state 
concerned is, however, informed in a manner suggesting that 
it might file a declaration of intervention whose fate 
would have to be determined by the Court. There has always 
been a preference for the cautious as against the bold 
approach. Any state to which the notification is sent is 
invited to consider exercising its statutory right of
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intervention. Receipt of the notification may also be 
regarded as a prima facie indication that the recipient 
might be entitled to intervene. Since 1936 the Rules have 
provided that a state which considers itself a party to the 
convention whose construction is in question, to which the 
statutory notification has not been sent, may, nonetheless, 
file a declaration of intervention. This Rule enables the 
court to remedy any oversight which might inadvertently 
have been committed by the registrar.
The 1978 Rules have changed the character of the 
sending of the statutory notification from an apparently 
administrative function to a judicial one. This might lead 
states which receive the statutory notification into 
believing their chances of being permitted to intervene to 
be very high, while those to which the notification has not 
been sent might rate their chances of being allowed to 
intervene to be very low and therefore might feel 
discouraged from seeking to intervene. This change 
notwithstanding, it remains a procedural requirement for 
alerting states to their right of intervention under 
Article 63 and does not and cannot in any way prejudge the 
admissibility or rejection of any declaration of 
intervention which may subsequently be filed with the 
Court. The practice of the Court has been to send the 
statutory notification during the preliminary objection 
phase of cases. There is nothing in either the text of 
Article 63 of the Statute itself, its preparatory work, or 
the Rules, to suggest that the sending of this notification 
is restricted to the merits phase of the proceedings. The
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sending of the notification is to be distinguished from the 
determination of the admissibility of the declaration of 
intervention, which is purely a judicial task. If this 
distinction is obliterated, receipt of the notification 
would be erroneously interpreted as an invitation to 
exercise an absolute right to intervene. The Court would 
also cease to exercise any discretion in respect of the 
admissibility of declarations of intervention.
A related issue is the timing of the filing of the 
declaration of intervention. This may be done after the 
statutory notification has been sent, but before the 
commencement of oral proceedings. In exceptional
circumstances, a declaration submitted later than this 
would be admitted. The "exceptional circumstances” rule 
ought to apply where a convention falls to be construed at 
a later stage of the proceedings and in the case of a third 
state which has not received the statutory notification. 
In this connection, it is necessary to strike a balance 
between the need to enable third states to exercise their 
statutory right to intervention and the need for a speedy 
and efficient administration of justice.
Article 63 refers to such multilateral conventions as 
the General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International 
Disputes, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
of the Crime of Genocide, the Charter of the United Nations 
and the Statute of the International Court. By an 
administrative decision taken early in his history, the 
registrar does not notify states when the Charter is cited 
in proceedings before the Court, the notification of the
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institution of proceedings under Article 40(3) of the
Statute being considered sufficient in this respect. This
is another example of the Court's restrictive attitude 
towards the institution of intervention. The two 
notifications are, however, meant to serve different 
purposes. We do not understand why intervention as of 
right should not be applicable in the case of the
construction of the Statute. As to the timing of the
sending of the notification under Article 63(1) , we believe 
that at whatever stage in the proceedings in a case it 
becomes clear that the prescribed conditions are satisfied, 
the states concerned must be notified within a reasonable 
time, having regard to the object of the institution of 
intervention, the circumstances of the case, and the speedy 
and efficient administration of justice.
In theory, the original parties will be bound by the 
operative provisions of the judgment. The third state 
which intervenes under the terms of Article 63 will only be 
bound by the construction of the convention given by the 
judgment and in future litigation relating to the 
application of that instrument. In practice, because of 
the value of judicial decisions both as precedents and an 
auxiliary source of law, the Court is not likely to 
disregard the construction which it placed on the 
convention in an earlier case should the same convention 
fall to be interpreted in a future litigation involving 
different parties. In principle, Article 59 seems to 
restrict the binding force of the operative portions of the 
judgment to the parties. Article 63(2) seeks to limit the
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effect of the interpretation of the convention given by the 
judgment to the parties and the intervening state. It 
would therefore seem that a state which intervenes under 
the terms of Article 63 is not a party within the meaning 
of Article 59 of the Statute. A significance of Article 
63(2) which should not be overlooked is that it furnishes 
the strongest indication yet that parts of the judgment 
other than the decision can be binding upon states. It has 
been argued on the strength of the preparatory work of the 
Statute that Article 59 complements Article 63(2) by 
stating directly what the latter provision indirectly 
expresses. Another view, also based on the preparatory 
work, holds that Article 59 states directly what Article 63 
indirectly admits. Though the Court refused to admit El 
Salvador's Declaration of Intervention in the jurisdiction 
and admissibility phase of the Nicaragua/United States 
Case, it does not seem that such intervention is barred by 
the text of the Statute and Rules. While we subscribe to 
the view that intervention as of right should be extended 
to cover the construction of declarations under the 
optional clause of the Statute, we suggest the possibility 
of seeking discretionary intervention in such 
circumstances.
In exercising its advisory jurisdiction, the Court has 
been concerned to protect its character as a judicial body, 
as well as to emphasise the judicial character of the 
advisory function itself. This has been accomplished 
largely through the assimilation of the advisory procedure 
to that followed in contentious cases. As a result of the
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judicial procedure followed in performing the advisory 
function, the opinions rendered are endowed with the 
authority appropriate to the status of the Court as the 
world's supreme judicial body.
In theory, advisory opinions lack the binding force 
attaching to judgments, except in the case of the so-called 
compulsive opinions, opinions relating to the review of 
administrative tribunal judgments, those opinions which are 
binding in a negative sense and opinions which for one 
reason or another are binding on the parties immediately 
concerned. In practice, given the authoritative character 
of advisory opinions, their value both as precedents and as 
a source of international law, they are considered to have 
the same legal effect as judgments of the Court.
In conclusion, we should like to make some brief 
suggestions which would help to clarify the law relating to 
the various devices enshrined in the Statute to safeguard 
the rights and interests of third parties and to render 
such protective remedies more effective and attractive. 
The present state of affairs in which public international 
organisations have only limited procedural capacity, and 
non-governmental international organisations and 
individuals have no locus standi before the International 
Court is unsatisfactory. In view of the fact that so much 
of contemporary international law concerns such 
organisations and individuals, perhaps the time has come
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for Article 34 of the Statute to be amended1 in order to 
make them full subjects of international law.
The forms of intervention for which the Statute 
provides should be made more widely available in order to 
increase their potential and extend the basis of 
international adjudication. In this connection, Article 63 
might be revised so as to make possible intervention by an 
international organisation when the construction of its 
constituent instrument or an international convention 
adopted thereunder is involved in a case. It is suggested 
that the idea of extending intervention as of right to 
cover declarations made under the Optional Clause of the 
Statute be considered in the event of the revision of 
Article 63, if this cannot be done through a modification 
of the Rules and practice of the Court.
Article 62 should also be amended to enable public and 
non-governmental international organisations and 
individuals to intervene in most other situations. While 
the Court could still define more precisely the nature, 
scope and effect of Article 62, by clarifying its ambiguous 
phraseology, through modification of its Rules or practice, 
nevertheless, we suggest that this matter could also form 
the subject of an amendment of this provision.
Third states and third persons2 may be permitted to
1 On the procedure for amending the Statute, see 
Articles 69-70 of the Statute. See also E. Schwelb, "The 
Process of Amending the Statute of the International Court 
of Justice”, 64 AJIL (1970), 880-91.
2 The term "third person" is meant to include human 
persons, juridical persons such as corporations and other 
entities recognised under domestic law, as well as public
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intervene as amici curiae in both contentious and advisory 
proceedings. This would, no doubt, not only call for a 
change of attitude by the Court, but also necessitate a 
modification of the Statute in favour of an extension of 
the role of the Court in international adjudication. 
Considering the Court*s tendency towards a narrow 
interpretation of third party participation in pending 
litigation, the Court may well find this suggestion 
unacceptable. Nevertheless, its merits cannot be over­
emphasised. For instance, the real party in interest, the 
"interested" employee of the international organisation, 
the international corporation whose right to do business is 
under assault and the alien denied equality of treatment, 
may be afforded an opportunity to make statements and 
observations in proceedings before the Court. The 
employees of certain international organisations may be 
afforded an opportunity to present their views to the Court 
in disputes with their employing agencies. A multinational 
corporation might be allowed to intervene to protect its 
interests in circumstances such as those in Barcelona 
Traction Case (Merits)3 where no willing state was found 
competent to represent the shareholders* interests.
The inadequacy of the protection afforded for third 
party interests by the relative effect of judicial 
decisions is borne out by the availability of the shield of 
intervention which is not subject to the constraints of the
and non-governmental international organisations.
3 See ICJ Reports 1970, 4.
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consensualism that underlies the Court's jurisdiction. 
Although the possibility of using intervention as a sword 
remains open, it may be so employed subject to normal 
jurisdictional requirements. Ultimately, the effectiveness 
of the various third party safeguards lies both in a 
liberal interpretation of the conditions governing their 
operation and in full participation by interested parties 
in contentious and advisory proceedings.
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